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ABSTRACT 
The goal of this dissertation is two-fold. It is, first, to reconstruct Kant's argument 
against self-murder, and , second , to analyze the function of the principle of self-
preservation of reason with regard to the proh ibition of self-murder. I argue that 
self-murder is contrary to the principle of self-preservation of reason and violates 
the trustee-relationship between the homo phaenomenon and the homo 
noumenon. The analysis shows that moral self-preservation in Kant is a rational 
principle wh ich serves to secure the possibility of moral faith and self-perfection . 
In the first part of the dissertation , I provide a comprehensive analysis of 
Kant's argument against self-murder by examining all of the relevant statements 
in his works , the Nach/a/3 , as well as the lectures recorded by Herder, Powalski , 
Collins, and Vigilantius. Since self-murder violates a perfect duty to oneself, key-
topics of the analysis are: the dual status of the duty of self-preservation as both 
inner duty of right and duty of virtue , the right and end of humanity, as well as 
Kant's model of self-possession in terms of proprietas. The analysis makes clear 
iv 
that self-murder destroys the moral self and must be distinguished from 
sacrificing one's life in order to preserve one's moral integrity. 
In the second part of the dissertation, I interpret the duty of self-
preservation and the prohibition of self-murder in the context of Kant's doctrine of 
the fa ith of reason ("Vernunftglaube") and the principle of self-preservation of 
reason. I first provide an overview of the debate on self-preservation and its 
implications for an understanding of modern rationality and summarize the 
different meanings of (self)-preservation in Kant. I then argue that the "principle 
of self-preservation of reason" consists in what Kant calls "the maxim of healthy 
reason" and that it grounds the faith and the unity of reason. Against the 
background of this analysis, I interpret the trustee-relationship between the homo 
phaenomenon and the homo noumenon as a model of moral self-obligation . 
Entrusting the homo phaenomenon to the homo noumenon, I contend , means to 
entrust life to practical reason and to subject oneself to the moral law. 
v 
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NOTES ON QUOTATIONS AND LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
Unless otherwise indicated, Kant's works , lectures, and the Nachlaf3 are quoted 
from Kant's gesammelte Schriften, herausgegeben von der Koniglich 
Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften . Berlin: Georg Reimer, 1910-. 
The print of quotations in German adheres to the print of the original 
sources: Letter spacing or bold print will be rendered as such; Latin and Greek 
terms are only printed in italics if the original text indicates a special printing . 
Only in rare cases did I indicate uncommon or mistaken spellings with "[sic]." 
References to translations are to the last name(s) of the translator(s) 
followed or preceded by the reference to the Academy Edition . Whenever I have 
changed a translation , I have indicated it in the text. If no translator is listed, the 
translation is mine. 
The following list of abbreviations represents the works of Kant frequently 
used in this dissertation. All other references to Kant's gesammelte Schriften 
include the full title, followed by volume number, number of the letter or of the 
Reflexion (if applicable) and page number. 
A pH: Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht, val. 7. 
GMS: Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten, val. 4. 
KpV: Kritik der praktischen Vemunft, val. 5. 
KrV: Kritik der reinen Vemunft, 1976 reprint of Schmidt's edition by Felix 
Meiner. 
KU: Kritik der Urteilskraft, val. 5. 
MC: Moralphilosophie Collins, val. 27.1. 
MM: Moral Mrongovius, val. 27.2.2. 
viii 
MS: Metaphysik der Sitten, vol. 6. 
MSV: Metaphysik der Sitten Vigilantius , vol. 27.2.1. 
PPH: Praktische Philosophie Herder, vol. 27.1. 
PPP: Praktische Philosophie Powalski, vol. 27.1 . 
RGV: Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blol3en Vemunft, vol. 6. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Scope and Purpose 
The goal of this dissertation is two-fold . It is , first, to reconstruct Kant's argument 
against self-murder, and , second , to analyze the function of the principle of self-
preservation of reason with regard to the prohibition of self-murder. I will argue 
that self-murder is contrary to the principle of self-preservation of reason and 
violates the trustee-relationship between the homo phaenomenon and the homo 
noumenon. The analysis will show that moral self-preservation in Kant is a 
rational principle which serves to secure the possibility of moral belief and self-
perfection . 
The division of the dissertation into two main parts corresponds to the two 
goals outlined above. 
In the first part I am concerned with the analysis and reconstruction of 
Kant's argument against self-murder. Self-murder is not only, to use the words of 
Gerhard Lehmann, one of the editors of the Academy Edition , "the most 
frequently discussed topic,"1 but it is also a "central topic of Kant's ethics."2 It 
comes, therefore , as a surprise that there exist only three publications which are 
exclusively devoted to the discussion of suicide in Kant: H. J. de Vleeschauwer's 
article "La Doctrine du Suicide dans L'Ethique de Kant"3, Georg Rompp's article 
1Gerhard Lehmann, Kants Tugenden. Neue Beitrage zur Geschichte und Interpretation der 
Philosophie Kants (Berlin : Walter de Gruyter, 1980.}, p. 75: "Der Selbstmord (autochiria [footnote 
follows]) bzw. das Verbot des Selbstmordes ist zweifellos das am meisten behandelte Thema und 
tritt wahl in allen AuP..erungen Kants zur praktischen Philosophie und Anthropolog ie auf, nicht 
zuletzt im Zusammenhang mit der Antike." 
2Erlauterungen, Praktische Philosoph ie Herder in val. 27.2,2 of the Academy Edition, page 1077 
(footnote to page 30 line 20ff of the lecture): "Der Selbstmord ist ein Zentralthema der Ethik 
Kants." 
3H. J. de Vleeschauwer, "La Doctrine du Suicide dans L'Ethique de Kant," Kant-Studien 57 
"Der unfreie Tod . Kant und die ethische Dimension des Suizids,"4 and 
Vorbereitungen eines Unglilcklichen zum freywil/igen Tode , written by an 
anonymous author--a contemporary of Kant--and published by Kant's publisher 
Friedrich Nicolovius in 1800.5 De Vleeschauwer mentions this work in his article 
but adds that he had no luck finding it: "II ne m'a pas encore ete donne de 
depister un exemplaire de cette perle rare et je me recommande chaudement 
aux bons offices de mes lecteurs ace sujet."6 During my research , I was able to 
locate the book and to obtain a copy of the work.? 
2 
In addition to these two works there exist two comparative studies: David 
Novak's Suicide and Morality. The Theories of Plato, Aquinas and Kant and their 
Relevance for Suicidology a and Michael Seidler's "Kant and the Stoics on 
(1966) : 251-265. Since de Vleeschauwer does not take all of Kant's references to self-murder 
into account, it might explain why he states, first, that suicide in Kant's eyes does not constitute 
"un probleme majeur de Ia ph ilosophie" (page 254) , second , that the topic is not discussed in his 
precritical writings ("!'absence totale du suicide dans sa production litteraire de Ia periode 
precritique;" p.252), and, th ird , that it is impossible to detect the slightest personal interest of Kant 
in suicide ("Decidement, il est impossible de decouvrir le moindre rapport ou le moindre interet 
personnel entre Kant et le suicide, dans l'ordre vital comme dans l'ordre de Ia pensee." Ibid .). My 
analysis shows that all of the three points have to be corrected or qualified. 
4Georg Rompp's article "Der unfreie Tad. Kant und die ethische Dimension des Su izids," 
Freiburger Zeitschrift far Philosophie und Theologie 35 ( 1988) : 415-431 , can be read as a 
negative answer to the question of the anonymous author of the Vorbereitungen quoted in 
footnote no. 7. 
svorbereitungen eines Ung/Ocklichen zum freywi/ligen Tode , ed ited by Bernhard Georg , 
(Konigsberg : Friedrich Nicolovius, 1800). 
6oe Vleeschauwer 264f mistakenly refers to the publisher Bernhard Georg as the author. 
7 The author who professes to be a Kantian sets out to answer the question whether or not the 
"freely chosen death is permissible" (Vorbereitungen , p. 27: "I st [sic] m i r de r frey w i II i g e 
T o d e r I a u b t ?") . He believes that Kant's argument against self-murder is not convincing (he 
refers only to the examples discussed in the Groundwork) and that Kant's conception of moral ity 
allows for suicide in specific cases. Since morality is the final end or purpose of a human being , 
he argues that the moral law allows for suicide in cases where one's physical existence does not 
allow one to live a morall ife .(lbid . 48: "Der freywillige Tad ist demnach der Person , deren 
Organisation jede Moglichkeit des Gebrauchs derselben zum sittl ichen Zwecke ausschl ier..t, 
erlaubt. Der Tad selbst ist objektiv r e c h t .") . 
8David Novak, Suicide and Morality. The Theories of Plato, Aquinas and Kant and their Relevance 
for Suicidology (New York: Scholars Studies Press Inc. , 1975). 
Suicide."9 We also find many brief discussions of Kant's position on self-murder 
in the literature on the categorical imperative,1o Kant's doctrine of duties to 
oneself,11 as well as in the literature on the ethical aspects of suicide,. 12 on 
suicide in general,.13 and on medical ethics.1 4 
Since my goal in this dissertation is to offer an immanent interpretation of 
Kant's view of self-murder, I refrain from discussing the implications of Kant's 
view of suicide for medical ethics. I would, however, like to point out that, 
because Kant's concept of autonomy excludes the permissibility of suicide, any 
argument which is aimed at proving the legal or moral permissibility or even the 
right to commit suicide cannot be based on Kant's concept of autonomy or 
freedom. 15 
3 
In order to create a context for my analysis, I turn in the second part of the 
dissertation to the discussion of the topic of self-preservation and its implications 
for an understanding of modern rationality which has been conducted by Max 
Horkheimer, Robert Spaemann, Dieter Henrich, Hans Blumenberg, Manfred 
9Michael Seidler, "Kant and the Stoics on Suicide," Journal of the History of Ideas 44 (1983): 429-
453. 
10See for example: Paton, H. J. Paton, The Categorical Imperative. A Study in Kant's Moral 
Philosophy (New York: Harper & Row, 1967); Leo Henri Wilde, Hypothetische und kategorische 
Imperative (Bonn: Bouvier Verlag , 1975). 
11 See for example Duran Casas , Vicente, Die Pflichten gegen sich selbst in Kants "Metaphysik 
der Sitten " (Frankfurt am Main; Berlin ; Bern; New York; Paris; Wien : Peter Lang , 1995); Mary 
Gregor, Laws of Freedom. A Study of Kant's Method of Applying the Categorical Imperative in the 
'Metaphysik der Sitten ' (New York: Barnes & Noble, Inc., 1963). 
12See for example: Margaret Pabst Battin, Ethical Issues in Suicide (Englewood Cliffs, New 
Jersey: Prentice Hall , 1995). 
13See for example: Rudolf Hirzel , Der Selbstmord (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche 
Buchgesellschaft: 1966). 
14See for example: Leon R. Kass, "Is There a Right to Die," in Contemporary Issues in Bioethics, 
ed. Tom L. Beauchamp and LeRoy Walters (Belmont, California: Wadsworth Publishing 
Company, 1994), pp. 371-380; S. H. Furness, "Medical Ethics, Kant and Mortality ," in Principles of 
Health Care Ethics, ed. Raanan Gillon (John Wiley & Sons Ltd) , pp. 159-171 . 
15My findings can be used to support Leon Kass who states on page 378 that "it is a heavy irony 
that it should be autonomy, the moral notion that the world owes mainly to Kant, that is now 
invoked as the justifying ground of a right to die." 
4 
Sommer and Hans Ebeling.16 All of these philosophers stress the importance of 
self-preservation for an understanding of modern rationality. They differ, 
however, in their view regarding the interpretation of the origin of the specific 
modern understanding of self-preservation as well as the meaning of the term 
itself. A collection of essays on the topic of self-preservation edited by Hans 
Ebeling, is presented in the book Subjektivitat und Se/bsterhaltung ("Subjectivity 
and Self-preservation").17 Of particular importance for my own research are 
Ebeling's and Sommer's work's. Ebeling develops his theory of subjectivity with 
reference to Kant' prohibitions of self-murder and lying and points out that the 
preservation of the subject is always directed towards its perfection; whereas 
Sommer understands Kant's entire philosophy as a philosophy of self-
preservation and, contrary to Ebeling, argues that self-perfection is a dangerous 
goal. I will argue that the two positions can be reconciled. With regard to the 
question whether the function of reason in Kant is to ensure that we "live," "live 
well," or "live better,"18 our analysis will suggest that it comprises all of the three 
elements. 
161 could only find one English publication written by Thomas Cook. His "Self-Knowledge as Self-
Preservation" is printed in Spinoza and the Sciences, ed. Marjorie Grene and Debra Nails 
(Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1986), pp. 191-210. 
17Hans Ebeling, ed ., Subjektvitat und Selbsterhaltung. Beitrage zur Diagnose der Moderne 
(Frankurt am Main ; Suhrkamp Verlag). Further references are given in the Chapter on "Self-
preservation : Overview and Summary." 
18Aifred North Whitehead , The Function of Reason, Louis Clark Vanuxem Foundation Lectures 
delivered at Princeton University , March 1929 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1929) p. 5. 
Compare JOrgen-Eckhardt Pleines, ed ., "praktische Teleologie (Der Handlungszwecke) ," in 
Te/eo/ogie: ein philosophisches Problem in Geschichte und Gegenwart (WOrzburg: Verlag 
Konigshausen & Neumann, 1994) page 144. 
The Chapters of the Dissertation and the Methodological Approach to the 
Sources 
The chapters of th is dissertation serve as an elaborate commentary to Kant's 
official but extremely condensed argument against self-murder in The 
Metaphysics of Morals.19 In order to provide the reader with a guide for the 
dissertation , I have listed the relevant statements from The Metaphysics of 
Morals below and indicated in which of my chapters the respective topic is 
discussed: 
5 
The Introduction to the first part of the "Doctrine of the Elements of Ethics" 
is entitled : 
ON DUTIES TO ONESELF AS SUCH2o 
[Chapter on "Duties"]. 
Here, Kant states in § 4 "On the Principle on Which the Division of Duties to 
Oneself is based": 
Negative duties forb id man to act contrary to the end of his nature and so 
have to do merely with his moral self-preservation; positive duties, which 
command him to make a certain object of choice his end , concern his 
perfecting of himself. Both of them [negative and positive duties to 
oneself; Y. U.] belong to virtue, either as duties of omission (sustine et 
abstine) or as duties of commission (viribus concessis utere) , but both 
belong to it as duties of virtue.21 
[Chapters on "Ends" and on "Duties"]. 
The first [that is , negative duties; Y. U.] belong to the moral health (ad 
esse) of man as object of both his outer senses and his inner sense, to 
the preservation of his nature in its perfection (as receptivity).22 
[Chapters on "Ends" and "Belief of Reason"] . 
19Gregor 218-220 (MS 422-424). 
20Gregor 214 (MS 417). 
21Gregor 216 (MS 419). 
221bid. 
The vices that are here opposed to man's duty to himself are murdering 
himself, the unnatural use of his sexual inclination , and such excessive 
consumption of food and drink as weakens his capacity for making 
purposive use of his powers.23 
6 
[Chapter on "Homicidium Dolosum"]. 
Book I of the "Doctrine of the Elements of Ethics" is entitled : 
[OF] PERFECT DUTIES TO ONESELF24 
[Chapters on "Duties" and the "Right of Humanity"]. 
The first Chapter of Book I concerns "Man's Duty to Himself as an Animal Being" 
and in § 5 it states: 
The first, though not the principal, duty of man to himself as an animal 
being is to preserve himself in his animal nature.25 
[Chapters on "Ends" and the "Trustee-Relationship"] . 
Article I. § 6 is entitled: 
0 f S e I f - D i s e m b o d i m e n t26 
[Introduction: Section on "Self-disembodiment"]. 
Kant makes the following statements in this paragraph: 
Self-disembodiment is a crime (murder).27 
[Chapter on "Homicidium Dolosum"] . 
But since what is in question here is only a violation of duty to oneself, the 
question is whether, if I set aside all those relations [to others or to God; 
Y. U.], man is still bound to preserve his life simply by virtue of his quality 
as a person and whether he must acknowledge in this a duty (and indeed 
a strict duty) to himself.28 
[Chapters on "Duties," the "Right of Humanity," "Ends," and "Trustee-
relationship"] . 
23Gregor 216 (MS 420). 
24Gregor 218 (MS 421 ). 
251bid. 
26MS 422: "Von de r S e I b s tent I e i bun g." My translation . 
271bid.: "Die Selbstentleibung ist ein Verbrechen (Mord)." My translation . 
28Gregor 218f (MS 422) . 
Man cannot renounce his personality as long as he is a subject of duty, 
hence as long as he lives; and it is a contradiction that he should be 
authorized to withdraw from all obligation , that is, freely to act as if no 
authorization were needed for his actions.29 
7 
[Chapters on the "Right of Humanity" and on "Care for the Moral Self'] . 
To annihilate the subject of morality in one's own person is to root out the 
existence of morality itself from the world , as far as one can , even though 
morality is an end in itself.30 
[Chapters on "Care for the Moral Self' and on "Ends"] . 
Consequently, disposing of oneself as a mere means to some 
discretionary end is debasing humanity in one's person (homo noumenon) 
to which man (homo phaenomenon) was nevertheless entrusted for 
preservation. 31 
[Chapters on "Ownership" and "Trustee-Relationship"]. 
At the end of his discussion Kant adds 
Casuistical Questions32 
[Chapter on "Casuistical Questions"]. 
In addition to the above quotes from The Metaphysics of Morals , we find more 
than fifty passages and brief remarks on the topic of self-murder in Kant's 
Schriften. Over a period of nearly forty years Kant offers a variety of approaches 
to the topic of suicide ranging from ethical , and juridical to phenomenological , 
psychological and logical considerations. Despite discussions of the possible 
acceptability of suicide, Kant remained throughout his life strongly opposed to 
what he calls "self-murder" ("Selbstmord"). 
I have based the reconstruction of Kant's argument against self-murder on 
Kant's works , the Nachlaf3 , his correspondence as well as his lectures recorded 
by Kant's students. Even though the lectures provide valuable information for the 
29Gregor 219 (MS 422) . 
30Gregor 219 (MS 423). 
311bid. 
32Gregor 219f (MS 423f) . 
reconstruction of Kant's argument against self-murder, it had to be decided 
whether they could serve as a reliable source for the reconstruction of Kant's 
position. 
8 
Paul Menzer who in 1924 published for the first time Eine Vorlesung 
Kants ilber Ethik (he used the manuscripts of Brauer (1780) , Kutzner (1781) and 
Mrongovius (1782))33 made the following statement concerning the status of the 
lecture notes: 
It is not permissible to rely on the formulations in the booklets 
to the same degree as we are allowed to do when we have a work before 
us which has been edited by the author himself. Likewise, Kant's 
pedagogical attitude must be remembered. It is unquestionable that the 
standard of the listeners was considerably below the one of today's 
students. Frequently Kant's lectures are somewhat scholastic. 34 
I have approached the problem concerning the authenticity of the lecture notes 
in two ways. The corrective of the ideas in the lecture notes is always Kant's own 
writings. Often, however, a detailed explanation or even a whole theory such as 
the right of humanity presented in the lecture notes, is missing or only mentioned 
in passing in the main works . In these cases I have either turned to the 
corresponding passages in the Nach/a/3 or compared lecture notes of the same 
lectures written by different students.35 This way it was possible to reconstruct a 
conclusive argument without compromising the authority of the published works . 
33See Gerhard Lehmann's Introduction in the Appendix to Vorlesungen Ober Moralphilosophie , 
vol. 27.2.2, page 1041 . 
34Paul Menzer, Eine Vorlesung Kants Ober Ethik, (Berlin : Pan Verlag Rolf Heise, 1924 ), pp. 327f: 
"Es ist unerlaubt, Formulierungen der Hefte so in Anspruch zu nehmen, wie wir es da tun dOrfen, 
wo wir ein von einem Autor selbst herausgegebenes Werk vor uns haben. Auch ist an die 
padagogische Einstellung Kants zu erinnern. Es ist unzweifelhaft, da~ das Niveau der Zuhorer 
doch erheblich unter dem unserer heutigen Studenten lag. Kants Vorlesungen haben haufig etwas 
schulma~iges" . --1 have not translated "doch." 
35The notes taken , for example, by Collins and Mrongovius are very often identical, and the 
editors of the Academy Edition have designated the lecture notes taken by Collins as the norm for 
all others. See vol. 27.2.2, page 1041 , 1 050f. 
9 
Concerning the Terminology of Self-disembodiment and Self-murder 
In the Doctrine of Virtue Kant states that self-disembodiment ("Selbstentleibung") 
is a crime called murder.36 However, in one of his notes to the Doctrine of Virtue 
Kant makes clear that self-disembodiment has to be distinguished from self-
murder: "Self-disembodiment not self-m u r de r."37 If self-disembodiment 
("Selbstentleibung") , according to Kant, is not identical with self-murder, but can , 
nevertheless be called a crime, the question arises "What makes self-
disembodiment a crime?" Before Kant answers this question he offers a purely 
descriptive analysis of willful physical death or disembodiment ("Entleibung"). 
Our concern in this introductory section is to clarify the meaning of the different 
terms Kant uses to describe the act of disembodiment. 
The terms disembodiment and autochiria refer to physical death 
("physische Tad"). Kant distinguishes between total and partial physical death or 
disembodiment; total disembodiment is called suicide ("suicidium") , and partial 
disembodiment is called dismemberment ("Entgliederung"). Dismemberment is 
further divided into two subclasses. Kant refers to the first class of 
dismemberment as "material" since this act constitutes a deprivation of body 
parts or mutilation. The second class is called "formal" dismemberment since it 
deprives the person of the physical and thereby also the moral usage of her or 
his powers. According to this purely descriptive distinction between different 
kinds of disembodiment, no judgment concerning the morality or immorality of 
the acts can be made. Kant only clarifies the meaning of different terms. It is 
36MS 422: "Die Selbstentleibung ist ein Verbrechen (Mord) ." 
37My translation ; see Vorarbeiten zur Tugendlehre , val. 23, 400:"Selbstentleibung . Die 
Selbstentleibung nicht Selbst m or d ." 
important to point out that Kant is not only concerned with total disembodiment 
("suicidium") but any form of disembodiment. 
10 
I suggest that we turn briefly to the etymological roots of the term 
"Entleibung" in order to see why the rather strange English translation 
"disembodiment" might be justified . It is my view that the English translation of 
"Entleibung" with "suicide" is not wholly appropriate for two reasons . The first 
reason has been stated already, namely, that not every kind of disembodiment is 
suicide in the sense of total disembodiment or suicidium. Closely connected with 
this reason is another one: the English "suicide" does not render all of the 
connotations of the German "Entleibung" or "Selbstentleibung."38 The verb 
"entleiben" derives from the Middle High German "entllben ," to rob someone of 
her or his life, or to kill someone or oneself.39 The noun "Leib" (body) derives 
from the Middle High German "lip," and its main meaning is "Leben" ("life"; Old 
English and Old Saxon: "llf'). Following Heine, the words "llf' and "lip" belong to 
the verb "bi-llban" (German "bleiben" (to "remain")) and are related to the verb 
"Ieben" (to "live"). 40 A similar point is made by Kluge who states that the noun 
"Leib" like the verb "Ieben" means, according to the Greek "liparein," "beharren" 
("persevere").41 The original meaning of "Leib" as "Leben" was used to refer to 
the person ; later, it also indicated the distinction between body and soul.42 
38EIIington, fo r example, translates Selbstentleibung with "suicide." See page 83 of his Immanuel 
Kant. Ethical Philosophy (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 1983). Gregor 218 uses 
the expression "killing oneself." 
39see Moritz Heyne, Deutsches Worterbuch , (Leipzig : Verlag von S. Hirzel , 1890-1895), s.v. 
"entleiben ." 
401bid. S.V. "Leib." 
41 Friedrich Kluge, Etymologisches Worterbuch derDeutschen Sprache, 10th rev. ed . 
(Berlin/Leipzig : Walter de Gruyter & Co., 1924), s.v. "Leib." Kluge points out that the original 
meaning of the Old Germanic "liba-" is "Beharrung , Dauer" (permanence, duration) and the 
meaning "Leib, Korper," is exclusively German. See also Franz Janssen's Gesamtindex zu Kluges 
etymologischem Worterbuch der deutschen Sprache (Strar3.burg: Karl. J. TrObner, 1890), p. 234. 
He states that the original meaning of "Leib" has been "Leben" and "Beharrung" ("permanence"). 
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What we have said thus far indicates that a translation of "Entleibung" as the 
opposite of self-preservation has to cover the following meanings: the taking of a 
human life or the killing of a person (total disembodiment), the deprivation of 
body parts (partial disembodiment or material dismemberment) as well as the 
incapacitation of functions of the body (partial disembodiment or formal 
dismemberment) . It seems to me that all of these meanings are covered by the 
translation "disembodiment." 
Kant speaks of "willful! [willkurliche] p h y sic a I death," that is, willful! 
disembodiment, and we might get the impression that this action refers only to 
the destruction of the body so that Kant's usage of disembodiment would not 
refer to the whole person but only to the body. However, this picture changes 
when we turn to the concept of self-disembodiment, and we will see that the 
interpretation of the different meanings of "Entleibung ," given above, can be 
upheld . 
Kant uses the term self-disembodiment ("Selbstentleibung") instead of the 
expression "willful disembodiment of one's self."43 In other words, the term 
"Selbst" covers the fact that the killing is done willfully and directed towards the 
self. The term "Selbstentleibung" must be a recent word-creation , if not Kant's 
own word-creation , since the noun "Selbst" ("self') does not appear before the 
18th century and is taken from English translations.44--What we have said so far 
An example of the connection between "Leib" and "Leben" in today's German and English would 
be the Austrian "bei Leibe nicht!" which translates into English as "not on your life." 
42See Heyne's Deutsches Worterbuch as well as in Hermann Paul's Deutsches Worterbuch , 3rd . 
ed ., (Halle (Saale) : Verlag von Max Niemeyer, 1921), s.v. "Leib." Paul states that the original 
meaning of "min lip" is "ich" ("I") and refers to the whole person. See also Daniel Sanders, 
Handworterbuch derdeutschen Sprache, 3rd. ed ., (Leipzig : Verlag von Otto Wigand, 1883), s.v. 
"Leib." 
43MS 422. 
44See Paul's Deutsches Worterbuch , s.v. "selbe." 
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about disembodiment as well as self-disembodiment allows us to translate 
"Selbstentleibung" as the killing or dismembering of one's own person ("Totung 
oder Verstummelung der eigenen Person")45 or as killing/dismembering of the 
self/body ("Selbsttotung ," "Selbstverstummelung"). The aspect of the willfulness 
of the act of dismemberment is rendered by the term "autochiria." 
Kant does not explain his understanding of "autochiria ,"46 but we can turn 
for additional information to Baumgarten's Ethica Philosophica. In this book, 
which Kant used as a compendium for his lecture on the Metaphysics of Morals, 
Baumgarten discusses "autochiria" in the section concerning the "Care of the 
Body" ("Cura Corporis"). This section belongs to the second main part of his 
Ethica entitled "Duties towards Yourself' ("Officia erga te ipsum"). The passage 
important for our discussion states that "autochiria" is the action which makes us 
the author of our death . Any kind of suicide, according to Baumgarten , should be 
avoided.47 
Another possible source of information for Kant might have been 
Stephan us' dictionary where we find the following explanation of autocheiria4B: 
"Homicidium quod aliquis manu propria perpetravit, non per alium perpetrandum 
curavit."49 According to this definition autocheiria is an act of killing 
("homicidium") committed directly ("non per alium perpetrandum curavif') and 
45Hence, this analysis supports Gregor's translation "killing oneself." 
46MS 421 : "Der physiche [Tod; Y. U.], die En tIe i bung (autochiria) . In MSV 603 Kant states 
"Selbstmord (autocheiria)" . See also Chapter on "Casuistical Questions" footnote no. 23. 
47The reprint of Baumgarten's Ethica Phi/osophica from 1763 follows Vigilantius' records of the 
Metaphysics of Morals in volume 27.2, 1 of the Academy Edition. The Latin text on p. 940 reads as 
follows: "" ... ita mortem exspecta, donee pulsauerit, interim, quantum pates, eam vitans, et 
a u to c h i r i a m (a) , actionem. qua fieres auctor mortis tuae, tam subtilem minus obseruabili tibi 
nexu mortem contrahentem, quam crassam, tam repentem, quam repentinam, tam culposam, 
quam dolosam". My underlin ing . 
4Bautocheiria becomes autochiria. 
49Stephanus, Thesaurus Graecae Linguae, photomechanical reprint of the edition from 1572 rev. 
in 1831-1865 (Graz: Akademische Druck- und Verlagsanstalt, 1954), s.v. "autocheiria. " 
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with one's own hand ("manu propria"). In his article "The Linguistics of Suicide," 
David Daube explains that the noun "autocheiria" referred in the first place to the 
direct killing, like the stabbing or strangling of a person, and it was only in a later 
stage of the development of the noun "autocheiria" from the adjective "autocheir'' 
that it described the act of self-killing.so In both senses the stress is laid on the 
"own-handedness" ("autocheiria") of the act. And it is this "own-handedness" 
described by Baumgarten with the Latin "auctor'' which the term "willkUrlich" 
("willful" rather than "arbitrary") implies. The "self' in self-disembodiment 
("Selbstentleibung") indicates that the subject of the act is essentially an agent 
endowed with a will. Furthermore, since the subject and the object of the act are 
identical , the willful killing destroys the will or the (self) . In other words, the will 
destroys itself, and it can only do so because the will or self is an embodied will 
or self. 
Under the title "Of self-disembodiment,"51 Kant shows that willful 
disembodiment constitutes a violation of a duty to oneself and must therefore be 
labeled self-murder ("Selbstmord") or "homicidium dolosum." Despite the fact 
that Kant distinguished between partial disembodiment ("dismemberment") and 
total disembodiment ("suicidium"), he uses the term self-murder for both kinds of 
disembodiment and refers to mutilation as partial self-murder. 52 We can therefore 
sosee David Daube's article "The Linguistics of Suicide," Philosophy & Public Affairs 1 (1971) : 
401 f, 409ft. Daube states on these pages that the noun autocheiria is derived form the adjective 
autocheir. He makes clear that Plato, for example, used both words in his Laws to refer to the 
direct killing of another person. According to Daube, it was only around the last century B.C. that 
autocheiria was used to refer to suicide. Daube points to Josephus' Jewish War in which 
Josephus recounts two mass suicides--the one that took place in the Galilean fortress Jotapata 
and the resistance of Masada--and argues against autocheiria or "own-handedness." 
51 My translation ; seeMS 422: "Von der Selbstentleibung ." 
52See MS 423. In MSV Kant distinguishes on page 642 between a "grobe Selbstmorder" (coarse 
or gross self-murderer), that is, a person who performs total disembodiment, and a "subtile 
Selbstmorder" (subtile self-murderer), that is, a person who performs formal dismemberment--In 
Der Selbst-Mord, eine Abhandlung eines deutschen Philosophen , published in 1775 (Location: 
say that, for Kant, any form of willful disembodiment or self-disembodiment 
constitutes a crime. 
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Kant's choice to describe suicide as self-murder in his works and his 
lectures indicates his rejection and moral disapproval of the act. 53 Only in The 
Metaphysics of Moral where he offers a description of suicide and 
dismemberment does he make use of value neutral expressions like "Entleibung" 
("disembodiment") and "Selbstentleibung" ("self-disembodiment") .54 It is in this 
descriptive sense that he uses the terms "suicidium" and "Selbsttotung" ("self-
killing"). Kant asks, for example, "is it allowed to forestall the unjust death penalty 
of one's superior by killing oneself?" Only when this question can be answered in 
the negative can the act be called "self-murder." 
Following Du Ganges' Glossarium media et intimae Latinitatis, the term 
"suicidium" does not exist in medieval Latin, and we are referred to "succidium" 
under "suicidium."55 Daube points out that there never was a Latin term 
"suicidium. "56 This pseudo-Latin form appears later than the corresponding 
English and French term "suicide "in learned dissertations from the last quarter 
of the eighteenth century."57 Like the term "homicidium ," the term "suicidium" is a 
Staatsbibliothek Preu~ischer Kulturbesitz in Berlin, Handschriftenabteilung. Signature: No. 
13733R. Microfilm) which I found during my research, the (unknown) author also uses and 
explains the expression "subtile Selbst-Mord." In this work, we find also many references to the 
literature on suicide.--For "grebe" and "subtile" self-murder see also Gerhard Lehmann's editoral 
note to MC 347 in val. 27.2.2, page 1117 in which he points out that Johann August Eberhard in 
his Sittenlehre der Vernunft, pp. 199f also distinguishes between "subtile" and "grebe" self-
murder. 
531n MS 425 Kant uses the expression "trotzige Wegwerfung." 
541n PPH 30 Kant uses the expression "SelbstverkUrzung des Lebens." 
55See Du Gange's G/ossarium mediae et intimae Latinitatis, reprint of the 1883-1887 ed. (Graz-
Austria: Akademische Druck- und Verlagsanstalt, 1954), s.v. "suicidium." 
56See Daube's article page 422. He states that: "'Suicide' gave--still gives--the impression of 
coming directly from Latin ; but there was no Latin suicidium and indeed the formation is contrary 
to Latin grammar .. .. if understood in accordance with the rules of Latin word-building, 'suicide' 
would suggest 'the killing of a pig' .... " 
571bid. 428. 
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value free expression and does not carry with it the brutal connotation of the 
German "Selbstmord" ("self-murder") which came into existence in the middle of 
the seventeenth century. sa From the aforesaid it follows that Kant makes use of 
an artificial Latin term which had just come into existence when he wrote The 
Metaphysics of Morals. Furthermore, for Kant to be acquainted with the Latin 
fabrication he must not only have read dissertations on suicide but these 
dissertations must have been contemporary ones to allow the use of the newly 
formed term "suicidium."s9 
It is not clear whether Kant was aware of all of the different meanings and 
etymological origins of the terms he used in his argument against suicide. We 
will see that the original meanings of "Leib" as life and person, permanence and 
body play an important role in Kant's argument against suicide. So far we have 
found out that Kant's understanding of the concept of self-disembodiment is not 
restricted to the destruction of the body but encompasses the destruction of the 
self or will. Since the meaning of "Leib" is closely related to "Leben" and 
"Person," I suggest that we use the terms interchangeably and say that self-
disembodiment implies for Kant the destruction of the physical and the moral life. 
Kant makes clear that our physical capacity or our physical life is the basis for 
our moral capacity or our moral life. so Suicide as "Ent-le(i)bung" makes a moral 
life impossible. The following chapters of the dissertation will explain why self-
disembodiment constitutes a crime called "self-murder" ("homicidium dolosum") : 
581bid. 414. According to Daube, it was the Catholic satirist Thomas Murner who "in 1514 
introduced the grim 'sich ermorden"' one hundred and thirty years before the noun "Selbstmord" 
(self-murder) appeared. 
59The only other possibility is that Kant was the creator of the term. See also footnote no. 51 . 
6DMS 421 . 
Willfully killing oneself can be called murdering oneself (homicidium 
dolosum) only if it can be proved that it is in general a crime committed 
either against one's own person or also, through one's killing oneself, 
against another (as when a pregnant woman takes her life) .61 
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61Gregor 218 (MS 422: "Die willkurliche En tIe i bung seiner selbst kann nur dann allererst 
Selbstmord (homicidium dolosum) genannt werden , wenn bewiesen werden kann , dar.. sie 
Oberhaupt ein Verbrechen ist, welches entweder an unserer eigenen Person oder auch durch 
dieser ihre Selbstentleibung an anderen begangen wird (z. B. wenn eine schwangere Person sich 
selbst umbringt) .") 
PART ONE 
KANT'S ARGUMENT AGAINST SELF-MURDER 
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CHAPTER I 
DUTIES 
Kant treats self-murder throughout his opus, Lectures, the Vorarbeiten and the 
Reflexionen not as a violation of duty to others including those to God but as a 
violation of a duty to oneself, namely, the duty of self-preservation. According to 
The Metaphysics of Morals as well as the Lecture on the Metaphysics of Morals, 
the duty of self-preservation is a "perfect" or "strict" duty to oneself. 
[OF] PERFECT DUTIES TO ONESELF 
[ ... ] 
The first, though not the principal, duty of man to himself as an animal 
being is to preserve himself in his animal nature. 1 
But since what is in question here is only a violation of duty to oneself, the 
question is whether, if I set aside all those relations [meaning duties to 
others and to God], man is still bound to preserve his life simply by virtue 
of his quality as a person and whether he must acknowledge in this a duty 
(and indeed a strict duty) to himself.2 
The duty to preserve one's life is a strict duty; it is based on the respect 
for his personality which is assigned to him as a being of reason [or: 
intelligible being] and of which he is not permitted to deprive himself as a 
sensible being.3 
1Gregor 218 (MS 421 : 
"Von den vollkommenen Pflichten gegen sich selbst. 
( ... ] 
Die, wenn gleich nicht vornehmste, doch e r s t e Pflicht des Menschen gegen sich selbst in der 
Qualitat seiner Th ierheit ist dieS e I b s t e r h a It u n g in seiner animalischen Natur." 
2Gregor 218f (MS 422: " ... aber hier ist nur die Rede von Verletzung einer Pflicht gegen sich 
selbst, ob namlich , wenn ich auch aile jene Rucksichten bei Seite setze, der Mensch doch zur 
Erhaltung seines Lebens bios durch seine Qualitat als Person verbunden sei und hierin eine (und 
zwar strenge) Pflicht gegen sich selbst anerkennen musse.") 
3MSV 628: "Es ist eine strenge Pflicht die Erhaltung seines Lebens, sie beruht auf der Achtung fOr 
seine Personlichkeit, die ihm als Vernunftwesen zugetheilt ist, und der er sich als Sinnenwesen 
nicht entziehen darf." 
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However, in the Lecture on Practical Philosophy Kant calls the duty to preserve 
one's life a "conditioned" duty: 
The preservation of one's life is not an unconditioned but a mediate and 
conditioned duty. If I am unworthy of the means which can preserve my 
life, the duty to preserve my life is suspended.4 
The same point is made in the Lecture on Moral Philosophy: 
The preservation of life is therefore not the highest duty, but one must 
often give up life in order to only have lived honorably.5 
Despite the discrepancy between the strict duty to preserve oneself and the 
conditioned duty to preserve life, Kant's opus including the Lectures on Moral 
and Practical Philosophy leave no doubt that self-murder is "under no 
circumstance permitted."6 In other words, the duty not to murder oneself is a 
strict or a perfect duty. We will see that, according to Kant, it is one thing to 
sacrifice or give up one's life in order to preserve one's moral integrity, yet 
another to murder oneself. Hence the main question is whether the two views--
the view that the duty of self-preservation is a strict or perfect duty and the view 
that the preservation of life is a conditioned duty--can be reconciled. In order to 
4The entire passage from PPP 191 reads: "Die Erhaltung seines Lebens ist nicht eine unbedingte, 
sander eine mittelbare und bedingte Pflicht. Wenn ich der Mittel unwurdig bin , die mein Leben 
erhalten konnen, so hart die Pflicht auf mein Leben zu erhalten . Coram foro externo kann die 
Erhaltung des Lebens nicht der Grund seyn von der Imputation eines Verbrechens gegen seine 
Mitmenschen, denn ich kann keinen Menschen zwingen mit Recht, auf sein eigenes Leben 
Verzicht zu thun , um eines andern Leben zu erhalten. Der Beg riff der ganzen Pflicht gegen sich 
selbst beruhet fUrnehmlich auf dieser Haupt Idee. Der Mensch ist nicht befugt uber sich selbst zu 
disponiren." (" ... Coram foro externo the preservation of life cannot be the reason for the 
imputation of a crime against one's fellow men, because I cannot rightfully coerce any human 
being to give up his own life in order to preserve that of another. The concept of the entire duty to 
oneself rests on this main idea. The human being is not authorized to dispose over himself.") 
5MC 378: "Es ist also die Erhaltung des Lebens nicht die htichste Pflicht sander man mu~ oft das 
Leben aufgeben, um nur ehrenwerth gelebt zu haben." 
6MC 372; MSV 627. 
decide this question, we must first determine the meaning of a perfect duty to 
oneself. 
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The determination of the meaning of the strict or perfect duty of self-
preservation is complicated by the fact that Kant discusses self-murder in 
seemingly different contexts . According to the Lectures on Practical and Moral 
Philosophy, self-murder violates the essential ends of humanity. According to the 
Lecture on Moral Philosophy, it violates the right of humanity and is contrary to 
an inner duty of right, whereas in The Metaphysics of Morals self-murder is 
contrary to the end of human nature and violates the perfect duty of self-
preservation which is now understood as a duty of virtue. 
In order to clarify the above points, we will, first, turn to Kant's 
classification of duties in the Groundwork and The Metaphysics of Morals and 
pay particular attention to Kant's treatment of self-murder. Second, we will 
discuss Kant's model of self-obligation, turn to the particular function of duties to 
oneself, and discuss several questions regarding the systematic place of the 
perfect duties to oneself in the "Doctrine of Virtue" based on the findings of the 
first part. 
Classification of Duties 
The Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals 
In the Groundwork Kant talks about various duties, in order to illustrate the 
different formulas of the categorical imperative: the duty not to kill oneself, not to 
make a false promise, not to neglect one's talents and not to be indifferent 
towards the suffering of others. He states that the arrangement of these 
examples corresponds to the classification of duties into perfect duties to oneself 
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and others, as well as imperfect duties to oneself and others, but is quick to point 
out that he reserves his "division of duties entirely for a future Metaphysics of 
Morals."7 
Kant explains in the Groundwork that a perfect duty in general "allows no 
exception in the interests of inclination" and adds that "contrary to the accepted 
usage of the schools," he recognizes "not only outer ... but also inner duties" 
among perfect duties. a In short, he introduces a new species of duties: the 
perfect duties to oneself. According to Wolfgang Kersting, the criterion of perfect 
duties to oneself is no longer that they can be enforced but that they are valid 
without exception.9 
Since Kant uses the example of a person who intends to kill himself in 
order to illustrate his newly introduced duty, we have reason to believe that our 
discussion of the prohibition of self-murder in this dissertation will also shed 
some light on the status of the perfect duties to oneself. 
7Paton 89 footnote (GMS 421 ). For the view that Kant's distinction between narrow and wide 
obligation of perfect and imperfect duties can be traced back to a wrong translation in Cicero's De 
Finibus Bonorum et Malorum (About the Ends of Goods and Evils) see Willi Schink's "Kant und 
die stoische Ethik,"Kant-Studien 18 (1913) : 446. 
BPaton 89 footnote (GMS 421 footnote: "Man mul1 hier wohl merken, da!1 ich die Eintheilung der 
Pflichten fOr eine kOnftige M e t a p h y s i k d e r S i t t e n mir ganzlich vorbehalte, diese hier 
also nur als beliebig (um meine Beispiele zu ordnen) dastehe. Ubrigens verstehe ich hier unter 
einer vollkommenen Pflicht diejenige, die keine Ausnahme zum Vortheil der Neigung verstattet, 
und da habe ich nicht blo!1 au!1ere, sondern auch innere v o II k o m me n e P f I i c h t e n, 
welches dem in Schulen angenommenen Wortgebrauch zuwider lauft, ich aber hier nicht zu 
verantworten gemeint bin, weil es zu meiner Absicht einerlei ist, ob man es mir einraumt, oder 
nicht. ") 
9Wolfgang Kersting , Wohlgeordnete Freiheit (Berlin/New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1984), p. 81 : 
"Er ... ersetzt dabei jedoch das vollkommenen Pflichten seit je definitorisch zugeordnete Merkmal 
der Erzwingbarkeit durch das der der ausnahmslosen GOitigkeit ... ". However, Kersting points out 
that this definition of a perfect duty is a "Tautology" and not convincing : "Wenn eine vollkommene 
Pflicht dadurch gekennzeichnet sein soli, dal1 sie 'keine Ausnahme zum Vorteil der Neigung 
verstattet', dann bleibt die spezifische Differenz Vollkommenheit unbestimmt, da der Pflicht als 
solcher ausnahmlose GOitigkeitkeit zukommt. Nach der hier vorgeschlagenen Definition ware der 
Ausdruck 'vollkommene Pflicht' eine Tautologie und sein Gegenstock eine logische 
Ungereimtheit." 
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Before we turn to Kant's classification of duties in The Metaphysics of Morals, let 
us focus on some of the characteristics of a perfect duty to oneself which Kant 
formulates in the Groundwork. 
First, after Kant discusses the four examples of violations of duty in the 
context of the first formula of the categorical imperative (the formula of the 
universal law of nature) he presents his canon of moral judgment and states: 
We must be able to will that a maxim of our action should become a 
universal law--this is the general canon for all moral judgment of action . 
Some actions are so constituted that their maxim cannot even be 
conceived as a universal law of nature without contradiction , let alone be 
willed as what ought to become one.1 o 
Suicide and making a false promise are actions which cannot be conceived 
("gedacht werden") as a universal law and are opposed to the "strict or narrow 
(rigorous) duty;" whereas neglecting one's talents and being indifferent towards 
the suffering of others are kinds of actions which cannot be willed and are 
opposed to "wider (meritorious) duty."11 Kant's discussion shows that perfect 
duties to oneself and others only require that the maxim in question must be able 
to be conceived as a universal law of nature; whereas imperfect duties require in 
addition that one must be able to will that the maxim should become a universal 
law of nature.12 Since the categorical imperative commands "Act only on that 
maxim through which you can at the same time will[!] that it should become a 
10Paton 91 (GMS 424: "Man mur.. w o II e n k o n n e n , dar.. eine Maxime unserer Handlun9 ein 
allgemeines Gesetz werde: dies ist der Kanan der moralischen Beurtheilung derselben Oberhaupt. 
Eini9e Handlun9en sind so beschaffen, dar.. ihre Maxime ohne Widerspruch nicht einmal als 
all9emeines Naturgesetz 9 e d a c h t werden kann ; weit 9efehlt, dar.. man noch w o II e n 
konne, es so II t e ein solches werden.") 
11 Paton 91 (GMS 424: "Man sieht Ieicht: dar.. die erstere der stren9en oder en9eren 
(unnachlar..lichen) Pflicht, die zweite nur der weiteren (verdienstlichen) Pflicht widerstreite ... ".) 
12Paton 91 (GMS 424: "Eini9e Handlun9en sind so beschaffen, dar.. ihe Maxime ohne 
Widerspruch nicht einmal als all9emeines Natur9esetz 9 e d a c h t werden kann ; weit 9efehlt, 
dar.. man noch w o II en konne, es so II t e ein solches werden.") 
23 
universal law," and since it constitutes the "general canon for all moral judgment 
of action," Kant's examples of suicide and making a false promise suggest that 
adherence to a perfect duty does not necessarily entail that an action is moral , 
since the principle which governs a perfect duty only requires the satisfaction of 
the criterion of universalizability and is not concerned with the question of 
whether such an action can be willed.--ln this context it should be pointed out 
that Wolfgang Kersting argues that Kant's position in the Groundwork, namely, 
that the fundamental difference between perfect and imperfect duties can be 
based on the categorical imperative and justified with regard to the two different 
respects of universalization--that of "being able to conceive" and of "being able 
to will" the maxim as a universal law--is wrong and no longer found in The 
Metaphysics of Morals. Kersting believes that the two parts of the The 
Metaphysics of Morals are based on two independent principles of duty: 
alongside the "formal Apriori of Right" ("formale Apriori des Rechtsgesetzes") 
Kant places the "material Apriori of the ethical principle of end[s]" ("materiale 
Apriori des ethischen Zweckprinzips") and that Kant abandons his position that 
the categorical imperative can serve as the principle for both perfect and 
imperfect duties.13 
Second, when Kant turns to the example of self-murder in order to 
illustrate the second formula of the categorical imperative (the formula of the end 
13Wofgang Kersting , "Das starke Gesetz der Schuldigkeit und das schwachere der GOitigkeit," 
Studia Leibnitiana XIV/2 (1982): 188, 207. See also Kersting (1984) 82-84, and his "Der 
Kategorische lmperativ, die vollkommenen und die unvollkommenen Pflichten," Zeitschrift far 
Philosophische Forschung 37 (1983): 405f.--This is, however, not the only possible position: 
despite the difficulties to reconcile the view of the Groundwork with that of the Metaphysics of 
Morals, Josef Schmucker states in "Der Fomalismus und die materialen Zweckprinzipien in der 
Ethik Kants," in Kant und die Scholastik heute, Pullacher Philosophische Forschungen, val. 1, ed. 
Johannes B. Lotz (Pullach bei MOnchen: Verlag Berchmanskolleg , 1955), p. 190 that this 
opposition is only a seeming one. 
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in itself) which forbids using oneself or others merely as an end, he speaks of the 
"necessary duty to oneself." We can therefore say that a "strict," "narrow," or 
"necessary" duty is the same as a "perfect" duty to oneself. 14 
Furthermore, Kant's discussion of a person who neglects his talents gives 
us some additional information about the perfect duty to oneself: 
Thirdly, in regard to contingent (meritorious) duty to oneself, it is not 
enough that an action should refrain from conflicting with humanity in our 
own person as an end in itself: it must also harmonize with this end. Now 
there are in humanity capacities for greater perfection which form part of 
nature's purpose for humanity in our person . [Paton's footnote follows] To 
neglect these can admittedly be compatible with the maintenance [or: 
"preservation"] of humanity as an end in itself, but not with the promotion 
of this end.15 
If we adhere to the perfect duty not to use ourselves merely as things but neglect 
our talents, our maxim does not conflict with the status of humanity as an end in 
itself. Even though, as Kant points out, this maxim can very well be compatible 
with the preservation of humanity as an end in itself, it is not compatible with the 
promotion of one's status as an end in itself which requires that one cultivate 
one's capacities or predispositions ("Anlagen"). It is therefore one thing not to 
violate one's status as an end in itself, yet another to promote it.16 
Our brief analysis suggests that, according to Kant, the categorical 
imperative: "Act only on that maxim through ... which you can at the same time 
14Kersting (1982) 187 makes the same point. 
15Paton 97f (GMS 430: "Dr itt ens , in Ansehung der zufalligen (verdienstlichen) Pflicht gegen 
sich selbst ists nicht genug, dal1 die Handlung nicht der Menschheit in unserer Person als Zweck 
an sich selbst widerstreite, sie mur1 auch d a z u z u s a m m e n s t i m m e n . Nun sind in der 
Menschheit Anlagen zu gror1erer Vollkommenheit, die zum Zwecke der Natur in Ansehung der 
Menschheit in unserem Subjecte gehoren; diese zu vernachlassigen , wUrde allenfalls wahl mit der 
E r h a I t u n g der Menschheit als Zwecks an sich selbst, nicht der B e f o r d e r u n g dieses 
Zwecks bestehen konnen.") 
16The same point is expressed in Kant's formulation of the supreme principle of the "Doctrine of 
Virtue" in MS 395. 
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will that is should become a universal law" is not a purely formal principle 
because it does not only require avoiding contradictions including the violation of 
the status of the human being as an end in itself, but it also requires that we 
cultivate our capacities in order to promote our status as an end in itself. 17 
The aforementioned characteristics of perfect duties can now be applied 
to Kant's first example of the man who thinks about killing himself: 
His maxim is 'From self-love I make it my principle to shorten my life if its 
continuance threatens more evil than it promises pleasure'. The only 
further question to ask is whether this principle of self-love can become a 
universal law of nature. It is then seen at once that a system of nature by 
whose law the very same feeling whose function ["Bestimmung"] is to 
stimulate the furtherance of life should actually destroy life would 
contradict itself and consequently could not subsist as a system of nature. 
[Paton's footnote follows] Hence this maxim cannot possibly hold as a 
universal law of nature and is therefore entirely opposed to the supreme 
principle of all duty.1a 
171t was already indicated that Wolfgang Kersting bel ieves that this view cannot be upheld . He 
states that whereas the formula of the universal law selects all maxims which cannot be 
universalized, the formula of the end in itself selects all those ends which are not capable of 
universalization. Because the moral law is purely formal it can only "command the practical 
opposite of what it prohibits." Because it is formal , only the prohibition not to perform any actions 
which would destroy freedom can be derived from it; it can, however, not serve as a basis for the 
command of actions which serve the promotion of freedom. The latter must, according to Kersting 
(1982) 206, be "a material, teleological principle" which can neither be found in the Groundwork 
nor in the Critique of Practical reason 
"because Kant has only introduced it in the Metaphysics of Mora/s--in the "System of the 
Universal Doctrine of Duties"--as a constitutive law of the doctrine of virtue and ethics in 
the narrow sense." 
If Kersting is right with his assumption, it means that the categorical imperative in the Groundwork 
is the principle of Right and can only serve as a basis for perfect duties; see Kersting (1983) 414. 
18Paton 89 (GMS 422: "Nun versucht er: ob die Maxime seiner Handlung wahl ein allgemeines 
Naturgesetz werden konne. Seine Maxime aber ist: ich mache es mir aus Selbstliebe zum Prinzip, 
wenn das Leben b.ei seiner langern Frist mehr Obel droht, als es Annehmlichkeit verspricht, es mir 
abzukorzen. Es fragt sich nur noch, ob dieses Princip der Selbstliebe ein allgemeines Naturgesetz 
werden konne. Da sieht man aber bald, da~ eine Natur, deren Gesetz es ware , durch dieselbe 
Empfindung , deren Bestimmung es ist, zur Beforderung des Lebens anzutreiben , das Leben 
selbst zu zerstoren , ihr selbst wiersprechen und also nicht als Natur bestehen wOrde, mithin jene 
Maxime unmoglich als allgemeines Naturgesetz stattfinden konne und folglich dem obersten 
Princip aller Pflicht ganzlich widerstreite.") 
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Because killing oneself violates a perfect duty to oneself, it is by Kant's definition 
an act which constitutes an "exception in the interests of inclination ." In this case 
it is an exception in the interest of self-love which consists in the maxim to avoid 
a life which "threatens more evil than it promises pleasure." But perfect duties 
also forbid adopting a maxim that cannot be unversalized. Since Kant defines 
the function of self-love in the system of nature in terms of stimulation and 
furtherance of life, it cannot be conceived that the function of self-love is the 
destruction of life .1 9 
Finally, according to the second formula of the categorical imperative, 
perfect duties to oneself preserve the status of the human being as an end in 
itself: 
.. . the man who contemplates suicide ["Selbstmord[e]"] will ask 'Can my 
action be compatible with the Idea of humanity as an end in itself?' If he 
does away with himself in order to escape from a painful situation, he is 
191n the Critique of Practical Reason (Beck 45) Kant offers a similar argument but does not speak 
of ending one's life from self-love but of ending one's life "arbitrarily" ["willkUrlich"). 
"When the maxim according to which I intend to give [page number follows; Y. U.) 
testimony is tested by practical reason, I always inquire into what it should be if it were to 
hold as a universal law of nature. . .. Also the maxim which I adopt in respect to freely 
disposing of my life is at once determined when I inquire what it would have to be in order 
that a system of nature could maintain itself in accordance with such a law. Obviously in 
such a system of nature no one could a r b i t r a r i I y end his life, for such an 
arrangement could not constitute a permanent natural order [order of nature; Y. U.)." 
(KpV 44: "Wenn die Maxime, nach der ich ein Zeugnir.. abzulegen gesonnen bin , durch die 
praktische Vernunft geprUft wird , so sehe ich immer darnach , wie sie sein wUrde, wenn sie als 
allgemeines Naturgesetz golte . ... Eben so wird die Maxi me, die ich in Ansehung der freien 
Disposition Uber mein Leben nehme, sofort bestimmt, wenn ich mich frage, wie sie sein mur..te, 
damit sich eine Natur nach einem Gesetze derselben erhalte. Offen bar wUrde niemand in einer 
solchen Natur sein Leben w i I I k U r I i c h endigen konnen , denn eine solche Verfassung wurde 
keine bleibende Naturordnung sein, und so in allen Ubrigen F~llen . ") 
I added the spacing between letters in the English translation in order to adjust it to the 
Academy text. The term "w iII k UrI i c h" can , as Beck does, be translated with 
"arb it r a r i I y." I believe, however, that it should be translated with "willfully ." In MS 421 , for 
example, Kant speaks of "willkUrliche E n t I e i b u n g seiner selbst" which Gregor rightly 
translates with "willfully killing oneself." 
For the second instance of suicide mentioned in the Critique of Practical Reason and 
Kant's discussion of the natural law as a "type" of a law of freedom see KpV 69f (Beck 72). 
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making use of a [his?] person merely as a means to maintain a tolerable 
state of affairs till the end of his life. But man is not a thing--not something 
to be used merely as a means: he must always in all his actions be 
regarded as an end in himself. Hence I cannot dispose of man in my 
person by maiming , spoiling, or killing .2o 
Kant mentions again that the person contemplating self-murder makes an 
exception in the interest of inclination and hence uses himself merely as a 
means. Making an exception in the interest of inclination cannot be reconciled 
with the status of the human being as an end in itself, and that means that self-
murder in order to avoid pain is prohibited . To put it differently, the second 
formula commands the preservation of one's status as an end in itself. Kant 
refers to this principle as the principle which is the "Supreme limiting condition of 
every man's freedom of action."21 
To summarize: According to Kant, perfect duties to oneself as well as 
perfect duties to others do not allow for an exception in the interest of inclination . 
They are only concerned with the avoidance of a contradiction : they serve the 
preservation of nature as well as the preservation of the status of the human 
being as an end in itself. In addition to the requirement that our actions are free 
of contradiction and leave the status of the end in itself intact, imperfect duties 
command that we promote our status as an end in itself by cultivating our 
capacities. It should be added that perfect as well as imperfect duties can , 
2DPaton 96f (GMS 429: " ... derjenige, der mit Selbstmorde umgeht, sich fragen , ob seine 
Handlung mit der Idee der Menschheit a I s Z w e c k a n s i c h s e I b s t zusammen bestehen 
konne. Wenn er, um einem beschwerlichen Zustande zu entfliehen, sich selbst zerstort, so 
bedient er sich einer [seiner?] Person blor., als e i n e s M i t t e I s zu Erhaltung eines 
ertraglichen Zustandes bis zu Ende des Lebens. Der Mensch aber ist keine Sache, mithin nicht 
etwas, das b I o r., als Mittel gebraucht werden kann , sondern mur., bei allen seinen Handlungen 
jederzeit als Zweck an sich selbst betrachtet werden. Also kann ich Ober den Menschen in meiner 
Person nicht disponiren, ihn zu verstommeln , zu verderben, oder zu todten." 
21 Paton 98 (GMS 430f: "Dieses Princip der Menschheit und jeder vernOnftigen Natur Oberhaupt, 
a I s Z w e c k s a n s i c h s e I b s t , (welche die oberste einschrankende Bedingung der 
Freiheit der Handlungen eines jeden Menschen ist) ... ".) 
accord ing to the Groundwork, have a moral worth. With regard to the duty to 
preserve one's life this means: 
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When .. . disappointment and hopeless misery have quite taken away the 
taste for life; when a wretched man, strong in soul and more angered at 
his fate than faint-hearted or cast down, longs for death and still preserves 
his life without loving it--not from inclination or fear but from duty; then 
indeed his maxim has a moral content.22 
The Metaphysics of Morals 
In the "Doctrine of Right" under Division of the Metaphysics of Morals as a Whole 
Kant states: 
All duties are either duties of Right (officia iuris), that is, duties for which 
external lawgiving is possible, or duties of virtue (officia virtutis s. ethica), 
for which external lawgiving is not possible ... _23 
Before we turn to Kant's distinction between duties of right and duties of virtue , 
let us study the criteria which distinguish the "Doctrine of Right" from the 
"Doctrine of Virtue." This discussion will provide us with the information 
necessary to understand Kant's distinction between duties of right and duties of 
virtue. 
22Paton 65 (GMS 398: "Dagegen wenn Widerwartigkeiten und hoffnungloser Gram den 
Geschmack am Leben ganzlich weggenommen haben; wenn der UngiOckliche, stark an Seele, 
Ober sein Schicksal mehr entrostet als kleinmothig oder niedergeschlagen, den Tod wonscht und 
sein Leben doch erhalt, ohne es zu lieben, nicht aus Neigung oder Furcht, sondern aus Pflicht: 
alsdann hat seine Maxime einen moralischen Gehalt.") 
23Gregor 64 (MS 239: "Aile Pflichten sind entweder Recht s p f I i c h ten (officia iuris), d. i. 
solche, fOr welche eine auf1ere Gesetzgebung mtiglich ist, oder Tug end p f I i c h ten (officia 
virtutis s. ethica) , fOr welche eine solche nicht mtiglich ist ... ". ) 
The Difference between the "Doctrine of Right" and the "Doctrine of Virtue": 
Incentive and End 
Both parts of the The Metaphysics of Morals, the "Doctrine of Right" as well as 
the "Doctrine of Virtue," are concerned with duties. Kant defines duty as 
that action to which someone is bound . It is therefore the matter of 
obligation, and there can be one and the same duty (as to the action) 
although we can be bound to it in different ways.24 
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In the "Introduction to the Metaphysics of Morals" and the "Introduction to the 
Doctrine of Virtue," Kant offers two different criteria for distinguishing the 
"Doctrine of Right" from the "Doctrine of Virtue." The first criterion concerns the 
form of obligation and the second the matter of obligation . 
According to the first criterion, found in the "Introduction to the 
Metaphysics of Morals," the difference between the two parts is based on the 
difference in their lawgiving ("Gesetzgebung") . 
The doctrine of Right and the doctrine of virtue are therefore distinguished 
not so much by their different duties as by the difference in their lawgiving , 
which connects one incentive or the other with the law.zs 
Lawgiving comprises for Kant two things: first, a law which designates an action 
as a duty and, second , an incentive which motivates the subject to act as 
prescribed by the law: 
In all lawgiving (whether it prescribes internal or external actions, and 
whether it prescribes them a priori by reason alone or by the choice 
["Willkur"] of another) there are two elements: first, a Jaw, which 
represents an action that is to be done as objectively necessary, that is, 
which makes the action a duty; and second, an incentive, which connects 
24Gregor 49 (MS 222: "P f I i c h t ist diejenige Handlung, zu welcher jemand verbunden ist. Sie 
ist also die Materie der Verbindl ichkeit, und es kann einerlei Pflicht (der Handlung nach) sein , ob 
wir zwar auf verschiedene Art dazu verbunden werden konnen .") 
25Gregor 47 (MS 220: "Rechtslehre und Tugendlehre unterscheiden sich also nicht sowohl durch 
ihre verschiedenen Pfl ichten , als vielmehr durch die Verschiedenheit der Gesetzgebung, welche 
die eine oder die andere Triebfeder mit dem Gesetze verbindet. ") 
a ground for determining choice to this action subjectively with the 
representation of the law.26 
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Lawgiving can differ even though the action prescribed as duty is the same 
because the law can be connected with different incentives ("Triebfedern") which 
determine the empirical will ("Willkur"). 
The lawgiving which requires that the incentive for doing our duty be only 
the idea of duty itself is called "ethical" whereas juridical or outer (external) 
lawgiving "does not include the incentive of duty in the law and so admits an 
incentive other than the Idea of duty itself."27 
Because of the difference regarding the incentive, duties of juridical 
lawgiving can only be external duties (duties of right), whereas ethical lawgiving 
is not restricted to inner (internal) duties (duties of virtue) but also applies to 
external duties. In other words, even though ethical lawgiving is internal it applies 
to external as well as internal actions: 
It can be seen from this that all duties, just because they are duties, 
belong to ethics; but it does not follow that the lawgiving for them is 
always contained in ethics: For many of them it is outside ethics.2B 
It is helpful to follow Friedrich Kaulbach's suggestion and keep in mind that Kant 
distinguishes between two different points of view: the point of view of the law of 
practical reason and the point of view of the subject's attitude to the law. In the 
26Gregor 45f (MS 218: "In aller Gesetzgebung (sie mag nun innere oder aur..ere Handlungen und 
dies entweder a priori durch blor..e Vernunft, oder durch die WillkOr eines andern vorschreiben) 
gehoren zwei Stocke: erstlich ein G e set z, welches die Handlung, die geschehen soli, 
object i v als nothwendig vorstellt, d. i. welches die Handlung zur Pflicht macht, zweitens eine 
Triebfeder, welche den Bestimmungsgrund der WillkOr zu dieser Hand lung s u b j e c t i v mit der 
Vorstellung des Gesetzes verknOpft; ... ".) 
27Gregor 46 (MS 219: "Diejenige aber, welche das Letztere nicht im Gesetze mit einschlier..t, 
mithin auch eine andere Triebfeder als die Idee der Pflicht zular..t, ist juri d is c h.") 
2BGregor 47 (MS 219: "Hieraus ist zu ersehen, dar.. aile Pflichten bios darum, weil sie Pflichten 
sind , mit zur Ethik gehoren ; aber ihre G e set z g e b u n g ist darum nicht allemal in der Ethik 
enthalten, sonder von vielen derselben aur..erhalb derselben.") Compare also Vorarbeiten zur 
Tugendlehre , vol. 23, 390. 
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case of lawgiving, the lawgiver requires either a specific incentive (ethical 
lawgiving) or leaves the incentive unspecified Ouridicallawgiving), and it is the 
subject which either fulfills or does not fulfill the expectation or does even more 
than what is demanded by law.29 It is, however, important to point out that 
because juridical lawgiving is "a lawgiving, which constrains, not an allurement, 
which invites, that this incentive must be drawn from aversions."30 
The difference between ethics and Ius is that ethics asks "what motivates 
the subject to do her or his duty?" whereas this question is of no relevance in 
Ius. There the law commands only, for example, to repay one's debt, an external 
action, but does not command that the motivation for paying one's debt be the 
idea of duty.31 All it does is threaten punishment in case the debt is not paid . The 
29Friedrich Kaulbach "Der Herrschaftsanspruch der Vernunft in Recht und Moral bei Kant," Kant-
Studien 67 (1976): 390f. 
The following schema tries to capture Kaulbach's, respectively Kant's, distinction between the two 
points of view: 
view from subject as lawgiver. lawgiving 
juridical ethical 
no specific incentive required incentive must be the idea of duty 
view from subject as agent: motivation 
subject acts on incentive drawn from subject acts only from the idea of duty 
aversion or acts from the idea of duty 
For a critique of Kaulbach's position see Kersting (1984) 7 4f footnote. 
30Gregor 46 (MS 219: "Man sieht in Ansehung der letztern Ieicht ein , da~ diese von der Idee der 
Pflicht unterschiedene Triebfeder von den p a t h o I o g i s c h e n BestimmungsgrOnden der 
WillkOr der Neigungen und Abneigungen und unter diesen von denen der letzteren Art 
hergenommen sein mosse, weil es eine Gesetzgebung , welche nothigend, nicht eine Anlockung , 
die einladend ist, sein soli. 
311n the Vorarbeiten zur Einleitung in die Metaphysik der Sitten, vol. 23, 251 Kant stresses that 
outer duties concern the performance of an action and are satisfied if the required action is 
performed whereas inner duties concern the disposition ("Gesinnung") , and they are satisfied if 
one has the honest disposition, that is, wants to act from duty, even though one might be unable 
to perform the action: 
"Au ~ e r e P f I i c h t e n sind die d e r L e i stu n g e n (ihrer Wirkung nach) lnnere 
Pflichten sind die der G e s i n n u n g e n. 
Au~ere Pflichten mogen die [sic] Gesinnungen gema~ oder zuwieder seyn , man 
mag der 0 b r i g k e i t gern oder ungern und mit Wiederwillen dienen so hat man seine 
Pflicht erfOIIet wenn man ihr nur die erforderliche Dienste leistet. 
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incentive from the point of view of the lawgiver is therefore external coercion 
("Zwang"). This does, however, not exclude the possibility that a person pay her 
or his debt solely because of the idea of duty. In other words, it allows for the 
possibility that external duties, even though the law does not require it, are done 
because of the idea of duty. 
According to the incentive-criterion, as we might call it, the difference 
between the "Doctrine of Right" and the "Doctrine of Virtue" lies not in the 
content or matter of the obligation but in the incentive the respective lawgiving 
requires. 
For what is distinctive of ethical lawgiving is that one is to perform actions 
just because they are duties and to make the principle of duty itself, 
wherever the duty comes from, the sufficient incentive for choice.32 
All duties are indirectly ethical duties since all duties can be performed for the 
sake of duty.33 This suggestion is supported by a statement Kant made in his 
lecture on moral philosophy recorded by Collins. Kant explains that the 
difference between Jus ("Doctrine of Right") and ethics ("Doctrine of Virtue) does 
not consist in the kind of obligation, but in the "incentives to satisfy the 
obligations." According to Collins, Kant states that "ethics talks of all obligations, 
they may be obligations of good will, generosity and kindness or they may be 
obligations of bounden duty ("Verbindlichkeiten der Schuldigkeit")."34 
lnnere Pflichten sind erfOIIt wenn man die ernstliche Gesinnung hegt obgleich 
unvermogend sie zu vollfOhren.") 
32Gregor 47 (MS 220: "Denn Handlungen bios darum, weil es Pflichten sind, ausOben und den 
Grundsatz der Pflicht selbst, woher sie auch komme, zur hinreichenden Triebfeder der WillkOr zu 
machen, ist das EigenthOmliche der ethischen Gesetzgebung." 
33See MS 220f for indirectly ethical duties. In Vorarbeiten zur Rechtslehre 268 Kant makes a 
similar point: "Aile Pflichten gehOren was die Moralit~t der Hand lung betrift zur Ethik welche die 
Nothwendigkeit der Handlungen aus Achtung furs Gesetz enth~lt." 
34MC 271 : "Der Unterschied vom jure und der Ethic besteht nicht in der Art der Verbindlichkeit, 
sondern in den Bewegungsgronden, den Verbindlichkeiten ein GenOge zu thun. Die Ethic redet 
von allen Verbindlichkeiten , es mogen Verbindlichkeiten des Wohlwollens, der Gro~mut und Gote 
From the standpoint of ethics, external coercion is an additional and 
unnecessary incentive since the action would have to be done even if external 
coercion did not exist; thus , for ethics, the idea of duty is sufficient as an 
incentive.35 
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We turn now to the second criterion which distinguishes the "Doctrine of 
Right" from the "Doctrine of Virtue." In the "Introduction to the Doctrine of Virtue" 
Kant points out that the "Doctrine of Right" is concerned with Right ("Recht") and 
the "Doctrine of Virtue" with an end ("Zweck"). 36 
"The "Doctrine of Right" is only concerned with the formal conditions of 
what Kant calls outer freedom. This is expressed in the universal principle of 
right: 
Any action is right if it can coexist with everyone's freedom in accordance 
with a universal law, or if on its maxim the freedom of choice of each can 
coexist with everyone's freedom in accordance with a universallaw.37 
Our actions or maxims must be unversalizable in order to guarantee the 
conformity with the law. All rights are founded on the concept of freedom and are 
the result of the hindrance of the impairment of freedom in conformity with law. It 
is consistent with this principle that one has the right to prevent the hindrance to 
seyn , oder es mogen Verbindlichkeiten der Schuldigkeit seyn, so betrachtet die Ethic aile 
zusammen nur so, daf:l, der Bewegungsgrund innerlich, ist, sie erwagt sie aus Pflicht und aus der 
innern Beschaffenheit der Sache selbst, und nicht aus Zwang . Das Ius aber betrachtet die 
Satisfaction der Verbindlichkeit nicht aus Pflicht, sondern aus Zwang." 
35Gregor 47: "All that ethics teaches is that if the incentive which juridical lawgiving connects with 
that duty, namely external constraint, were absent [weggelasen wird], the Idea of duty by itself 
would be sufficient as an incentive." (MS 220: "Die Ethik lehrt hernach nur, daf:l, , wenn die 
Triebfeder, welche die juiridsche Gesetzgebung mit jener Pflicht verbindet, namlich der aul:l,ere 
Zwang, auch weggelassen wird , die Idee der Pflicht allein schon zur Triebfeder hinreichend sei.") 
36See MS 380. 
37Gregor 56 (MS 230: "Eine jede Handlung ist r e c h t , die oder nach deren Maxime die Freiheit 
der WillkOr eines jed en mit jedermanns Freiheit nach einem allgemeinen Gesetze bestehen 
kann.") 
freedom, that is, to counteract another person's attempt to hinder freedom and 
thus to coerce a person to abstain from this hindrance.3a 
The "Doctrine of Virtue," however, is concerned with inner freedom and 
Kant renders and explains its supreme principle as follows: 
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Act in accordance with a maxim of ends that can be a universal law for 
everyone to have. In accordance with this principle man is an end for 
himself as well as for others, and it is not enough that he is not authorized 
to use either himself or others merely as means (since he could then still 
be indifferent to them); it is in itself his duty to make man in general his 
end.39 
The distinguishing mark between the "Doctrine of Right" and the "Doctrine of 
Virtue" is that the latter is concerned with ends and the former is not. 
Only the concept of an end that is also a duty, a concept that belongs 
exclusively to ethics, establishes a law for the maxims of actions by 
subordinating the subjective end (that everyone has) to the objective end 
(that everyone ought to make his end) .40 
Kant's view that ethics are concerned with an end has the following implications: 
First, it follows that we cannot be physically constrained by others to 
observe duties which are particular to ethics.41 The concept of ethics excludes 
38Compare MS 231; MSV 587 reads: "Aile Rechte grOnden sich auf den Begriff der Freiheit, und 
sind eine Folge der Behinderung des Abbruches der gesetzma~igen Freiheit: mithin aile negativ 
und stricter Art, so wie prohibitio ex propositione neminem laede." 
39Gregor 198 (MS 395: "Das oberste Princip der Tugendlehre ist: handle nach einer Maxime der 
Z we c k e . die zu haben fOr jedermann ein allgemeines Gesetz sein kann.--Nach diesem Princip 
ist der Mensch sowohl sich selbst als Andern Zweck, und es ist nicht genug, da~ er weder sich 
selbst noch andere bios als Mittel zu brauchen befugt ist (dabei er doch gegen sie auch indifferent 
sein kann) . sender den Menschen Oberhaupt sich zum Zwecke zu machen ist an sich selbst des 
Menschen Pflicht. ") 
40Gregor 193 (MS 389: "Der Beg riff eines Z w e c k s . der zugleich Pflicht ist, welcher der Ethik 
eigenthOmlich zugehort, ist es allein, der ein Gesetz fOr die Maxime der Handlungen begrOndet, 
indem der subjective Zweck (den jedermann hat) dem objectiven (den jedermann dazu machen 
soli) untergeordnet wird .") 
41Gregor 187 (MS 381 : "Da~ die Ethik Pflichten enthalte, zu deren Beobachtung man von 
anderen nicht (physisch) gezwungen werden kann, ist bios die Folge daraus, da~ sie eine Lehre 
der Z we c k e ist, weil dazu (sie zu haben) ein Z wang sich selbst widerspricht." My 
underlining.) 
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the possibility of outer coercion ("Zwang"), and "self-constraint ("Selbstzwang") 
"in accordance with moral laws belongs to the concept of ethics alone."42 To 
repeat, coercion in terms of coercion by others is a concept whose application is 
limited to the "Doctrine Of Right." 
Second, since ethics is concerned with universal ends it "does not give 
laws for actions (Ius does that), but only for maxims of actions." Because it does 
not prescribe laws for actions, 
it leaves a latitude (latitude) for free choice in following (complying with) 
the law, that is , that the law cannot specify precisely in what way one is to 
act and how much one is to do by the action for an end that is also a 
duty.43 
Hence, if the law commands or prohibits a particular action, the duty is of narrow 
obligation, and if the law commands a maxim the duty is of wide obligation. 
In the Lecture on the Metaphysics of Morals Kant elaborated on the 
difference between the principle of right and of ethics. He criticized Baumgarten 
for not having differentiated between the principles of right and ethics. The 
wording of the principle of right given in the lecture44 is similar to the formulation 
of this principle in The Metaphysics of Morals. The principle of ethics, however, is 
rendered in two separate formulations. According to the first one, called 
principium ethicum (ethical principle), one should "act in conformity with the law 
42Gregor 187 (MS 381 ). 
43Gregor 194 (MS 390: " ... denn wenn das Gesetz nur die Maxime der Handlungen, nicht die 
Handlungen selbst gebieten kann , so ists ein Zeichen, da~ es der Befolgung (Observanz) einen 
Spielraum (latitudo) fOr die freie WillkOr Oberlasse, d. i. nicht bestimmt angeben konne, wie und 
wie viel durch die Handlung zu dem Zweck, der zugleich Pflicht ist, gewirkt werden soil.") 
44MSV 539: 
"Herr Kant setzt a) das oberste Principium juris 
in der Einschrankung der Freiheit eines Jeden durch die Vernunft auf die Bedingung, da~ 
die Freiheit eines Jeden mit der Freiheit von Jedermann nach dem allgemeinen Gesetz 
Obereinstimme." 
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for the sake of the law or perform your duty for the sake of duty."45 Kant states 
that this aspect of the principle is formal and subjective because it concerns the 
incentive ("Triebfeder"), that is, the disposition ("Gesinnung") of the agent. In The 
Metaphysics of Morals this principle is called the "universal ethical command" 
("allgemeine ethische Gebot") .46 
The second formulation of the principle of ethics, principium ethices 
(principle of ethics), is material because it determines the action which should be 
performed and concerns the performance of the various duties of virtue: "Act in 
such a way towards other people that you c a n w i I I that the maxim of your 
action will become a universal morallaw."47 
The distinction between the prinicipium ethicum and the principium 
ethices corresponds to Kant's distinction between "virtue" and "duties of virtue" in 
The Metaphysics of Morals. Kant stresses that whereas "there are many different 
duties, corresponding to the different ends prescribed by the law, which are 
called duties of virtue (officia honestatis)" there is "merely one and the same" 
virtue.4B 
Virtue, according to Kant, is the disposition of respect for the law which 
involves the capacity for self-coercion "through the mere representation of one's 
duty in accordance with its formallaw."49 It is possible, according to Kant, to 
45MSV 541: " ... handle dem Gesetz gemar.. um des Gesetzes willen oder thue deine Pflicht aus 
Pflicht." 
46See MS 391 . 
47MSV 541 : "Handle so gegen andere Menschen , dar.. du w o II e n k a n n s t, dar.. die maxime 
deiner Handlung ein allgemeines Gesetz werde." 
48Gregor 198 (MS 395:"Die Tugend, als die in der festen Gesinnung gegrUndete 
Obereinstimmung des Willens mit jeder Pflicht, ist wie alles F o r m a I e bios eine und diesel be. 
Aber in Ansehung des Z we c k s der Handlungen, der zugleich Pflicht ist, d. i. desjenigen (des 
Materiale), was man sich zum Z we c k e machen so II, kann es mehr Tugenden geben , und 
die Verbindlichkeit zu der Maxime desselben heir..t Tugendpflicht, deren es also viele giebt.") 
49Gregor 197 (MS 394: " .. . so ist die Tugend nicht bios ein Selbstzwang (denn da konnte eine 
Naturneigung die ander zu bezwingen trachten), sondern auch ein Zwang nach einem Princip der 
perform a duty of right with respect to the law even though the law does not 
command it: 
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All duties involve a concept of constraint through a law. Ethical duties 
involve a constraint for which only internal lawgiving is possible, whereas 
duties of Right involve a constraint for which external lawgiving is 
possible. Since the moral capacity to constrain oneself can be called 
virtue, action springing from such a disposition (respect for law) can be 
called virtuous (ethical) action, even though the law lays down a duty of 
Right; for it is the doctrine of virtue that commands us to hold the Right of 
men sacred.so 
From virtue , as expressed in the principium ethicum or the universal ethical 
command, Kant distinguishes the duty of virtue which is concerned with the 
matter of the maxim which is an "end that is thought as also a duty."51 
We can summarize our findings in this section as follows: First, the 
"Doctrine of Right" differs from the "Doctrine of Virtue" with regard to its 
lawgiving. Ethical lawgiving unlike juridical lawgiving requires that a duty be done 
for the sake of duty and thus satisfies the principium ethicum. Every inner duty 
innern Freiheit, mithin durch die blo~e Vorstellung seiner Pflicht nach dem formalen Gesetz 
derselben) ." 
50Gregor 198. (MS 394: "Aile Pflichten enthalten einen Beg riff der N o t h i g u n g durch das 
Gesetz; die e t h i s c h e eine solche, wozu nur eine innere, die Rechtspflichten dagegen eine 
solche Nothigung, wozu auch eine au~ere Gesetzgebung moglich ist; beide also eines Zwanges, 
er mag nun Selbstzwang oder Zwang durch einen Andern sein: da dann das moralische 
Vermogen des ersteren Tugend und die aus einer solchen Gesinnung (der Achtung tors Gesetz) 
entspringende Handlung Tugendhandlung (ethisch) genannt werden kann, obgleich das Gesetz 
eine Rechtspflicht aussagt. Denn es ist die T u g e n d I e h r e, welche gebietet das Recht der 
Menschen heilig zu halten." 
Kant expresses the same idea in the following quote in which he compares the "respect 
for Right" with the universal ethical command: 
"Although there is nothing meritorious in the conformity of one's actions with Right (in 
being an honest man), the conformity with Right of one's maxims of such actions, as 
duties, that is, respect for Right, is meritorious. For a man thereby makes the Right of 
humanity, or also the Right of men, his end and in so doing widens his concept of duty 
beyond the concept of what is due (officium debit/), since another can indeed by his right 
require of me actions in accordance with the law, but not that the law be also my incentive 
to such actions. The same holds true of the universal eth ical command, 'act in conformity 
with duty from duty. "' (Gregor 194/MS 390f) 
51 Gregor 198 (MS 394f) . 
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must be performed because of the idea of duty, and every external duty can be 
performed because of the idea of duty. 
Second, in addition to the formal aspect that the action should be done 
from duty, ethics commands to set an end which is also a duty. It is thus 
concerned with an end in itself. In other words , to the requirement that a duty 
must be performed for the sake of duty Kant adds the requirement that in 
satisfying this duty one must strive for a universal end . Furthermore, since ethics, 
according to the principium ethices, is concerned with ends, it follows that we 
cannot be physically forced to fulfill them but must rely on self-constraint and are 
given a latitude for the observation of duties. 
In light of the findings of this section I suggest that the distinction between 
the "Doctrine of Right" and the "Doctrine of Virtue" in terms of the requirement to 
act because of an unspecified Uuridicallawgiving) or specified incentive (ethical 
lawgiving) corresponds to the distinction between the possibility of coercion by 
others Uuridicallawgiving) and the necessity of self-coercion (ethical lawgiving). 
Kant's distinction between the two parts of The Metaphysics of Morals 
presupposes that the subject is a free or autonomous subject who because it is 
free can act for the sake of duty and thus necessitates herself or himself to do 
her or his duty. The two parts of The Metaphysics of Morals taken together 
picture the autonomous subject as a whole and describe the different 
implications of this freedom in relationship with others and oneself. 
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Duties of Right and Duties of Virtue 
Kant's general division of duties into duties of right and duties of virtue is stated 
in the section on the "Division of the Metaphysics of Morals as a Whole. "52 Duties 
of right as well as duties of virtue are either duties to oneself or duties to others. 
Duties of right correspond either to "The right of humanity in our own person" or 
to "the Right of men;" both kinds of duties are, according to this division, "perfect" 
duties. Duties of virtue correspond either to "the end of humanity in our own 
person" or "the end of men" and are imperfect duties. This division of duties 
corresponds to the one Kant provides in the Lecture on the Metaphysics of 
Morals.53 
The particular "schema of duties of virtue" is diagrammed in the 
"Introduction to the Doctrine of Virtue."54 Kant distinguishes between a material 
and a formal aspect of duties of virtue and provides a further classification by 
distinguishing between internal and external duties of virtue: the material aspect 
is represented by the end commanded by the moral principle which is either "My 
own end, which is also my duty (My own petfection)" or "The end of others, the 
promotion of which is also my duty (The happiness of others)." The formal aspect 
of the duty of virtue refers to the incentive ("Triebfeder") or the subjective reason 
why someone performs an action. It is either the law or the end which represents 
the incentive, and Kant adds that the "morality of every free determination of the 
will" is based on the fact that the law is the incentive of the action, and that it is 
the end as incentive which is the reason for "the legality of the free determination 
of the will." In other words, if we act from duty we ensure the morality of our 
52Gregor 65 (MS 240). 
53See footnote no. 138. 
54Gregor 200 (MS 398). 
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actions, and if we use the end as an incentive we solely ensure the legality of our 
actions.55 
We pointed out that whereas Ius gives laws for actions which do not leave 
any latitude for the observance of duty, ethics, because it is concerned with 
universal ends,s6 gives laws for maxims which provide the agent with a latitude to 
comply with the duty. With regard to the question of obligation this means that 
"ethical duties are of wide obligation, whereas duties of right are of narrow 
obligation."57 
Kant speaks of obligatio stricta sive perfecta (strict or perfect obligation) if 
the law determines the action of duty ("Pflichthandlung") directly and he gives the 
example of repayment of one's debt.58 In this case, the law tells us specifically 
what kind of action should be done and the degree to which the action should be 
55We stated that Kant does not regard the four examples of duties in the Groundwork as the final 
representation of his system of duties, yet his examples correspond with one exception to the 
perfect and imperfect duties discussed in the "Doctrine of Virtue." In other words, they correspond 
to what Kant calls in The Metaphysics of Morals "duties of virtue." Since Kant regards making a 
false promise in the Groundwork as a violation of a perfect duty to others, it seems that in this 
early work he understood the four violations of duties as representations of the general 
classification of duties into inner (suicide) and outer (making a false promise) duties of right, and 
inner (neglecting one's talents) and outer (ignoring the suffering of others) duties of virtue , rather 
than as a representations of the particular classification of duties of virtue into perfect duties to 
oneself and imperfect duties to oneself and others. 
56Kant explains in MSV 541 that this universal will "consists in the universal end of all human 
beings and is called love towards others, the principle of good will with respect to the universal 
end of happiness. " ("Dieser allgemeine Wille besteht in dem allgemeinen Zweck aller Menschen 
und hei~t Liebe gegen andere, das Princip des Wohlwollens zum allgemeinen Zweck der GIUck-
seligkeit. ") 
57 Gregor 194. I have ignored the capitalization in the English translation of the title. (MS 390: "Die 
ethischen Pflichten sind von w e i t e r , dagegen die Rechtspflichten von e n g e r Verbind-
lichkeit. ") 
58See MSV 578. Kant also refers here to lawgiving as the "form of obligation," that is, the way the 
law determines how someone is obligated, whether in a strict or wide manner: "Verbindlichkeit 
beruhet jederzeit auf einer Nothigung durchs Gesetz, und bezieht sich also auf die Gesetzgebung. 
Diese ist die Form der Verbindlichkeit; durch das Gesetz wird die Art und Weise bestimmt, wie 
jemand verbunden wird , ob late oder stricte, und dabei von Handlungen , welche er dem zu Folge 
ausUben mu~. ganz abstrahirt." 
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performed. 59 The law obligates us strictly to perform the action and does not 
leave any latitude for its observance. The agent under perfect obligation can be 
forced by the empirical will of others to perform the action of duty.60 Duties 
determined in such a way by the law are called "perfect duties." 
In the case of obligatio lata (wide obligation), the law determines only the 
maxim needed to accomplish the end, and it is up to the agent to choose 
whatever action conforms with the maxim. Since these duties do not command a 
particular action the subject is given a latitude to comply with the law. 51 These 
kinds of duties are called "imperfect duties, "62 and Kant states that they are 
duties of virtue ("Tugendpflichten").63 Inner duties of virtue correspond to the end 
of humanity in our own person which is the perfection of ourselves. 54 Outer 
duties of virtue correspond to the end of other human beings which is 
happiness. 55 
We saw that duties of right, that is, perfect duties, 56 are either external or 
internal. Outer (external) duties of right (officia externi juris)67 are those for which 
59MSV 536: "Leges stricte determinantes sind diejenigen , die sowohl die Art der Verbindlichkeit, 
als auch solche dem Grade nach , d. i. ob, wann , wieviel , geleistet werden soli , bestimmen." See 
also MS 232, Vorarbeiten zur Tugendlehre , vol. 23, 394. 
60See MSV 528. 
61See MS 390. 
62MS 390; Kant uses the adjectives narrow ("eng"), perfect ("vollkommen ") , strict ("strenge") , wide 
("weit') and imperfect ("unvollkommen ') to characterize duties as well as obligations. 
63MS 240. The Latin is given in MSV 581 : officia lata or imperfecta. For a further discussion of 
duties of virtue see the last section of this Chapter. 
641n MS 447 (Gregor 242) Kant stresses again that "All duties to oneself regarding the end of 
humanity in our own person, are, therefore, only imperfect duties." ("Also sind aile Pflichten gegen 
sich selbst in Ansehung des Zwecks der Menschheit in unserer eigenen Person nur unvoll-
kommene Pflichten.") 
65MSV 583. In MSV 651 Kant states the principle of imperfect duties as follows: "Das Princip aller 
unvollkommenen Pflichten ist g e g e g e n s i c h s e I b s t : befordere deine eigene Vollkom-
menheit, und g e g en a n de r e: befordere andere r Menschen GIUckseligkeit." Compare 
MS 391-394. 
66See MS 240. 
67See MSV 585. 
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an external coercion ("Zwang '') is possible. Since they can be enforced by others 
they are called duties of coercion ("Zwangspflichten '') or offici a juridica. 68 Inner 
(internal) duties of right (officia intemi juris) cannot be enforced by others but 
only by oneself, they presuppose self-coercion ("Selbstzwang").69 From the 
aforesaid it is clear that not every duty of right is a duty of coercion.7° 
Since Kant defines duties of right as "duties for which external lawgiving is 
possible,"71 this definition allows for the possibility that there are duties of right 
for which an external lawgiving is not necessary. But this possibility can only 
refer to juridical duties and not to inner duties of right since for inner duties of 
right only an inner lawgiving is possible. I suggest therefore that Kant's definition 
of duties of right does not refer to outer as well as inner duties of right but only a 
definition of juridical duties. In other words, the possibility of external lawgiving 
must be restricted to juridical duties.72 My suggestion can be supported by a 
statement of Kant's found in his Lecture on the Metaphysics of Morals: 
lnterni juris stricti with respect to their form are all duties to oneself, which 
are strict because even though an external [lawgiving] is not possible 
nevertheless an inner lawgiving (inde self-coercion) is possible because 
they are derived from the concept of freedom by means of the law of 
contradiction, hence analytically, and are therefore of such a kind that 
68See MSV 582 where Kant identifies "Zwangspflichten" with "eigentliche officia juridica , rechtliche 
Pflichten." See also MSV 581 , 586. 
69See MS 380, MSV 587. 
70See MSV 581 : " ... endlich ist nicht jedes officium strictum d. i . jede Rechtspflicht eine 
Zwangspflicht in dem angenommenen Sinne, vielmehr la~t sich Zwang denken, ohne da~ er eine 
Pflicht gegen andere voraussetzt ... ". 
71Gregor 64 (MS 239: " ... Recht s p f I i c h ten (officia iuris), d. i. solche, fOr welche eine 
au~ere Gesetzgebung moglich ist ... ".) 
72The importance of this correction will become clear when we will discuss the systematic place of 
inner duties of right in the last section of this chapter. 
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they carry with them a necessity which also determines the action of duty 
itself. 73 
This quote also implies that inner duties of right are of strict or perfect obligation 
because these duties can be derived merely by applying the law of contradiction 
to the concept of freedom.74 According to this quote, the reason why duties are 
perfect or of strict obligation and thus command specific actions is that they are 
the result of the application of the law of contradiction to the concept of freedom. 
Both inner and outer duties of right limit the inner or outer exercise of freedom 
and obligate strictlyJs They are actions we owe to others or to ourselves 
("Schuldigkeitspflichten") and are directly determined by the law.76 Kant seems to 
suggest that duties of right are of strict or perfect obligation and duties of virtue 
of wide or imperfect obligation because the former are "analytical" duties and the 
latter "synthetical" duties, that is, the latter cannot be formulated merely by 
applying the law of contradiction to the concept of freedom. 
While duties of coercion (perfect duties to others) correspond to the right 
human beings have against each other, inner duties of right (perfect duties to 
oneself) reflect the right of humanity in our person.77 The "Doctrine of Right" as a 
doctrine concerned with the rights of human beings is only concerned with outer 
duties Uuridical duties), that is, perfect duties to others. Inner duties of right, that 
73MSV 587: "Die interna juris stricti sind der Form nach aile Pflichten gegen sich selbst, die darum 
streng sind , damit, wenngleich keine au~ere , dennoch eine innere Gesetzgebung (inde Selbst-
zwang) moglich ist ... ". 
74The following quote is the continuation of the previous quote in footnote no. 73 of MSV 587: 
" ... weil sie aus dem Begriff der Freiheit durch das Gesetz des Widerspruchs, mithin analytisch, 
abgeleitet werden, und also von der Art sind , da~ sie eine Nothwendigkeit bey sich fOhren , die 
auch die Pflichthandlung selbst bestimmt; (daher gehoren der materie nach hieher aile officia 
j u r i s i n t e r n i stricta, z. E. Die Pflicht, sich nicht zu verstommeln, sich nicht zu verkaufen, 
sich nicht zu toten.") 
75See Vorarbeiten zur Rechtslehre, vol. 23, 268. 
76See for example MSV 600, the Latin is rendered as: officia debiti. 
77See MSV 583 footnote no. 138 and MSV 604. 
is, perfect duties to oneself are not part of the "Doctrine of Right" and we will 
have to discuss whether or not they find entrance into the "Doctrine of Virtue" 
under the name "perfect duties to oneself."7B 
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To summarize: In this section, we distinguished external duties of right for 
which an external lawgiving is possible from inner duties of right as well as duties 
of virtue for which an external lawgiving is not possible. All duties of right are 
perfect, meaning they are of strict obligation and command or prohibit a 
particular action. Duties of virtue are, however, of wide obligation which means 
that a maxim and not a particular action is commanded so that the agent is 
provided with a latitude and can decide for himself how to comply with the duty. 
Inner Duties of Virtue 
Our discussion so far has shown that the distinction between perfect and 
imperfect duties and strict and wide obligation corresponds to Kant's distinction 
between duties of right and duties of virtue. We said that duties are perfect or of 
strict or narrow obligation when they command one to perform or not to perform 
a particular action; whereas imperfect duties or duties of wide obligation are 
duties which command one to adopt a particular maxim, but leave it up to the 
subject how to go about realizing it; they leave a latitude for action . 
We will now see that in the "Doctrine of Virtue" Kant uses the terms 
"perfect" and "imperfect" not only to distinguish between duties of right and 
duties of virtue, but to indicate the difference between two kinds of inner duties of 
virtue79 and to characterize the difference between the quality and the degree of 
7Bsee last section of this Chapter. 
79See also Schink 447. 
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the duty to perfect oneself. In addition to these two different meanings, I will 
discuss a third meaning which Kant provides in the Vorarbeiten zur Tugendlehre. 
In order to clarify the first usage of the terms, we turn to Kant's 
classification of duties to oneself into "limiting" or "negative" (perfect) and 
"widening" or "positive" (imperfect) duties which he provides in his "objective" 
division of duties to oneself in the first part of the "Doctrine of the Elements of 
Ethics" entitled "on Duties to oneself as such." 
The only objective division of duties to oneself will, accordingly, be the 
division into what is formal and what is material in duties to oneself. The 
first of these are limiting (negative) duties; the second, widening (positive 
duties to oneself). Negative duties forbid man to act contrary to the end of 
his nature and so have to do merely with his moral self-preservation; 
positive duties, which command him to make a certain object of choice his 
end, concern his perfecting of himself. Both of them belong to virtue, 
either as duties of omission (sustine et abstine) or as duties of 
commission (viribus concessis utere) , but both belong to it as duties of 
virtue.80 
First of all, it has to be observed that Kant's expression of the "division of duties 
to oneself ... into what is formal and what is material in duties to oneself' seems 
to suggest that "each" duty to oneself has a formal as well as a material aspect.81 
80Gregor 215f (MS 419: "Es wird daher nur eine 0 b j e c t i v e Eintheilung der Pflichten gegen 
sich selbst in das Formale und Materiale derselben statt finden; wovon die eine e i n s c h r a n -
k e n d (negative Pflichten) , die andere e r we iter n d (positive Pflichten) sind: jene, welche 
dem Menschen in Ansehung des Zwecks seiner Natur v e r b i e t e n demselben zuwider zu 
handeln, mithin bios auf die moralische S e I b s t e r h a I t u n g , diese welche g e b i e t e n 
sich einen gewissen Gegenstand der WillkOr zum Zweck zu machen und auf die V e r v o II -
k o m m n u n g seiner selbst gehen: von welchen beide zur Tugend entweder als Unterlassungs-
pflichten (sustine et abstine) oder als Begehungspflichten (viribus concessis utere) , beide aber als 
Tugenpflichten gehOren." 
81 According to this interpretation each inner duty of virtue comprises a formal aspect not to violate 
the end of human nature (the aspect of moral self-preservation) and the material aspect to strive 
for one's perfection (the aspect of perfecting oneself). This interpretation may explain why Kant 
does not list any vices when he speaks of imperfect duties to oneself, even though he lists vices 
when he speaks of the imperfect duties to others. It could be argued that the duties of omission 
listed under the perfect duty of self-preservation represent the vices which violate the duties of 
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1 will , however, not follow this line of interpretation at this point and assume that 
Kant's reference to what is formal and material in duties to oneself refers to 
different kinds of duties to oneself. We can then distinguish between duties 
which are purely formal and prohibit the violation of the end of human nature, 
that is, duties concerned with moral self-preservation , and duties which 
command us to adopt certain ends in order to perfect ourselves. Both kinds of 
duties are concerned with (an) end(s) . 
If we compare Kant's description of duties with the one given in the 
Groundwork, it becomes clear that the expression "what is formal and what is 
material in duties to oneself' corresponds to the characterization of perfect and 
imperfect duties in terms of the first and second formula of the categorical 
imperative. In other words , limiting or negative duties to oneself correspond to 
those duties which , according to the first formula , command that our maxim must 
be universalizable or conceivable as a universal law of nature, and , according to 
the second formula , prohibit the violation of the status of the human being as an 
end in itself.82 Widening or positive duties, however, correspond to those duties 
which , according to the first formula , command that we must be able to will that 
our maxim should become a universal law and, according to the second formula , 
command the promotion of humanity's status as an end in itself. Since every 
imperfect duty must satisfy the formal criterion of universalizability and hence 
satisfy the command of the perfect duty, every positive duty to perfect oneself 
must satisfy the negative duty to preserve oneself. According to this 
interpretation, the aspect of the formal and the material in duties to oneself make 
commission listed under the imperfect duty to perfect oneself. Furthermore, it could be argued that 
both aspects together characterize an end in itself in the full sense. 
82We saw that Kersting rejects this interpretation. But I am here not concerned with his criticism. 
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up the full sense of the concept of an end in itself. They ensure that the status of 
the human being is not violated (the aspect of moral self-preservation) and that it 
is promoted (the aspect of perfecting oneself). 
With regard to Kant's distinction between duties of wide and perfect 
obligation in The Metaphysics of Morals, we expect to find the latitude of wide 
obligation in the positive or widening duties and have reason to assume that the 
negative or limiting duties are those duties which prohibit particular actions. 
Support for the latter assumption is found in the Vorarbeiten where Kant states 
that ethical duties are directed towards an object or an end in general "except 
the duty to oneself which has to be rendered in specie, for example. Thou shall 
not speak the untruth ."B3 Since lying like self-murder constitutes a violation of the 
duty of self-preservation, it seems that the duty of self-preservation is called a 
"perfect" duty because this duty specifies the particular actions which have to be 
omitted.84 In other words, perfect duties to oneself do not allow for a latitude with 
regard to the observance of the law. 
We now turn to the second usage of the terms "perfect" and "imperfect" in 
the "Doctrine of Virtue." When Kant discusses the duty to increase one's moral 
perfection, he uses the terms not to distinguish between different kinds of duties 
to oneself, but to distinguish different aspects within one and the same duty. 
The duty to increase one's moral perfection commands purity of heart, 
that is , a moral disposition as well as the fulfillment of all of one's duties. In terms 
of its quality this duty is a narrow and perfect duty, but in terms of its degree it is 
a wide and imperfect duty. To further clarify this point Kant states: 
B3Vorarbeiten zur Tugendlehre , vol. 23, 387: "Sie [ethical duties] gehen aber immer nur auf das 
Object so fern es in genere prastirt werden soli ausgenommen die Pflicht gegen sich selbst die in 
specie soli geleistet werden z. B. Du sollst nicht die Unwahrheit reden ." 
B4We will return to this point in the last section of this Chapter. 
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It is man's duty to strive for this perfection, but not to reach it (in this life), 
and his compliance with this duty can, accordingly, consist only in 
continual progress. Hence, while this duty is indeed narrow and perfect 
with regard [Hinsicht] to its object (the idea that one should make it one's 
end to realize), with regard [Rucksicht] to the subject it is only a wide and 
imperfect duty to himself.B5 
According to this quote, the compliance with the duty to perfect oneself consists 
in a continual progress. The goal of this progression is perfection . All of us ought 
to intend the perfection of ourselves which is the reason why Kant calls it a 
perfect duty. But because of the "frailty (fragilitas) of human nature," that is, with 
regard to the subject, this duty is imperfect. Johann Heinrich Tieftrunk interprets 
Kant's statement as follows : "To be sure, the will we have, but the [power] to 
achieve it we lack."B6 In other words, despite our good intentions we may not 
always be able to act according to them. We must, therefore, according to 
Tieftrunk, distinguish between the command: "Have the maxim to make 
yourself perfect (consistent with the idea)" which is a strict duty, and the 
command: "Strive to follow your maxim as faithfully as it is p o s sib I e for 
you" which is a wide duty because of the latitude it leaves for its observance; it is 
up to us to decide "w h i c h virtue, and to which d e g r e e" we should make it 
our own.B7 
85Gregor 241 (MS 446: "Diejenige Vollkommenheit namlich, zu welcher zwar das S t r e b e n, 
aber nicht das E r r e i c he n derselben (in diesem Leben) Pflicht ist, deren Befolgung also nur im 
continuirlichen Fortschreiten bestehen kann , ist in H i ns i c h t auf das Object (die Idee, deren 
AusfOhrung man sich zum Zweck machen soli) zwar enge und vollkommene, in R 0 c k s i c h t 
aber auf das Subject weite und nur unvollkommene Pflicht gegen sich selbst.") 
B6Johann Heinrich Tieftrunk, Philosophische Untersuchungen Ober die Tugendlehre zur 
Erlauterung und Beurthei/ugn der metaphysichen AnfangsgrOnde der Tugend/ehre vom Herrn 
Prof lmm. Kant (Halle: in der Rengerschen Buchhandlung, 1798; reprinted ., Bruxelles, 115 
avenue Gabriel Lebon: Impression Anastaltique Culture et Civilisation, 1970), p. 337: "Das Wollen 
haben wir wahl , aber das Vollbringen fehlt uns ... ". 
87Tieftrunk 338: "Habe die Maxim e , dich vollkommen, (der Idee angemessen,) zu machen. 
Diese Pflicht ist eine enge, denn nie kann man sich hiervon frei sprechen. Aber z wei tens 
sagt es: B e s t r e b e dich, deiner Maxime so treu nachzukommen, als es dir m o g 1 i c h ist. 
Hiermit wird eine weite Pflicht ausgesagt, denn die AusObung derselben bekommt einen 
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Kant's distinction with regard to the duty to increase one's perfection 
corresponds to his distinction in the Vorarbeiten where he classifies ethical 
duties into strict and wide duties. Under strict duties he lists the end of humanity 
in one's own person which comprises one's perfection.ss Under wide duties he 
lists the end of human being which comprises the happiness of others. He then 
distinguishes between the disposition of virtue with regard to all duties and the 
duty of virtue; the former represents "obligatio stricte ethica" and the latter 
"obligatio ethica lata ."B9 
Spielraum in Ansehung der mancherlei Tugenden, wobei wir zu Oberlegen haben, w e I c h e 
Tugend, und in welchem Grade wir sie uns jederzeit zu eigen machen k on n e n."--Kant adds 
to the above considerations regarding the imperfect duties two different ones (I agree here with 
Gregor (1963) 173 and not with Tieftrunk 339f who seems to believe that the following 
considerations are an extension of the previous ones) . First, he argues that one does not possess 
the self-knowledge necessary to determine whether or not the incentive to fulfill one's duty 
"proceeds entirely from the representation of the law or whether there are not many other 
sensible impulses contributing to it that look to one's advantage (or to avoiding what is 
detrimental) and that, in other circumstances, could just as well serve vice." (Gregor 241) 
Second he states that objectively there "is only one virtue (as moral strength of one's moral 
maxims}," but subjectively there "is a multitude of virtues." It is therefore possible to understand 
the idea of virtue in terms of the sum of particular virtues. Since it is, according to the first quote, 
impossible to know whether or not we fulfill our duty solely from duty, we have reason to believe 
that among all the various virtues or duties there are some which do not qualify as virtues 
because they are not done from duty: 
"But a sum of virtues such that our self-knowledge can never adequately tell us whether it 
is complete or deficient can be the basis only of an imperfect duty to be perfect." (Gregor 
242) 
Kant provides two reasons why the duty to increase one's moral perfection is imperfect. First it is 
imperfect because we cannot know whether the sum of virtues is complete and, second, we 
cannot be certain that we perform all duties from the motive of duty. The limitation of (self-) 
knowledge is thus the reason why Kant believes that this duty is an imperfect duty. 
881n MSV 582 Kant states: " ... ich bin es dem Zwecke der Menschheit allerdings schuldig , mich 
zu vervollkommnen , nur freilich das Maa~ der Vollkommenheit ~~~t sich nicht vorschreiben." 
B9vorarbeiten zur Tugendlehre , vol. 23, 387: 
stricte late 
Ethische Pflicht 
I \ 
Zweck der Menschheit 
Ibid. 388: 
Tugendgesinnung in Ansehung 
aller Pflicht (innerlich) 
Zweck der Menschen 
Tugendpflicht (~u~erlich) 
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Kant concludes Book II"On Man's Imperfect Duties to Himself (with regard to his 
End)" by saying: 
All duties to oneself regarding the end of humanity in our own person, are 
therefore only imperfect duties. go 
Tieftrunk explains that all duties with regard to the end of humanity in our own 
person are "only imperfect (allowing for a latitude in the execution) duties" and 
that it is the second maxim "Do as much you can" which expresses this 
duty.91 
In the Vorarbeiten zur Tugendlehre we find another meaning of a perfect 
duty to oneself which may serve to explain why Kant refers to the limiting duties 
to oneself in The Metaphysics of Morals as negative duties. 
Kant distinguishes in the Vorarbeiten duties we owe to ourselves and 
duties we owe to others. He then points out that a violation of the former belongs 
to another class than the violation of the latter so that self-murder must be 
distinguished from murder. He then continues: 
It is always only a negative duty to the homo noumenon not to throw 
oneself away. 
It is not like in the case of the duty to oneself to refuse to serve 
another as a concubine. NB. It is a duty to omit that to which the human 
being has not right at all. Now, he has a right to sexual partnership, but 
only under certain conditions .. . . But to the disposition over his life or the 
obligatio stricte ethica 
Zweck der Menschheit 
in unserer eigenen Person 
obligation ethica lata 
Zweck der Menschen 
eigene Vollkommenheit fremde GIOckseligkeit 
90Gregor 242 (MS 447) . 
91Tieftrunk 340: "Das Gesetz also: 'Mache dich sittlich vollkommen' , schreibt uns einen Zweck 
vor, von dem wir, als Endzweck der Menschheit, nur eine Idee haben; die folglich , (in diesem 
Leben wenigstens,) nicht erreicht, sonder nur als Objekt der Bestrebung geboten werden kann ; da 
es heir..t: Thut, so v i e I i h r k o n n t : mithin sind aile Pflichten gegen sich selbst in Ansehung 
des Z we c k s de r Mensch he it in unsrer eignen Person nur unvollkommene, (der 
AusObung einen Spielraum verstattende,) Pflichten ." 
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unnatural use of his sexual organs he has no right at aii.--Hence, the duty 
to oneself is here unconditioned.92 
Kant is saying that a duty which does not correspond to a right is an 
"unconditioned" duty. It is a duty to which we are strictly obligated and it seems 
appropriate to call such a duty a perfect duty to oneself. Negative duties like the 
prohibition of self-murder as well as crimina carnis contra naturam93 are duties 
with respect to the homo noumenon, they command that we do not "throw" 
ourselves "away." 
Kant continues the above quote by saying : 
With regard to duties to oneself one does not look at whether one gives 
oneself to another as a thing but that one ought not to abuse oneself. 
Duties to oneself without a relation to a being that has rights, for 
example, not to lie--duties to oneself with regard to a being that has rights-
-duties to oneself with corresponding rights--right toward oneself without 
such duties. 
Of the duty which does not refer to the right of another.s4 
Kant repeats the above point differently by saying that there are duties to oneself 
which do not correspond to a being that has rights--before he did not speak of 
the subject of rights but said only that it is a duty to omit those actions to which 
the human being has no right. Lying and self-murder are duties of omission and 
do not correspond to a right. Furthermore, Kant seems to distinguish between 
92Vorarbeiten zur Tugendlehre , vol. 23, 405: "Es [he talks about self-murder] ist nicht so wie in der 
Pflicht gegen sich selbst nur sich zu weigern als Concubine einem Andern zu dienen. NB. Es ist 
eine Pflicht etwas zu unterlassen wozu der Mensch gar kein Recht hat. Nun hater ein Recht zur 
Geschlechtsgemeinschaft aber nur unter gewissen Bedingungen namlich sich mit dem den er sich 
erwirbt in welchselseitigen Besitz zu setzen. Aber zur disposition Ober sein Leben oder den 
unnatorlichen Gebrauch seiner Geschlechsgliedmar1en hater gar kein Recht.--Die Pflicht gegen 
sich selbst ist hier also unbedingt." 
93For a discussion of these crimina see the Chapter on "Homicidium Oolosum." 
94 Vorarbeiten zur Tugenlehre , vol. 23, 405: "Man sieht in der Pflicht gegen sich selbst nicht darauf 
dar1 man sich einem Andern als Sache hingeben sondern nur sich nicht selbst misbrauchen soli. 
Pflicht gegen sich selbst ohne Beziehung auf ein Wesen das Rechte hat z. B. nicht zu 
IOgen -- Pflicht gegen sich selbst mit Beziehung auf ein Wesen das Rechte hat -- Pflicht gegen 
sich selbst mir eben solchem Rechte -- Recht gegen sich selbst ohne solche Pflicht. 
Von der Pflicht die sich nicht auf das Recht des andern bezieht." 
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refusing to make oneself a means for someone else (the example of the 
concubine) and abusing oneself as a means (the example of self-murder, 
unnatural use of one's sexual organs, and lying) . This could either indicate a 
distinction within inner duties of right themselves and would explain why he 
discusses the former example in the "Doctrine of Right"95 and the latter in the 
"Doctrine of Virtue," or it could mean that only the former are inner duties of right 
and the latter duties of virtue. 
To summarize: 
First, Kant does not only call duties of right but also some of the duties of 
virtue "perfect." These perfect duties proh ibit the violation of an end (which has 
yet to be identified) and forbid particular actions. 
Second , Kant refers to the requirement of a moral disposition as a "perfect 
duty" or as "obligatio ethica stricta." If, therefore , negative duties to oneself which 
represent "what is formal in duties to oneself' are perfect in the latter sense, it 
means that they refer to the moral disposition to make perfection one's end. In 
short, "they are narrow and perfect with regard to ... the idea" of perfection. 
Third , perfect duties to oneself are duties to omit actions to which the 
human being has no right whatsoever. According to this interpretation , a perfect 
duty is a duty which , first, requires the omission of a specific action (it thus 
comprises the first meaning) and second, requires this omission unconditionally 
because of the lack of a right. 
95See MS 278. 
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Duties to Oneself 
Kant's Model of Self-obligation : Homo Phaenomenon and Homo Noumenon 
Before Kant turns to the discussion of the specific duties to oneself in the 
"Doctrine of Virtue," he first clears away possible objections to the very concept 
of a duty to oneself by referring to his distinction between the noumenal and 
phenomenal aspect of the human being, and , secondly, takes this opportunity to 
repeat his criticism of Baumgarten's classification of duties to oneself. For 
purposes of clarity I will start with the second point. 
In the "Doctrine of Virtue" Kant stresses in§ 4. On the Principles on 
Which the Division of Duties to Oneself is Based that we are not allowed to 
speak of duties to the body or the soul because they cannot be understood as 
substances placing us under obligation. With this warning Kant takes up his 
earlier criticism of Baumgarten's classification of duties to oneself into duties to 
the soul (officia erga animam) and duties to the body (officia erga corpus).96 Kant 
makes unmistakably clear that the subject who obligates and the subject who is 
obligated is "always only the human being."97 The question whether or not the 
soul exists is of no importance to morals. However, in so far as human beings 
ascribe to themselves the capacity for freedom, that is, personality, and regard 
themselves as noumena, Kant is willing to call this capacity or quality "soul."98 
Kant's argument that it makes sense to speak of self-obligation has to be 
understood in the broader context of the antinomy of freedom and determinism 
discussed in the first Critique and in the Groundwork.99 Any action, according to 
96See MSV 607, 625 and the index on page 743 of the reprinted editions of Baumgarten's Ethica 
Phi/osophica from the years 1751 and 1763. 
97MS 419: "Das verpflichtete sowohl als das verpflichtende Subject ist immer n u r d e r 
Mensch .... "My translation . 
98See MSV 626. 
99See Kant's Chapter on "The Extreme Limit of Practical Philosophy" in the Groundwork. 
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Kant, must be determined, but we have to distinguish between different kinds of 
determination: "Praedeterminismus" and "freedom."1oo The former describes 
actions as natural events in time and space, governed by the law of cause and 
effect. The latter describes actions as the result of the spontaneity of the 
subject.1D1 In other words, the subject is not determined by a previous event in 
time and space but is auctor1D2 of the action and thus a free being responsible 
for them. 1D3 
Furthermore, Kant argues against Wolff and Baumgarten who believe that 
the human being as agent is independent from the mechanism of nature if her or 
his actions are guided by intellect or reason. Performing an act of reasoning 
while acting does not free us from the mechanism of nature because every act of 
thinking and deliberating is itself a natural event where the intellect investigates 
the effects and then chooses the means to act.1D4 To consider the advantages, 
disadvantages, or other consequences of an action is an example of an action 
determined by reason or the intellect but still governed by the mechanism of 
nature. An action performed under a hypothetical imperative is thus an example 
of an action determined by natural laws. 
1DDsee MSV 502f, 505; compare also GMS 446f. 
101See for example MSV 494, 505. 
102See MSV 503f. 
1D3To illustrate Kant's point: A person who kills another while driving drunk could try to defend 
himself by telling the judge that this accident was likely to happen since it is a physiologically 
known fact that the intake of alcohol impairs one's reaction time. No judge would accept this 
explanation since the person is viewed not from the point of "predeterminism" but as determined 
by his own will and therefore responsible for making the choice to drink alcohol in the first place. 
104See MSV 503: "Man nimmt zwar ferner an, z. E. Wolf sowie Baumgarten, dar.. der handelnde 
Mensch von aller Naturnothwendigkeit unabhangig sey, insofern seine Handlungen durch motiven 
geleitet, mithin durch Verstand und Vernunft determiniert worden ; dies ist aber falsch . Der Mensch 
wird dadurch nicht vom Natur-Mechanismo befreit, dar.. er bey seiner Handlung einen actum der 
Vernunft vornimmt. Jeder Actus des Denkens, Ueberlegens ist selbst eine Begebenheit der Natur, 
wobey der Verstand die VerknOpfung der Ursachen der Dinge mit ihren Wirkungen aufsucht, und 
darnach die Mittel zum Handeln wahlt: nur dieser Actus ist eine innerliche Begebenheit, da sie in 
dem Menschen selbst geschieht ... ". 
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According to Kant, we could not meaningfully speak of obligation if the human 
being would solely be subjected to the mechanism of nature, that is, to natural 
laws. If there were to be no categorical imperative so that the reason for the 
determination of our actions would be merely hypothetical, obligation 
("Verbindlichkeit") would not exist, and all actions would be built only on 
technical-practicallaws.1os The very concepts of obligation as well as self-
obligation imply that the empirical will of the human being is free because it can 
be successfully necessitated by the moral law despite physical and psychological 
restraints. 
The possible contradiction inherent in the assumption of a self which not 
only actively necessitates (obligates) but at the same time is passively 
necessitated (obligated)1D6 to do her or his duty can, according to Kant, be 
avoided if the subject regards ("betrachtet") herself or himself in two different 
ways. While speaking of obligation in his Lecture on the Metaphysics of Morals 
Kant poses the following question: "Namely, whether obligation requires two 
kinds of persons, that is, an obligans and an obligatum and who the obligans 
would be?" He answers this question with regard to duties to oneself as follows: 
However, if we consider the duties to oneself, the human being rightly 
["recte"] depicts himself in his physical nature, that is , in as much as he is 
subjected to the laws of nature, as the one who is obligated , but if one 
personifies the one who obligates as an ideal being , or as a moral person 
it cannot be anything but the lawgiving of reason: this is therefore the 
human being as intelligible being which in this case obligates the human 
105See MSV 506: "Hatten wir keine moralischen Gesetze, und ware in uns kein categorischer 
lmperativ der Pflicht, sondern standen unsere Handlungen bios unter Naturbedingungen, und 
unsere Bestimmungsgronde waren bios hypothetisch, so gabe es keine Verbindlichkeit, so waren 
aile Handlungen nur auf technisch-practische Gesetze gebaut. " 
106See MS 417. Compare GMS 456. 
being as sensible being; [it is therefore] a relation between the 
phaenomenon to him as noumenon.1 D7 
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Following Kant, the person who is obligated is the physical person subjected to 
the law of nature (sensible being), and the one who obligates is the reasoning 
person understood as lawgiver. It is therefore the sensible being (phaenomenon) 
who is obligated by the intelligible being (noumenon). 
In The Metaphysics of Morals Kant speaks of the "twofold quality" 
("zwiefache Qualitat") or the "twofold meaning" ("zweierlei Bedeutung") which 
describe the human being : 
When man is conscious of a duty to himself, he views himself, as the 
subject of duty, under two attributes: first as a sensible being, that is , as 
man (a member of one of the animal species), and second as an 
intelligible being (not merely as a being that has reason, since reason in 
its theoretical capacity could well be an attribute of a living corporeal 
being) . The senses cannot attain this latter aspect of man; it can be 
recognized only in morally practical relations , where the incomprehensible 
107MSV 509f. Prior to this quote Kant briefly refers to Baumgarten and Crusius who regard God or 
God's will as that which or the one who obligates. The whole quote reads as follows: 
"Bey jeder Pflicht mur.. eine obligans persona gedacht werden , und ohne dar.. sie einen 
actum praestirt, der den anderen als obligatum darstellt. -- Dies wird in der Folge 
erwiesen werden ; inder.. ist dieser Satz bisher problematisch anzusehen: 
ob namlich zu einer Obligation zweyerlei Personen, namlich ein 
obligans und obligatum erforderlich sind , und wer der obligans sey? 
Obzwar die Obligation durch die Vernunft festgestellt wird , so nimmt man doch an, dar.. 
wir uns als passsive Wesen bei Ausobung unserer Pflicht ansehen mussen, und dar.. eine 
andere Person da seyn musse, die uns zur Pflicht necessitirt. --
Diese nothigende Person fand Crusius in Gott, und Baumgarten gleich als im gottlichen 
Willen , jedoch durch die Vernunft und nicht positive erkannt, und auf diesem Princip ist 
ein besonderes moralisches System gebauet worden . Nehmen wir inder.. auf die Pflichten 
gegen uns selbst ROcksicht, so stellt sich der Mensch in seiner physischen Natur, d. i. 
insoweit er den Gesetzen der Natur unterworfen ist, als der verpflichtetet und recte dar, 
personificirt man aber den Verpflichtenden als ein idealisches Wesen , oder als eine 
moralische Person, so kann es kein anderes, als die Gesetzgebung der Vernunft seyn : 
dies ist also der Mensch als intelligibeles Wesen allein betrachtet, das hier den Menschen 
als Sinnenwesen verpflichtet, also ein Verhaltnir.. des Phanomenon gegen ihn als 
Noumenon. -- In ahnlicher Artistes bey Verbindlichkeiten gegen Andere." 
property of freedom is revealed by the influence of reason on the inner 
lawgiving wi11.1oa 
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Kant offers in this quote a description of a human being conscious of a duty to 
herself or himself. Being conscious of a duty to oneself is described as regarding 
oneself "first" as sensible being, "but then also" as intelligible being. 1o9 
Kant distinguishes between the view of the human being as a member of 
an animal species to whom he refers as sensible being or being of the senses 
("Sinnenwesen") and the view of the human being as a being of reason or an 
intelligible being ("Vernunftwesen"). The latter view is the view of the human 
being as an ideal of reason. With regard to the meaning of the term "intelligible 
being," Kant points out that this aspect represents freedom which manifests itself 
as the determination of the inner lawgiving will by reason. Furthermore, Kant 
distinguishes in this paragraph between the theoretical and practical capacity of 
reason. It is possible to ascribe the capacity for theoretical reasoning to a living 
corporeal being. Yet it seems that Kant believes that the capacity for practical 
reasoning cannot be ascribed to a corporeal being. When Kant then defines the 
homo phaenomenon as a "natural being that has reason" ("vernunftiges 
Naturwesen"), the term "reason" can only refer to the theoretical capacity of 
reasoning. In this case reason is understood as the cause which determines the 
1 OBGregor 215 (MS 418: "Der Mensch betrachtet sich in dem Bewur..tsein einer Pflicht gegen sich 
selbst, als Subject derselben, in zwiefacher Qualitat: erstlich als S i n n en we s e n , d. i. als 
Mensch (zu einer der Thierarten gehorig); dann aber auch als V e r n u n f t we s e n (nicht bios 
vernOnftiges Wesen, weil die Vernunft nach ihrem theoretischen Vermogen wohl auch die Qualitat 
eines lebenden korperlichen Wesens sein konnte) , welches kein Sinn erreicht und das sich nur in 
moralisch-praktischen Verhaltnissen, wo die unbegreifliche Eigenschaft der F r e i h e i t sich 
durch den Einflur.. der Vernunft auf den innerlich gesetzgebenden Willen offenbar macht, 
erkennen lar..t." 
109J have changed Gregor's translation which renders "dann aber auch" with "and" which makes it 
hard to see a possible connection with GMS 453, where obligation is described as a simultaneous 
experience of belonging to the sensible as well as to the intelligible world (see text below). 
actions in the sensible world .11 o Despite the rationality of the homo 
phaenomenon and because reason is understood in terms of causality, we 
cannot speak of obligation: 
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Now, man as a natural being that has reason (homo phaenomenon) can 
be determined by his reason, as a cause, to actions in the sensible world , 
and so far the concept of obligation does not come into consideration .111 
As homo noumenon, however, human beings are endowed with inner freedom 
and therefore capable of obligation as well as imputation. 112 It is by virtue of the 
human being as homo noumenon or exclusively rational being that we can speak 
of obligation. 
But the same man thought in terms of his personality, that is, as a being 
endowed with inner freedom (homo noumenon), is regarded as a being 
that can be put under obligation and, indeed, under obligation to himself 
(to the humanity in his own person).113 
In the introduction to the "Doctrine of Virtue" Kant explains that the term "inner 
freedom" refers to the determination of actions by the thought of the moral law. 
Two conditions have to be fulfilled in order to speak of inner freedom , namely 
that we are able to tame our affects and to rule our passions.11 4 In other words , 
110The terms "sensible being," "homo phaenomenon" and "natural being that has reason" are 
used interchangeably by Kant as are the terms "intelligible being" and "homo noumenon." A 
sensible being is therefore still a rational being. For the distinction between sensible and 
intelligible being or phenomenon and noumenon see also MSV 504 ff. 
11 1Gregor 215 (MS 418: "Der Mensch nun als vernOnftiges Nat u rw e sen (homo 
phaenomenon) ist durch seine Vernunft, als U r s a c h e , bestimmbar zu Handlungen in der 
Sinnenwelt, und hiebei kommt der Begriff einer Verbindlichkeit noch nicht in Betrachtung.") 
112See MS 239, MSV 579. See also Kant's definition of moral personality and humanity MS 223, 
239. 
113Gregor 215 (MS 418: "Eben derselbe aber seiner P e r s o n I i c h k e i t nach, d. i. als mit 
innerer F r e i h e i t begabtes Wesen (homo noumenon) gedacht, ist ein der Verpflichtung 
fahiges Wesen und zwar gegen sich selbst (die Menschheit in seiner Person) betrachtet ... ".--
The Eng lish translation splits Kant's single sentence into two. 
11 4MS 407: "Zur inneren Freiheit aber werden zwei Stocke erfordert: seiner selbst in einem 
gegebenen Fall Meister (animus sui compos) und Ober sich selbst Herr zu sein (imperium 
in semetipsum) , d. i. seine Affecten zu z a h me n und seine Leidenschaften zu be h e r r-
schen." 
only if we are able to determine ourselves to action independent from our 
sensibility does the term "inner freedom" apply. 
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What we have said so far indicates that we can only speak of obligation if 
human beings are able to see themselves as independent from causal determi-
nation, that is, as free . The basis for obligation is therefore the homo noumenon. 
And even though a sensible being is a rational being, reason manifests itself in 
this case as an instrument to choose the means necessary for the accomplish-
ment of subjective goals; whereas, in the case of the intelligible self, reason 
manifests itself as freedom. This, however, does not mean, according to the 
cited texts, that the relation of obligation or self-obligation could be explained 
solely with reference to the homo noumenon as the last quote might suggest. 
Kant completes the above statement by saying: 
So man (taken in these two different senses) can acknowledge a duty to 
himself without falling into contradiction (because the concept of man is 
not thought in one and the same sense) .115 
This last part of the sentence suggests that obligation is the result of regarding 
the human being on the one hand as homo noumenon (the one who obligates) 
and on the other hand as homo phaenomenon (the one who is obligated). Thus, 
obligation is understood in terms of a relation between the homo noumenon and 
the homo phaenomenon. Kant expresses a similar view in the Groundwork and 
in the Lecture on the Metaphysics of Morals. In the former work, he contrasts 
freedom with obligation and explains: 
We see now that when we think of ourselves as free, we transfer 
ourselves into the intelligible world as members and recognize the 
115Gregor 215 (MS 418: " ... so: dar.. der Mensch (in zweierlei Bedeutung betrachtet), ohne in 
Widerspruch mit sich zu gerathen (wei I der Beg riff vom Mensch en nicht in einem und demselben 
Sinn gedacht wird) , eine Pflicht gegen sich selbst anerkennen kann.") 
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autonomy of the will together with its consequence--morality; whereas 
when we think of ourselves as under obligation we look upon ourselves as 
belonging to the sensible world and yet to the intelligible world at the 
same time.116 
Kant assumes in this quote and the quote from the "Doctrine of Virtue" that being 
obligated (to oneself) can be described as the simultaneous thought or 
consciousness of two standpoints. The characterization of obligation given in the 
Groundwork describes obligation in general in terms of the sensible and the 
intelligible world; whereas, the one given in the "Doctrine of Virtue" specifies who 
is obligated to whom in terms of the homo phaenomenon and the homo 
noumenon. 
In the Lecture on the Metaphysics of Morals Kant describes making a rule 
for oneself or putting oneself under obligation in terms of a relation between the 
sensible (homo phaenomenon) and intelligible self (homo noumenon): 
To make a rule for oneself implies that one put in relation one's intelligible 
self, i.e., humanity in one's person, to one's sensible being, thus [that one 
put in relation] the human being as acting [part] to humanity as law-giving 
part.117 
Yet the most elaborate description of the relation of obligation is found some 
fifteen pages later where Kant prefaces his discussion of inner duties of right as 
follows: 
116Paton 121 (GMS 453: "Denn jetzt sehen wir, dar.., wenn wir uns als frei denken , so versetzen 
wir uns als Glieder in die Verstandeswelt und erkennen die Autonomie des Willens sammt ihrer 
Folge, der Moralitat; denken wir uns aber als verpflichtet, so betrachten wir uns als zur Sinnenwelt 
und doch zugleich zur Verstandeswelt gehorig.") Given Kant's explanation of the homo noumenon 
or personality in terms of inner freedom, we are justified in believing that autonomy is an 
expression of inner freedom. 
117MSV 579: "Gegen sich selbst eine Regel machen setzt voraus, dar.. man sein intelligibles 
Selbst, d. i. die Menschheit in seiner Person gegen sein sensibles Wesen , d. i. den Menschen in 
seiner Person , mithin den Menschen als handelnden gegen die Menschheit als Gesetz gebenden 
Theil , in Verhaltnir.. setzt." 
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As there must correspond to every right a duty (although not a duty of 
constraint, yet) at least an inner duty, likewise humanity has a right with 
regard to myself as a human being so that in this case an ob/igatus versus 
an obligatum appears. This has to be explained with the help of a double 
nature. One thinks of the human being first of all as an ideal as he should 
be and can be merely according to reason and calls this idea homo 
noumenon: this being is thought of in relation to another in such a way as 
if this other would be restricted by it; this is the human being in the state of 
sensibility whom one calls homo phanomenon. The latter is the person 
and the former merely a personified idea, where the human being is only 
subjected to the moral law, whereas as a phanomenon [the human being 
is] affected by feelings of lust and pain and must be forced by the 
noumenon to the performance of duty. One can therefore draw an 
analogy to the relation between one human being to another.11a 
Here Kant represents the relation between humanity and the human being as a 
relation between the homo noumenon and the homo phaenomenon which 
characterizes the human being.119 Kant equates the intelligible self (the ideal) or 
the homo noumenon with humanity and the sensible self or the homo 
phaenomenon with the human being or the person. It is the homo noumenon 
which restricts the homo phaenomenon. 
118MSV 593: "So wie jedem Recht eine Pflicht wenigstens (wenngleich nicht Zwangspflicht, doch) 
eine innere Pflicht correspondiren mur.., so hat auch die Menschheit gegen mich als Menschen ein 
Recht, also tritt hier ein obligatus gegen einen obligatum auf. Dies ist durch ein doppeltes Wesen 
zu erklaren. Man denkt sich den Menschen zuvorderst als Ideal , wie er seyn soli , und seyn kann , 
bios nach der Vernunft, und nennt diese Idee homo noumenon: Dies Wesen denkt man sich zu 
einem andern , so, als werde dies andere von ihm eingeschrankt; dies ist der Mensch im Zustande 
der Sinnlichkeit, den man homo phanomenon nennt. Dies ist die Person und jenes ist bios eine 
personificirte Idee, wo der Mensch bios unter dem moralischen Gesetze, hier aber als phanomen , 
der vom GefOhl von Lust und Schmerz afficirt und durch das noumenon zur Pflichtleistung 
gezwungen werden mur... Man kann also hier ein analogon hernehmen, sowie ein Mensch im 
Verhaltnis zu einem anderen steht." 
119Kant is saying here that the relation of 
humanity is analogous to homo noumenon . yet it has to be remembered that the latter 
human being homo phaenomenon 
relation characterizes the human being so that the relation : 
humanity 
human being ... is analogous to ... homo noumenon 
~ ~ homo phaenomenon 
By internalizing humanity as homo noumenon the human being is no longer only a homo 
phaenomenon but both , homo noumenon as well as homo phaenomenon. 
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The previous quotes taken together confirm that the homo noumenon is the 
lawgiving aspect, and the homo phaenomenon, the subject who can be coerced 
by the homo noumenon to act according to the law. 12o Humanity or the homo 
noumenon obligates the homo phaenomenon and has the right to restrict the 
actions of the homo phaenomenon, that is, to constrain her or him to perform her 
or his duties. The homo phaenomenon is therefore subjected to the jurisdiction 
of the homo noumenon and its coercion. In the case of juridical duties this 
coercion is exercised by others, but in the case of inner duties it must be 
exercised by the subject herself or himself, that is, by the homo noumenon. 
Since Kant also equates humanity (homo noumenon) with practical reason which 
in turn is defined as will , we can say that the will or practical reason obligates the 
empirical will (homo phaenomenon).12L-What has been said so far suggests that 
the obligation of the homo phaenomenon by humanity or the homo noumenon is 
understood in terms of constraint ("Zwang"). 
Kant's description of the human being as "sensible being" 
("Sinnenwesen") and "intelligible being" ("Vernunftwesen") indicates not only that 
he or she is on the one hand determined by the laws of nature and on the other 
hand by the moral law, but it also indicates that the human being as a sensible 
being is an object of experience; whereas the human being as intelligible being 
is an idea(l) of reason which by definition can never become an object of 
experience, but must nevertheless--for practical purposes--be thought. Kant 
points out that the human being is "humanity in appearance thus subsumed to 
humanity as generi,"122 and draws an analogy between the relation of humanity 
120compare also Vorarbeiten zur Tugendlehre, vol. 23, 386. 
121 Compare for example Vorarbeiten zur Tugendlehre , vol. 23, 398, MS 226, KpV 97f. 
122MSV 579: "Der Mensch dagegen ist die Menschheit in der Erscheinung, mithin der Menschheit 
als generi untergeordnet." 
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to the human being and the relation of the idea of reason and human reason. 
Thus, we may say that Kant's model of self-obligation relates the human being 
as object of experience (the one under obligation) or homo phaenomenon to the 
human being as an ideal of reason (the one who imposes obligation) or homo 
noumenon. 
The Function of Duties to Oneself in Kant's Ethics 
On the first page of the introduction to the "Doctrine of Virtue" Kant points out 
that the duties to oneself are the basis for all other duties. 
For suppose there were no such duties: Then there would be no duties 
whatsoever, and so no external duties either. For I can recognize that I 
am under obligation to others only insofar as I at the same time put myself 
under obligation, since the law by virtue of which I regard myself as being 
under obligation proceeds in every case from my own practical reason; 
and in being constrained by my own reason, I am also the one 
constraining myself.123 
The very existence of duties to oneself must provide us with an element 
essential to all duties, including external duties of right. Self-obligation and any 
other kind of obligation is possible because self-constraint ("Selbstzwang") is 
possible. Self-constraint refers to moral constraint where the mere representation 
of the moral law is felt as a necessitation to act in accordance with it.124 Self-
constraint proves that the human being is free because he or she can act 
independently from the determination by stimuli; and not only that, because self-
123Gregor 214. See the German in MS 417f: "Denn setzet: es gebe keine solche Pflichten, so 
wurde es Uberall gar keine, auch keine aul1ere Pfl ichten geben. -- Denn ich kann mich gegen 
Andere nicht fUr verbunden erkennen, als nur so fern ich zugleich mich selbst verbinde: weil das 
Gesetz, kraft dessen ich mich fUr verbunden achte, in allen Fallen aus meiner eigenen 
praktischen Vernunft hervorgeht, durch welche ich genothigt werde, indem ich zugleich der 
Nothigende in Ansehung meiner selbst bin." See also PPP 192 for the importance of duties to 
oneself. 
124See MSV 519f, MS 396. 
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constraint is possible, human beings can be forced by others to do their duty.125 I 
suggest, therefore, that the importance of duties to oneself consists in the fact 
that they attest to the possibility of self-constraint or self-obligation and thus to 
the freedom of the subject. In other words, only if we assume that (the law of) 
practical reason can determine or necessitate the empirical will, that is, only if the 
subject is autonomous, does it makes sense to command specific actions or 
behavior in terms of duties from the subject. 
Kant had already pointed to the importance of duties to oneself in his 
Lecture on Practical Philosophy recorded by Powalski and had made the 
connection between duties to oneself and humanity: 
The duties to oneself are greater than all other duties. 
All duties to oneself consist in the conformity of the actions with the 
dignity of the human being to value his person, or not to dishonor 
humanity in his own person .126 
In other words the principle of duties to oneself "consists in the conformity of our 
actions with the dignity of humanity."127 According to this early lecture, any 
violation of the ends of humanity violates the duties to oneself: 
The essential ends of humanity are the grounds for the possibi lity of 
humanity itself. What contradicts the essential ends of humanity is also 
125MSV 520: " Dagegen ist es gewir.., dar.. durch den Selbstzwang der Mensch eben beweist, dar.. 
er frei ist, indem er dadurch eine independentiam arbitrii liberi a determinationibus per stimulos, 
mithin seine Freiheit beweist. Allein hieraus folgt noch mehr, namlich: §. 24. Es kann Jemand von 
anderen zur Pflicht gezwungen werden, under handelt auch alsdann frei. " See also MS 380, 
footnote.--For Kant's distinction of the two kinds of incentives (stimuli and motives) which 
determine actions in a human being, see MSV 491-494. 
126ppp 188: "Die Pflichten gegen sich Selbst sind gror..er als aile anderen Pflichten. 
Aile Pflichten gegen sich selbst beruhen in der Uebereinstimmung der Handlungen mit der WUrde 
des Menschen, seine eigene Person zu schazzen, oder in seiner eigenen Person die Menschheit 
nicht zu entehren."--For the question of honor see the section "The Principle of Inner Duties of 
Right or of Strict Duties to Oneself' in the Chapter on the "Right of Humanity." 
127ppp 190: "Das principium der Pflichten gegen uns selbst bestehet in der Obereinstimmung 
unserer Handlungen mit der WUrde der Menschheit. " 
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contrary to the duties to oneself. Thus it is contrary to the duty of humanity 
to take away one's freedom by oneself or to throw it away.12a 
These few quotes from the Lecture on Practical Philosophy suggest that the 
dignity of humanity can only be preserved if the ends of humanity are not 
violated and the duties to oneself ensure that we abstain from this violation. 
In the Lecture on Moral Philosophy recorded by Collins, Kant states the general 
principle of duties: 
The principium of all duties is the conformity of the use of freedom with 
the essential ends of humanity.129 
Kant explains that selling one's body parts, making oneself a sexual object for 
another person, and killing oneself are all actions which originate from freedom 
but are contrary to the essential ends of humanity. He then states the principle of 
duties to oneself: 
The principium of duties to oneself does not consist in favoring oneself 
["Selbstgunst;" Y. U.] but in self-esteem ["Selbstschatzung;" Y. U.] that 
means our action must conform with the dignity of humanity. One could 
here also say, as one does in /us: neminem laede , thus noli naturam 
humanam in te ipso /aedere.130 
Following Vigilantius' notes of the Lecture on the Metaphysics of Morals 
philosophy recorded fifteen years later, killing oneself or throwing one's freedom 
away constitutes a violation of the right of humanity. Kant explains with regard to 
the hierarchy of duties to oneself that inner duties of right have priority: 
128See PPP 190: "Die wesentliche Zwekke der Menschheit sind die Gronde der Moglichkeit der 
Menschheit selbst. Was den wesentlichen Zwekken der Menschheit wiederspricht das ist auch 
den Pflichten gegen uns selbst entgegen. So ist es der Pflicht der Menschheit entgegen, sich 
seine Freyheit selbst zu nehmen, oder sie wegzuwerfe." 
129MC 346: "Das principium aller Pflichten ist also die Uebereinstimmung des Gebrauchs der 
Freyheit mit den wesentlichen Zecken der Menschheit." 
130oas principium der Pflichten gegen sich selbst bestehet nicht in der Selbstgunst, sonder in der 
Selbstschatzung, das heir.,t unsre Handlungen mor.,en mit der Worde der Menschheit Ober-
einstimmen. Man konnte auch hier sagen, so wie es beim Recht heir.,t: neminem laede, also noli 
naturam humanam in te ipso laedere." 
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In short, assuming that duties to oneself exist, duties of right to oneself 
are the highest duties among all. They concern the corresponding right of 
humanity in one's own person, are therefore perfect duties and each 
action of duty is demanded without exception by the right of humanity and 
constitutes duty in and by itself.131 
Kant's reference to the end of humanity in this later lecture is given in the context 
of discussing the principle which governs imperfect duties to oneself (principium 
ethices): 
That is to say, it is impossible for the human being to will that the universal 
law of freedom takes place and is carried out if it would run counter to the 
universal end of humanity.132 
In the Vorarbeiten zur Tugendlehre Kant states: 
Duties to oneself do not refer to rights but ends which are at the same 
time duties and [they; Y. U] are the highest among all duties of virtues.133 
This quote does not, according to Kant, mean that duties to oneself are no 
longer concerned with the Right of humanity since he states that 
With regard to the right of humanity personal ["eigene"] perfection is the 
end [.]"134 
Personal perfection includes physical as well as moral perfection. In the first 
quote from the Vorarbeiten Kant only points out that duties to oneself are the 
most important duties of virtue. Whether or not this would contradict his 
statement in the "Doctrine of Virtue" where he stresses the importance of duties 
131MSV 604: "Kurz, angenommen, es giebt Pflichten gegen sich selbst, so sind die 
Rechtspflichten gegen sich selbst die hbchsten Pflichten unter 
a II e n. Sie betreffen das correspondirende Recht der Menscheit in seiner eigenen Person, sind 
daher vollkommene Pflichten, und jede Pflichthandlung wird von dem Recht der Menschheit 
unerlar..lich gefordert, und ist an und fOr sich selbst Pflicht." 
132MSV 541: "Es ist namlich dem Menschen zu wollen unmoglich, dar.. das allgemeine Gesetz der 
Freiheit dann Statt finde und ausgeObt werde, wenn es dem allgemeinen Zweck der Menschheit 
entgegen laufen word e." 
133Vorarbeiten zur Tugendlehre , vol. 23, 405: "Pflichten gegen sich selbst beziehen sich nicht auf 
Rechte sondern auf Zwecke, die zugleich Pflichten sind und sind die hochsten unter allen 
Tugendpflichten." 
1341bid. 406: "In Ansehung der Rechte der Menschheit ist eigene Vollkommenheit der Zweck." 
to oneself for all kinds of duties, cannot be decided, yet, we can say that the 
statement from the Vorarbeiten could be reconciled with the statement of the 
"Doctrine of Virtue." 
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Given that Kant points to the importance of duties to oneself in the 
"Doctrine of Virtue" and not in the "Doctrine of Right," and given that he 
postulates a strict duty of virtue which corresponds to the end of humanity it 
could be argued that in his late work Kant tried to combine his view of the 
importance of the end of humanity with his view of strict duties to oneself thereby 
returning to his earlier view of the importance of the end of humanity for duties to 
oneself. 
Questions Regarding the Systematic Place of the Perfect Duties to Oneself 
in the "Doctrine of Virtue" 
We saw in the first part of this chapter that the general classification of duties 
presented in The Metaphysics of Morals is the same as the one found in the 
Lecture on the Metaphysics of Morals. Furthermore, we indicated that according 
to both texts , self-murder is a violation of a perfect duty to oneself. Yet according 
to the lecture, self-murder violates the right of humanity, that is , an inner duty of 
right, whereas in The Metaphysics of Morals it violates a duty of virtue and is 
contrary to the end of human nature. This raises the question whether or not 
Kant distinguishes between two kinds of perfect duties to oneself: a duty of right 
and a duty of virtue, or whether there is only one kind of perfect duty to oneself 
which prohibits one from acting contrary to the end of human nature.135 
1351n the following analysis I independently have come to conclusions which are similar to the 
ones presented by Mary Gregor in the Chapter on "The Nature of Perfect Duties to Oneself," in 
Laws of Freedom. A Study of Kant's Method of Applying the Categorical Imperative in the 
'Metaphysik der Sitten' (New York: Barnes & Noble, Inc., 1963) pp. 113-127. 
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I will adopt the second position which, I believe, can be justified with the help of 
two lines of interpretation: 
First, it can be argued that even though there are two kinds of perfect 
duties, perfect duties to others and perfect duties to oneself, there is only one 
kind of perfect duty to oneself. The former corresponds to rights of others and 
the latter, according to our analysis of the Vorarbeiten zur Tugendlehre, do not 
correspond to a right but are duties toward the homo noumenon. Furthermore, it 
can be argued that the perfect duties to oneself which are owed to the homo 
noumenon, are synonymous with some but not all of the duties which correspond 
to the right of humanity. We already indicated in the first part of this chapter that, 
according to this line of interpretation, Kant integrates some of the latter duties--
among them the duty not to commit self-murder--into the "Doctrine of Virtue" and 
some, for example, the duty not to become another person's concubine, to the 
"Doctrine of Right." Because the perfect duties to oneself in the "Doctrine of 
Virtue" do not correspond to rights Kant might have found himself justified in 
calling them duties of virtue and to no longer speak of the right of humanity but of 
perfect duties to oneself. 136 We would, however, still have to explain whether 
Kant is justified in discussing perfect duties to oneself in the "Doctrine of Virtue." 
According to the second line of interpretation, we disregard the question 
whether duties to oneself do or do not correspond to rights, and whether or not 
Kant only implemented some of the perfect duties to oneself which correspond to 
the right of humanity to his "Doctrine of Virtue," and assume that because perfect 
duties to oneself prohibit particular actions they must be inner duties of right. 
This view implies that the perfect duties to oneself in the "Doctrine of Virtue" 
136Vorarbeiten zur Tugendlehre , vol. 23, 387: "Wir werden also hier nicht vom Recht der 
Menscheit reden sondern nur vond der Pflicht des Menschen." 
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which are concerned with "what is formal ... in duties to oneself' are inner duties 
of right and that Kant integrated the right of humanity into the "Doctrine of 
Virtue." Here again the question is, whether or not this position can be 
justified. 137 
We have to remember that the present division of The Metaphysics of 
Morals into the "Doctrine of Right" and the "Doctrine of Virtue" is the result of 
Kant using lawgiving , that is , the form of obligation , as the criterion to distinguish 
between the two parts. And since an inner (ethical) lawgiving is the only 
lawgiving possible for inner duties of right as well as for duties of virtue , both 
kinds of duties must be part of the "Doctrine of Virtue." This does not mean, 
however, that Kant could not have chosen another criterion for the construction 
of his doctrine of morals. It seems to have been Kant's initial plan to present the 
doctrine of morals (the doctrine of duties) in four parts. The first two parts, 
according to Vigilantius' notes of the Lecture on the Metaphysics of Morals, are 
concerned with the right of humanity (inner duties of right) and the right of 
human beings (outer duties of right). The two last parts are concerned with the 
end of humanity (inner duties of virtue) and the end of human beings (outer 
duties of virtue) .138 The same table of duties is found in The Metaphysics of 
137My findings concur with Wilhelm Metzger who states in Gesellschaft, Recht und Staat in der 
Ethik des Deutschen ldealismus (Heidelberg 1917; Neudruck, Scientia Verlag Aalen 1966), p. 70 
that the perfect duties to oneself in the "Doctrine of Vi rtue" are duties of right: " ... wenn dann in 
der Tugendlehre wieder vom Recht der Menschen und von "vollkommenen", also doch 
Rechtspflichten die Rede ist ... ". 
138See MSV 543. In MSV 583 Kant states: 
"Nimmt man nun hiernach alles zusammen, so ergiebt sich von der Sittenlehre (oder wie es, da 
sie so die alten Juristen der Rechtslehre nannten, eigenlich heir..en soli , von der P f I i c h t e n -
I e h r e ) folgendes system: 
officia sind 
Rechts-
interna 
und 
beyde sind 
Tugendpflichten 
extern a 
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Mora/s.139 If one would assume that the distinction of two main kinds of duties 
(duties of right and duties of virtue) corresponds to the two main parts of The 
Metaphysics of Morals (the "Doctrine of Right" and the "Doctrine of Virtue") one 
would have to wonder why Kant did not discuss inner duties of right in the 
"Doctrine of Right." 
While interpreting the first Stoic precept, honeste vive , which governs 
inner duties of right, Kant states his intention to explain this obligation with 
reference to the right of humanity (lex iustt) in one's own person. The only 
reference he makes to the right of humanity is his formulation of the innate right 
of freedom every person possesses in virtue of her or his humanity. Despite his 
intentions, Kant never explains the duty of honeste vive with reference to the 
right of humanity. One could therefore argue that he not only falls short of 
discussing the inner duties of right but also the connection between inner duties 
of right and the right of humanity. And this could be taken as an indication that 
Kant was no longer interested in elaborating the status of the right of humanity. 
The few but explicit references to the right of humanity in The Metaphysics of 
a vel stricta oder innere Rechtspflich-
ten, d. i. das Recht der Menschheit in 
unserer eigenen Person. 
b vel lata oder innere Tugendpflich-
ten , d. i. Zweck der Menschheit in 
unserer eigenen Person, oder derjenige 
Zweck, den die Menschheit uns auf-
erlegt, und den wir also haben sollen ." 
a vel stricta oder aur.,ere 
Zwangspflichten, d. i. Recht 
der Menschen gegen einan-
der. 
b vel lata oder aur.,ere Tu-
gendpflichten, d. i. Zweck 
gegen andere Menschen. 
The diagram makes sense only if the heading "Rechtspflichten" refers only to the explanations 
given under "a," and the heading "Tugendpflichten" refers only to the explanations given under 
139See MS 240 and Vorarbeiten zur Einleitung in die Rechtslehre , val. 23, 268f where Kant 
stresses that the right to exercise one's freedom and the duty to enhance ends are determined 
either by one's own personality or other persons. 
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Morals would then have to be treated as remnants of a phase in which Kant still 
tried to integrate the right of humanity into a metaphysics of morals. 140 
I suggest that it could also mean Kant's final division of duties into perfect 
duties to others ("Doctrine of Right") and perfect duties to oneself as well as 
imperfect duties to oneself and others ("Doctrine of Virtue") was the logical 
consequence of focusing on the form of obligation. Given my interpretation, 
Metzger's slogan of the "decapitation" of the "Doctrine of Right" is misleading 141 
since he does not take into account that what he calls "decapitation" is the direct 
result of Kant's usage of the form of obligation and not the content of duty as the 
distinguishing mark between the "Doctrine of Right" and the "Doctrine of 
Virtue."142 Metzger's reasoning is based on the assumption that the final version 
of The Metaphysics of Morals should correspond to Kant's catalogue of duties of 
right and virtue. If Kant would have chosen to present The Metaphysics of Morals 
in terms of a catalogue of different duties, he would have proceeded according to 
the table of duties listed in the lecture and The Metaphysics of Morals and would 
have discussed inner duties of right together with outer duties of right. Kant 
140This position could be supported be a statement in MSV 604 where Kant states: "Die einzelnen 
Rechte der Menschheit oder die strengen Pflichten gegen sich selbst (diff. von Pflichten der 
Menschheit gegen ihn als Mensch) sind bis jezt noch nicht systematisch entwickelt, sondern sind 
bios gesammelt. Es fehlt an dem princip, aus dem sie abgeleitet werden mossen ... ". 
("The individual right of humanity or the strict duties to oneself (diff. from duties of humanity to him 
as human being) have been up to now not systematically developed, but are merely collected. 
The principle is missing from which they must be derived ... ".) 
141Wilhelm Metzger argues on pp. 69f that Kant had planned to add the right of humanity (inner 
duties of right) to his "Doctrine of Right." The exclusion of inner duties of right from the "Doctrine 
of Right" prompts him to speak of a "decapitation" ("der Rechtslehre der Kopf weggeschnit-
ten") of the "Doctrine of Right" because "the determination on principle of an immediate sphere of 
right and freedom of the 'person' is simply ignored as if it should already be known". Metzger 
describes the integration of inner duties into the "Doctrine of Virtue" as a confusion ("Verwirrung") 
which he attributes to the omission of the chapter on the inner duties of right from the "Doctrine of 
Virtue." 
142Even though Wilhelm Metzger refers on p. 69 to a statement of Kant's in which Kant ascribes 
the distinction between inner and outer duties of right to the form of obligation, Metzger uses this 
quote only to confirm his theses that Kant planned a two-part "Doctrine of Right." 
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expresses the consequences of choosing the difference in lawgiving rather than 
in duties as the criterion to divide a doctrine of morals as follows: 
If one divides morals as doctrine of morals in general accordingly [that is, 
according to lawgiving, Y. U.] and according to the difference in obligation 
no rule for the action of duty itself can be determined since this belongs to 
the matter [of the action; Y. U.], but one takes only lawgiving as the form 
into account in order to determine whether and how the obligation should 
be established. Whereas if one divides the doctrine of morals according to 
duties one considers the difference of the action as matter.143 
It is my view that Kant focused on the latter alternative when he presented his 
Lecture on the Metaphysics of Morals in the form of a catalogue of duties so that 
we have in fact an idea what a Kantian doctrine of duties would look like if the 
criterion for structuring the system would be the difference in duties and not the 
difference in the form of obligation. 
Thus far I have argued that the inner duties of right mentioned in the 
"Doctrine of Right" become the perfect duties to oneself discussed in the 
"Doctrine of Virtue." I have also suggested that Kant had to add inner duties of 
right to the "Doctrine of Virtue" because according to his criterion of lawgiving 
these duties belong to ethics and not to Right. 144 Kant seems therefore justified 
to discuss perfect duties to oneself in the "Doctrine of Virtue." We have now to 
discuss whether Kant is also justified in calling these duties "duties of virtue ." For 
143MSV 578: "Theilt man darnach und nach dem Unterschiede der Verbindlichkeit nun die Moral 
als Sittenlehre in genere ein , so kann dann keine Regel der Pflichthandlung selbst bestimmt 
werden, weil dies zur Materie gehort, sander man nimmt bios auf die Gesetzgebung als Form 
ROcksicht, urn zu bestimmen, ob und wie die Verbindlichkeit Oberhaupt festzusetzen sey. Theilt 
man dagegen nach den Pflichten die Sittenlehre ab, so nimmt man auf die Handlungen als 
Materie und deren Verschiedenheit ROcksicht." 
144Another consequence of the application of this criterion is that the inner duties of right which 
where discussed together in the Lecture on the Metaphysics of Morals are now either part of the 
"Doctrine of Right" (which is the case for those duties discussed under "On Rights to Persons 
Akin to Rights to Thing") or part of the "Doctrine of Virtue" (which is the case for the duties of self-
preservation, chastity, and veracity). 
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a discussion of this question and supporting arguments of my suggestion that 
the criterion of lawgiving determines the systematic place of inner duties of right, 
I turn to the last section in Kant's introduction to the "Doctrine of Virtue." In this 
section on "Concepts Preliminary to the Division of the Doctrine of Virtue" Kant 
offers a principle to distinguish between the form and the matter of the "Doctrine 
of Virtue" from the "Doctrine of Right." 
There are three aspects which distinguish the form of the "Doctrine of 
Virtue" from the form of the "Doctrine of Right." These aspects are: first, that an 
external lawgiving is not possible for duties of virtues; second, that in ethics the 
law prescribes the maxims for an action not the action itself, which implies, third, 
that ethical duties are wide (imperfect) and not narrow (perfect) duties. 
Regarding the difference in matter, Kant points out that the doctrine of morals is 
a doctrine of ends according to which every human being is obligated to think of 
him or herself and others as his or her end. Lastly, he states that in order to 
distinguish the conformity with law (form) from the conformity with end (matter) 
we have to note that respect for the law does not establish an end as duty "and 
only such an end is a duty of virtue." He stresses that we have to understand 
that there is only one obligation of virtue ("Tugendverpflichtung"), namely, the 
virtuous disposition which is the subjective determining ground ("subjective 
Bestimmungsgrund") to do our duty, but many duties of virtue which are 
performed because of that one disposition. Obligation of virtue only implies 
respect for the law, it does not determine an end as duty. 145 This last statement 
corresponds to Kant's distinction of the twofold principle of ethics. It is the first 
formulation, the principium ethicum or the universal principle of ethics, which 
145See MS 410. 
corresponds to what Kant calls in The Metaphysics of Morals "obligation of 
virtue."146 
The following problems arise when we apply Kant's own criteria to the 
perfect duties to oneself. 
With regard to the first formal criterion, we can make two observations. 
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First, we saw that the distinction between the "Doctrine of Right" and the 
"Doctrine of Virtue" is based on the difference in the incentives of lawgiving. 
Since we know that ethical lawgiving demands that the subject perform a duty 
because of the idea of duty, we must assume that the systematic place of perfect 
duties to oneself in the "Doctrine of Virtue" indicates that these duties as well as 
imperfect duties should be performed because of the idea of duty. According to 
another statement from the Vorarbeiten zur Tugendlehre, the right of humanity in 
our own person to which the perfect duties to oneself correspond does "not 
require that the idea of the duty to oneself is at the same time the incentive for 
the action ." And this in turn prompts Kant to say that this right "does not yet 
belong to the Doctrine of Virtue" but to the "Doctrine of Right."147 
Second, we saw that for duties of virtue only inner lawgiving, not external 
lawgiving is possible because these duties are concerned with an end. We must 
therefore decide whether or not perfect duties to oneself are duties of virtue 
concerned with an end . 
If we were to take the last quote of Kant seriously, it must be possible to 
satisfy the right of humanity or the perfect duties to oneself without acting from 
146For the explanation of principium ethicum and ethices see the section "The difference between 
the 'Doctrine of Right' and the 'Doctrine of Virtue': Incentive and End" at the beginning of this 
Chapter. 
147Vorarbeiten zur Tugendlehre , val. 23, 390f: "Das Recht der Menschheit in unserer eigenen 
Person gehort also noch nicht in die Tugendlehre weil sie auch nich verlangt dar.. die Idee der 
Pflicht gegen sich selbst zugleich die Triebfeder der Handlung sey ... ". 
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duty. In other words, it must be possible that perfect duties to oneself are the 
result of external or juridical lawgiving which would imply that these duties can be 
enforced by others. Persons other than oneself could then enforce perfect duties 
like self-preservation , chastity, and truth-telling; and it would become possible to 
apply external force to prevent people from committing suicide, from sexual 
conduct deemed contrary to existing mores, and from telling lies. The result of 
this line of interpretation would be that perfect duties to oneself are juridical 
duties--not duties of virtue--and should be part of the "Doctrine of Right." 
Contrary to the conclusion derived from the above quote from the 
Vorarbeiten , Kant affirms in The Metaphysics of Morals that negative duties to 
oneself (perfect duties to oneself), and positive duties to oneself (imperfect 
duties) "belong to virtue, either as duties of omission (sustine et abstine) or as 
duties of commission (viribus concessis utere), but both belong to it as duties of 
virtue."148 This quote not only states that perfect duties to oneself as well as 
imperfect duties are virtuous actions ("Tugendhandlungen") , but it also states 
that perfect duties as well as imperfect duties are duties of virtue .1 49 
With regard to the aspect of virtue, we should stress that perfect duties to 
oneself as well as imperfect duties must satisfy the formal aspect of the ethical 
principle (principium ethicum) , which demands that we not only act in conformity 
with the law, satisfying thereby the principle of Right, but also that we act 
because of the idea of duty. This reading is confirmed by another quote from the 
Vorarbeiten zur Tugendlehre: 
Thus, all duties to oneself are ethical (not juridical) because if the 
incentive of the action would not be duty itself what else would necessitate 
148Gregor 216 (MS 419). 
149For virtuous actions see footnote no. 50. 
us morally since the action has to originate from ourselves, but not the 
reverse[ :] all ethical duties are duties to oneself since [they] can also be 
duties to each other. 15o 
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Thus, we can state with Kant that the part of the Law concerned with inner duties 
of right belongs solely to Morals.151 
If Kant wants to integrate inner duties of right into the "Doctrine of Virtue," 
as I suggest he does, he has to restrict the possibility of external lawgiving to 
juridical duties and must argue that for inner duties of right as well as duties of 
virtue only an inner or ethical lawgiving is possible.152 This is exactly what he 
does when he distinguishes between juridical lawgiving and eth ical lawgiving 
whereby the former is restricted to juridical duties or duties which can be 
enforced by others .1 53 The fact that only ethical lawgiving is possible for inner 
duties of right as well as imperfect duties corresponds to the view of the subject 
that every duty which can only be performed because of self-coercion from duty 
belongs to the "Doctrine of Virtue ," and those duties which can be accomplished 
with the help of other incentives belong to the "Doctrine of Right." This way the 
"Doctrine of Virtue" comprises inner duties of right (perfect duties to oneself) as 
well as imperfect duties. 
150 Vorarbeiten zur Tugendlehre , vol. 23, 393: "So sind aile Pflichten gegen sich selbst ethisch 
(nicht juridisch) denn wenn die Triebfeder der Hand lung nicht die Pflicht selbst ware was wOrde 
uns sonst moralisch nothigen da die Handlung aus uns selbst entspringen soli , aber nicht 
umgekehrt aile eth ische Pflichten sind Pflichten gegen sich selbst sondern konnen auch Pflichten 
gegen einander seyn ." 
151 MSV 587: "Soviel nun die scientiam juris oder wissenschaftliche Kenntnil?> der rechtlichen 
Pflichten , welche eine aul?>ere rechtliche Verbindlichkeit enthalten, betrifft, so gehOrt diese insoweit 
zum jure naturae speciell , als sie das Recht der Menschen gegen einander betrifft, dagegen nur 
zur Moral das jus gehort, so Rechte und Pflichten in meiner eigenen Person ausmacht." My 
underl ining. Compare also Gregor 47 (MS 220): "Ethics has its special duties as well (e.g., duties 
to oneself) , but it also has duties in common with Right." 
152J cannot state with certainty whether Kant chose lawgiving in order to be able to integrate inner 
duties of right into the "Doctrine of Virtue" or whether the systematic placement of these duties 
was the unintended but necessary result of choosing this criterion . 
153See the section on "The difference between the "Doctrine of Right" and the "Doctrine of 
Virtue": Incentive and End" at the beginning of this Chapter. 
Thus far we have explained that inner duties of right belong to the "Doctrine of 
Virtue" because only ethical lawgiving is possible for them. Now we have to 
discuss why Kant refers to an inner duty of right as a "duty of virtue." For this 
discussion we turn to the second and third formal criterion which concerns the 
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maxim or the action and whether the obligation ("Verbindlichkeit") is either wide 
or narrow. 
In ethics the law does not determine the action. In other words, it does not 
determine how and to which degree an action has to be performed which is the 
reason why Kant speaks of wide or imperfect obligation. Since the law in ethics 
prescribes the maxim and not the action, perfect duties as duties of virtue must 
command a maxim. But, according to Kant's own definition, such a duty would 
be of wide obligation, that is, an imperfect duty, and not of narrow or strict 
obligation, that is, a perfect duty. Given the second criterion , it has to be 
explained how perfect duties to oneself (inner duties of right) which by definition 
are of narrow obl igation and as such are concerned with a specific action can be 
part of the "Doctrine of Virtue."154 
Kant states in the Vorarbeiten zur Tugendlehre that "the Doctrine of Virtue 
comprises only wide duties."155 According to this quote, perfect duties to oneself 
should not be part of the "Doctrine of Virtue." We could either disregard this 
quote or we could assume that Kant adhered to the view expressed in this quote 
but distinguished between a "Doctrine of Virtue proper" which is only concerned 
with imperfect duties and that part of the "Doctrine of Virtue" which specifies the 
conditions necessary (the observance of perfect duties to oneself) for the 
154We could also restate the question and ask: "How can the prescription of a maxim constitute a 
perfect obligation?" 
155Vorarbeiten zur Tugendlehre , val. 23, 389: "Weil die Tugendlehre nur weite Pfl ichten ent-
halt ... ". See also MS 411 . 
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fulfillment of imperfect duties. Kant's reference to the "Doctrine of Virtue" in the 
quote from the Vorarbeiten would then only point to the "Doctrine of Virtue 
proper." The content of the "Doctrine of Virtue" seems to support this view, since 
it is only in Book II of the "Doctrine of the Elements of Ethics" that Kant actually 
begins his discussion of imperfect duties.156 
We turn now to the discussion of the latter alternative which we will 
combine with the discussion of the material criterion. According to this criterion, 
ethics is concerned with ends, and the question which has to be answered is: 
"How can a perfect duty be concerned with an end?" 
I suggest that we turn to Kant's distinction between the principium ethicum 
and the principium ethices to justify the systematic place of perfect duties to 
oneself. We could say that perfect duties to oneself as well as imperfect duties 
have to satisfy the formal aspect of the ethical principle, the principium ethicum, 
and only imperfect duties have to satisfy the material aspect of the ethical 
principle, the principium ethices. The distinction between the two main 
principles--the principle of right and the principle of ethics--would thus 
correspond to the distinction between the "Doctrine of Right" and the "Doctrine of 
Virtue"; and the distinction between the principle of right, the principium ethicum 
and principium ethices would correspond to the trias of perfect duties to others, 
perfect duties to oneself, and imperfect duties to oneself and others. According 
to my interpretation, perfect duties to oneself unlike imperfect duties are only 
indirectly concerned with an end. To explain this point we turn to The 
Metaphysics of Morals. 
156See MS 448. 
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Perfect duties to oneself are duties of omission ("Unterlassungspflichten") and 
imperfect duties are duties of commission ("Begehungspflichten").The first type 
of duty forbids one to act contrary to the end of one's nature (negative duties), 
whereas the second kind commands one to make an object of empirical will 
("WillkOr") one's end, (positive duties.)157 Perfect duties to oneself are intended to 
protect the physical and moral well-being of the human being whereas imperfect 
duties require the perfection of physical and moral well being . Both kinds of 
duties display a respect ("Achtung") for the law, that is, for the personality of the 
human being . In the case of perfect duties to oneself, the person abstains from 
an action because of this respect. In the second case of imperfect duties, the 
person expresses her or his respect by trying to further the ends of humankind . 
In order to satisfy a perfect duty to oneself, it suffices to abstain from a vice; 
whereas mere abstinence is not enough to satisfy an imperfect duty which 
requires an additional effort on the part of the agent. 
In the case of perfect duties to oneself and perfect duties to others, the 
law obligates strictly because it prescribes an action. In the case of juridical 
duties it prescribes a specific action, but in the case of perfect duties to oneself it 
prohibits a specific type of action. This is the reason why the discussion of these 
duties is followed by casuistical questions. Perfect duties to oneself preclude 
actions which would be considered to belong to the following types of actions: 
self-murder, self-mutilation , lying .158 These duties conform to the command : "act 
in such a way that you abstain from doing actions of the type x," whereas 
juridical duties are actions answering to the command : "Perform action x in such 
and such a way, in such and such a degree." Unlike juridical duties, which are 
157See MS 419. 
1581 do not list all types of actions. For a complete list compare MS 420. 
duties necessary to satisfy the right of others, perfect duties to oneself are 
actions which have to be omitted in order to avoid acting contrary to the end of 
one's nature. In other words, these duties limit the exercise of freedom--a 
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property they share with juridical duties--but they limit it with regard to the end of 
human nature and still leave the subject with the latitude ("Spielraum") of how to 
realize the end of human nature. In the case of the duty of self-preservation 
which prohibits self-murder and self-mutilation, it is still up to the subject how to 
realize the end of preservation . 
Negative duties command the abstinence from a vice, and positive duties 
command the performance of a virtuous action, which is the reason why I 
suggest that perfect duties to oneself are only indirectly concerned with an 
end .159 They only state what not to do and not what to strive for--they are perfect 
duties and must be distinguished from imperfect duties. Yet both kinds of duties 
must be performed because of the idea of duty 
I suggest that perfect duties to oneself when compared with imperfect 
duties cannot be regarded as duties of virtue in the literal sense, a title which 
should be reserved for imperfect duties, but they can be called "virtuous" actions 
since they fulfill the principium ethicum or the universal principle of virtue. 
However, when compared to juridical duties, perfect duties to oneself can be 
regarded as duties of virtue because they are, if only indirectly, concerned with 
an end . 
159This thesis finds support in the titles Kant uses for the discussion of perfect duties to oneself 
and imperfect duties. The first book is entitled "Perfect Duties to Oneself," and the second book is 
entitled "On Man's Imperfect Duties to Himself (With Regard to His End)." It is only in the latter title 
that Kant explicitly refers to the end of the human being. For a further discussion of this topic see 
the Chapter on "Ends." 
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We have seen in this last part of the section that both perfect duties to oneself as 
well as imperfect duties must be performed because of the idea of duty; they are 
both examples of duties for which only an inner lawgiving is possible. This line of 
interpretation overrides Kant's exclusion of the right of humanity from the 
"Doctrine of Virtue" as suggested in one of the quotes from the Vorarbeiten. 
Kant's idea that the right of humanity can be protected without the demand to act 
from duty cannot be taken seriously, if Kant believes that the right of humanity 
corresponds to the perfect duties to oneself, and if he believes that inner duties 
to oneself are governed by inner lawgiving. 
I have suggested that perfect duties to oneself are governed by the 
principium ethicum which allows Kant to integrate them with the "Doctrine of 
Virtue" even though they are only indirectly governed by the principium ethices 
which rules only the duties of virtue. We have seen that Kant is justified in 
discussing perfect duties in the "Doctrine of Virtue" because even though they 
are perfect with regard to the action, they prohibit only a type of action and leave 
a latitude for the observance of the command . Hence, we can affirm that inner 
duties of right or perfect duties to oneself are rightly discussed in the "Doctrine of 
Virtue," but that they have to be distinguished from imperfect duties or duties of 
virtue because they are only indirectly governed by the material principle of 
ethics; and because they are not directly governed by both principles of ethics, 
they do not belong to the "Doctrine of Virtue proper." 
Our findings so far suggest that the negative duties to oneself in the 
"Doctrine of Right" are inner duties of right, corresponding to the right of 
humanity discussed in the Lecture on the Metaphysics of Morals and concern 
only "what is formal ... in duties to oneself." We suggested that these duties are 
indirectly concerned with an end because they prohibit actions which would 
make the end of human nature impossible. The two Chapters on the "Right of 
humanity" and on "Ends," will lend further support to the thesis that the perfect 
duties to oneself in the "Doctrine of Virtue" represent the right of humanity and 
are indirectly concerned with ends. 
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CHAPTER II 
RIGHT OF HUMANITY 
In this chapter we will concentrate on Kant's discussion of the right of humanity 
in the Lecture on the Metaphysics of Morals.1 Even though the status of the right 
of humanity in The Metaphysics of Morals is not completely clear, there is no 
question that its main tenet, the protection of personality or inner freedom, is the 
basis of Kant's "Doctrine of Right" and his "Doctrine of Virtue." 
Our discussion of the right of humanity will lend further support to our 
thesis that Kant integrated the inner duties of right into the "Doctrine of Virtue ," 
that is , his ethics. We will see that the right of humanity protects the inner 
freedom or personality of human beings. Hence, when Kant, after affirming that 
self-disembodiment constitutes a crime, poses the rhetorical question: 
... whether, if I set aside all those relations [namely those to others or to 
God] , man is still bound to preserve his life simply by virtue of his quality 
as a person and whether he must acknowledge in this a duty (and indeed 
a strict duty) to himself2 
we must look for the answer in Kant's doctrine of the right of humanity and its 
correspond ing strict or perfect duties. 
In the following sections we will , first, discuss the status of the right of 
humanity as strict right, show that the inner duties of right or the perfect duties to 
oneself correspond to the right of humanity in one's own person , and that the 
1 Some of the ideas I present in this chapter have also been discussed by Gau-Jeng Ju in his 
Kants Lehre vom Menschenrecht und von den staatsbOrgerlichen Grundrechten (WOrzburg: 
Verlag Konigshausen & Neumann, 1990); see my footnotes. 
2Gregor 218 (MS 422) . 
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right of humanity provides the formal basis for any kind of obligation. Second, we 
will present the objects of the right of humanity and will qualify the particular 
rights which the right of humanity comprises, and , third, we will present the 
principle which governs inner duties of right. 
The Status of the Right of Humanity as a Strict Right 
Kant distinguishes in the Lecture on the Metaphysics of Morals and the 
Vorarbeiten zur Tugendlehre between inner and outer Right. The former refers to 
the right of humanity in our person, the latter to the right of human beings in our 
person.3 Outer or external right comprises the innate Right (ius connatum) as 
well as acquired Right (ius acquisitum).4 Both inner and outer Right limit the use 
of freedom, namely, either the use of inner or of outer freedom. s Since Kant not 
only postulates outer Right which authorizes us to counteract attacks of others 
on our lawfully exercised freedom, but also inner Right, he must assume that it is 
possible that we ourselves can interfere with our freedom. Kant distinguishes 
between inner freedom as the independence from one's desires and inclinations 
and outer freedom which refers to the independence from the constraint of other 
3See MSV 586 where Kant states that the opposite of "the right of humanity in our own person" 
which is ''jus internum et officium juris" is "the right of human beings in our person" which is ''jus 
externum und officium juridicum." Comparing MSV 592f and MSV 601 , I come to the conclusion 
that "right of humanity in one's own person," "inner duties of right," "right of the human being in his 
own person" are used interchangeably and have to be distinguished from "the right of human 
beings in our person." Likewise, the expressions "duties of humanity in his own person" and 
"officia debiti to oneself' are used interchangeably. 
4See MSV 587f. 
svorarbeiten zur Tugenlehre , val. 23, 385: "Die Rechtslehre als Lehre strenger Pflichten (unter 
bestimmten Gesetzen) ist entweder die Lehre des inneren oder au~eren Rechts, wodurch a, 
entweder die Freyheit im inneren oder b. im au~eren Eingeschrankt ist. Die erste gehbrt fOr sich 
selbst zur Ethik dem In halt nach aber doch zur Moral Oberhaupt und also auch zum Recht als 
einschrankende hochste Bedingung. " Compare also MSV 601f. 
85 
peoples' choices. Inner Right commands us to abstain from all those actions we 
inflict on ourselves and which would interfere with the lawful exercise of freedom. 
In the "Doctrine of Right" Kant seems to restrict the term "Right" to external 
freedom because he states that 
Right is therefore the sum of the conditions under which the choice of one 
can be united with the choice of another in accordance with a universal 
law of freedom.s 
Since Kant still mentions the right of humanity in connection with the inner duties 
of right in the "Doctrine of Right," we must assume that he still believes in the 
existence of inner Right while writing the "Doctrine of Right." If that is the case, 
we must ask how inner Right can be concerned with external freedom. In other 
words, how is it possible that inner Right is also concerned with external 
freedom? This question concerns Kant's view of the right of humanity as strict 
right which, according to the "Doctrine of Right," is external Right: 
Only a completely external Right can therefore be called strict (Right in 
the narrow sense). This is indeed based on everyone's consciousness of 
obligation in accordance with a law; but if it is to remain pure, this 
consciousness may not and cannot be appealed to as an incentive to 
determine his choice in accordance with this law. Strict Right rests instead 
on the principle of its being possible to use external constraint that can 
coexist with the freedom of everyone in accordance with universal laws.? 
Even though a strict right is based on the consciousness of obligation , it is 
external coercion and not the consciousness of self-obligation which determines 
choice or the empirical will ("Willkur"). 
Yet in the Lecture on the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant states 
6Gregor 56 (MS 230). 
7Gregor 57 (MS 232). 
.. . the general moral Right is divided into the formal duty and material 
duty, according to strict Right. (Here ethico legale, not legale in sensu 
civili.) 
a) with regard to the legality of the action 
1) into the right of humanity in my own person and 
2) into the right of other human being towards me. 
The first represents in the human being only a personifiecf[sic] person 
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which determines the inner use of his freedom, is invulnerable and so ,_ 
unrestricted [or unconditioned] that in this case an action's end is neither 
mentioned nor does it constitute an exception . The point is not the right 
against others or of others against myself, but everything concerns the 
strict duty and the strict right in one's own person . It can, however, never 
be assumed according to laws of right but only ethically: a proof that 
ethics too is not essentially concerned with [an] end, but carries with it 
strict Right in the general sense.s 
In this quote, Kant refers to the right of humanity on the one hand as strict right, 
but states on the other hand that it has its foundation in ethics. This quote could 
lend further support to the thesis that inner duties of right (right of humanity) 
become the perfect duties to oneself discussed in the "Doctrine of Virtue" and 
that perfect duties to oneself even though they belong to ethics, are only 
indirectly concerned with ends. 
BMSV 543: "Hiernach theilt sich nun das allgemeine moralische Recht in die formale Pflicht und 
materielle Pflicht nach strengem Recht. (Hier ethico legale, nicht legale in sensu civili .) 
a) in Ansehung der Rechtmar..igkeit der Handlung 
1) in das Recht der Menschheit in meiner eigenen Person und 
2) in das Recht anderer Menschen gegen mich . 
Ersteres stellt in dem Menschen nur eine personificirte Person dar, die seinen inneren 
Gebrauch der Freiheit bestimmt, ganz unverletzlich ist, und so unumschrant ist, dar.. hiebey kein 
Zweck der Handlung zur Sprache kommen kann , noch eine Ausnahme macht. Es ist hier nicht 
von Rechten gegen Andere oder anderer gegen mich die Rede, sondern alles betrifft die strenge 
Pflicht und das strenge Recht in eigener Person. Es kann inder.. nie nach Rechtsgesetzen , sander 
nur ethisch angenommen werden: ein Beweis, dar.. auch die Ethic nicht wesentlich mit Zweck 
verbunden ist, sander strenges Recht im allgemeinen Sinne bey sich fOhrt."--
Ju 69 rightly suggests that the redundant expression "personificirte Person" should be 
replaced by "personificirte Idee." Compare also MSV 587 where Kant states that the right which 
comprises the rights and duties in our own person, i. e. , inner right, belongs to morals. 
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In order to clarify the reason why Kant calls the right of humanity on the one 
hand a strict right, but states on the other hand that it has its foundation in ethics, 
I suggest that we turn to Kant's concept of freedom. 
Given Kant's definition of strict right in the "Doctrine of Right" and given 
that Kant refers in the lecture to the right of humanity in one's person as strict 
Right, we must either assume that self-coercion is understood as an external 
coercion; in other words, we must assume that Kant distinguishes between two 
kinds of strict Right--an inner and an outer one--which would contradict his 
statement in the "Doctrine of Right" that only a "completely external Right" can 
be called strict,9 or that he changed his mind and no longer regards the right of 
humanity as a strict Right.1o 
We observe that Kant distinguishes between inner Right and outer Right 
whereby the former is concerned with inner freedom and the latter with outer 
freedom. Kant calls freedom an "innate" or "original" right all human beings 
possess in virtue of their humanity: 
Freedom (independence from being constrained by another's choice) 
insofar as it can coexist with the freedom of every other in accordance 
with a universal law, is the only original right belonging to every man by 
virtue of his humanity.11 
In this quote from The Metaphysics of Morals Kant renders a definition of outer 
freedom, namely the independence of being constrained by another's choice. 
Outer freedom is a right which human beings possess in virtue of their humanity. 
9Gregor 57 (MS 232). 
1DFor this alternative see Ju 75 in footnote no. 32. 
11 MS 237: "F r e i h e i t (Unabht3ngigkeit von eines anderen nothigender WillkOr), sofern sie mit 
jedes Anderen Feiheit nach einem allgemeinen Gesetz zusammen bestehen kann , ist dieses 
einzige, ursprOngliche, jedem Menschen kraft seiner Menschheit zustehende Recht." The title 
preceding this paragraph speaks of "D as a n g e b o r e n e R e c h t" that is "innate right." 
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In other words, because every human being is a homo noumenon, he or she has 
the right to protect her or his external freedom as a homo phaenomenon. In this 
quote nothing is said about inner freedom. 
According to Kant, the innate right of freedom comprises the following 
authorizations ("Befugnisse"): the equality of people and hence that they are 
their own mistresses or masters (sui iuris), that they are beyond reproach (iustt) 
and that they can say anything to another person as long as they do not intend 
to deprive them of what is theirs (veriloquium aut falsiloquium). 12 In the Lecture 
on the Metaphysics of Morals Kant explains that the expression: 
i n nate rig h t cannot indicate anything else than the use of my 
empirical will or freedom to resist the empirical will of the other insofar as 
the maxim of my action conforms with the freedom of others according to 
universallaw.13 
Here again Kant defines the innate right in terms of external freedom which must 
be exercised according to universal law. He makes clear that the right to resist 
the empirical will of the other and therefore the right to coerce the other 
12See Gregor 63 (MS 237f: "Die angeborne G I e i c h h e it, d. i. die Unabhangigkeit nicht zu 
mehrerem von Anderen verbunden zu werden, als wozu man sie wechselseitig auch verbinden 
kann; mithin die Qualitat des Menschen sein e i g e n e r H e r r (sui iuris) zu sein , imgleichen 
die eines u n b e s c h o I t e n e n Menschen (iustt), weil er vor allem rechtlichen Act keinem 
Unrecht gethan hat; endlich auch die BefugniP.., das gegen andere zu thun , was an sich ihnen das 
lhre nicht schmalert, wenn sie sich dessen nur nicht annehmen wollen; dergleichen ist ihnen blor.. 
seine Gedanken mitzutheilen , ihnen etwas zu erzahlen oder zu versprechen, es sei wahr und 
aufrichtig, oder unwahr und unaufrichtig (veriloquium aut falsiloquium) , weil es blor.. auf ihnen 
beruht, ob sie ihm glauben wollen oder nicht*); -- aile dies Befugnisse liegen schon im Princip der 
angebornen Freiheit und sind wirklich von ihr nicht (als Glieder der Eintheilung unter einem 
hoheren Rechtsbegriff) unterschieden."--Compare also what Kant says about lying as a vio lation 
of a perfect duty to oneself in MS 428-431 . 
13MSV 588: "Die Benennung nun : an g e bore n e s Recht , kann also nichts anderes 
anzeigen, als den Gebrauch meiner Willkur oder die Freiheit, der Willkur des anderen zu 
widerstehen, insoweit die maxime meiner Handlung mit der Freiheit anderer nach einem 
allgemeinen Gesetz Obereinstimmt." 
according to universal law is the function of the individual innate rights like 
freedom, equality and honor.14 
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So far we have spoken about the innate right of freedom which Kant 
understands as external Right. We must now turn to Kant's view of inner 
freedom and its connection with inner Right in order to clarify the relationship of 
inner and outer Right. 
According to the Vorarbeiten zur Rechtslehre, the authorization to coerce 
either someone else or oneself represents the formal aspect of Right: 
Rl G HT 
is f o r m a I i t e r the relationship of a person to an action according to 
which [and] by means of which [the person] is authorized to coerce 
someone according to laws of freedom (facultatem habet)[.] Is she [that 
is, "the person"] only authorized to constrain herself then it is the right of 
humanity to the human being's own person, that is, inner right; is she 
authorized to coerce others, her right is an external right [;] the former 
belongs to ethics the latter to ius. 15 
Kant distinguishes this formal aspect from the material aspect regarding "a right." 
The material aspect refers to the relationship of possession between the person 
and an external object of her empirical will and authorizes the person to use 
constraint to enforce this relationship. 16The Vorarbeiten suggest that we must 
distinguish between an authorization to constrain others or oneself and particular 
14See MSV 588. 
15Vorarbeiten zur Rechts/ehre, vol. 23, 276: 
"Das Recht 
f o r m a I i t e r betrachtet ist das Verhaltnis einer Person zu einer Hand lung nach welchem sie 
durch dieses jemanden nach Gesetzen der Freyheit zu zwingen befugt ist (facultatem habet) 1st 
[sic] sie nur befugt sich selbst zu zwingen so ist es das Recht der Menschheit zu des Menschen 
eigener Person d. i. das innere Recht; ist sie befugt andere zu zwingen so ist ihr Recht ein 
au~eres Recht jenes gehort zur Ethik diese zum ius." 
16Vorarbeiten zur Rechtslehre, vol. 23, 277: " Materia I it e r betrachtet ist e i n Recht 
(welches einen Theil der Haabe ausmacht) das Verhaltnis einer Person zu einem Gegenstande 
ihrer Willkuhr au~er ihr nach welchem sie ihn zu besitzen gegen andere nach Gesetzen der 
Freyheit Zwang ausuben kan." 
rights.17 The authorization to coerce oneself is represented by the right of 
humanity with regard to one's person. 
According to the Vorarbeiten zur Tugendlehre the permission to coerce 
("zwingen") others is based on the personality of the subject. Kant speaks of 
"personality, that is, a being endowed with inner freedom (homo noumenon)"18 
and explains the meaning of inner freedom with reference to two conditions: 
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But two things are required for inner freedom: being one's own master in a 
given case (animus sui compos), that is, subduing one's affects, and 
ruling oneself (imperium in semetipsum), that is, governing one's 
passions.19 
The personality of the subject can constrain her or his empirical will in which 
case Kant speaks of an obligation to oneself ("Verbindlichkeit gegen sich 
selbst"). 
The authorization to constrain others (to constrain them) is based on the 
personality of the subject, and the free empirical will of the person is 
subordinated to the idea of its personality, according to which, by analogy 
to the constraint of another, it [the person] can be necessitated by itself 
and be morally constrained with respect to actions which are directed to 
itself, and this obligation to oneself can be called the right of humanity in 
our own person which precedes any other obligation.2o 
17See also MS 383. 
18Gregor (MS 418: "Eben derselbe [Kant is referring to the human being] aber seiner 
Per s b n I i c h k e it nach, d. i. als mit innerer Freiheit begabtes Wesen (homo noumenon) 
... ".) 
19Gregor 208 (MS 407: "Zur inneren Freiheit aber werden zwei Stucke erfordert: seiner selbst in 
einem gegebenen Fall M e i s t e r (animus sui compos) und Ober sich selbst H e r r zu sein 
(imperium in semetipsum) , d. i. seine Affecten zu z a h men und seine Leidenschaften zu be-
h errs c h e n.") 
20Vorarbeiten zur Tugendlehre, val. 23, 390:"Die Befugnis des Zwanges anderer (sie zu zwingen) 
grOndet sich aber auf die Personlichkeit des Subjects und die freye WillkOhr der Person steht 
selbst under der Idee ihrer Personlichkeit wornach sie in Handlungen die auf sie selbst gehen 
durch sich selbst genothigt wird und moralisch gezwungen nach der Analogie mit dem Zwange 
eines Anderen und diese Verbindlichkeit gegen sich selbst kann also auch das Recht der 
Menschheit in unserer eigenen Person heir3.en welches aller anderen Verbindlichkeit vorgeht. " 
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The constraint of the empirical will by personality or humanity is understood as 
obligation to oneself, and Kant draws the analogy between the coercion of one's 
empirical will by one's personality and the coercion of one person by another. He 
makes clear that instead of the term "self-obligation" we can also use the 
expression "right of humanity." The human being as personality or representative 
of humanity restricts the use of freedom . This view of the right of humanity or 
self-obligation presupposes the already discussed distinction between homo 
phaenomenon and homo noumenon. 
In the Vorarbeiten zur Tugendlehre Kant states: 
But the right of humanity is ... the supreme condition of all laws of duty 
because the subject would otherwise cease to be a subject of duties (["a"] 
person) and would have to be numbered among things.21 
Another way of expressing the importance of the right of humanity for the 
constitution of a moral subject is given in the Bemerkungen zur Rechtslehre 
where Kant explains that "personality is the supreme condition of all relations of 
Right."22 These quotes suggest that the right of humanity is the right of 
personality or the right of the homo noumenon. 
If we do not respect the absolute value of personality, and that means, if 
we do not acknowledge something that has a higher value than our personal 
interests and forces us to limit the arbitrary exercise of our freedom ,23 rights and 
duties would be inconceivable. According to the Groundwork, this "reverence for 
21 Vorarbeiten zur Tugendlehre, vol. 23, 390: "Das Recht der Menschheit ... ist aber die oberste 
Bedingung aller Pfl ichtgesetze weil das Subject sonst aufhOren wOrde ein Subject der Pflichten 
(Person) zu seyn und zu Sachen gezahlt werden mor..te." 
22Bemerkungen zur Rechtslehre, vol. 20, 455: "Personlichkeit ist die oberste Bedingung aller 
Rechtsverhaltnisse." 
23Kant puts it in slightly different words in the footnote of GMS 69: "Reverence is properly 
awareness of a value which demolishes my self-love." 
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a person is properly only reverence for the law ... of which that person gives us 
an example."24 Respect for the law is therefore respect for humanity or 
personality and implies compliance with the strict duties to oneself or the right of 
humanity. Without respect for personality which represents the capacity for self-
coercion and thus for self-obligation, neither Ius nor ethics could exist since 
neither the use of inner or outer freedom could be limited. 
We pointed out that self-constraint and self-obligation which characterize 
the right of humanity entail that the human being is subjected to humanity as the 
lawgiving aspect, that is, her or his personality, so that the sensible self is 
obligated to the intelligible self or the homo noumenon.25 The duties which 
represent the matter or object of this self-constraint are inner duties of right or 
perfect duties to oneself: 
Now the first section of duties of right (in opposito to the duties of wide 
obligation) concerns the duties to oneself or the inner duties of right. 
These are called right of humanity in one's own person; jus humanae 
naturae in nostra persona.26 
The duties to oneself do not concern the human being as a physical 
subject, but the right of humanity in his person, or the right which it 
[humanity] has over him and his person. Since duty can only tell what is 
right or, rather, [since] both [duty and right] have to be deduced from 
obligation, duties to oneself will also depend on the right of humanity 
itself.27 
241bid. To be precise it should be the respect for the capacity to give and follow the law. 
25See Chapter on "Duties" footnote no. 118. 
26MSV 592: " Der erste Abschnitt der Rechtspflichten (in opposite gegen die Pflichten von later 
Verbindlichkeit) betrifft nun die Pflichten gegen sich selbst oder die inneren Rechtspflichten. Diese 
nennt man Recht der Menschheit in seiner eigenene Person; jus humanae naturae in nostra 
persona." See also MSV 604. 
27MSV 603: "Die Pflichten gegen sich selbst beziehen sich nicht auf den Menschen als ein 
physisches Subjekt, sondern jederzeit auf das Recht der Menschheit in seiner Person, oder das 
Recht was sie auf ihn und seine Person hat. Da Pflicht nur sagen kann , was recht ist, oder 
vielmehr Beydes aus der Verbindlichkeit abgeleitet werden mu~ . so wird auch die Pflicht gegen 
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According to these quotes, inner duties of right "are called ," "concern" or 
"depend on" the right of humanity. We already discussed Kant's model of self-
obligation and showed that the right of humanity is the right of an ideal, namely, 
the homo noumenon. This ideal constrains the homo phaenomenon or the 
person to comply with the perfect duties to herself. In the Vorarbeiten zur 
Einleitung in die Rechtslehre Kant explains that the status of the homo 
noumenon or humanity as an ideal is the reason why the principle of the right of 
humanity is "absolute" and "merely formal."28 
The correspondence of inner duties of right with the right of humanity 
indicates that duties to oneself, specifically perfect duties to oneself, are of 
particular importance for Ius and ethics. Instead of saying that the compliance 
with perfect duties to oneself protects inner freedom, we can also say that the 
adherence to the commands of inner duties of right constitutes inner freedom or 
personality,29 and we can state with Kant that the 
The duties to oneself are the supreme condition and the principle of all 
morality, because the worth of the person makes up the moral worth .3o 
sich selbst von dem Recht der Menschheit selbst abhangen."--lmmediately following this passage 
Vigilantius writes under nota bene that the expression jus humanae naturae in nostra persona 
could be replaced by jus humanitas nostrae naturae if we keep in mind that the meaning of 
humanity in this expressions is not taken in the sense of "humaneness" or the benevolence 
towards others. The latter would, following Kant, not only concern the legality ("Gesetzmar..igkeit") 
of the action but also the maxim to give another person something of one's own, for example, to 
forego the repayment of the others' debt. The right of humanity , however, is only concerned with 
the legality of the action which is the reason why the right of humanity belongs to strict right. 
28 Vorarbeiten zur Rechtslehre , vol. 23, 257: "Das Princip des Rechts des M e n s c h h e it" ist 
absolut und ohne Subject das der M e n s c h e n bedingt weil da das erstere der homo 
noumenon ist von dem es keine empirische Bestimmung giebt es bios formal ist. Das zweyte 
dagegen empirisch bedingt oder vielmehr bestimmt ist." 
29This in turn could mean that the capacity for self-obligation or personality or freedom constitutes 
only an absolute value if used properly, which in turn could mean that we are responsible for our 
own worth . 
30MC 344: "Die Pflichten gegen sich selbst sind die oberste Bedingungen und das principium aller 
Sittlichkeit, denn der Werth der Person macht den moralischen Werth aus ... ". Even though it was 
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The priority of duties to oneself indicates that the capacity for self-coercion and 
thus obligation to oneself is the necessary basis for obligations to others. In other 
words, the priority of perfect duties to oneself indicates that the possibility for 
obligation rests on the autonomy of the subject. Furthermore, it indicates that 
self-respect understood as respect for the moral law is the same as respect for 
others. Thus, directly or indirectly, all duties presuppose self-obligation, that is, 
the right of humanity represented by our personality: 
In short, assuming that duties to oneself exist, duties of right to oneself 
are the highest duties among all. They concern the corresponding right of 
humanity in one's own person, are therefore perfect duties, and each 
action of duty is demanded without exception by the right of humanity and 
constitutes duty in and by itself.31 
Our discussion makes clear that it is the sphere of personality or humanity which 
inner Right aims to protect. But it also makes clear that the analogy between 
inner Right and strict Right in the sense of the definition given in the "Doctrine of 
Right" is limited. Even though inner and external right are unconditioned or strict 
in the sense that the law demands or prohibits a particular action, the former can 
only be enforced by the subject herself or himself and not by someone else. It 
seems, therefore, that Kant either changed his view of inner Right as a strict 
indicated by Vigilantius that it is the perfect duties to oneself (inner duties of right) which are of 
special importance for morals, Kant speaks here as well as in MS 417 of duties to oneself in 
general. In PPP 193 Kant expresses the importance of the dignity of the person as follows: "Aile 
Pflichten sind von der Art, dal1 sie sich haupts~chlich auf die Wi.lrde der Menschheit gri.lnden. Die 
Menschheit in meiner eigenen Person erkennen, ist die Wi.lrde der Welt kennen ." 
31MSV 604: "Kurz, angenommen , es giebt Pflichten gegen sich selbst, so sind die Recht s -
p f I i c h t e n g e g e n s i c h s e I b s t d i e h b c h s t e n P f I i c h t e n u n t e r a 1 1 e n. 
Sie betreffen das correspondirende Recht der Menscheit in seiner eigenen Person, sind daher 
vollkommene Pflichten, und jede Pflichthandlung wird von dem Recht der Menschheit unerlar11ich 
gefordert, und ist an und fOr sich selbst Pflicht." 
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Right, 32 or that he contradicts himself, or that he gave up the idea of inner Right 
completely. The latter point seems implausible in light of his mentioning inner 
duties of right and the right of humanity in the "Doctrine of Right." If we assume 
that Kant changed his view of the status of the right of humanity as a strict Right, 
it remains, nevertheless, of the utmost importance for the preservation of 
freedom as an innate right. 
To summarize: We saw that Kant understands freedom in the "Doctrine of 
Right" in terms of external freedom or the independence from the coercion by 
others. Furthermore, we saw that Kant distinguishes between "ius connatum" 
(innate right) and "ius acquisitum" (acquired right) both of which belong to 
external Right which seems to indicate that the innate right of freedom including 
its authorizations or individual innate rights must be distinguished from the right 
of humanity.33 If we distinguish outer from inner freedom , then the "Doctrine of 
Right" covers only those aspects which concern freedom as the "independence 
from being constrained by another's choice." In other words , we then understand 
freedom as the independence from being constrained by all those desires and 
interests other people might choose to impose on us which are contrary to the 
categorical imperative. If we are, however, concerned with inner freedom , we no 
longer focus on the choice of the empirical will of others but on our 
independence from our affects and passions. Inner freedom is defined in terms 
32This possibility is suggested by Ju (1990) 75 who states: "Aur.,erdem ist zu erinnern, dar., in der 
Vig ilantius-Mitschrift das "Recht der Menschheit" bzw. das innere Recht mit dem aur.,eren Recht 
zusammen zum strengen Recht gerechnet wurde, woran Kant in den MAdR nicht mehr festhalt, 
wo das strenge Recht mit dem aur.,eren Recht gleichgesetzt wird." Ju then quotes MS 232, see 
our footnote no. 7. 
33Ju 76 argues that the ius connatum rests on the right of humanity: " .. . und wiederum beruht das 
Jus connatum auf dem "Recht der Menschheit"." 
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of taming one's affects and mastering one's passions or the ability for self-
possession in terms of self-governance or self-rule. Self-rule is only possible if 
we assume that the homo noumenon or personality can put us under obligation. 
Furthermore, since Kant believes that strict right is "based on everyone's 
consciousness of obl igation in accordance with law," it can be argued that the 
right of humanity, that is , the constraint by one's own reason is the basis for inner 
as well as outer freedom. 
The Object(s) of the Right of Humanity 
The last section explained that according to the Lecture on Moral Ph ilosophy the 
inner duties of right concern or are identical with the right of humanity. I 
suggested that the right of humanity is concerned with the protection of the 
innate right of freedom and limits the exercise of inner freedom via the perfect 
duties to oneself. 
In this section we will compare the classification of the objects of the right 
of the human being in one's own person presented in the Lecture on the 
Metaphysics of Morals with that of the authorizations entailed in the innate right 
of freedom presented in the "Doctrine of Right," in order to arrive at the individual 
perfect duties to oneself. 
We mentioned that the innate right of freedom includes three 
authorizations or individual innate rights: the equality of people (sui iuris) , that 
they are beyond reproach (iusft) and that they can communicate their thoughts 
(veriloquium aut falsiloquium) . While discussing the topic of innate right, Kant 
states: 
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With regard to the object of innate right, that is, with regard to the mine 
and thine, the latter can only consist in the possession of one's own 
person, in the quintessence of all those rights which make up a part of 
me, which therefore cannot be separated from me without damaging the 
laws which are in conformity with the freedom of everyone according to 
universallaws.34 
The object of the innate right is the possession of one's own person . The 
possession of the person is understood as the possession of rights. These 
rights, says Kant, make up a part of our selves. It seems, therefore, appropriate 
to say that the possession of these rights entails the possession of the self. 
Kant's explanation of the innate right in terms of the possession of rights which, I 
take it, refers to the individual innate rights corresponds to Kant's elaboration of 
the innate right of freedom in terms of different authorizations. 
In the Lecture on the Metaphysics of Morals Kant determines the objects 
of the rights of the human being in her or his own person, that is, the objects of 
the right of humanity according to the three categories of relation.35 In the 
Critique of Pure Reason Kant had distinguished between the following three 
categories of relation: Inherence and Subsistence (substantia et accidens), 
Causality and Dependence (cause and effect) and Community (reciprocity 
34MSV 588: "In Ansehung des Objects, [sic] des angeborenen Rechts, d. i. in Ansehung des Mein 
und Dein, kann dies letztere nun in nichts weiter bestehen, als in dem Besitz einer eigenen 
Person, in deren [sic]lnbegriff aller derjenigen Rechte, die einen Theil von mir selbst ausmachen, 
die also von mir nicht getrennt werden konnen , ohne dem mit der Freiheit von Jedermann nach 
allgemeinen Gesetzen zusammenstehenden Gesetzen Abbruch zu thun."--The "sic" after "object" 
is meant to indicate that if indeed there should be a comma after "objects" Kant would refer to the 
innate right as an object and the innate right would be equivalent with "the mine and thine." If, 
however, as my translation suggests, Vigilantius wrongly added the comma "the mine and thine" 
is the object of the innate right. The second "sic" indicates that I assume that instead of "in deren 
lnbegriff' it should say "in dem lnbegriff." 
35Compare footnote no. 3 for the concept right(s) of the human being in her or his own person and 
right of humanity. 
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between agent and patient) .36 In the lecture he only speaks of substance, 
causality, and community and lists the objects of the right of humanity 
accordingly. The category of substance refers to the body; the category of 
causality refers to the use of one's capacities and powers, and the category of 
re lation , to one's honor.37 After determining the objects of rights, Kant specifies 
what precisely these rights are. He does so by identifying the duties we owe to 
ourselves, that is, the perfect duties to oneself. These duties are an expression 
of the restrictions humanity requires with regard to the disposition over one's 
body, powers and capacities, and honor. Adhering to the original sequence of 
the category of relation, Kant lists the following duties: 
First, that one should not dispose over one's body as one disposes over a 
thing; second, that one should not allow others to arbitrarily use one's capacities; 
and third, that one should not allow others or oneself to take one's honor away.3a 
All these strict duties to oneself, i. e., inner duties of right, are based on the 
identical principle that the human being belongs to herself or himself which 
means that as an intellectual being he or she belongs to her or his own humanity 
and should therefore never treat herself or himself as a thing . The "right to [the] 
36See Kemp Smith 113 (KrV A 80/B 1 06) . See also the section on "Substance and Personality" in 
the Chapter on "Care for the Moral Self." 
37MSV 593: "Die Gegenstande der Rechte des Menschen in seiner eigenen Person lassen sich 
wie die drei Kategorien der Relation (in der Metaphysik) bestimmen: 
1) in Ansehung seiner Substanz oder in RUcksicht des Rechtes zur disposition Uber 
seinen Kerper als Kerper . .. . 
II) [sic) In ansehung der Causalitat oder des eigenen Vermegens und Kraft des 
Menschen , wirkungen hervorzubringen . .. . 
Ill) In Ansehung des commcercii mit andern oder in Ansehung des Verhaltnisses der 
Menschen unter einander in der Gemeinschaft ... ". 
Compare also MSV 595 where Kant uses the same categories to speak about the acquisition of 
"things outside of my person" which corresponds to Kant's doctrine of property discussed under 
the heading "Private Right" in MS 245-308. 
38MSV 594. 
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disposition over one's body as body"--which is one aspect of self-possession--is 
governed by the command not to use oneself as a thing. 39 Kant argues that it is 
a perfect duty not to weaken, mutilate40 or destroy the body. Referring to suicide, 
he states: 
The self-murderer violates the law of the noumenon and the respect to the 
same.41 
This violation of the law of the noumenon or the right of humanity is understood 
as a violation of the relationship between the homo noumenon and the homo 
phaenomenon: 
He [the human being] is proprietarius of it [the body], that is, he manages 
it, but [manages it] as a person, that is, the phanomenon insofar as he 
wants to dispose over it as a thing appears as restricted by the 
noumenon. He is therefore not dominus of his body since he cannot treat 
it as rem suam or like the dominationem servi.42 
39For a more detailed discussion of this command see the next section. 
40Kant's examples in MSV 593f are: Origines who mutilated himself to avoid sexual desires; the 
practice in ancient times to cut off one's thumb so that one would be unable to draw a bow and 
could not participate in fights. A man who mutilated himself in such a way was called a "poltron 
per truncationem pol/icis." Kant's third example of self-mutilation refers to the selling of one's own 
healthy teeth to enable another person to replace her or his rotten teeth by implanting the new 
ones.--ln Malter's Immanuel Kant in Rede und Gesprach (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1990) 
553 we find a statement Kant made during the last years of his life. Hasse quotes Kant as saying 
that he would not be a "Poltron" whereby he uses the term to refer to a suicide as well as a person 
who cuts of his thumb: "lch bin , fuhrer dann fort zu sagen, kein Poltron ; ich habe noch so viel 
Kraft, mir das Leben zu nehmen, aber ich halte es fOr unmoralisch. Wer sich selbst entleibt, is ein 
Aas, das sich selbst auf den Anger wirft. Bey dem Worte Poltron etymologisirte er fast jedesmahl 
also: "Poltron ist eigentlich pollex truncatus (ein abgeschnittener Daumen) . Die, zu Rekruten 
enroullirt wurden , schnitten sich, aus Furcht vor dem Soldaten-Dienst, den rechten Daumen ab, 
um das Pulver nicht auf die Pfanne legen zu konnen, und folglich zum Dienst unbrauchbar zu 
werden , und davon hieP.,en sie pol-troncs, d. i. Poltrons." Compare the similar definition of 
"P o I t r o n" (Latin is rendered as "pollex truncates") or "murcus" in the footnote of ApH 256. 
41 MSV 594: "So verletzt der Selbstmorder das Gesetz des noumenon und die Achtung gegen 
dasselbe." 
42MSV 593: "Er ist zwar proprietarius davon, d. i. er schaltet und waltet darOber, aber als Ober 
eine Person, d. i. das ph~nomen erscheint insoweit, als er Ober denselben als Sache disponieren 
will , durch das noumenon eingeschr~nkt. Er ist also nicht dominus seines Korpers, da er ihn nicht 
als rem suam oder wie die dominationem servi behandeln darf." 
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Since we will provide as detailed analysis of the proprietarius-relationship in the 
Chapter on "Ownership," it should here only be pointed out that if one disposes 
over one's body or one's substance, one disposes over one's inner freedom or 
personality. 
The human being cannot dispose over his substance: because he would 
dispose over his personality itself, i n n e r freed om , or humanity in 
his person itself. Yet, these do not belong to him, but he belongs to it [sic]. 
As phaenomenon he is obligated to [the] noumenon. He is therefore not 
dominus of his personality considered as objectum reale.43 
In the next chapters we will see that Kant prohibits treating one's body as a thing 
not because he wants to protect the body as body but the body as the 
phaenomenon of the personality. This prohibition takes into account that a 
separation of body from personality is impossible. The category of substance 
does therefore not only refer to the body but at the same time to the personality 
as the first object of the right of humanity.44 
If we now compare the objects of the rights of the human being in her or 
his own person determined with the help of the categories of relation (substance, 
causality, community) with the "authorizations" implied in the innate right of 
freedom as presented in the "Doctrine of Right," the following correlation can be 
established: the right to dispose over one's body and to use one's powers 
corresponds to the first authorization to be one's own master or mistress (sui 
431bid . 601 : "1) der Mensch kann nicht Uber seine Substanz disponieren: denn er wUrde Uber 
seine Personlichkeit selbst, i n n e r e F r e i h e i t , oder Menschheit in seiner Person selbst 
verfUgen. Diese gehoren aber nicht ihm, sondern er gehort ihr an , er ist als phaenomen dem 
noumenon obligirt. Er ist daher nicht dominus Uber seine Personlichkeit als ein objectum reale 
betrachtet." Vigilantius changes from the plural ("diese gehOren") to the singular ("gehort ihr an") . 
Instead of "he is therefore not dominus of' we could also translate "he has no dominium over." 
44The connection between the category of substance and the category of personality which is one 
of the categories of freedom listed in the Critique of Practical Reason will be discussed in the 
Chapter on "Care for the Moral Self." 
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iuris)45 in the "Doctrine of Right" . The third right to respect or to honor 
corresponds to the second authorization to be beyond reproach. It seems 
therefore that the third authorization in the "Doctrine of Right" (to be able to 
communicate one's thoughts to others) is newly introduced. Even though Kant 
does not list the specific inner duties of right in the "Doctrine of Right," the 
established correlation between duties and authorizations or rights suggests that 
the perfect duties to oneself listed in the lecture represent the "missing" inner 
duties of right in the "Doctrine of Right." Since the content of these perfect duties 
to oneself listed in the lecture is nearly identical with the content of the perfect 
duties to oneself listed in the "Doctrine of Virtue," we could also argue that Kant 
integrated the inner duties of right or the right of humanity discussed in the 
lecture into the "Doctrine of Virtue."46 
To conclude: The correlation makes clear that, according to both the 
Lecture on the Metaphysics of Morals and The Metaphysics of Morals, the 
human being is endowed with an innate right called freedom . Applying the 
categories of relation to the concept of freedom understood as possession of 
rights, Kant derives the individual innate rights to which he either refers as 
451 only mention sui iuris and not equality since the former authorization includes the latter. 
46We have the following correspondence: 
MS MSV 
authorizations implied in the innate 
right of freedom 
1. To be one's own master -7 
~ 
2. To be beyond reproach 
3. To communicate one's thoughts to 
others. 
rights and duties (categories) 
implied in the identical principle homo est sui iuris 
1. right to dispose over 1. not to mutilate 
one's body or kill oneself (substance) 
2. right to use one's 2. not to become some 
capacities and powers one's slave (causality) 
3. right to respect 3. prohibition of (commercium) 
lying 
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"objects of the right of the human being in his person" or as "authorizations." The 
right of humanity prohibits the violation of these individual innate rights.47 If we 
understand the self or person constituted by rights as a space constituted by 
three dimensions we could say that the innate right of freedom constitutes this 
space in a positive sense whereas the right of humanity or the perfect duties to 
oneself constitute this space in the negative sense. The constitution is negative 
because by not killing, mutilating, or dishonoring ourselves, we allow for and 
respect the authorization to be one's own master or mistress--which must, I 
believe, include the right to life and well being--and the authorization to be 
beyond reproach.48 It will become clear in the next section that these 
authorizations, if respected, reflect the dignity of the human being. 
47 Ju 75 comes to the same conclusion when he states: "M.a.W. das Jus connatum ist kein "Recht 
der Menschen" im eigentlichen Sinne, welches das vollig au~ere Rechtsverhaltnis der Menschen 
in der Zeit und dem Raum zueinander bestimmt. Denn von meiner eigener Seite her betrachtet ist 
es ein blo~ negatives Abwehrrecht gegen den ungesetzma~igen Freiheitsgebrauch des andern in 
Ansehung des innernen Mein und Dein, welches der Schutzgegenstand des "Rechts der 
Menschheit in unserer eigenen Person" ist. Aber auf der anderen Seite gilt mein Jus connatum in 
den Augen der anderen doch als "Recht der Menschen", welches den Gebrauch ihrer au~eren 
Freiheit notwendig einschrankt." 
481 disagree therefore with Reinhard Brandt who not only states in his Eigentumstheorien von 
Grotius bis Kant (Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Frommann-Holzboog, 197 4 ), p. 180 that for Kant life 
and conservatio sui is not a constitutive part of his "Doctrine of Right," but also states that Kant 
does not acknowledge a right for self-preservation. (" ... die Tatsache, da~ das Leben des 
Menschen und die conservatio sui fOr die Kantische Rechtslehre nicht von konstitutiver 
Bedeutung ist. [A paragraph follows in the German text] Kant kennt kein Recht auf 
Selbsterhaltung .") Even though Kant does not acknowledge this right explicitly our discussion has 
shown that he acknowledges it implicitly in terms of "homo est sui juris." 
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The Principle of Inner Duties of Right or of Strict Duties to Oneself 
In this section we will discuss the command which governs inner duties of right 
and the principle which underlies this command . Since Kant explains the 
underlying principle of inner duties of right in the Lecture on the Metaphysics of 
Morals, but does not mention it in his brief remarks concerning inner duties of 
right in the "Doctrine of Right," we will turn to the lecture notes to clarify the 
connection between this principle and the command and then decide whether 
our findings can be applied to the command given in the "Doctrine of Right." For 
purposes of clarity we will start with Kant's discussion of this command in The 
Metaphysics of Morals and afterwards turn to the formulation of the principle in 
the Lecture on the Metaphysics of Morals. 
In the Introduction to the Doctrine of Right under the heading "General 
Division of Duties of Right," Kant uses Ulpian's formulae to distinguish inner 
duties of right from outer duties of right. The formula which governs inner duties 
of right is expressed by the command "be an honorable man (honeste vive)."49 
The mottoes of external duties of right are "Do not wrong anyone (neminem 
laede)," and "suum cuique tribue" which Kant interprets to mean 
Enter a condition in which what belongs to each can be secured to him 
against everyone else. so 
Kant explains that the first formula , "honeste vive," understood as "rightful honor 
(honestas iuridica)" ("rechtliche Ehrbarkeit") commands: 
49Gregor 62 (MS 236: "S e i e in r e c h t I i c her Mensch (honeste vive) ." The precise 
translation of the imperative "honeste vive" is "live honorably!"). See also footnote no. 66 for the 
translation of "S e i e in r e c h t I i c her Mens c h. "--Compare MSV 540 where neminem 
laede is referred to as the principle of the universal Doctrine of Right and suum cuique tribue the 
principle of juris publici. 
50Gregor 62 (MS 237f) . 
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Do not make yourself a mere means for others but be at the same time an 
end for them.s1 
Given this interpretation of honeste vive , all inner duties of right must require not 
to make oneself a mere means for others while simultaneously excluding 
becoming an end for them. Despite his intention to explain this obligation with 
reference to the right of humanity (lex iustt) in our own person , Kant never, as 
was stated in the last chapter, offered this explanation in the "Doctrine of Right." 
But in the Lecture on the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant offers an explanation of 
the connection between inner duties of right and the right of humanity. He 
prefaces the analysis of strict duties to oneself or officia debiti to oneself with the 
"identical principle" ("identische Grundsatz"): "The human being belongs to 
himself, homo est sui juris."52 
According to the lecture, this principle is based on the right of humanity. 
And because it is based on the right of humanity Kant reformulates it to read : 
"The human being belongs to his own humanity as intelligible being."s3 
To repeat, the principle "the human being belongs to himself' is synonymous 
with the principle "the human being belongs to his own humanity as intelligible 
being." From this last formulation of the principle Kant derives 
The first right and duty of the human being in his own person: The human 
being can never treat himself as a thing.s4 
51 Gregor 62 (MS 236: "Mache dich anderen nicht zum blor..en Mittel, sondern sei fOr sie zugleich 
Zweck.") 
52See footnote no 55. 
53See footnote no. 55. 
54MSV 601 : "Zuvorderst die analyse der o f f i c i a r u m d e b i t i g e g e n s i c h s e I b s t, 
die man als schuldige Pflichten ansehen kann . 
Hier ist nun der der identische Grundsatz zu praemittiren : 
Der Mensch gehort sich selbst an, homo est sui juris. 
Dies grOndet sich auf das Recht der Menschheit in seiner eigenen Person und heir..t also: er 
gehort seiner eigenen Menschheit als intellectuelles Wesen an. Daraus folgt 
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Summarizing the findings thus far, we can state that, according to the lecture, 
the principle "homo est sui iuris"55 ("the human being belongs to himself') 
underlies the command not to treat oneself as a thing which governs the strict 
duties to oneself. And, according to The Metaphysics of Morals, it is "honeste 
vive" or the command not to make oneself merely a means for others but to be 
also an end for them to which inner duties of right must conform. In order to 
decide whether or not Kant's explanation of the connection between the right of 
humanity and inner duties of right given in the lecture can be used to clarify the 
same connection in the "Doctrine of Right," we must answer two questions. First, 
we must find out how the principle sui iuris is connected with the command 
honeste vive , and , secondly, we must find out whether the command given in the 
lecture not to treat oneself as a thing , means the same as the command given in 
the "Doctrine of Right" not to make oneself merely a means for others, but to be 
also an end for them. 
To begin, in the "Doctrine of Right" Kant renders sui iuris as "being one's 
own master'' which is one of the authorizations "the principle of innate freedom 
das erste Recht und Pfl icht des Menschen in seiner eigenen Person: 
Der Mensch kann sich nie als Sache behandeln." 
--The following remarks concerning the quote are in order: 
First, the "kann" ("can") could be replaced by "darf' or "soli," since this statement 
expresses a right as well as a duty. 
Second, it is not completely clear to which subject the attribute "als intellectuelles Wesen" 
(which I translate with "intelligible being") refers. It could refer to the human being so that we must 
translate the sentence with : "the human being as intelligible being belongs to his own humanity," 
or it could refer to humanity so that we must translate: "the human being belongs to humanity as 
intelligible being." The first alternative would imply that the homo noumenon (the human being as 
intelligible being) belongs to humanity and the second would imply that the human being would 
belong to humanity as idea, that is, as homo noumenon. Given Kant's remarks in MSV 543 (see 
footnote no. 8) that the right of humanity in one's person represents a personified idea, and his 
statement in MSV 601 that the human being belongs to humanity which he explains by saying "he 
is as phaenomenon obligated to the noumenon .. . ," I have chosen the second alternative. 
55Like Kant I spell "iuris" with an "i" and not like Vigilantius with a "j ." 
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already involves."56 In other words, to be one's own master or mistress is an 
innate right.57 In the lecture sui iuris is not explicitly mentioned in Kant's list of the 
individual innate rights of freedom, equality and honor. 58 But Kant uses sui iuris 
as an axiom--he calls it an "identical principle"59--to develop the strict duties to 
oneself which seem to correspond to these individual natural rights. Thus it 
seems that in the lecture sui iuris is given priority over the other innate rights and 
is the basis of the command which governs strict duties to oneself. 
According to the Lecture on the Metaphysics of Morals, Ulpian's honeste 
vive is the principle of ethics "which can determine affirmative actions of duties 
since it is directed to ends."60 Kant makes a similar observation in the 
Vorarbeiten zur Tugendlehre: 
Morals consist in the Doctrine of Right (doctrina iustt) and the Doctrine of 
Virtue (doctrina honestt), the former is also called "ius" in the general 
sense, the latter "ethica" in the special sense (since otherwise ethics 
means also the whole of morals).--lf we take the latter last, we can 
express the formula with Ulpian as follows: honeste vive.--The Doctrine of 
Right comprises two parts: Private Right and Public Right--Neminem 
laede, suum cuique tribue; hence the right of the state of nature and of the 
civil [state]. 61 
56Gregor 63 (MS 238: " .. . aile diese Befugnisse liegen schon im Princip der angeborenen Freiheit 
und sind wirklich von ihr nicht (als Glieder der Eintheilung unter einem hoheren Rechtsbegriff) 
unterschieden ." 
571n the "Doctrine of Virtue" Kant defines inner freedom in terms of being one's own lord as well as 
being one's own master. The latter is now no longer understood in terms of sui iuris but as "ruling 
oneself (imperium in semetipsum) , that is, governing one's passions." We will return to this point in 
the Chapter on "Ownership." 
581t may be argued that freedom could be understood as "sui iuris." 
59See footnote no. 55. 
60MSV 527: "1 . honeste vive. Dies ist das Princip der Ethic, welches affirmative Pflichthandlungen 
bestimmen kann , da es auf Zwecke gerichtet ist, z . E. befordere die GIOckseligkeit anderer nach 
deinen Kraften , suche dich zu vervollkommnen." 
61 Vorarbeiten zur Tugendlehre , vol. 23, 386: "Die Moral besteht aus der Rechtslehre (doctrina 
iust1) und der Tugendlehre (doctrina honest!) jene heir..t auch ius im allgemeinen Sinne, diese 
Ethica in besondrer Bedeutung (denn sonst bedeutet auch Ethic die ganze Morai). --Wenn wir die 
letztere zuerst nehmen so konnen wir mit Ulpian die Formel derstelben so ausrOcken: honeste 
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Since the formula honeste vive is the principle of the Doctrine of Virtue, it has to 
be explained why this principle governs inner duties of right. In the following we 
will see that Kant distinguishes between two meanings of the formula. 
In the Lecture on the Metaphysics of Morals Kant returns to the topic of 
honor when he explains the concept of "philotima" or love of honor ("Ehrliebe") 
which he distinguishes from ambition ("Ehrbegierde"). He discusses the love of 
honor not in the context of duties to others but in the context of "the right of 
humanity in his own person." He states that 
Now, the love of honor is the highest duty of humanity to itself which 
cannot be damaged so that it [(the duty of) the love of honor] must go 
further than [meaning: "override"] the love of life."62 
In order to explain the love of honor, Kant distinguishes between true honor in 
the negative sense which only the human being can give to or take away from 
himself by means of a "morally good behavior," and true honor in the positive 
sense. The former is negative "in as much as the human being does not act 
contrary to humanity and its dignity."63 The person who complies with this sense 
of honor only avoids dishonor. The negative concept entails that the subject acts 
in conformity with duty whereas the positive concept requires that the subject 
perform meritorious actions. 
A few pages later Kant defines "honestas morum" with reference to true 
honor in the negative sense to which he now refers as respectability 
vive--Die Rechtslehre enthalt zwey Theile die des Privatrechts und des offentlichen --Neminem 
/aede , suum cuique tribue also das Recht des Naturzustandes und des bOrgerlichen." 
62MSV 664: "Die Ehrliebe ist nun die htichste Pflicht der Menschheit gegen sich selbst, der man 
so wenig Abbruch thun kann , da~ sie weitergehen mu~ . als die Liebe zum Leben." Reading MSV 
581 it becomes clear that the "highest duty of humanity" is the perfect duty to oneself which 
corresponds to the "right of humanity" or the rights of the human being in her or his own person. 
63MSV 665: "Negativ ist dieser Beg riff darum, weil der Mensch insofern nur seiner Menschheit 
und deren WOrde nicht entgegenhandelt ... ". 
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("Ehrbarkeit") and true honor in the positive sense or the performance of 
honorable ("ehrenwerte" or "ehrenvolle") actions. He points out that the mere 
compliance with a strict duty to oneself alone or the conformity of an action with 
strict right cannot be called an honorable action. It is not enough to "abhor" all 
those actions which could make us an object of contempt but in addition we must 
perform these actions from duty. The fulfillment of the latter requirement 
satisfies the command: "honeste vive ."64 
In order to apply the given explanation of true honor to Kant's usage of 
"honeste vive" in the "Doctrine of Right" we must decide which of the two senses 
of true honor Kant might have had in mind. According to the "Doctrine of Right," 
"honeste vive" governs inner duties of right which are strict or perfect duties and 
only concerned with the limitation and thus protection of freedom and not the 
improvement of oneself. It seems, therefore, that Kant employs "honeste vive" in 
the negative sense of true honor. This interpretation is confirmed by Kant's own 
characterization of "be a rig h teo us h u m a n be i n g (honeste vive)" as 
"i u rid i c a I respect a b i I it y (honestas iuridica)."65 
64See MSV 668: " ... aber die ErfOIIung aller unserer strengen Pflichten an sich oder die 
Pflichtmar..igkeit unserer Handlungen an sich erfordert schon das strenge Recht und drOckt nicht 
das aus was das Ehrenvolle der Handlung sagen will. Es liegt also darin nicht allein 
a. der negative Begriff: aile Handlungen zu verabscheuen , die mich zum Gegenstand der 
Verachtung machen konnten , sonder specifice 
b. der positive Beg riff oder das Bestreben, sich ehrenwerth zu machen, d. i. denjenigen Werth 
zu erringen, der uns, wenn unsere Handlungen bekannt werden, den Beifall zusichert, und also 
uns ehrenvoll bekannt macht. Um dies zu bewirken, mur.. zu der Pflichtmar..igkeit der Handlung 
noch derselben moralische Bonitat hinzukommen, oder dar.. die Vorstellung der Pflicht die 
Triebfeder zur Hand lung gewesen, dar.. wir also aus Pflicht und keinen anderen Motiven 
gehandelt haben . Seine moralische Gesinnung dahin zu stimmen und darnach sein Betragen 
einzurichten, ist Pflicht, und ist dasjenige dessen ErfOIIung in dem 
honeste vive 
liegt." 
65Ju 78 makes a similar observation.--! have changed Gregor's translation on page 62 ("Be an 
honorable man (honeste vive) . Rightful honor (honestas iuridica)") of MS 236 ("S e i e i n 
It is this negative sense of true honor or respectability which Kant has in mind 
when he states in the Lecture on Moral and Practical Philosophy: 
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Respectability is the worthiness of respect. But this respect ["Ehre"] is not 
positive but negative. Honeste vive means: live in such a way that you do 
not make yourself unworthy of respect. 56 
This statement is made in the section on "Duties which concern the personal 
worth of the human being" where Kant also points out that there is 
no greater crime with regard to the desecration ["Schandung"] of one's 
own person than self-murder and the abuse of one's sexual capacities. 57 
We will return to Kant's discussion of these crimes in the Chapter on 
"Homicidium Dolosum." For our present purposes we point out that the negative 
sense of true honor entails the prohibition not to make oneself unworthy of 
respect or not to violate one's dignity. This meaning of negative honor is closely 
related to neminem laede. We remarked that Kant uses this formula as the motto 
of external duties and , more specifically, as the motto of Private Right or the right 
of the state of nature. According to Mrongovius' lecture notes, Kant draws the 
following connection: 
The principle of the duties to oneself does not consist in the appreciation 
of oneself ["Selbstgunst"] but in self-respect [Selbstschatzung"], that is, 
our actions must conform with the dignity of humanity. One could here 
r e c h t I i c h e r M en s c h (honeste vive). Die r e c h t I i c h e E h r b a r k e it (honestas 
iuridica)") in light of the information provided by MSV 664-668. Compare also Baumgarten's 
distinction between honestas interna and externa in his Ethica Philosophica (1763) §§ 300, 317 in 
vol. 27.2, 1 of the Academy Edition. 
66ppp 225: "Die Ehrbarkeit ist die Ehrenwi.irdigkeit. Diese Ehre ist aber nicht positive sondern 
negative. Honeste vive heiP..t: lebe so dar.. du nicht der Ehre unwi.irdig bist, oder dar.. du nicht 
verachtet wirst." 
67PPP 216: "Es sind keine groP..eren Verbrechen in Ansehung der Schandung seiner eigenen 
Personals der Selbstmord und der Mir..brauch des Geschlechts Vermogens." 
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also use [the formula ] from Right: neminem laede therefore noli naturam 
humanam in te ipso /aedere!6B 
Since the formula "honeste vive" in the Doctrine of Right refers to honor in the 
negative sense, it seems identical with the formula "noli naturam humanam in te 
ipso Jaedere" which Kant uses to express the principle of the (perfect ) duties to 
oneself. Both formulae command not to abuse oneself, and are concerned with 
the preservation of the dignity of humanity. In short, both prohibit using oneself 
as a thing : 
Holy is nothing in the world but the right of humanity in our person and the 
right of human beings. The holiness consists in our never using them as 
means, and the prohibition of such a use lies in freedom and 
personality. 69 
This observation leads us to our second initial question whether the command 
"Do not make yourself a mere means for others but be at the same time an end 
for them" given in the "Doctrine of Right" is the same as the command: "the 
human being can never treat himself as a thing." 
First, both commands stress not making oneself a mere means, in other 
words, not treating oneself as a thing. If we make ourselves a mere means for 
others, we treat ourselves as nothing but a means; in other words , we treat 
ourselves as a thing. Furthermore, making ourselves a mere means for others 
and thereby allowing them to use us merely as a means, is a case of treating 
ourselves as things. Even though both commands forbid using oneself as a 
6BMM 1484: "Das Principium der Pflichten gegen sich selbst, bestehet nicht in der Selbstgunst, 
sander in der Selbst-Schatzung d. h. unsere Handlungen mor..en mit der WOrde der Menschheit 
Obereinstimmen." 
691n the Reflexionen zur Moralphilosophie, val. 19, no. 7308, 308 Kant states: "Heilig ist nichts auf 
der Welt als die Rechte der Menschheit in unserer Person und das Recht der Menschen. Die 
Heiligkeit besteht darin , dar.. wir sie niemals bios als Mittel brauchen, und das Verbot eines 
solchen Gebrauchs liegt in der freyheit und Personlichkeit." 
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means, the command from the "Doctrine of Right" refers only to those kinds of 
self-abuse which involve others; whereas the command from the lecture is more 
general and includes both self-abuse with and without the help of others.7° 
We already indicated in the previous chapter that Kant distinguishes in the 
Vorarbeiten between duties to oneself which correspond to rights and concern 
others and those which do not correspond to rights and only concern oneself. It 
could be argued that the command in the lecture because it covers both kinds of 
duties to oneself, is the general command and comprises the one in the 
"Doctrine of Right;" whereas the "Doctrine of Right" refers only to the first kind of 
duties to oneself and commands not to abuse oneself by, for example, becoming 
another's concubine. 
Second, even though both commands stress not using oneself as a thing , 
it is only the command in the "Doctrine of Right" which commands to "be at the 
same time an end for them." The question is whether abstaining from using 
oneself or others as a thing constitutes treating oneself or others as an end . 
We can argue that it is possible not to treat others as a thing, even though 
we are indifferent to them; whereas this is impossible in the case where we 
either abstain from allowing others to use us as a thing or from using ourselves 
only as a thing. To put it differently, it is possible to fulfill one's external duties of 
right and treat someone as an end in itself even though one does not regard the 
other person as an end in itself. Yet it is not possible to observe inner duties of 
7
°For the particular duties see footnote no. 47. In Vorarbeiten zur Tugend/ehre , vol. 23, 399 Kant 
states: "Die Frage: ob jemand Ober sich selbst zum Gebrauch seines Korpers von Andern durch 
Vertrag zu disponiren befugt sey gehort zur rechtslehre [sic)-- Ob er es zu seinem eigenen befugt 
sey zur Ethic." 
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right without regarding oneself as an end in itself.71 Because why would one 
comply with the inner duty of right if external constraint is not possible? We have 
to remember that a duty constrains one to do something one does not like to do. 
If a person does not kill himself because he is afraid of killing himself or because 
he no longer wants to die, he abstains from an action which is prohibited but he 
is not fulfilling his "duty." Since duties to oneself concern inner freedom and that 
means that reason rules one's passions and desires, the compliance with these 
"duties" presupposes that the agent regards himself as an end in itself. 
I believe that my reasoning can be supported with reference to the 
Reflexionen zur Moralphilosophie and the "Doctrine of Virtue." 
In the Reflexionen zur Moralphi/osophie Kant states: 
Both [meaning: the duty which commands an action and the duty which 
commands a disposition] can also be understood in terms of the division 
of perfect and imperfect duties. The former are only based on the form of 
the action, namely of freedom which with regard to its external and inner 
universality is consistent. The latter consists in the relationship between 
freedom and ends: 1. ends in themselves, 2. end of human beingJ2 
According to this quote, imperfect duties to oneself and not perfect duties to 
oneself are based on the relation between freedom and ends in themselves. This 
would mean that inner duties of right, since they are governed by the principle 
not to makes oneself a means for others, are in fact imperfect duties because 
they are concerned with the limitation of freedom in order to protect the status of 
an end in itself. 
71Support for this view is provided by Gregor (1963) 120. 
72Reflexionen zur Moraphilosophie, val. 19, no. 7309, 308: "Beyde konnen auch unter der 
Eintheilung der vollkommenen und unvollkommenen Pflichten begriffen werden . Jene beruhen 
bios auf der form der handlungen, nemlich der freyheit, die in ihrer aur..ern und innern 
allgemeinheit betrachtet mit sich selbst bestehen kan . Diese bestehen in der Beziehung der 
freyheit auf Zweke: 1. Zweke an sich selbst, 2. Zweke der Menschen." 
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Furthermore, in The Metaphysics of Morals Kant formulates the principle of the 
"Doctrine of Virtue": 
The supreme principle of the doctrine of virtue is: Act in accordance with a 
maxim of ends that it can be a universal law for everyone to have. In 
accordance with this principle man is an end for himself as well as for 
others, and it is not enough that he is not authorized to use either himself 
or others merely as means (since he could then still be indifferent to 
them); it is in itself his duty to make man in general his end.73 
This quote suggests that the command not to treat others or oneself merely as a 
means is a command of Right. The command to make "man in general"," that is, 
humanity or the homo noumenon one's end is a command of ethics. I find it 
noteworthy that Kant only states that one can be indifferent to others ("to them") 
but does not say that one can be indifferent to oneself. The right of humanity and 
the right of human beings prohibit our using ourselves or others merely as things. 
Yet Kant should have said that because the prohibition against using ourselves 
as things is a prohibition of our own practical reason, we cannot be indifferent to 
its command so that if we comply with the duty, we must regard ourselves as 
ends in ourselves, and that means we must act from duty. 
With regard to the command in the "Doctrine of Right" we can now say 
that it prescribes the conditions necessary for the respect for the person, namely: 
in order not to give other people the opportunity to treat us as a thing, we must 
regard and treat ourselves as ends in ourselves which in the case of inner duties 
of right means that we act from duty and thus respect ourselves as well as 
73Gregor 198 (MS 395: "Das oberste Princip der Tugendlehre ist: handle nach einer Maxime der 
Z w e c k e , die zu haben tor jedermann ein allgemeines Gesetz sein kann. -- Nach diesem 
Princip ist der Mensch sowohl sich selbst als Andern Zweck, und es ist nicht genug, da~ er weder 
sich selbst noch andere bios als Mittel zu brauchen befugt ist (dabei er doch gegen sie auch 
indifferent sein kann) , sondern den Menschen Oberhaupt sich zum Zwecke zu machen ist an sich 
selbst des Menschen Pflicht.") 
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humanity. Since Kant does not give an example for juridical respectability in the 
"Doctrine of Right," I suggest we use the example he gives in the lecture. 
Kant refers in his discussion of true honor in the negative sense to the 
same example which he uses in order to illustrate the third object of the rights of 
the human being in her or his person, that is, the object of the right of humanity. 
According to this example, a son cannot be allowed to receive the punishment in 
lieu of his guilty father because it would mean that the son would have to 
confess to a crime he did not commit, and he would lose his honorJ4 This 
humiliation violates the respect he owes to humanity, that is, to himself as homo 
noumenon. 75 
Applying this argument to the command in the "Doctrine of Right" Kant 
would, I think, argue that a son who accepts the punishment for his guilty father 
allows others to treat him as a thing because he himself does not regard himself 
as an end in itself or as an autonomous subject. In other words, others can treat 
him merely as a thing because he treats himself merely as a thing and does not 
respect himself. The only way we can avoid making ourselves mere means for 
others is by not allowing them to treat us merely as means, and that in turn 
implies that we must regard ourselves as ends in ourselves. Our interpretation so 
far confirms that honeste vive in the "Doctrine of Right" is a principle of ethics. If 
74MSV 594, 665.--Unlike Christian teaching and like the Stoics Kant values honor. Kant's 
objection that the innocent son who is punished instead of the guilty father violates the respect he 
owes to humanity seems to be in contradiction to another statement of Kant's, according to which 
Kant accepts the righteousness of Christ sacrificing himself for the sins of humanity. It may, of 
course, be that Christ, as the son of God cannot violate the dignity of humanity because he 
constitutes the dignity of humanity. See Chapter on "Casuistical Questions" footnote no. 16. 
75Th is example confirms therefore that the duty of true honor in the negative sense refers to the 
third object of the right of humanity in our person. The latter is the third perfect duty to oneself 
discussed under commercium and forbids acting contrary to one's innate dignity or honor. 
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Kant still believed in the identity of inner duties of right and perfect duties to 
oneself while writing the "Doctrine of Virtue," the status of the command as an 
ethical principle would provide us with one more reason why inner duties of right 
must be discussed in the "Doctrine of Virtue" and not in the "Doctrine of Right." 
What we have said so far seems to suggest that the command "Do not 
treat yourself as a thing" or "do not make yourself a mere means for others but 
be at the same time an end for them" is different from the command "do not use 
others merely as means."76 Given Kant's view that duty implies coercion, it is 
possible not to treat someone else as a thing or not as a mere means without 
acting from duty. It is possible because others can coerce us not to do so by 
threatening us with punishment so that we might fulfill our duty only because of 
the fear of punishment. In the context of Right this means that we simply abstain 
from actions which would violate the authorizations inherent in the innate right of 
freedom of another person. Yet in order not to treat oneself as a thing , which 
includes the case of not making oneself a mere means for others, one must 
coerce oneself, that is, act from duty, and that means one must regard oneself 
as an end in itself. The command "the human being can never treat himself as a 
thing" as presented in the lecture must therefore also be an ethical command 
because it governs inner duties of right. The statement must be understood in 
the sense that the human being should never treat herself or himself as a mere 
means but always at the same time as an end. If my interpretation is correct, it 
would mean that the command in the lecture is identical with the command given 
in the "Doctrine of Right." 
76See footnote no. 73. 
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Furthermore, it would follow, first, that it is impossible to satisfy the negative 
sense of true honor or a strict duty to oneself concerned with the right of 
humanity solely by acting in conformity with duty. It follows, second , that Kant's 
analogy between the coercion of one person by another with the coercion of the 
homo phaenomenon by the homo noumenon is misleading because self-
coercion differs from coercion by others with regard to the motivation of the 
subject. Third , it follows that the second formula of the categorical imperative in 
the Grundlegung which commands to "treat humanity, whether in your own 
person or in the person of any other, never simply as a means, but always at the 
same time as an end" is a principle of ethics and comprises the principle not to 
treat oneself merely as a means.n 
Finally, we turn to the application of our findings to Kant's prohibition of 
self-murder in The Metaphysics of Morals. We have seen that, according to the 
Lecture on the Metaphysics of Morals, the command never to use oneself as a 
thing is derived from the principle that "the human being belongs to himself' 
("homo est sui juris") . We showed that the command "honeste vive" which, 
according to the "Doctrine of Right," governs inner duties of right must be 
understood in the sense of negative honor. The command in the lecture prohibits 
self-abuse including self-abuse which involves others; whereas the command in 
the "Doctrine of Right" prohibits only self-abuse involving others. Hence, the 
prohibition of self-murder in The Metaphysics of Morals seems to be governed by 
the identical principle homo est sui iuris or the "human being belongs to his own 
humanity as an intelligible being ." The term "belonging" to which we will return in 
77Paton 96 (GMS 529) . 
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the next Chapter on "Ownership" means two things: first, it means that the 
human being as a homo noumenon is a representative or member of humanity; 
and, second, it means that he is subjected to the laws of humanity or his own 
practical reason . It is the quality of being a person or a member of humanity 
which commands us not to use ourselves as things. Furthermore, Kant's 
reasoning in the lecture suggests that the principles of right, unlike the principles 
of ethics, "can be deduced from the nature of the human person." They can be 
deduced from the nature of the human being as intelligible being or homo 
noumenon. 78 
If this analysis is correct, Kant's question in The Metaphysics of Morals 
whether .. . man is still bound to preserve his life simply by virtue of his 
quality as a person, and whether he must acknowledge in this a duty (and 
indeed a strict duty) to himself 
can be interpreted against the background of the principle "homo est sui iuris ." 
Since Kant argues for a duty of self-preservation on the basis of the quality or 
nature of the person as personality, his argument seems to be based on a 
principle of right rather than on a principle of ethics. We will , however, see that it 
is the prohibition of self-murder and not the preservation of life per se which is 
strictly commanded. Furthermore, even if we agree with Kant that the command 
never to treat oneself as a thing can be derived from homo est sui iuris , it does 
not explain why a person who kills himself treats himself as a th ing , someth ing 
we will have to discuss in the Chapter on "Homicidium Dolosum." 
78MSV 600: "Daher sind auch die principia der Ethic nicht aus der Natur der Person des 
Menschen abzuleiten, sondern sie mossen synthetisch entwickelt werden .. . ". Compare also 
MSV 601 where Kant states the officia meriti can only be explained with reference to the officia 
debiti. 
In order to further clarify the principle "the human being belongs to his own 
humanity as an intelligible person" we turn to Kant's view of "Ownership." 
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CHAPTER Ill 
OWNERSHIP 
Kant's argument against mutilation and suicide rests on a specific interpretation 
of the relationship of "belonging" ("gehoren") between the homo phaenomenon 
and the homo noumenon. In his discussion of suicide, Kant refers to theological, 
juridical and ethical arguments against suicide all of which, I suggest, can be 
understood as different interpretations of the relationship of belonging. Kant's 
own interpretation of this relationship develops out of the contrast between 
"belonging" understood in terms of proprietas and "belonging" understood in 
terms of dominium. I suggest, therefore, that Kant's analysis of the prohibition of 
suicide has to be understood in the broader context of his discussion of 
ownership. 
Depending on how the relation of belonging is characterized, we arrive at 
different views of the human being and her or his duties and rights. It will be our 
next task to reconstruct Kant's interpretation by analyzing the terms proprietas 
and dominium in Kant's rendition of the theological , juridical and ethical 
argument against suicide. 
We saw that the perfect duty not to weaken , muti late or destroy oneself is 
based on the "identical principle" ("identische Grundsatz") that "the human being 
belongs to himself, homo est sui juris." Kant explains that this principle is based 
on the right of humanity in one's own person and can therefore be rendered in 
the following version: "The human being belongs to his own humanity as an 
intelligible being."1 We indicated in the Chapter on the "Right of Humanity" that 
1See footnote no. 55 in the Chapter on the "Right of Humanity." 
120 
Kant refers to the statement "the human being belongs to himself, homo est sui 
juris" as an identical principle because "belonging to oneself' implies "being 
one's own lord" ("Herr") in the sense that one is ruled by one's reason . In other 
words, "belonging to oneself' is treated as an analytical proposition . 
When Kant states that human beings belong to themselves he does not 
intend to say that they own themselves like they own property of which they can 
dispose ("disponieren") as they please but as property which has to be treated 
with respect. The analysis of Kant's description of the theological and juridical 
arguments will help us to understand how they influenced his own view of 
"belonging" as "being entrusted" to something or someone and thus his ethical 
argument against suicide. My thesis that Kant characterizes "belonging to 
oneself' as a relation between a trustee or custodian who cares for what is 
entrusted to her or him will be developed in the last Chapter of this dissertation . 
Theological Argument 
Kant's characterization of the relationship of belonging between God and human 
beings can be summarized as follows: Human beings are God's property 
because He or She created them. From this it follows that the relationship with 
regard to duties and rights is one-sided . It is only the human being who has 
duties and only God who has rights. Because of their status as property, humans 
are subjected to God's will which implies that their freedom to dispose over their 
bodies and lives is restricted by God's intentions. We will see that Kant's own 
view of the relationship between God and human beings differs from his 
description of the traditional view. 
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The notes taken by Herder ( 1764), Powalski ( 1777/1778), Collins ( 1784/1785), 
and Vigilantius (1793/1794) illustrate that Kant, even though he discusses the 
theological argument against suicide in detail, does not base his own 
argumentation against suicide on it.2 Only in his early Lecture on Practical 
Philosophy, recorded by Herder, and the Beobachtungen zu den Beobachtungen 
Oberdas Gefilhl des Schonen und Erhabenen (1764) does it sound as if he has 
adopted the theological position. 
In the Lecture on Practical Philosophy, Kant describes how persons 
should act if they either know or do not know God's intentions. If God's intentions 
are unknown to the agents, they should act according to their own will given to 
them by God as a guideline and thereby follow nature's course. If, however, 
God's will is known , it has to be followed.3 Take, for example, Kant says, the 
case of an old man who is terminally ill and heading for certain misery; if this 
man would abbreviate his misery himself and commit suicide, it would be as 
natural as the amputation of a dead arm.4 This seemingly obvious judgment of 
the situation must nevertheless be revised: 
2Michael J. Seidler in his "Kant and the Stoics on Suicide," Journal of the History of Ideas XLIV 
(July-September 1983): 444, takes Kant's reference to the theological argument for his own 
position . He argues that Kant "rebuts himself' because he on the one hand affirms that suicide is 
wrong because it violates God's intentions, but on the other hand stresses that the prohibition of 
suicide is independent from God's prohibition . This seeming contradiction can be resolved if we 
follow my suggestion and regard the discussion of the theological argument not as an elaboration 
of Kant's own position (in the quote Seidler uses, Kant himself speaks of "the standpoint of 
religion") , but as part of an overview of the traditional arguments against suicide. MM 1503 and 
MC 370 read : "Wir wollen auf der andern Seite [.] die Hand lung nur an sich [.] und nicht von der 
Religions-Seite betrachten." Mrongovius' notes show only a comma after "Seite;" whereas Collins' 
notes show only a comma after "sich." 
3This is how I interpret in this context PPH 30: "Gibts aber a u r.. e r meinem Willen noch einen 
be sonde r en gottlichen Willen : so mur.. ich dem folgen ." 
4PPH 30: "Sezzt einen alten Mann, unheilbar, g e w i r.. e m Elende ausgesezt: nach der Ordnung 
ist hier eine SelbstverkOrzung des Elendes so natorl ich als die Abschneidung eines todten 
Armes." He uses the term "SelbstverkOrzung" ("self-abbreviation") for suicide. 
122 
But since this [self-abbreviation, that is, suicide] affects the whole of my 
existence which was not created by me but by someone else's intentions 
which I do not grasp and which I should therefore not oppose because I 
then act most foolishly if I act contrary to him who has secret intentions 
with me etc. s 
It is of interest to us that Kant, according to Herder, explicitly states that suicide 
would be allowed if humans were not created by God , but their existence would 
be the result of an accidental arrangement of "Epicurus' atoms." 
Self-murder would therefore be permissible not only if evils outweigh the 
good but [also if] boredom makes us tired of it; if we would have only 
come into existence through Epicurus' atoms rather than exist be-
c a use of someone e Is e.6 
But since we are created by God we belong to the "divine things" and our will is 
subjected to God's will.? The conformity with God's will ensures that the human 
will does not contradict itself and cannot be evii.B 
According to Collins' lecture notes on moral philosophy, Kant explains the 
one-sided obligation between human beings and God in terms of the intentions 
SppH 30: "Aber da dies das ganze meines Daseyns anbetrift, das ich nicht setze sondern durch 
eines andern Absicht, die ich nicht einsehe, und der ich also nicht entgegen handeln mul1, weil ich 
alsdenn am thOrigsten handle, dem zuwider zu handeln, der geheime Absichten mit mir hat etc. " 
The sentence is not complete: after "andern Absicht" it should be added "gesetz wird".-- Since 
Kant formulates his response in the first person singular, he may not necessarily refer to the case 
of the old man, even though it seems highly unlikely, given the context. 
6ppH 30: "Daher w~re der Selbstmord erlaubt, nicht bios wenn Uebel das Gute Oberwiegen: 
sondern die langeweile es Oberdr011ig macht, wenn wir nur nicht d u r c h e i n e n 
a n d e r n w~ren , sondern aus Epikurs Atomen von ungef~hr entstanden w~ren ." Kant uses the 
term Selbstmord ("self-murder") , even though the term "Selbsttotung" ("killing of the self') or 
"Selbstentleibung" ("self-disembodiment") would be more appropriate in this context, since he 
talks about the possible permissibility of the act--Compare the section "Concerning the 
Terminology of Self-Disembodiment and Self-Murder" in the Introduction. 
7 Bemerkungen zu den Beobachtungen Ober das GefOhl des Sch6nen und Erhabenen , vol. 20, 68: 
"Wir gehoren gleichsam zu den gottlichen Sachen und sind durch ihn u. seinen Willen ." 
81bid. Kant states in this context that a father obeying God's command to kill his son--he is 
obviously referring to God commanding Abraham to sacrifice his son Isaac--does not act 
immorally . But in Der Streit der Facu/taten in drei Abschnitten, vol. 7, 63 footnote, he reverses his 
opinion: "Abraham h~tte auf diese vermeinte gottliche Stimme antworten mossen: 'Dal1 ich 
meinen guten Sohn nicht tOdten salle, ist ganz gewil1; dal1 aber du, der du mir erscheinst, Gott 
sei , davon bin ich nicht gewil1 und kann es auch nicht werden' , wenn sie auch vom (sichtbaren) 
Himmel herabschallte." 
123 
of God. It is a truth, according to Kant, that it is one of God's intentions as the 
"master of property"s that humans preserve their lives. As Her or His creatures 
we have no right to violate the powers of preservation1o inherent in our nature. 
Like a sentry, we are not allowed to leave our posts,11 that is, our lives, until God 
relieves us. The relationship between the human being and God is analogous to 
the relationship between a benevolent master and a serf. The serf is not allowed 
to act contrary to the master's intentions; yet if he does and commits suicide, he 
is called a "rebel against God,"12 and Powalski records that suicide constitutes a 
violent interference with the masterpiece of creation because it does "not have a 
single part which would not have its particular purpose."13 
Two questions can be asked at this point. First, why could it not be God's 
intention to allow for the self-destruction of Her or His creatures as well as Her or 
His own existence; and, secondly, what is Kant's position on atomism? 
First, according to Collins notes, self-destruction is ontologically 
impossible for God since a being which exists through its own necessity cannot 
destroy itself. For human beings who do not exist necessarily, life is the condition 
for everything else, and they regard it as being entrusted ("anvertraut") to them.14 
Thus, necessary existence by definition entails self-preservation, and God's self-
preservation in turn is the necessary condition for any kind of preservation. 
9MC 375, Kant uses the term "Eigenthums-Herr." 
1olbid. , Kant uses the term "Erhaltungskr~fte unserer Natur." 
111bid.: "Er kommt in jener Welt an, als ein solcher der seinen Posten verlassen hat." Compare 
also Bemerkungen zu den Beobachtungen Ober das GefOhl des SchOnen und Erhabenen , vol. 20, 
41 . 
12MC 375. 
13PPP 209: "Er [the suicide] thut einen gewaltigen Eingriff in das Meisterstock des grol1en Werck 
Meisters, welches doch nicht einen einzigen Theil hat, der nicht seinen besonderen Zwekk h~tte." 
14See MC 372: "Ein Wesen , was durch seine Nothwendigkeit da ware, konnte sich unmoglich 
selbst destruieren; ein Wesen , was nicht nothwendig da ist, siehet sein Leben als die Bedingung 
von alleman . Er siehet, dal1 das Leben ihm anvertraut ist ... ". See also next footnote. 
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Unlike God who exists necessarily and cannot commit suicide, human beings are 
able to commit suicide. From the point of view of God, human beings can be said 
to belong to or be part of the self of the creator so that the self-destruction of this 
extension of the divine self constitutes a violation of the self and must be 
forbidden. 15 Furthermore, the teleological view of nature which goes hand in 
hand with the theological view excludes self-destruction .16 
Powalski's and Vigilantius' notes add another dimension to the aspect of 
divine property and its implication for the status of human life. According to 
Powalski's notes, Kant combines the juridical property argument with the 
theological argument: "Any property, " says Kant, "presupposes that it is 
acquired; a human being does not own himself originally because he is there."17 
Since human beings are brought into existence by the will of God , they always 
already exist and therefore cannot acquire their lives in the literal sense.1a And 
since property requires the act of acquisition, human beings cannot own 
themselves, that is , their lives; hence, it is only the state of their lives not their 
persons which is at their disposal.19 
Secondly, opposing positions regarding suicide are for Kant based on 
different views of nature, and he formulates the alternative in terms of God 
versus atomism. Kant suggests in his reference to atomism an interdependence 
15MC 369: " ... ware er ein Geist, so konnte er sein Leben nicht zernichten ; weil die Natur in das 
absolute Leben eine Unzerstorlichkeit gelegt hat, so folgt, dar.. man darober als Ober den Zweck 
nicht disponieren kann ." (" ... since nature made absolute life indestructible it follows that one 
cannot dispose over it as the end.") 
16We will return to this view in the Chapter on "Ends." 
17PPP 192: "Ein jedes Eigenthum setzt zum voraus, dar.. es mur.. erworben werden , ein Mensch 
besitzt sich aber nich originaire, deswegen weil erda ist." Compare MSV 524 as well as footnote 
no. 27. 
1Bibid. Kant says by "the will of another" ("durch den Willen eines andern") and I take it that he 
refers to God's will . If he would not refer to God's wi ll the text would allow for the possibility that 
parents because they produce offspring own the life of the child . Compare footnote no. 71 . 
19See PPP 192, 208; MC 369. 
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between physical theory and moral theory. According to Kant's brief 
interpretation, atomism would describe human existence as the product of 
chance and not of divine creation . It is not clear whether Kant at the time of the 
lecture had already developed a critical position to atomism which he labeled in 
the Opus postumum as a false doctrine of nature.2o Since he draws a connection 
between a theory of nature and the prohibition of suicide, it would be interesting 
to ask whether Newtonian physics would imply the prohibition of suicide. We will 
touch upon the possible implications of Newtonian physics for Kant's argument 
against suicide in the Chapter on "Care for the Moral Self' as well as in the 
Chapter on "Self-preservation : Overview and Summary" in the second part of 
this dissertation. 
In the Lecture on the Metaphysics of Morals while discussing the parties 
to whom human beings are obligated, Kant points out that duties and rights 
between human beings are reciprocal. One can only speak of a one-sided 
obligation if one party (God) is the only cause of the other party's (human being) 
existence. This one-sided relationship is altered "as soon as he [the human 
being] no longer depends on him [God] as the author of his own being" and "lays 
claim upon the universal laws of freedom. "21 The exclusion of creation entails 
that human beings have mutual rights and duties which have to be fulfilled and 
respected. We will see in the following text that the exclusion of creation refers 
only to the creation of a free being in time. 
20 Opus postumum, vol. 22: 212, 207, 437. 
21 MSV 580: "Es mu~ namlich das Wesen, gegen welches der Mensch nur allein verpflichtet seyn 
kann , von der Art seyn, da~ aus ihm die erste und alleinige Entstehung seines Daseins abzuleiten 
ist, weil er, sobald er nicht von ihm als autore seines eigenen Wesens abhangt, auf die 
allgemeinen Freiheitsgesetze Anspruch macht." 
126 
The interpretation of the one-sided obligation between humans and God could 
not be supported if human beings were to be regarded as things. A thing neither 
has obligations nor does someone have an obligation to a thing; only a person 
can be the source of obligation. Obligation implies, as we saw, that the person is 
free. In order for the creatures of God to have obligations to their creator, He or 
She must have created free beings. But how is it possible that a free being is the 
product of creation? And if it is possible to create a free being which belongs in 
the possession of the creator, it has to be explained how it is possible to possess 
a person without violating her or his freedom. Kant gives the following answers to 
this question: 
Whether God himself could be regarded as owner; I doubt whether one 
can say this because with regard to a free being one cannot understand 
that it was created by another; quite possibly the body [could have been 
created] but not his intellectual being. That is [the reason] why he cannot 
have an unconditioned rig h t over him.22 
This quote indicates that even though a free being cannot be the product of 
creation, the body can.23 It also indicates that creation implies ownership. If, 
therefore, God creates the bodies of human beings, He or She owns them. This 
in turn implies that human beings do not have an unconditioned right to do with 
their bodies whatever they want. It could be argued that the right of God as well 
as the right of humans are restricted, the former with regard to the free being ; the 
22Vorarbeiten zur Rechtslehre, vol. 23, 258: "Ob Gott selbst als EigenthOmer betrachtet werden 
konne; lch zweifle ob man dieses sagen konne; denn von einem freyen Wesen kann man nicht 
begreifen dar.. es von einem anderen geschaffen sey wohl zwar der Kerper aber nicht sein 
geistiges Wesen. Eben darum kann man sagen er konne auch kein unbedingtes R e c h t Ober 
diesen haben." It is not completely clear whether the last sentence in this quote means that God 
(''er") does not have an unconditioned right over the human being ("diesen") or that the free being 
does not have an unconditioned right over her or his body. Both translations make sense. 
23How this view can be upheld with regard to the procreation of children by their parents will be 
discussed below. 
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latter with regard to their bodies. This would mean that contrary to Kant's 
statement in the Lecture on the Metaphysics of Morals, God would have an 
obligation to human beings if only to respect their freedom. In other words , even 
if God would own the human body, the rights to which He or She would be 
entitled would still be restricted by the rights of the free being . 
The view that God is not the owner of a free being is further supported by 
a statement from the Lecture on the Metaphysics of Morals where Kant points 
out that human beings cannot be regarded as "mancipia divina ," that is , divine 
property.24 These last two quotes could be used to refute Kant's earlier 
statement in the Bemerkungen zu den Beobachtungen ilber das Gefilhl des 
Schonen und Erhabenen that human beings belong to the "divine things" and 
are created by God and exist through God . In other words , they could be 
interpreted to mean, first, that humans are not created by God and , secondly, 
that they are not in the possession of God. But they could also indicate first, that 
we do not know how the creation of humans is possible (which does not mean 
that we cannot think of it as possible), and secondly, that a human being as 
"divine thing" is not a thing in the sense of an inanimate object but has the same 
status Kant confers on a child. This line of interpretation would entail that a 
"divine thing" cannot be treated as a thing but can be in God's possession like a 
thing. Yet we still have to explain how it is possible that a free being can be the 
product of (pro)creation . 
24MSV 547: "Fragt man selbst, ob man Menschen als mancipia divina ansehen kann , so mu(l, 
man auch dies verneinen ."--For a detailed discussion of the term "mancipium" in Roman Right 
see Max Kaser's Eigentum und Besitz im atteren romischen Recht, 2nd ed. (Koln - Graz: Bohlau 
Verlag , 1956). Compare especially the three different meanings of mancipium as act of acquisition 
("mancipium als E r we r b sa k t)", mancipium as the power acquired through this act 
("mancipium als die mit diesem Akt erworbene G e w a I t") , and mancipium as slave ("mancipium 
als SkI ave") on pages 180-194. 
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In the "Doctrine of Right" under the title "Parental Right" Kant points out that 
children, even though they are the result of procreation, are persons (free 
beings) . It is, however, "impossible to form a concept of the production of a being 
endowed with freedom through a physical operation ."25 This problem not only 
arises in the context of procreation but also in the context of creation of humans 
by God since we are also not able to understand "how it is possible for God to 
create free beings."26 With regard to the procreation of a free being , Kant tries to 
solve the problem with his definition of the act of procreation: 
So from a practical point of view it is a quite correct and even necessary 
Idea to regard the act of procreation as one by which we have brought a 
person into the world without his consent and on our own initiative, for 
which deed the parents incur an obligation to make the child content with 
his condition so far as they can.27 
According to Kant, the parents have "brought not merely a worldly being but a 
citizen of the world into a condition" or "state."28 Kant seems to offer here an 
25MS 280f: "Denn da das Erzeugte eine P e r s o n ist, und es umoglich ist, sich von der 
Erzeugung eines mit Freiheit begabten Wesens durch eine physische Operation einen Beg riff zu 
machen* ... ". In th is footnote Kant points to the importance of the discussion of the creation of a 
free being: "If the philosophic jurist reflects on the difficulty of the problem to be resolved and the 
necessity of solving it to satisfy principles of Right in this matter, he will not hold this investigation, 
all the way back to the first elements of transcendental philosophy in a metaphysics of morals, to 
be unnecessary pondering that gets lost in pointless obscurity." (Gregor 99) . 
261bid. footnote: "*) Selbst nicht, wie es moglich ist, dar.. G ott freie Wesen e r s c h a f f e ... ". 
Compare the similar statement in Vorarbeiten zur Rechtslehre , vol. 23, 261 . 
27Gregor 99 (MS 280f: " ... so ist es eine in p r a k tisch e r H i n s i c h t ganz richtige und auch 
nothwendige Idee, den Act der Zeugung als einen solchen anzusehen, wodurch wir eine Person 
ohne ihre Einwilligung auf die Welt gesetzt und eigenm~chtig in sie herOber gebracht haben; fur 
welche That auf den Eltern nun auch eine Verbindlichkeit haftet, sie, soviel in ihren Kr~ften ist, mit 
diesem ihrem Zustande zufrieden zu machen.") It should be added that Gregor's translation fuses 
a) "ohne ihre Einwilligung" (without their consent), b) "auf die Welt gesetzt" ("placed into the 
world") and c) "und eigenm~chtig in sie [the world] herOber gebracht" ("transferred to it on own 
authority") into: "by which we have brought a person into the world without his consent and on our 
own initiative." 
28Gregor 99 (MS 281: " ... nicht blor.. ein Weltwesen, sondern auch ein WeltbOrger in einen 
Zustand herOber gezogen ... ".)--If we do not distinguish between Kant's usage of state in this 
context and the one which we will discuss in a later chapter, the quote would imply that life is a 
state ("Zustand") which would contradict Kant's other statements that life and death are not simply 
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existentialist-like reading of procreation, because the person who comes into 
existence was never asked whether he or she would want to live. Because the 
child cannot give her or his consent before it was conceived , the parents have an 
obligation to compensate for the initial unauthorized creation of the child .29 
With regard to the creation by God, Kant believes it can be shown that the 
concept of the creation of a free being does not harbor a contradiction. The 
contradiction arises only if we understand the creation of a free being as a 
temporal event. He states that it is possible to use the category of causality 
directly, without the mediation of a schema (the temporal condition) in the 
concept of creation; in other words, that it is possible to use the category of 
causality "in the concept of creation with a morally practical and therefore non-
sensible intent."30 This could mean that we regard ourselves as eternal beings 
and therefore as intelligible beings subjected to the moral law. 31 
different states of existence (see Chapter on "Care for the Moral Self'). Werner Haensel in his 
Kants Lehre vom Widerstandsrecht. Ein Beitrag zur Systematik der Kantischen 
Rechtsphilosophie, "Kant-Studien," Erganzungshefte im Auftrag der Kant-Gesellschaft, no. 60 
(Berlin: Pan-Verlag Rolf Heise, 1926) p. 38f points out that according to MS "natural Right" 
("natorliche Recht') is also called the right "in the state of nature," (das Recht "im bOrgerlichen 
Zustande") and the "civil Right" is called the Right "in the civil state" (das Recht "im bOrgerlichen 
Zustande"). According to Haensel, the meaning of "state" in this context does not refer to 
existence in time, but must be understood in the purely logical sense which , following RGV 97 
footnote means "the relation in which and through which they [the human beings] are capable of 
... rights." ("Entsprechend bedeutet der Ausdruck 'Zustand' nicht ein Dasein in der Zeit, sondern in 
rein logischem Sinne 'das Verhaltnis, in und durch welches sie (die Menschen] der Rechte .. . fahig 
sind."') Haensel's quote is taken from the edition of RGV 110 of the Phi/osophische Bibliothek. 
29Now, it could be argued that human beings can only consent or dissent to their existence 
because they exist, and that suicide is a way of dissenting with what Kant calls an "unauthorized" 
act of the parents. Yet if we think of life in terms of the will (compare MS 211 ff) , we could argue 
that the will can never stop willing. 
30Gregor 99 footnote (MS 281: " ... er -- der Widerspruch -- aber verschwinde, wennn in morali-
praktischer, mithin nicht-sinnlicher Absicht die reine Kategorie (ohne ein ihr untergelegtes 
Schema) im Schopfungsbegriff gebraucht wird.") 
31Compare for example Das Ende aller Dinge, vol. 8, 327: "lndem wir nun den Obergang aus der 
Zeit in die Ewigkeit (diese Idee mag, theoretisch, als Erkenntnir.!.-Erweiterung, betrachtet, objective 
Realitat haben oder nicht), so wie ihn sich die Vernunft in moralischer ROcksicht selbst macht, 
verfolgen , stor..en wir auf das E n d e a II e r D i n g e als Zeitwesen und als Gegenstande 
moglicher Erfahrung: welches Ende aber in der moralischen Ordnung der Zwecke zugleich der 
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In the second Critique Kant stresses that the term creation refers to the creation 
of noumena. It concerns the creation of the intelligible but not the sensible 
existence. 32 This could mean that Kant's denial of the creation of a free being in 
the Vorarbeiten refers to creation as a temporal event and does not exclude 
creation in the atemporal, that is, practical sense. 
Even though Kant allows for the possibility of a creator and seems 
inclined to accept the theological argument against suicide, 33 he, nevertheless, 
does not acknowledge, in the final analysis, its seeming plausibility and its 
relevance for morals. In other words, allowing for the possibility of creation does 
not mean, according to Kant, that one has to accept the argument that because 
humans are created by someone else, they are not allowed to take their lives. 
Let me support this statement with the following two references. 
Anfang einer Fortdauer eben dieser als 0 b e r s i n n I i c h e r, folglich nicht unter 
Zeitbedingungen stehender Wesen ist, die also und deren Zustand keiner andern als moralischer 
Bestimmung f~hig sein wird ." 
32Beck 106: "If existence in time is merely a sensuous mode of presentation belonging to thinking 
beings in the world , and consequently does not concern the things-in-themselves, the creation of 
these beings is a creation of the things-in-themselves, because the concept of creation does not 
belong to the sensuous mode of conceiving existence or to causality but can be referred only to 
noumena .... Now, assuming existence in time to hold only of appearances and not things-in-
themselves, if it is possible to affirm freedom without detriment to the natural mechanism of 
actions as appearances, then the circumstances that the acting beings are creatures cannot make 
the least difference to the argument, because creation concerns their intelligible but not their 
sensuous existence, and therefore creation cannot be regarded as the determining ground of 
appearances." (KpV 102: "Wenn die Existenz in de r Zeit eine blor..e sinnliche 
Vorstellungsart der denkenden Wesen in der Welt ist, folglich sie als Dinge an sich selbst nicht 
angeht: so ist die Schopfung dieser Wesen eine Schopfung der Dinge an sich selbst, weil der 
Begriff einer Schopfung nicht zu der sinnlichen Vorstellungart der Existenz und zur Causalit~t 
gehort, sender nur auf Noumenen bezogen werden kann . ... 1st es nun moglich (wenn wir nur das 
Sein in der Zeit fOr etwas, was bios von Erscheinungen, nicht von Dingen an sich selbst gilt, 
annehmen) die Freiheit unbeschadet dem Naturmechanism der Handlungen als Erscheinungen 
zu behaupten, so kann, dar.. die handelnden Wesen GeschOpfe sind , nicht die mindeste Anderung 
hierin machen, weil die Schopfung ihre intelligibele, aber nicht sensibele Existenz betrifft und also 
nicht als Bestimmungsgrund der Erscheinungen angesehen werden kann ; ... ".)Beck does not 
add the letter spacing to "in time." 
33See PPP 30, MC 375. 
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First, Kant rejects the theological argument against suicide indirectly under§ 93 
("Probatio plus und minus probans") of his Logic published by Jasche in 1800. In 
this paragraph, Kant stresses that whenever a proof proves "too much" it is 
"false."34 His example for such a proof is the argument against suicide which 
refers to the creation of life by someone else as the reason for the prohibition not 
to take one's life: 
The proof against suicide, for example, that he who has not given himself 
his life is not allowed to take his life, proves too much, since for that 
reason we would not be allowed to kill animals either. It is therefore 
false.35 
Kant seems to believe that he provides a reductio ad absurdum. 36 However, it 
could only be a reductio if it would read "he who has not given himself his life is 
not allowed to take life away." From Kant's own premise given in the Logic we 
cannot conclude that it would be forbidden to kill animals since it only prohibits 
the killing of oneself. In other words, since the reflexive pronoun "sich" is used, 
killing oneself or taking one's life away cannot entail killing other human beings 
or animals. Contrary to Kant's statement this proof would then be true and not a 
reductio. 
341mmanuel Kant, Logic, transl. , with an intoduction, by RobertS. Hartman and Wolfgang Schwarz 
(New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1988) 139: "A proof that proves too little can be true and is 
thus unobjectionable. If, however, it proves too much, it proves more than is true, and th is is then 
false." (Logik 136: "Ein Beweis, der zu wenig beweist, kann wahr sein und ist also nicht zu 
verwerfen . Beweist er aber zu viel : so beweist er mehr, als was wahr ist; und das ist denn 
falsch.")--ln the Reflexionen zur Logik, vol. 16, 775, the editor notes that the example of self-
murder originates from "Meier's Vernunftlehre S. 615" . 
351 have changed the translation by Hartman/Schwarz 139 ("The proof against suicide, for 
example, that he who has not given himself his life is not allowed to take it, proves too much , 
since for that reason we would not be allowed to kill animals either") because it neglects to render 
the reflexive pronoun "sich." (Logik 136: "So beweist z. B. der Beweis wider den Selbstmord: daf1, 
wer sich nicht das Leben gegeben, es sich auch nicht nehmen konne, zu viel ; denn aus diesem 
Grunde dOrften wir auch keine Thiere todten . Er ist also falsch .") I added the bold print. 
36Michael Seidler mentions this reductio briefly on page 444 footnote no. 53 but does not 
comment on it. 
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If, however, Kant intended to use the premise I suggested , he would provide a 
reductio because if the claim that no human being is allowed to take life away is 
assumed true, it would follow that no human being is allowed to take the life of 
an animal, which in Kant's words would prove "more than is true." In other words, 
Kant believes that it is absurd to assume that we are actually not allowed to kill 
or take away the life of animals. It follows that the negation of the claim is true, 
and the claim itself is false . Kant shows with his reductio that the argument 
against suicide if based on the second premise is not an argument against 
suicide specifically but against killing in general, which , I take it, is the reason 
why Kant says that a proof which proves "too much , ... proves more than is true , 
and this is then false."37 
Despite the possible conclusiveness of the last proof, I believe that it, too , 
if intended as reductio , could be criticized since it could possibly be true that 
humans are not allowed to kill animals so that Kant's proof is not truly a reductio. 
There were , in fact, some Jewish philosophers and rabbis who argued that the 
slaughter of animals is forbidden by God or will become obsolete in the end of 
days so that it is not absurd to assume that the prohibition to take life includes 
the prohibition to kill animals.3a Furthermore, in both proofs it is assumed that a 
normative statement (the prohibition to take one's own life or life in general) can 
be deduced from a factual statement (the human being does not give herself or 
himself life) . We could therefore say that both theological proofs constitute a 
naturalistic fallacy which Kant despite his belief in the strict separation of the 
factual and the normative does not criticize. 
37See Reflexionen zur Logik, vol. 16, no. 3315, 775. 
38See for example Joseph Albo and Rabbi Abraham Isaac Kook in Arthur Hertzberg , ed ., 
Judaism. The Key Spiritual Writings of the Jewish Tradition , revised ed. (New York: Simon & 
Schuster, Touchstone, 1991 ), pp. 144f. 
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Second, it comes as no surprise that the content of Collins' and Vigilantius' notes 
does not imply that self-murder is prohibited and horrible because God has 
prohibited it; but, says Kant: "God has prohibited it because it is horrible."39 It is 
horrible because the human being uses "his freedom to destroy himself."40 
Vigilantius' lecture notes indicate that Kant takes up this very idea ten years later 
because he records Kant as saying: "The prohibition of self-murder must be 
presupposed in order to infer a divine law of prohibition."41 Both statements 
reflect Kant's view that morality with its duties is not based on religion but religion 
on morals and therefore on reason.42 God, according to Kant, is identical with the 
law, so that obligations exist only to either ourselves or other human beings and 
not to a being called "God."43 Suicide is prohibited and considered horrible 
because of a law of reason and not because of a divine law. 
Juridical and Ethical Arguments 
Proprietas versus Dominium 
We have seen that for practical purposes it is possible to think of the creation of 
a free being. But we have also seen that the creation by God cannot serve as an 
argument against suicide. We will now turn to the juridical and ethical arguments 
against suicide which presuppose Kant's view of the human being as 
proprietarius. 
39MC 375: "Der Selbstmord ist aber unerlaubt und abscheulich , nicht deswegen, weil ihn Gott 
verboten hat, sondern Gott hat ihn verboten , weil er abscheulich ist." See also MM 1481. 
40MC 342: "Dies Abscheulichkeit besteht nun darin, da~ der Mensch seine Freyheit sich selbst 
zu destruieren braucht, da er sie nur bios dazu brauchen sollte, da~ er als Mensch lebe." 
41 MSV 627: "Die Unerlaubtheit des Selbstmordes mu~ also vorausgesetzt werden , um auf ein 
gottliches Verbotsgesetz zu schlie~en ." 
42See for example MSV 546, 713. Please note the following pagination-mistake in the Academy 
edition of MSV: page 713 follows page 704 and page 705 follows page 712. 
43MSV 713: "Gott ist das Gesetz selbst ... ". Compare also MSV 546, 713. 
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Kant distinguishes between possessing things and possessing persons. A 
person, unlike an inanimate object, is endowed with freedom; freedom is the 
differentia specifica between a thing and a person. Kant captures this essential 
difference with his distinction between two kinds of possessions: possession of 
an external object and use of it as an object and the possession of a subject as a 
thing and use of it as a person .44 I will argue that these two kinds of possessions 
correspond to what Kant calls dominium and proprietas. Proprietas differs from 
dominium with regard to the rights and duties of the owner and the rights and 
duties of the subject in possession. Proprietas, unlike dominium, characterizes a 
kind of possession which honors the respect owed to the subject in possession. I 
will suggest that self-possession in terms of proprietas can be understood as the 
model for any kind of possession of persons and thus also for the Kantian 
"Rights to Persons Akin to Rights to Things," and I will use the parent-child 
relationship as an analogy for the relationship of self-possession in order to shed 
further light on the relation of self-possession in terms of proprietas. 
The answer to the question whether human beings own their bodies and 
lives like they own physical objects implies the answer to the question whether or 
not human beings can dispose over their bodies and their lives without any 
restrictions . In the following quote from the last paragraph of the "Property Right" 
in the "Doctrine of Right," Kant states first, that human beings cannot own 
themselves in the sense of dominium, and , secondly, that the reasons why 
human beings cannot own themselves in the sense of dominium has to be 
discussed in the context of the right of humanity. This statement indicates that 
44Kant does not use the term proprietas in MS, but given that MS 270 (see next footnote) only 
allows for being one's own master and not for being one's own dominus, we are justified to use 
the term proprietas in the context of being one's own master. 
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the "Doctrine of Right" is only concerned with the rights of human beings and not 
with the right of humanity. But it also indicates that the right of humanity is of 
importance for the "Doctrine of Right", since it provides the reason why a person 
cannot be another or the same person's possession in the sense of dominium. 
An external object that in terms of its substance belongs to someone is his 
property (dominium), in which all rights in this thing inhere (as accidents of 
a substance) and which the owner (dominus) can, accordingly, dispose of 
as he pleases (ius disponendi de re sua). But from this it follows that an 
object of this sort can be only a corporeal thing (to which one has no 
obligation). So a man can be his own master (sui iuris) but cannot be the 
owner of himself (sui dominus) (cannot dispose of himself as he pleases) 
-- still less can he dispose of other men as he pleases -- since he is 
accountable to the humanity in his own person. This is not, however, the 
proper place to discuss this point, which has to do with the Right of 
humanity, not that of men.45 
According to Kant, one person cannot be the owner ("dominus" or "Eigen-
thOmer'') of another person. As owner he or she has the ius disponendi to sell 
and intentionally destroy the thing he or she owns, but Kant states" ... that a 
p e r s o n as such could be the property ["Eigenthum"] of another is a 
contradiction."46 To repeat, an object which is dominium is a thing and provides 
the basis for the right to dispose over it without restrictions. We can add that only 
45Gregor 90 (MS 270: "Der au~ere Gegenstand, welcher der Substanz nach das Seine von 
jemanden ist, ist dessen E i gent h u m (dominium) , welchem aile Rechte in dieser Sache (wie 
Accidenzen der Substanz) inhariren, Ober welche also der Eigenthomer (dominus) nach Belieben 
verfOgen kann (ius disponendi de re sua) . Aber hieraus folgt von selbst: da~ ein solcher 
Gegenstand nur eine korperliche Sache (gegen die man keine Verbindlichkeit hat) sein konne, 
daher ein Mensch sein eigener Herr (sui iuris), aber nicht EigenthOmer v o n s i c h s e I b s t 
(sui dominus) (Ober sich nach Belieben disponiren zu konnen), geschweige denn von anderen 
Menschen sein kann, weil er der Menschheit in seiner eigenen Person verantwortlich ist; wiewohl 
dieser Punkt, der zum Recht der Menschheit, nicht dem der Menschen gehort, hier nicht seinen 
eigentlichen Platz hat, sondern nur beilaufig zum besseren Verstandni~ des kurz vorher Gesagten 
angefOhrt wird .") Compare MSV 601 . See also Kant's similar remarks in Bemerkungen zur 
Rechts/ehre , val. 20, 450, 458; PPP 191f. 
46See Bemerkungen zur Rechts/ehre, val. 20, 455: " .. . nicht als E i gent h o mer desselben 
(ius disponendi ihn zu verausseren oder absichtlich zu zerstoren) denn da~ eine P e r s o n als 
solche das Eigenthum einer anderen sey ist ein Widerspruch." 
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something that can be acquired can be dominium which also indicates that 
dominium is an expression of ius acquisitum and not of ius connatum, whereby 
ius connatum is negative and refers only to one's person.47 Thus, when Kant 
uses the term "master" ("Herr") he is not using it in the sense of "master of a 
slave." To illustrate this point we turn to Kant's lectures. 
Collins notes that Kant refers to the example of slavery to show that 
ancient Greeks and Romans thought suicide to be an honorable act and forbade 
their slaves to commit suicide because they, like animals, were regarded as 
things and were the property of their masters ("Herren").4B We could call this the 
juridical argument against suicide. Following Vigilantius' lecture notes, Kant 
refers to this property relation of master and slave as dominatio servi which 
implies the ius disponendi de re sua (the right to dispose over one's property) .49 
In the given example, suicide is a privilege of a free person . Kant's rendition of 
the Greek and Roman view seems to imply that a free person is a dominus. so 
Owning his own life and the lives of his slaves, he has the right to dispose of life 
47Naturrecht Feyerabend vol. 27.2,2 1345: "Dominium ist kein jus connatum. Denn dieses geht 
blor.. auf meine Person und ist negativ. Ein Dominium ist affirmativ, daher ists jus acquisitum. Es 
ist der lnbegriff aller Rechte an einer Sache." Compare also footnote no. 57. 
4Bsee MC 374: "Es ist ein Zeitalter bey den ROmern und Griechen gewesen, wo der Selbstmord 
Ehre brachte, daher auch die Romer ihren Sklaven verbothen sich selbst umzubringen, weil sie 
nicht sich selbst, sondern ihren Herren zugehOrten , also als eine Sache angesehn wurden , so wie 
jedes andre Thier." 
49MSV 593: "Er ist also nicht dominus seines Korpers, da er ihn nicht als rem suam oder wie die 
dominationem servi behandeln dart." Compare also Naturrecht Feyerabend, vol. 27.2,2 page 
1348 where Kant distinguishes between "jus utendi" and "jus disponendi." The former concerns 
the accidentia, whereas the latter concerns the substance. It is of interest that disposition is here 
understood in the sense of destruction or the annihilation of the thing : "Dominus disponens, wenn 
er Actus ausObt, die mit dem dominio nicht bestehen konnen , und wenn dadurch die Sache 
aufhOrt zu seyn. Das jus utendi geht auf die accidentia disponendi , aber auf die Substanz. Hierzu 
gehort Destruction, Deterioration, Verminderung des Nutzens und Corruption, gantsliche 
Aufhebung des Nutzens." The comma should be inserted before "disponendi" and not after it. 
sowhether or not Kant's characterization of the Roman view of dominium is correct cannot be 
decided in this dissertation. For a discussion of property and possession according to later Roman 
Right see Max Kaser. 
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as he wishes which includes the right to commit suicide; whereas his slaves 
cannot dispose over their lives. It is not clear from Kant's statement whether the 
Greeks and the Romans distinguished between different kinds of owning life, 
namely owning one's life as a free being and owning one's life as a slave. If no 
distinction was made, owning one's own life could mean owning one's life as 
dominium. In other words , the ius disponendi de re sua would apply not only to 
the body and life of the slave, but also to the body and the life of the master. 
Ironically, this would imply that the master who owns himself as dominium, owns 
himself like he owns a slave. 
This view that a person can be a dominus of life is not shared by Kant. For 
Kant, a free person does not have the right to possess himself or others in the 
sense of dominium, and we can therefore never regard ourselves as owners 
("dominus") of our own or someone else's body and life. The free or autonomous 
person can never be "res in patrimonio like the servus roman us. "51 
So far our discussion has shown that dominus implies the unrestricted 
right to dispose over a thing. If human beings would own themselves, that is, 
their bodies or lives, like they own things , suicide would be permitted . Kant 
stresses that persons can never own themselves or others in the sense of 
dominium and can therefore not treat themselves as things. 
Even though it is impossible to own a person in the sense of dominium, it 
is , nevertheless, possible to own a person in the sense of proprietas.52 In the 
51 MSV 547. Th is means also that the head of household in relation to his servants "can never 
behave as if he owned them (dominus servt) ... ". (Gregor 101 ; MS 283: " ... so kann er sich nie als 
Eigenthomer desselben (dominus servt) betragen ... ". ) 
52According to Handbook of Roman Law, prepared by Max Radin (St. Paul, Minn.: West 
Publishing Co., 1927), s.v. "Proprietas": "The term proprietas, "property ," is sometimes used as a 
synonym of dominium, and sometimes for dominium with certain rights of user deducted." Our 
analysis makes clear that Kant uses the term in the second sense. 
138 
Lecture on the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant introduces the terms proprietarius 
and proprietas in order to distinguish the possession of things from the 
possession of one's own body and person. He does so in the context of the 
analysis of inner duties of right, that is, perfect duties to oneself which 
correspond to the right of humanity. The rights of human beings with regard to 
their own bodies is restricted by the right of humanity which prohibits the thing-
like use of the body: 
.. . it is a strict duty of humanity in my own person that I cannot dispose 
over my body as my property. 53 
Even though he [the human being] is proprietarius of it [the body], that is, 
he manages it, but as a person, that is, the phanomenon insofar as he 
wants to dispose over it as a thing appears as restricted by the 
noumenon. He is therefore not dominus of his body, since he cannot treat 
it as rem suam or like the dominationem servi. 54 
To repeat, the human being manages the body, and the homo noumenon or 
reason restricts the use of the body by the human being. Thus, Kant replaces the 
statement made by other moralists that "homo est mancipii sul' ("the human 
being is his mancipium")55 with the statement "homo non est dominus sui ipsius, 
sed tautum [!] proprietate gaudet."56 In other words, the human being is 
proprietarius and not dominus of herself or himself. 57 I suggest, first, that even 
53MSV 581 : " .. es ist strenge Pflicht der Menschheit in meiner eigenen Person, dar.. ich Ober 
meinen Kbrper nicht als EigenthOmer verfOgen kann." 
54MSV 593: "Er [der Mensch; Y. U.] ist zwar proprietarius davon, d. i. er schaltet und waltet 
darOber, aber als Ober eine Person, d. i. das phanomen erscheint insoweit, als er Ober denselben 
als Sache disponieren will, durch das noumenon eingeschr~nkt. Er ist also nicht dominus seines 
Kbrpers, da er ihn nicht als rem suam oder wie die dominationem servi behandeln darf."--
According to Kaser 308, the term "dominium" refers in later Roman Right to the authority or 
dominium over animals and slaves. 
55 For an explanation of "mancipium" see the section "Theological Argument" footnote no. 24. 
56MSV 601 . 
571n Naturrecht Feyerabend, vol. 27.2,2 page 1345 Kant states: "Jus in personam kann nicht 
dominium heir..en. Die Rbmer aber nahmen die Sklaven auch als res. Dominium ist also jus in re 
und jus in re propria . Niemand ist suimet ipsius dominus .... Sui juris ist man wohl." This seems 
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though the terms proprietas or proprietarius are not explicitly used in the quote 
from The Metaphysics of Morals with which we started this section, their 
meaning is nevertheless implied; and, secondly, I suggest that "sui iuris" esse 
must be understood in the sense of proprietarius. 
Kant's characterization of the relationship between the human being and 
the homo phaenomenon in terms of proprietas, that is, as restricted by the homo 
noumenon, prompts him to state the following strict duty to oneself with regard to 
one's body: 
It is therefore [a] duty with regard to one's substance 
a) to neither totally nor partially ruin [or] destroy one's substance, 
e. g., self-murder, or to make oneself especially unfit for the natural 
purposes of one's substance and of every limb. sa 
also to imply that the proprietarius has the ius utendi as described in footnote no. 49 and has, 
according to PPP 192, "usum and fructum over himself'. According to Adolf Berger's Encyclopedic 
Dictionary of Roman Law, Transactions of the American Philosophical Society, New Series, vol. 
43, Part 2 (Philadelphia: The American Philosophical Society, 1953), s.v. "Ususfructus," it is "the 
right to use (uti, ius utend1) another's property and to take produce (fructus) therefrom (ius 
fruendi) , without impairing (i.e. destroying, diminishing , or deteriorating) its substance (salva rerum 
substantia ... )." 
58MSV 601 : "Es ist daher Pflicht in Ansehung seiner Substanz 
a) weder total noch partial seine Substanz zu verderben , zu zerstoren , z. e. Selbstmord, oder 
sich zu den naturlichen Bestimmungen seiner Substanz und eines jeden Gliedes besonders 
untauglich zu machen." 
It is of historical interest that Hugo Grotius in De lure Belli ac Pacis, ed. P. C. Molhuysen (Lugduni 
Batavorum: A W. Sijthoff, MCMXIX) states in L. II , c. XVII , n. II , p. 329 explicitly that life as the 
natural possession of the human being has to be guarded ("custodiendum") and certainly not to 
be destroyed ("perdendum'') : "Natura homini suum est vita, non quidem ad perdendum, sed ad 
custodiendum, corpus, membra, fama, honor, actiones propriae." Following Karl Olivecrona's 
"Das Meinige nach der Naturrechtslehre," Archiv fOr Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie 59 (1973): 
199, the subject of the suum is an intellectual ego or personality to which body, life, freedom 
belong. As we have seen, Kant expresses a similar view when he lists freedom as an innate right 
in the "Doctrine of Right" which includes so-called authorizations or innate rights. These innate 
rights are protected by the right of humanity which is represented by the strict duty not to violate 
or destroy one's life, body, freedom and honor. We discussed that being one's own master (sui 
iuris [esse]) is one of the authorizations and does not mean that one can own oneself like property 
(dominium) but that one respects the right of humanity; only objects or things can become one's 
property . We will see that Kant like Grotius uses the custos-relationship or trustee-relationship to 
argue for an obligation to oneself, but unlike Grotius, Kant explains that this relationship is based 
on humanity as an ideal of reason . 
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Kant points out that the disposition over one's body goes hand in hand with the 
disposition over one's personality or freedom: 
the human being cannot dispose over his substance: because he would 
dispose over his personality itself, i n n e r freedom , or humanity in 
his person itself. Yet these do not belong to him, but he belongs to it [sic] . 
As phaenomenon he is obligated to the noumenon. He is therefore not 
dominus of his personality considered as an objectum rea/e . 59 
We saw that the human being as phaenomenon belongs to humanity and is 
subjected to its laws, that is, the moral law. Kant states: 
The sensible being is so dependent on the power of the noumeno as 
intellectual being that it is subordinated to it, and the substance of the 
sensible being is only entrusted to it by the former.6o 
In this quote Kant distinguishes between the intelligible and the sensible being 
and between the sensible being and the substance of the sensible being. We 
pointed out that the body is the substance of the sensible being so that we can 
now say that the intelligible being entrusts the body to the sensible being or the 
homo phaenomenon. 
In the following paragraphs I will reconstruct the formal conditions of what 
it means to be a proprietarius. I indicated that self-possession in terms of 
proprietas can be understood as the model for any kind of possession of persons 
and thus also for the Kantian "Rights to Persons Akin to Rights to Things." These 
possessions of persons can in turn be used to exemplify different aspects of self-
possession. All three kinds of possession--mutual possession of husband and 
59MSV 601 : " ... der Mensch kann nicht Ober seine Substanz disponieren: denn er worde Ober 
seine Personlichkeit selbst, i n n e r e F r e i h e i t , oder Menschheit in seiner Person selbst 
verfOgen. Diese gehoren aber nicht ihm, sondern er gehort ihr an, er ist als phaenomenon dem 
noumenon obligiert. Er ist daher nicht dominus Ober seine Personl ichkeit als ein objectum reale 
betrachtet." 
60ibid . 602: "Das Sinnenwesen ist von dem noumeno als intellectuellem Wesen seiner Gewalt 
nach so abht:ingig , dal1 es derselben subordin iert, und die Substanz des Sinnenwesens ihm von 
ersterem nur anvertraut ist." 
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wife, the possession of the children by their parents, and the possession of the 
servants by the family--are analogous constructions of the relation of self-
possession described above. In the following, I will use Kant's discussion of the 
parent-child relationship to shed further light on the relation of self-possession, 
that is, the relation of belonging to oneself which, if understood in terms of the 
right of humanity, belongs to inner right. I am not suggesting that this analogy is 
an exhaustive description of self-possession, but I use it here in order to 
underline the important aspects of self-possession . 
Kant explains the term proprietaet which seems to have the same 
meaning as the terms proprietas61 while discussing marital and family relations 
61MSV 596: "Durch das Commercium mit andern. Hier entsteht nie ein dominium auf ein object, 
so ein praestandum ist, sander nur auf ein ausschlie~endes Recht zur Benutzung der Sache oder 
proprietaet; das Recht geht namlich auf aile erlaubte, von dem andern zu bewirkende Krafte des 
andern ... ".And in MSV 597 Vigilantius writes: "Ebenso ist der Besitz einer Person zu verstehen ; 
z. E. der Vater besitzt die Kinder, der Mann die Frau, der Herr das Gesinde, inde vindicatio [Recht 
der Beanspruchung, Y.U.] uxoris, filii , servi , das Recht ausschlie~end auf ihre Krafte Anspruch zu 
machen." Compare footnote no. 57. 
In Deutsches Privatrecht, by Otto Gierke, in Systematisches Handbuch der Deutschen 
Rechtswissenschaft, Zweite Abteilung, dritter Teil , zweiter Band, ed. Karl Binding (Leipzig: Verlag 
von Duncker & Humblot, 1905), pp.368-375, Gierke explains in the section on "Das geteilte 
Eigentum" ("The divided Property") that the original Germanic concept of property was divided into 
dominium directum ("Obereigentum" or "Grundherrschaft") and dominium utile ("Untereigentum," 
"minderes Eigentum" or "Nutzbares Eigentum"). On page 371 he points out that: "Insbesondere 
drang mehr und mehr die Auffassung durch, dass dem Obereigentomer ein "Recht an der 
Substanz" oder die "Proprietat", dem Untereigentomer ein Miteigentum an der Proprietat und das 
alleinige "Nutzungsrecht" zustehe ... ". Hence, "Proprietat" refers to the "right to the substance ." In 
footnote 16 on the same page he quotes: "Preuss. L.R. I, 18 § 1 19--20: Wer nur die Proprietat an 
der Sache ohne das Nutzungsrecht hat, wird Eigner genannt. Wer Miteigner der Proprietat ist und 
zugleich das Nutzungsrecht hat, dem wird das nutzbare Eigentum an der Sache beigelegt. Dazu I, 
18 § 1: Wenn das Eigentum geteilt ist, so wird derjenige, welchem nur ein Miteigentum an der 
Proprietat, aber kein Anteil an dem zum Eigentum gehOrenden Nutzungsrecht zukommt, 
Obereigentomer genannt. Osterr. Gb. § 357: Kommt ... Einem nur ein Recht auf die Substanz der 
Sache, dem Anderen dagegen nebst einem Rechte auf die Substanz das ausschliessliche Recht 
an derselben Nutzung zu , dann ist das Eigentumsrecht geteilt und fOr beide unvollstandig. Jener 
wird Obereigentomer, dieser Nutzungseigentomer genannt."--That Kant was familiar with and 
used the distinction of dominium directum ("Obereigentum") and dominium utile ("Untereigentum") 
shows RGV 78 where he distinguishes between God who is "ObereigenthOmer (dominus 
directus)" of the world and the human being who owns the goods of the world as "Untereigenthum 
(dominium utile) ." In other words, the human being has the ususfructus over the goods of the 
world but cannot destroy them. For "Unterherr" see also Vorarbeiten zum Streit der Faku/taten , 
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under the category of commercium62 in the Lecture on the Metaphysics of Morals 
and states that these kinds of relations do not result in the right to possess a 
person like a thing but in the right to claim only the use of her or his powers. This 
difference in rights reflects the distinction between ius utendi and ius disponendi. 
This right over the powers of persons is the right to possess persons like one 
possesses things even though one cannot treat them as things but must treat 
them as persons. 53 These "Rights to Persons Akin to Rights to Things" are an 
innovation of Kant's which he introduces in the "Doctrine of Right" as part of the 
Private Right which belongs to external right. 54 This Right "is that of possession 
of an external object as a thing and use of it as a person."65 Kant explains that 
the 
Acquisition of this status, and within it, therefore takes place neither by a 
deed on one's own initiative (facto) nor by a contract (pacta) alone but by 
principle (lege) ; for, since this kind of right is neither a right to a thing nor 
merely a right against a person but also possession of a person , it must 
be a right lying beyond any rights to things and any rights against 
persons. That is to say, it must be the Right of humanity in our own 
vol. 23, 462. Since Kant in MSV 596 speaks of the "exclusive right to use the thing ," we can 
assume that the person who has this right is a "Nutzungseigentomer." However, according to Kant 
the person who has the ususfructus over himself or others seems not to have the right to the 
substance of the person. So it seems that Kant's innovation of the "Rigths to Persons Akin to 
Rights to Things" entails also a change of the concept of "proprietaet" which refers to the 
ususfructus but not to the right to the substance of a person, that is, his life or body. 
621n the context of external right the category of substance refers only to land ("Boden") . 
63Gregor 95 : "This Right is that of possession of an external object as a thing and use of it as a 
person." (MS 276: "Dieses Recht ist das des Besitzes eines auP->eren Gegenstandes a Is 
e in e r Sac he und des Gebrauchs desselben a Is e i n e r Person.") 
641 will not discuss the question whether Kant's addition of a third part to the traditionally two parts 
of Private Right was merely a question of applying all three of the categories of relation and thus 
only the result of systematic considerations. See Bemerkungen zur Rechtslehre , vol. 20, 448-467 
for Kant's own view and that of the reviewer of the Metaphysical Doctrine of Right. 
65Gregor 95 (MS 276: "Dieses Recht ist das des Besitzes eines auP->eren Gegenstandes a 1 s 
e in e r Sac he und des Gebrauchs desselben a Is e in e r Person." 
person, from which there follows a natural permissive principle, by the 
favor of which this sort of acquisition is possible for us.66 
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The right to possess another person is rooted in the right of humanity which, 
according to the interpretation offered in the Chapter on the "Right of Humanity," 
means that it is rooted in the right to self-possession in terms of proprietas.67 Of 
the three different kinds of acquisition (a man acquires a wife, a couple their 
children, and a family their servants) it is the second kind which is of interest for 
our discussion. For, according to Kant a child is a person and thus a "being 
endowed with freedom." It is a "rational creature."68 
In the case of the parent-child relationship , proprietas indicates that the 
imposition of the parents' will on the child's will is restricted by the respect owed 
to its personality: 
From a child's personality it also follows that the right of parents is not just 
a right to a thing, since a child can never be considered as the property of 
his parents, so that their right is not alienable (ius personalissimum) . But 
this right is also not just a right against a person, since a child still belongs 
to his parents as what is theirs (is still in their possession like a thing and 
66Gregor 95 (MS 276): "Die Erwerbungsart dieses Zustandes und in demselben geschieht weder 
durch eingenm~chtige That (facto) , noch durch blor1en Vertrag (pacta) , sondern durchs Gesetz 
(lege) , welches, weil es kein Recht in einer Sache, auch nicht ein blor1es Recht gegen eine 
Person, sondern auch ein Besitz derselben zugleich ist, ein Ober alles Sachen- und personliche 
hinaus liegendes Recht, n~mlich das Recht der Menschheit in unserer eigenen Person sein mur1, 
welches ein natOrliches Erlaubnisgesetz zur Folge hat, durch dessen Gunst uns eine solche 
Erwerbung moglich ist." Gregor translates "Erwerbungsart" (kind of acquisition) with "acquisition ." 
67Given Kant's statement that persons cannot become the dominium of others or themselves "The 
Rights to Persons" cannot be based on possession in terms of dominium but, as suggested , on 
possession in terms of proprietas. It seems to me therefore that Manfred Brocker, in his Kants 
Besitzlehre. Zur Problematik einer transzendentalphilosophischen Eigentums/ehre {WOrzburg : 
Konigshausen und Neumann, 1987), p. 186 footnote no. 141 misinterprets Kant when he states: 
"lndem aber eine Person Ober eine andere als eine Sache disponieren kann , widerspricht Kant 
seiner eigenen grunds~tzlichen Feststellung, dal1 jedes Menschen Freiheit unver~ur1erlich , bzw. 
aller vertraglichen Vereinbarung grunds~tzlich entzogen sei: niemand kann sich durch Vertrag , 
(der Freiheit voraussetzt) , zur Sache machen lasse, d. h. sich seiner Freiheit entledigen". First, 
Kant makes clear that we cannot dispose over a person as a thing , and, second, our discussion 
has shown that if possession of a person is understood in terms of proprietas it does not 
contradict the freedom of the person. 
6BBemerkungen zur Rechts/ehre, vol. 20, 465: "vernOnftiges Geschopf [sic] ." 
can be brought back even against his will into his parents' possession 
from another's possession).69 
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Furthermore, since the parents procreate a person, they have the duty to care 
for itJO Kant explains in his notes to Achenwall's Juris natura/is that "the parents 
are not obligated to the child but to humanity in general with regard to the 
child."71 
Just as there arose from one's duty to oneself, that is, to the humanity in 
one's own person, a right (ius persona/e) of both sexes to acquire each 
other as person in the manner of things by marriage, so there follows from 
procreation in this community a duty to preserve and care for its offspring ; 
that is, children, as persons, have by their procreation an original innate 
(not acquired) right to the care of their parents until they are able to look 
after themselves, and they have this right directly on the basis of principle 
691bid . : " ... weil sie gleich den Sachen im Be sit z der Elten sind ... ". Unless we distinguish 
between a potential and actual freedom, Kant's assertion that children have the status of free 
beings seems to contradict his statement in the Vorarbeiten zur Rechtslehre 341 where he says 
that neither children nor insane and violent people are free. In Reflexionen zur Rechtsphilosophie 
val. 19, no. 7610, 468 Kant calls the child "persona in potentia proxima" : 
"Wenn ein Kind jederzeit dasjenige bliebe, was es bey der Geburt ist, so wc;ire es eine sache [sic] 
und der Eltern Recht in Ansehung des Kindes ein Recht in der Sache disponendi de eius etiam 
substantia derelinquendi, alienandi etc. 
Nun ist es aber persona in potentia proxima. Daher entspringt relatio voluntatis erga 
voluntatem obligatoria." 
7DReflexionen zur Rechtsphilosphie, val. 19, no. 7616, 470 : "Die Verbindlichkeit der Eltern gegen 
die Kinder ruhrt nicht daher, weil sie Menschen seyn, sondern weil die Eltern Ursache seyn , dar.. 
sie daseyn." 
71 Reflexionen zur Rechtsphilosophie 353, no. 7390: "Die Eltern sind dem Kinde nicht verbunden 
sondern der Menschheit Oberhaupt in Ansehung des Kindes." See also MSV 581 : "Eitern gegen 
Kinder stehen nur als Werkzeuge gegen die schopferische Urquelle in Verhaltnir.. . Ueberhaupt 
unter bekannten vernunftigen Wesen giebt es dergelichen Urheber nicht. Es ist nothwendig, dar.. 
ein solches Wesen Ober aile Verbindlichkeit, mithin Ober aile Pflichtgesetze erhoben gedacht wird , 
das selbst nicht unterm Gesetz steht, mithin kann es nur das Gesetz selbst seyn, und da das 
moralische Gesetz unter der Idee von Gott personificiert wird , nur dieser als hOchster moralischer 
Gesetzgeber aller Gesetze." This statement is reminiscent of Locke who, according to Brandt 81 , 
mocks Sir Robert Filmer's argument that a father acquires a right over his children by begetting 
them. Locke like Kant in his Lecture on Moral philosophy argues that it is God who creates the 
child , and that the parents are only the instrument of God or the moral law (compare John Locke, 
Treatise I, §§53, 54) . 
(lege), that is, without any special act being required to establish this 
right.72 
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The act of procreation73 entails the duty and the right, in other words, the 
responsibility of the parents to preserve and to care for their children and to 
make them happyJ4 Parents must not only keep the child alive75 which means 
that they are not allowed to "dispose over its substance, over its healthy 
members,"76 but they must also ensure that it can enjoy itself.77 The duty to care 
for the child implies the right of the parents to manage, feed, and educate it. This 
right of the parents results from the obligation they have to preserve the 
childrenJB The right of the children "to be raised, fed, preserved, cared for and 
defended" is a right of coercion ("Zwangsrecht") which does not include the right 
to prescribe to the parents the manner in which they have to fulfill their 
obligation. This right of coercion allows children only to demand the satisfaction 
of the most basic necessities of nature, yet if the parents would only fulfill their 
strict obligations, the child, Kant says, would "certainly perish ."79 Only when 
72Gregor 98 (MS 280). In Reflexionen zur Rechtsphilosophie, vol. 19, no. 7610, 469 Kant states: 
"Das Recht der Eltern in Ansehung der Kinder grUndet sich auf der obligation , die sie haben, die 
Kinder zu erhalten, welche sie sich generando contrahirt haben, .... ". 
73Concerning the implications for (pro)creation see the section on the "Theological Argument. " 
74Compare MS 281 . 
75See Bemerkungen zur Rechtslehre, vol. 20, 465: "Dieser Act der Zeugung fUhrt zugleich die 
Verbindlichkeit der Zeugenden das Kind am Leben zu erhalten (infantem tal/ere) .. . ". 
76Reflexionen zur Rechtsphilosophie, vol. 19, no. 7608, 468: "Der Eltern Recht in Ansehung des 
Kindes geht nicht auf die disposition Uber seine substantz, Uber seine Gesunde Gliedmal1en; er 
kann es nicht derelinquiren und das Kind ist nicht allein sein , sondern er kann es auch nicht 
alienieren."--AII unusual spellings are rendered as found in the text. Compare footnote no. 49. 
77See Bemerkungen zur Rechtslehre, vol. 465: " ... und es ist aliso Pflicht gegen ein vernUnftiges 
Geschopf [sic] es im Daseyn und frohen Genu!1 desselben zu erhalten. " 
7Bsee footnote no. 72.] 
79Reflexionen zur Rechtsphi/osophie , vol. 19, no. 7704, 496: "Die Kinder haben ein Zwangsrecht 
in Ansehung der Eltern aber nicht weiter als auf ihre nutrition, Ernahrung, conservation , Pflege 
und defension. Aber sie haben keine Befugnis vorzuschreiben wie. Sie konnen nichts verlangen , 
als was die au!1erste Nothdurft der Natur erfodert. Demnach da keine Befugnis in der Art, wie sie 
erzogen werden sollen , zu zwingen m6glich ist und sie, wenn nur das gesche, was aus Zwang ge-
fodert werden kann, gewil1 umkommen wOrden, so k6nen sie operam parentum als gratuitam 
ansehen und sind verbunden , und zwar aus quasi contractu zur obedientz." 
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children gain the ability to preserve themselves and thus reach majority do they 
become their own master (sui iuris) or mistress which as we saw means that they 
own themselves in the sense of proprietas. They acquire this right "without any 
special act to establish it and so merely by principle;" that is, they acquire it by 
virtue of their humanity. I interpret this to mean that the developed capacity of 
adult children to preserve themselves ("Vermogen ihrer Selbsterhaltung") is the 
criterion that they have actualized their innate freedom, can rule themselves, and 
defend their rights as citizens. 
I suggested using the parent-child relationship as an analogy for the 
relationship of self-possession. Our brief excursion into parental rights and the 
rights of children shows that the strict duty of the parent discussed in the 
"Doctrine of Right" mirrors the perfect duty of self-preservation discussed in the 
"Doctrine of Virtue." Even though Kant calls the right of the child "to be raised , 
fed, preserved, cared for and defended, "a right of coercion, he states that 
children cannot prescribe the manner in which this right should be fulfilled which 
seems to be contrary to Kant's usual use of the expression "right of coercion."so 1 
suggest that the parents' duty which corresponds to this strict right which the 
children have by virtue of their humanity is analogous to the strict duty of self-
preservation . The manner in which the latter duty would be obeyed is also left 
open; thus it may indicate that both the strict duty of the parents as well as the 
strict duty to preserve oneself depend on the right of humanity, the former 
referring to external, the latter, to inner freedom. 
Like the child who is in the possession of the parents, the homo 
phaenomenon is in the possession of the human being. And like the parents 
sosee Chapter on "Duties." 
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whose will is restricted because the child is a free being by virtue of its humanity 
(i.e., is a potential member of humanity) , the will of the human being (i .e., the 
empirical will able to act according to the categorical imperative) is restricted 
because as homo noumenon he or she represents humanity. We can say that 
the child is entrusted to the care of the parents , and the homo phaenomenon is 
entrusted to the care of the human being. Both parent and human being are 
obligated to care for what is entrusted to them by humanity, and both the child 
and the human being are entitled to this care by virtue of their humanity. This 
care involves not only physical preservation but also moral education. Since the 
parents brought a free being into existence, they have a duty to preserve and 
improve its life; and since the human being is the embodiment of the homo 
noumenon and thus brings humanity or freedom into existence, the human being 
is obligated to the homo noumenon. 
We have seen that a child's right of coercion is a right it has by virtue of its 
humanity. This right corresponds to the strict obligation of the parents to fulfill 
their duty. Both the parent in relationship to the child and the human being in 
relationship to herself or himself are obligated to humanity. In other words , the 
duty to preserve the child as well as the duty for self-preservation expresses an 
obligation to humanity. Furthermore, a violation of the duties owed to humanity is 
a violation of humanity. The strict duty of the parents not to dispose over the 
substance of their children corresponds to the strict duty of the human being not 
to destroy and mutilate herself or himself. 
We conclude that mutilation, physical abuse, suicide, and infanticide must 
be prohibited since it would violate humanity.a1 Self-destruction and the 
811t would be of interest to analyze whether or not Kant's view of the human being as proprietarius 
with respect to his prohibition of the death penalty is consistent. 
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destruction of another person cannot be justified with reference to the juridical 
property argument since possession of a person including one's own is 
understood in terms of proprietas which excludes the destruction of body and 
life. 82 
The analogy between the duties of the parents to their children and the 
duties to oneself shows that proprietas, unlike dominium, not only excludes the 
right to destruction in form of the strict duty to preserve the child or oneself but 
points beyond the strict duty of self-preservation to the wide duty to improve life. 
Proprietas and Imperium 
The previous section has shown that dominium in the sense of possession of a 
thing is exclusively used in the context of "Right to a Thing" ("Sachenrecht"). The 
application of the terms proprietas and proprietarius, however, because they 
express the relationship between humanity and human beings, is not restricted 
to "Rights to Persons Akin to Rights to Things" but is found in the context of 
juridical as well as ethical duties. We saw that the restriction of the disposition 
over others and oneself, that is, over the possession of the self is the result of 
the right of humanity. Since Kant thought it necessary to mention this restriction 
in the "Doctrine of Right," and presupposes it when he argues against the 
various vices, it must be of importance not only for the development of the 
Kantian idea of human rights but also for his idea of duties of virtue. 
821 have made a conscious effort in this dissertation not to enter the current debate on the pros 
and cons of suicide and abortion. I hope, however, that the critica l clarification of Kant's approach 
to, for example, ownership, might be of use for th is debate. Our clarification shows that Kant's 
understanding of autonomy does not mean that the person owns her or his life and body as a 
dominus but as a proprietarius. See also "Introduction," footnote no. 15. 
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In the Vorarbeiten zur Rechtslehre Kant states that the human being is her or his 
own ruler meaning that the human being rules over the phaenomenon of the 
noumenon. 
The human being is sui ipsius imperans (over the phaenomenon of the 
noumenon) and yet at the same time subditus.--But even though sui iuris 
with respect to both , [the human being] is nevertheless not dominus 
(owner) of himself.B3 
Kant speaks here of sui ipsius imperans (ruler of oneself).B4 At the same time 
human beings rule themselves, they subject themselves to the rule of reason; 
they are at the same time imperans and subditus, or, as we saw in the Chapter 
on "Duties", they are at the same time the one who obligates and the one who is 
obligated.ss 
Ruling oneself does not mean that one owns oneself in the sense of 
dominium, and even though Kant does not use the term proprietas in this quote, 
we can infer from his critique of Baumgarten, discussed below, that "sui iuris" 
esse is used in the sense of proprietarius. "Sui iuris" esse or sui ipsius imperans 
means that one owns oneself in the sense of proprietas. In other words, to be 
one's own master implies that one is neither subjected to other peoples' arbitrary 
rules or whims (outer freedom) nor to one's own (inner freedom). 
B3Vorarbeiten zur Rechts/ehre, val. 23, 258: "Der Mensch ist sui ipsius imperans (vom 
Phaenomenon des Noumenon) und doch zugleich subditus.--Aber obgleich sui iuris in beydem 
betracht [sic] dennoch nicht dominus (Eigenthomer) von sich selbst." 
841 take it that "imperans" is the present tense participle of the infinitive "imperare" ("to rule" or to 
"govern") and that Kant uses it here as a substantive ("ruler") . 
B5Kant uses the term "subditus," ("subordinate" or the one who receives orders) which Kant, 
according to Gottfried Feyerabend's notes of the lecture on "Naturrecht," contrasts with "civis." 
Kant states that everyone who belongs to a people is either subditus or civis. In the former case 
the imperans or ruler is a despot and in the latter case a monarch. By using the term subditus 
Kant seems to indicate that the homo noumenon rules like a despot even though it would be the 
civis who is ruled according to her or his own will. (Naturrecht Feyerabend , val. 27.2,2 page 1384: 
"Jeder in einem Volke ist entweder subditus oder Civis. lm ersten Faile ist der lmperans Despot. 
Der Civis ist unterthan, aber nicht subditus. Er wird betrachtet als werde er regiert nach seinem 
eignen Willen .") 
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Kant expresses the importance of the distinction between dominium and 
proprietas tor ethics in his critique of Baumgarten86 who refers to self-control as 
dominium sui: 
In opposition to the author's definition of self-control under§ 200, Mister 
Kant replies here only that one must not call it dominium sui ipsius but 
imperium sui ipsius since dominium can only be compared quoad res. 
Even though the human being would indeed belong to himself, would 
have his own personality, and can determine his state according to his 
own empirical will (although in conformity with the law) , this would only 
indicate proprietarium not dominium, since he would otherwise have the 
right to destroy himself, to mutilate himself etc. , but this would run contrary 
to his inner duty. a? 
Kant rejects Baumgarten's usage of the term dominium sui ipsius to refer to a 
person's self-discipline ("Selbstbeherrschung") and replaces it by the term 
imperium sui ipsius, indicating thereby the categorial difference between 
dominium and proprietas. Kant makes it clear that the relationship of belonging 
to oneself has to be understood in terms of proprietas. Self-control, according to 
the Lecture on the Metaphysics of Morals, refers to the control a person has over 
her or his faculties and entails the unrestricted power to use them properly 
("zweckmal1ig").BB This control refers to the control of one's state and not over 
one's substance and excludes self-mutilation and self-destruction. 
86Compare §200 in Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten's Ethica Phi/osophica reprinted in volume 
27.2, 1 of the Academy Edition . 
B7MSV 625: "Gegen die Definition des Verfassers in § 200 Ober die Selbstbeherrschung erwidert 
hier Herr Kant nur, dar.. man dies nicht dominium sui ipsius, sondern imperium sui ipsius nennen 
mosse, da dominium nur quoad res vergl ichen werden kann , der Mensch aber sich zwar 
angehore, seine eigene Personlichkeit habe, und nach seiner eigenen WillkOr (wiewohl 
gesetzmaf!.ig) seinen eigenen Zustand bestimmen kann , dies aber nur proprietarium, nicht 
dominium andeute, da er sonst das Recht haben wOrde, sich zu vernichten , zu verstommeln etc., 
welches aber wider seine innere Pflicht laufe." I take it that "proprietarium" is the genitive plural of 
"proprietas" whereby the proper form should be proprie-tat-ium." 
BBin MSV 626 Kant states that one can speak of a dominium over oneself if one understands it as 
a "dominium facultatum with regard to which the human being has an unrestricted power to use 
them properly ["zweckmaf!.ig"] according to his own choosing ; they [the faculties] have then to be 
regarded as incorporales." ("Man kann insofern sagen, dar.. der Mensch ein dominium Ober sich 
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Kant continues his statement in the lecture as follows: 
However, imperium or the duty to rule oneself would follow from the 
concept of duty. Duty would be the reason of the determination of the 
empirical will according to pure reason. This reason would be 
unconditioned, necessary, and thus the formula of duty always an 
imperative through which the kind of control is indicated . lnde imperium 
namely over oneself in casu.ag 
Paraphrasing this quote, we can say that duty is the determining ground of the 
free empirical will. Since "duty" is by definition an action that ought or ought not 
to be done, it is "unconditioned" or "necessary." Furthermore, since "duty" 
presupposes the possibility of constraint and in the final analysis the possibility of 
self-constraint, Kant says that the duty to rule oneself follows from the concept of 
duty. Finally, since it is the imperative of reason which rules or controls the 
empirical will , it is imperium as opposed to dominium which characterizes self-
control: 
The personality or humanity in my person is thought of as an intelligible 
substance, the place of all concepts, that which distinguishes the free 
human being from all objects [and] to whose lawgiving the human being in 
his visible nature is subjected. One thinks of it [personality] as a subject 
which is intended to give the moral law to the human being and to 
determine him. [One thinks of personality] as owner of the body under 
whose lawgiving the administration of all the powers of the human being is 
regulated. go 
habe, insofern man darunter ein dominium facultatum versteht, als in deren ROcksicht der Mensch 
freye Gewalt hat, sie zweckm~r..ig nach eigener Wahl zu gebrauchen; sie sind alsdann als 
incorporales anzusehen.") 
89MSV 625: "Imperium dagegen, oder die Pflicht, sich selbst zu beherrschen, folge aus dem 
Beg riff von Pflicht; Pflicht sey der G r u n d der Bestimmung der freien WillkOr nach der reinen 
Vernunft. Dieser Grund sey unbedingt, nothwendig, und daher die Formel der Pflicht jederzeit ein 
lmperativ, wodurch die Art der Beherrschung angedeutet werde. lnde imperium und zwar Ober 
sich selbst in casu ." The subjunctive mood in the original and the translation is due to the indirect 
quote of Kant by Vigilantius. 
90MSV 627:" Die Personlichkeit oder die Menschheit in meiner Person ist gedacht als eine 
intelligible Substanz, der Sitz aller Begriffe, dasjenige, was den Menschen in seiner Freiheit von 
allen Objekten unterscheidet, unter dessen Gesetzgebung der Mensch in seiner sichtbaren Natur 
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Personality is understood as a subject who owns the body and provides the 
legislation for the administration or management of the various powers of the 
human being. If we combine this quote with the previous one, we can say that 
the legislation of pure reason results in duties which determine the free empirical 
will. It seems therefore that Kant distinguishes between an ideal subject 
represented by personality or humanity (the homo noumenon) , the free empirical 
will or the human being (the homo phaenomenon) , and the body as part of the 
homo phaenomenon.91 The human being is the proprietarius of the body, and 
the Chapter on the "Trustee-relationship" will show that the ideal subject itself is 
understood as proprietarius. 
Freedom or the capacity of the human being to be determined only by 
himself is , according to Kant, unlimited ("unumschranktes Verm6gen").92 But he 
also stresses that it is this freedom by means of which "the duty of self-
preservation is cognizable."93 We will return to the connection between freedom 
and the duty of self-preservation in the last part of this dissertation. For our 
present discussion it is on ly of importance to stress that human self-
determination is understood in terms of proprietarius and proprietas. 
After presenting his view of self-control, Kant lists the duties to oneself 
which refer to the free being or the homo noumenon. We saw in the Chapter on 
"Duties" that even though Kant criticizes Baumgarten's assumption of a soul and 
steht. Man denkt sie sich also als ein Subjekt, das bestimmt is, dem Menschen moralische 
Gesetze zu geben, und ihn zu determiniren: als lnhaber des Korpers, unter dessen Gesetz-
gebung die Verwaltung aller Krafte des Menschen geordnet ist." 
91This hierarchy of ownership seems to be analogous to the distinction between 
"Obereigentomer'' und "Untereigentomer" which we described in footnote 61 . 
921bid. 627. This characterization of freedom could be the reason why Kant speaks of "subditus", 
namely, to indicate the possibility of a despotic or anarchic aspect of freedom. See footnote 85. 
931bid . 628: "Dies ist die Freiheit und durch diese ist die Pflicht der Selbsterhaltung erkennbar, die 
sich daher nicht deutlich demonstrieren lar..t. " 
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his discussion of officia erga animam (duties to the soul), he concedes that since 
all those duties to which one is obligated with regard to one's person are 
referring to the noumenon or "a being that acts freely," he is willing to refer to this 
aspect as soul.94 When Kant then continues to speak of duties to the soul, it is 
clear that he means duties to the homo noumenon. 
Following Vig ilantius' notes, it was Kant's intent to list three kinds of duties 
to the "soul," but it turns out that only two are actually mentioned: the duty to own 
oneself (animus sui compos) and the duty to rule oneself. The former is defined 
as "composed mind" or "composure" which can only be achieved if one subjects 
one's powers and abilities to one's free empirical wil l. 95 If one is unable to own 
oneself, and one's powers and abilities are not determined by the free empirical 
will , one is in the 
state of [mind] of a visionary who automatically re linquishes himself to his 
imagination and whose actions lack reflection and freedom; for example, a 
hypochondria c. 96 
The command to rule oneself on the other hand requires one to develop the 
faculties of the "soul" with regard to moral ends.97 
94MSV 625f: "Aile Pfl ichten also, die ihm in Rucksicht seiner eigenen Person obliegen, nehmen 
auf ihn als noumenon oder als ein in Freiheit handelndes Wesen Bezug , und insoweit kann man 
sagen, der Mensch habe eine Seele." Compare section on "Kant's Model of Self-obligation" in the 
Chapter on "Duties." 
95MSV 626: '"Aile Pflichten, die ihm nun in Rucksicht seiner Seele obliegen, lassen sich auf drey 
allgemeine Bestimmungen reduciren : 
a) s i c h s e I b s t z u b e s i t z e n , d. i. aile Handlungen nach einer freien Willkur zu 
bestimmen. Dies ist das, was man 
an imi sui compos 
nennt, gleich ein gefa~tes Gemuth."--
1 assume that the distinction between the three kinds of duties, like the rights of the 
human being in her or his own person, is the result of applying the three categories of relation. 
96MSV 626: "Vermag er dies nicht uber sich, so ist er in der Fassung eines Schwarmers, der sich 
unwillkurlich seinen Vorstellungen uberla~t und ohne Ueberlegung und Freiheit handelt; z. E. ein 
Hypochondrist. " 
97MSV 627: "b) D i e P f I i c h t , s i c h s e I b s t z u reg i e r e n. 
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In the "Doctrine of Virtue," the two duties described in the lecture become the 
conditions which make inner freedom as opposed to outer freedom discussed in 
the "Doctrine of Right" possible: 
But two things are required for inner freedom: being one's own master in a 
given case (animus sui compos), that is, subduing one's affects, and 
ruling oneself (imperium in semetipsum), that is, governing one's 
passions. 98 
Only when these two conditions are fulfilled is it possible that we can determine 
our actions" through the thought of the law" and speak of virtue. In other words, 
only if reason reigns over the passions and desires can we speak of inner 
freedom. It becomes clear from this that only those duties which concern inner 
freedom are ethical duties.99 
Kant explains that the command to be one's own master ("Meister seiner 
selbst sein") asks us not to be ruled by our affects and inclinations. Instead of the 
expression animus sui compos, Kant also uses the term apathy and explains that 
it refers to a "tranquil mind"10o and not to indifference. The second command to 
be one's own ruler ("Herr Ober sich selbst sein") asks us to govern our 
passions.101 Kant believes that it is passions and not affects which are 
associated with vices. 
Diese involvirt die Kultur der GemOthskr~fte zu den Zwecken, mit welchen sie zusammen 
bestehen konnen, und besteht also das requisit in dem Vermogen oder Fertigkeit der Seele, die 
facultates animi zu allen moralischen Zwecken auszubilden und auf sie zu richten."--lt seems that 
"es" is missing before "besteht". 
9BGregor 208 (MS 407: "Zur inneren Freiheit aber werden zwei Stocke erfordert: seiner selbst in 
einem gegebenen Fall Meister (animus sui compos) und Ober sich selbst Herr r zu sein 
(imperium in semetipsum) zu sein, d. i. seine Affecten zu z ~ h m e n, und seine Leidenschaften 
zu be h e r r s c h e n.") 
99See MS 406. 
100MS 409: "das GemOth in Ruhe." 
101The English translation of "sein eigener Herr sein" (sui iuris esse) is "to be one's own master." 
But we have to be aware that "master" is the translation of "Herr" and not "Meister." The opposite 
of "Herr" would be "Knecht" ("serf') but the opposite of "Meister" would be "Lehrling" ("apprentice") 
or "Junger" ("disciple"). Thus "Herr" indicates membership in the ruling class and is equivalent to 
The first command, the duty of apathy, is a negative command; whereas the 
second command, to rule oneself or to govern one's passion, is a positive 
command: 
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Since virtue is based on inner freedom, it contains a positive command to 
a man, namely to bring all his capacities and inclinations under his 
(reason's) control and so to rule over himself, which goes beyond 
forbidding him to let himself be governed by his feelings and inclinations 
(the duty of apathy); for unless reason holds the reins of government in its 
own hands, man's feelings and inclinations play the master over him. 102 
Even though apathy is necessary in order to be a virtuous person, it is not 
enough not to be subjected to one's affects and thus to become more receptive 
to the law, but one must "determine oneself to act through the thought of the law" 
in order to be virtuous.103 In other words, one must be ruled by reason . 
What we have said so far allows us to conclude that animus sui compos, that is, 
the duty to own oneself or to be one's own master and the duty to rule oneself 
are based on the assumption that the human being is proprietarius and not 
dominus of himself. In the Chapter on the "Rights of humanity" we stated that, 
according to the Lecture on the Metaphysics of Morals, homo est sui iuris (the 
human being belongs to himself, that is, to humanity) is the principle which 
the English "Lord," whereas "Meister" refers to the person who has mastered a craft. Kant uses 
both "Herr" and "Meister" in MS and we have to keep the distinction in mind. Compare also Kant's 
distinction between facility ("Leichtigkeit") and free aptitude ("freie Fertigkeit") in MS 407. The 
latter seems to be a combination of the two commands, namely, being one's own master in the 
sense of mastering a skill ("Fertigkeit") and using this skill according to the law ("freie Fertigkeit"). 
102Gregor 208 (MS 408: "Die Tugend also, so fern sie auf innerer Freiheit gegrondet ist, enthalt 
fOr die Menschen auch ein bejahendes Gebot, namlich aile seine Vermogen und Neigungen unter 
seine (der Vernunft) Gewalt zu bringen, mithin der Herrschaft Ober sich selbst, welche Ober das 
Verbot, namlich von seinen GefOhlen und Neigungen sich nicht beherrschen zu lasse, (der Pflicht 
der A path i e) hinzu kommt: weil, ohne dar.. die Vernunft die ZOgel der Regierung in ihre Hande 
nimmt, jene Ober den Menschen den Meister spielen.)--Gregor changes the beginning of the 
German text slightly since it should read: "Thus, virtue in so far as it is based on inner 
freedom .. .. " 
103See MS 407. 
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serves as the basis for the development of the right of the human being in her or 
his own person and that Kant deduces from it the command not to use oneself 
as a thing . According to the "Doctrine of Right," which is concerned with external 
freedom sui iuris or to be one's own Lord ("sein eigener Herr sein") is one of the 
authorizations or innate rights implied in the innate right of freedom; and , 
following the "Doctrine of Virtue ," it is the command imperium in semetipsum or 
to be Lord of oneself ("Ober sich selbst Herr sein") which in addition to the 
command to tame one's affects constitutes inner freedom . Thus, belonging to 
humanity means being a proprietarius and subjecting oneself to the rule of 
reason (humanity) , from which it follows that one's body and life ought not to be 
harmed or destroyed by oneself, and that one's faculties ought to be subjected to 
the rule of reason . 
From the findings in this section we can draw the following conclusions 
with regard to Kant's discussion of self-murder: 
First, Kant distinguishes between the duty to own oneself and the duty to 
rule oneself. He points out that affects have to be subdued and passions to be 
ruled in order to avoid a violation of duties. We therefore expect Kant to argue 
that self-murder constitutes either a violation of the duty to own oneself (the duty 
of apathy) or of the duty to rule oneself. According to the first possibility, self-
murder is the result of an affect and the self-murderer is a visionary who is 
unable to control his affects; whereas , according to the second possibility, self-
murder is the result of a passion and constitutes a vice. We will present Kant's 
view of the matter in the Chapter on "Homicidium Dolosum" and return to it in the 
Chapter on "Belief of Reason." 
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Second, Kant indicates that self-control (imperium) is the control over the state 
("Zustand") of the person . The distinction between the states and the subject of 
these states is another way for Kant to express that the disposition over one's 
self is limited . It also indicates that self-murder does not only affect the state of a 
subject but the subject herself, in other words , her moral substance or 
personality. The following Chapter on "Care for the Moral Self," will further clarify 
Kant's view of personality as moral substance and its implications for the 
question of self-murder. 
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CHAPTER IV 
CARE FOR THE MORAL SELF 
In the Chapter on "Ownership" we saw that our being a proprietarius means that 
we care for our bodies. In this chapter we will show that we not only have to 
preserve our physical selves, but, even more importantly, that we must preserve 
our moral selves. We will see that life is not always of absolute value and death 
not always an evil. Even though we must, on the one hand , preserve our lives if 
we are able to live morally, we must, on the other hand, sacrifice our lives if the 
alternative would be to lead an immoral life. I will argue that the meaning of the 
term "self' used by Kant in his argument against self-murder differs from the 
meaning he uses in his justification of self-sacrifice. 
In order to clarify the meaning of the term "self," I suggest that we take up 
Kant's distinction between the state of the person and the person itself. Kant's 
prohibition of self-murder is expressed in terms of the violation of one's 
substance; whereas one is only allowed to dispose over one's state. The 
interesting point is that self-sacrifice, which Kant believes can in specific cases 
be justified , seems not to constitute a violation of one's substance. 
Kant distinguishes the substance of the human being from her or his 
state. Substance refers to either the body (substantia phaenomenon) or one's 
personality (substantia noumenon), yet it is not always clear whether the term 
"substance" refers to the category of substance or the concept of substance in 
the traditional sense. With regard to the term "state" we already mentioned two 
meanings, namely that of the state of nature and the civil state and the control of 
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one's physical state which excludes self-mutilation and self-destruction. 1 But in 
addition to the physical state, Kant also speaks of the moral state of the human 
being. I will show that the first category of relation in the Critique of Practical 
Reason refers to the homo noumenon or personality; whereas the second 
category refers to the homo phaenomenon or the state of the person. 
The distinction between substance and state of the human being seems 
to be an expression for the essential and the non-essential in human nature. If 
this is true, it implies that if the essence of human nature is destroyed, human 
nature is destroyed. In the context of practical philosophy it is the freedom of the 
person which is the essence of human nature. Since freedom is represented by 
the intelligible self or personality, any action which adversely affects personality 
understood as the substance or essence of human nature is a violation or even 
destruction of this very nature. If suicide or other kinds of destructive behavior 
can be shown to make human nature impossible, it must be prohibited in order to 
uphold the essentialist view of human nature. Perfect duties to oneself could 
then be understood as the command not to violate or destroy that which is 
essential in human nature, namely the intelligible self or personality. Or, to put 
the matter differently, they could be understood as the logical consequence of 
Kant's view of personality as substance. 
Having said all this , one of the first questions I will try to answer is whether 
Kant's prohibition of suicide can be understood as an expression of his view of 
substance. In other words, does Kant's view of personality and the prohibition of 
self-murder reflect his metaphysical view of substance? 
1See Chapter in "Ownership," footnote no. 28. 
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One cannot fail to see, on the one hand , a connection between Kant's 
characterization of the substance of the human being and the view of substance 
in metaphysics and , on the other hand, between the substance of the human 
being and the first category of relation as developed in the Critique of Pure 
Reason and the Critique of Practical Reason. In the first section I will examine 
whether this connection is more than just an accidental correlation and suggests 
more than just a systematic correspondence. I will follow Heinz Heimsoeth and 
argue that through the consciousness of personality we have access to the 
intelligible, and I will argue that this consciousness implies that we can think of 
ourselves as the last subject to which all ends can be attributed. 
In the second section I will distinguish between two different Kantian 
views of life that he employs when discussing suicide. According to the first, 
theoretical view, life must be understood as the commercium between soul or 
personality and body so that the destruction of the physical life or self results in 
the destruction of the intelligible self. According to the second, practical view, life 
is understood in terms of the capacity for desire. It is in this context that Kant 
explains that life understood as mere physical existence is not per se of value, 
but only a life in which the chosen ends do not conflict with the moral law. In 
order to make the latter point Kant uses the distinction between substance and 
state. Since self-sacrifice, unlike self-murder, is morally justifiable, I suggest that 
the self which is murdered must be distinguished from the self which is 
sacrificed . 
In the third section we will take up Kant's example of the suicide who does 
not assume the immortality of the soul. We will discuss Kant's view that even 
though it cannot be proven that the soul is immortal or a substance which exists 
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by itself, the immortality of the soul must nevertheless be assumed if we believe 
that there is a moral order that includes a final purpose in the world to which we 
contribute by fulfilling our duties. 
Substance and Personality 
In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant presents the first category of relation: "of 
i n he r e n c e and subsistence (substantia et accidens)" in the first part of his 
"Transcendental Logic," the "Transcendental Analytic," and In the Critique of 
Practical Reason he presents the first category of relation: "to per so n a I it y" 
in the "Analytic of Practical Reason." I believe that this correspondence is more 
than just of systematic interest and that it can be used to reconstruct the 
ontological assumptions2 inherent in Kant's concept of personality. Since I must 
limit the discussion to this section, I will only be able to offer a rough sketch of a 
topic worthy of a more detailed analysis, and I will not be able to offer a clear cut 
distinction between the different usages of the term "substance." I hope, 
however, that this section will suffice to convince the reader that Kant's view of 
substance influences his view of personality as well as his prohibition of self-
murder.3 
21f we use the term "ontological," we should keep in mind that the analytic of pure understanding 
which Kant also equates with transcendental philosophy or the "Vorhof' (outer court) of 
metaphysics (Preisschrift Ober die Fortschritte der Metaphysik, val. 20, 260) replaces traditional 
ontology (KrV A 247/B 303). 
3The relevance of the table of categories for Kant's metaphysical works is the topic of lngeborg 
Heidemann's "Die Kategorientafel als systematische Topik," in Akten des 4. lnternationalen Kant 
Kongresses, Mainz 6.-10. April1974, Teillll (Berlin , New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1975), p. 57 
where she takes up Kant's term "systematische Topic" for the table of categories and shows that it 
can be regarded as a "Systemmodell" for the development of a priori systems. Two students of 
Heidemann have followed Heidemann's suggestion: Gisela Helene Lorenz in Oas Problem der 
Erklarung der Kategorien. Eine Untersuchung der forma/en Strukturelemente in der "Kritik der 
reinen Vernunff' (Berlin , New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1986), and Monika Sanger in Die 
kategoriale Systematik in den "Metaphysischen AnfangsgrOnden der Rechts/ehre. Ein Beitrag zur 
Methodenlehre Kants" (Berlin, New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1982). 
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The categories of relation listed in the Critique of Pure Reason: "I n h e -
r e n c e and Subsistence (substantia et accidents) ," "Causa I it y and 
Dependence (cause and effect},"" and "Com m u n it y (reciprocity between 
agent and patient) ," correspond to the categories of relation listed in the Critique 
of Practical Reason: relation "to person a I it y," "to the state of the 
person," and "r e c i p roc a II y" the relation "of one person to the state of the 
other."4 
Beck interprets the correspondence between the category of subsistence 
and inherence and the category "to p e r s o n a I i t y" as follows: 
Just as substance is that which is the cause of and is preserved through 
change in its accidents, the person is an intelligible substance to be 
preserved in conduct. Accordingly, the person is an end in itself as a 
setter of all ends, and moral values are always values of a person.s 
In order to present my own position with regard to the relevance of the category 
of substance for the interpretation of the category of personality and the possible 
implications for a duty of self-preservation , I turn to the critical discussion of 
Beck's statement. 
Beck states an analogy between the relation of substance to its accidents 
and the relation of the person as intelligible substance to her or his actions. The 
former relation states that substance is actually preserved; whereas the latter 
states that it should be ("to be") preserved. Even though Beck does not explicitly 
4KpV 66: 
3. 
Der Relation 
Auf die P e r s o n I i c h k e i t 
Auf den Z u s t a n d der Person 
We c h s e I s e i t g einer Person auf 
den Zustand der anderen. 
5Lewis White Beck, A Commentary on Kant's Critique of Practical Reason (Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press, 1960}, pp. 14 ?f. 
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say that the first part of the analogy ("substance is that which is the cause of and 
is preserved through change in its accidents") refers to the schematized category 
of substance as discussed in the first analogy of experience, we are justified in 
assuming it because he speaks of change of accidents which is an event in time 
and can only be thought as such. 
To explain this point we turn to the Critique of Pure Reason where Kant 
lists four functions of thought in judgment: quantity, quality, relation and modality. 
Under each title Kant subordinates three moments6 which are also called "logical 
functions."7 
Now the categories are just these functions of judgment, in so far as they 
are employed in determination of the manifold of a given intuition.s 
The pure categories are only functions of the understanding for concepts: 
They are the pure form of the employment of understanding in respect of 
objects in general, that is, of thought; but since they are merely its form, 
through them alone no object can be thought or determined.9 
According to the first Critique, appearances cannot be subsumed under pure 
categories but only under their schemata.1o The schemata of the pure concepts 
of understanding are the sole conditions under which these concepts can relate 
to objects and thus have meaning .11 The judgments which are produced under 
the conditions of schematization are classified as principles of the pure 
6KrV A 70/B 95. 
7KrV A 79/B 105. 
BKemp Smith 160 (KrV B 143). 
9Kemp Smith 265 (KrV A 248/B 305: " ... vielmehr sind sie blot! die reine Form des 
Verstandesgebrauchs in Ansehung der Gegenstande Oberhaupt und des Denkens, ohne doch 
durch sie allein irgendein Objekt denken oder bestimmen zu konnen.") 
10Compare for example: KrV A 139/B 178; A 181/B 223; A 247/B 304. 
11 KrV A 145f/B 185. Kant must therefore distinguish between "logische Bedeutung" und 
"Bedeutung" or "Sinn." 
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understanding.12 For our discussion we focus only on the third kind of principle, 
the analogies of experience which bring the existence of appearances under 
rules of universal time-determination.13 More specifically, it is the "First Analogy 
of Experience" or the "Principle of Permanence of Substance" which interests us 
here. Kant defines the latter as a rule "according to which a unity of experience 
may arise from perception ."14 In other words, the schema of substance is 
"permanence of the real in time."15 Time which itself is unchanging and abiding is 
represented in appearance by the permanent which is understood as substantia 
phaenomenon: "the permanent in relation to which alone all time-relations of 
appearances can be determined, is substance in the [field of] appearance, that 
is, the real in appearance." Kant further specifies what he means by the 
permanent by saying : 
In all appearances the permanent is the object itself, that is the substance 
as phaenomenon; everything, on the other hand, which changes or can 
change belongs only to the way in which substance or substances exist, 
and therefore to their determinations .1 6 
The terms "object itself," "substance as phaenomenon" or "the permanent" are 
therefore synonyms. We perceive substantia phaenomenon, that is, substance 
under the condition of time and space, only in terms of its accidents. Kant 
defines inherence as the existence of accidents and subsistence as the 
existence of the substance. The existence of a thing determined in time is called 
"state" (status) or the relation of accidents. 17 What changes are states; 
12Compare KrV A 148/B 187. 
13KrV A 178/B 220; KrV A 179/B 221f. 
14Kemp Smith 211 (KrV A 179/B 222). 
15Kemp Smith 184 (KrV A 144/B 183: "Das Schema der Substanz ist die Beharrlichkeit des 
Realen in der Zeit ... ".) 
16Kemp Smith 214 (KrV A 184/B 227). 
17Metaphysik Oohna, val. 28, 639: "Zustand, das VerMitni~ der Accidentien ." 
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substance does not change but is altered because the state changes. 18 Since we 
know the substance only through its accidents, it becomes clear why Kant 
stresses "inherence" when listing the category "i n h e r e n c e and 
subsistence." In other words , we know of the existence of substance, substance 
in appearance that is, only indirectly because of its accidents or the "special way 
in which it exists."19 The substantiale , however, which is not altered and remains 
the same,2o is the thing in itself and unknown.21 
We should note that Kant does not use the term "erhalten" (preserve) but 
speaks of "bleiben" ("remain") or "being permanent" ("beharren") or "the 
permanent" ("das Beharrl iche") with regard to substance; and with regard to the 
quantum of substance he says that it is "neither increased nor diminished ."22 
This remark is important because we might be tempted to interpret the first 
analogy of experience as a proposition of conservation in physics. But, as Peter 
Mittelstaedt has pointed out, the permanence of substance explains first and 
1BReflexionen zur Metaphysik, vol. 18, no. 5291 , 144: "Die Substantz ist nur veranderlich und 
wechselt nicht. Sie wird verandert, indem der Zustand wechselt; d. i. sie beharrt." 
In KrV B 230f/A 187f (Kemp Smith 216f) Kant expresses the same distinction between 
"Veranderung" ("alteration") and "Wechsel" ("change"): "All that alters persists, and only its state 
changes. Since this change thus concerns only the determinations, which can cease to be or 
begin to be, we can say, using what may seem a somewhat paradoxical expression , that only the 
permanent (substance) is altered, and that the transitory suffers no alteration but only a change, 
inasmuch as certain determinations cease to be and others begin to be." According to Reflexionen 
zur Metaphysik, val. 17, no. 4492, 571 the concept of substance "est terminator non entium, sed 
statuum" (The concept of substance does not make a thing but a state possible) since a 
"conceptus terminator" is a concept which makes the first of a sequence possible."(ibid. no. 4039, 
394: " .. . der conceptus terminator aber der Begrif, wodurch ein erstes der Reihe moglich ist.") 
19Kemp Smith 216 (KrV A 186/B 229). 
20Reflexionen zur Metaphysik, val. 17, no. 4060, 401: "Das substantiale ist unveranderlich ." 
21 Reflexionen zur Metaphysik, val. 18, no. 5292, 145: "Das substantiale ist das Ding an sich 
selbst und unbekant." 
22Compare the first analogy of experience Kemp Smith 212-217 (KrV A 182/B 224-A 189/B 232). 
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foremost what temporal alteration or permanence means, and it should not be 
interpreted as a proposition of conservation of physics.23 
With regard to the first part of Beck's analogy, we conclude, first, that his 
statement refers to substantia phaenomenon and, secondly, that it could be 
misleading to speak of the preservation of substance since Kant only speaks of 
permanence and the verb "preserve" could be interpreted wrongly as an 
indication that the first analogy of experience is a proposition of conservation. 
Furthermore, since the first part of Beck's analogy refers to substantia 
phaenomenon and the second part refers to the intelligible substance, the 
question is whether Beck, despite the difference of the relata in the analogy, 
could still apply the principle of permanence to the intelligible substance. If he 
could, we would have to assume that it would make sense to ascribe accidents 
or states to the intelligible substance or personality and that the intelligible 
substance could be understood in terms of its accidents or states. This, however, 
seems to be impossible because personality belongs to the noumenal to which 
the sensible forms of intuition (time and space) cannot be applied so that it is 
impossible to specify accidents or states of the intelligible substance or one's 
personality. We therefore conclude that the principle of the permanence of 
23Peter Mittelstaedt, Philosophische Probleme der Modernen Physik, 3rd revised ed ., (Mannheim: 
Bibliographisches lnstitut, 1968}, p. 129. In a footnote on the same page, he points out, however, 
that C. F. v. Weizsacker in his article "Kant's erste Analogie der Erfahrung und die 
Erhaltungssatze der Physik," in Argumentationen, Festschrift fOr Josef Konig (Gottingen 1965) 
connects the "quanta of conservation" ("Erhaltungsgrol1en") with the "quantum of substance" in 
the first analogy.--Heinz Heimsoeth indicates in Studien zur Philosophie Immanuel Kants I. 2nd 
ed. Kantstudien, Erganzungshefte no. 71 (Bonn: Bouvier Verlag Herbert Grundmann , 1971) in the 
Chapter "Chr. Wolffs Ontologie und die Prinzipienforschung I. Kants," p. 78 that Kant seems to 
have asked himself whether a rule analogous to that of the permanence of substance might not 
also exist for the "quantity of life." This possibility does, however, not affect the argument that the 
former should not be interpreted as a principle of conservation . 
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substance as a principle of theoretical reason cannot be applied to the intelligible 
substance.24 
Yet we could still ask whether Kant postulates with regard to the realm of 
the practical a principle whose function is analogous to that of the principle of the 
permanence of substance. This would either mean that we ignore the difference 
of the relata in Beck's analogy and focus on the relation between them or that we 
turn away from the schematized category of substance and focus on the logical 
meaning of the pure category of substance as "a something which can be 
thought only as subject, never as a predicate of something else."25 If we take up 
the former alternative we will have to explain how the fact-like statement that 
substance "is ... preserved" can be analogous to the prescription that the 
intelligible substance is "to be preserved." Because I believe that this first 
alternative represents a dead end I suggest taking up the second alternative.26 
We have pointed out already that, according to Kant, the pure categories 
are without meaning; yet they still have, says Kant, a logical meaning. 27 Heinz 
Heimsoeth with recourse to Adickes points out that if we think of Kant's 
241 believe that my findings are supported by Heimsoeth (1971) 77 who states , first, that the 
principle of permanence must be distinguished from the principle "which all philosophers" (quoting 
Kant) presuppose, namely that substance as substance can neither come into or go out of 
existence ("entstehen oder vergehen"); second, that the principle of conservation in physics based 
on the principle of the permanence of substance is only valid for appearances (ibid . p. 78) , and, 
third, that the principle of permanence concerns only the material not the intelligible (ibid.). 
25Kemp Smith 187 (KrV A 147/ B 186: "So wOrde z.B. Substanz, wenn man die sinnliche 
Bestimmung des Beharrlichkeit weglief1e, nichts weiter als ein Etwas bedeuten, das als Subjekt 
(ohne ein Pradikat von etwas anderem zu sein) gedacht werden kann.") See also KrV A 242f/B 
300f. In Reflexionen zur Metaphysik, val. 17, no. 4052, 398f Kant calls this subject the last 
subject: "Weillogische subiecte wiederum konnen praedicate seyn, so sind wir nach Gesetzen 
der Vernunft genothigt, uns ein letztes subiect zu denken; dieses ist substantz." This logical 
meaning seems to coincide with the traditional understanding of substance as the last subject. 
26The following interpretation is indebted to Heinz Heimsoeth's view of personality as substantia 
noumenon mentioned and developed in Heimsoeth (1971) Chapter I, "Chr. Wolffs Ontologie und 
die Prinzipienforschung I. Kants," pp. 1-92, as well as Chapter V, "Personlichkeitsbewuf1tsein und 
Ding an sich in der Kantischen Philosophie," pp. 227-257, abbreviated in the following as "PDK." 
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distinction between knowing ("erkennen") and thinking ("denken") we see that 
pure categories still have an " intention of meaning" or "intention of sense" 
("Bedeutungsintention"). Even though we cannot obtain knowledge through pure 
categories, we nevertheless use them to think problems, especially those of 
metaphysical nature. 27 
Applying the aforesaid to the pure category of substance, it seems 
plausible that Kant uses it for the discussion of the "I" of transcendental 
apperception in the Critique of Pure Reason and Personality in the Critique of 
Practical Reason. 
According to Heimsoeth the "I think" represents an immediate knowledge 
of action through which a contact with the substance of the "I" is given. 
That something is a subject and not a predicate ... of something else we 
can only perceive by means of the verbum activum "I," [and] thus , through 
. 28 consciousness ... . 
Even though this immediate consciousness of spontaneity is not a knowledge of 
the transcendental subject in itself, it is an immediate intellectual consciousness 
of the existence of my ego: 
Substantia noumenon of one's own soul shows itself as actually 
spontaneous existence without thereby "revealing" itself to me at the 
same time.29 
27Heinz Heimsoeth "Zur Herkunft und Entwicklung von Kants Kategorientafel ," in Studien zur 
Philosophie Immanuel Kants II. Kantstudien, Erganzungshefte no. 100 (Bonn: H. Bouvier u. Co. 
Verlag , 1970), pp. 113, 123. On p. 113 he quotes Kant's distinction in KrV B XXVI , and on page 
115 makes a reference to KpV 54 where Kant explicitly states that the category of causality can 
be applied to noumena. 
2BReflexionen zur Metaphysik, vol. 17, no. 4495, 573: "Dar! etwas ein subiect sey und kein 
praedicat (des Eindrucks, apparentia) von einem andern, konnen wir nur durch das verbum 
activum "ich" , also durchs Bewuf!tsein, Erkennen ... ". Heimsoeth PDK 247 refers in this context 
also to Kant's statement in KrV B 250/A 204 (Kemp Smith 229) : "Wherever there is action--and 
therefore activity and force--there is also substance ... . " 
28Heimsoeth PDK 247. 
169 
Since this consciousness of our spontaneity concerns theoretical reason, the 
question is what becomes of this consciousness in practical philosophy? 
Heimsoeth points out that, according to Kant, consciousness of spontaneity is a 
kind of consciousness of freedom.3o For the purpose of our discussion I follow 
Heimsoeth in his suggestion that logical personality is at the same time practical 
or moral personality.31 This consciousness of the moral law allows us to 
recognize our intelligible existence as person32 through our immediate feeling of 
respect33 for the moral law. Thus, the consciousness of our personality offers us 
more than only appearances even though the intelligible character of the human 
being remains unknown.34 
29Heimsoeth PDK 250 : "Die substantia noumenon der eigenen Seele zeigt sich als real tatiges 
Dasein, ohne sich mir damit auch gleich zu 'offenbaren'." 
3DHeimsoeth PDK 251 : "lmmerhin solider eine Hinweis nicht ganz unterdnJckt werden , dar.. nach 
den gelegentlichen, aber sehr gewichtigen AuP..erungen Kants schon die rein theoretische 
Spontaneitat eine Art Freiheit des Geistes darstellt und voraussetzt -- das Spontaneitats-
bewuP..tsein also ein Freiheitsbewur..tsein irgendwelcher Art sein muP..." 
31 Heimsoeth PDK 250: "Die 'logische Personlichkeit' ist zugleich doch 'praktische', 'moralische 
Personlichkeit' [footnote follows] ; die 'lntelligenz' sittlich-vernOnftiges Wesen. " 
32Heimsoeth PDK 254: "lm sittlichen BewuP..tsein weir.. und 'bemerke' ich eben doch mein 
intelligibles Dasein als Person und das ihm zugehorige 'Pradikat' der Freiheitskausalitat. " 
33Heimsothe PDK 254: "Dessen Unmittelbarkeit [die Unmittelbarkeit des sittlichen Bewur..tseins; 
Y. U.] spricht sich vor allem im GefOhl der Achtung aus." 
34Heimsoeth PDK 254, 256: "Der Freiheitsbegriff macht in seinem Objekte zwar ein 'Ding an sich 
selbst, aber nicht in der Anschauung vorstellig'. Also auch hier kein 'theoretisches Erkenntnis' vom 
lch an sich -- wenn auch der Ausdruck gelegentlich gebraucht wird : 'Erkenntnis seiner selbst nach 
derjenigen Beschaffenheit, was er an sich selbst ist' [footnote follows]--, aber doch eben 
Bewur..tsein von ihm." Of interest are in this connection Heimsoeth's reference to pages 399, 397 
of the "Erganzungen aus H" to the Anthropo/ogie, vol. 7 as well as page 457 of MS. Looking up 
the second, most enlightening, reference from the Anthropologie, we find the following : " ... aber 
mit der Einschrankung dar.. er sich selbst als Gegenstand durch diese Vorstellung in der 
Erfahrung nur erkennen kann wie er ihm e r s c h e i n e nicht wie er der Beobachtete an sich 
selbst ist. -- Wollte er sich auf die letztere Art erkennen so mOP..te er ein Bewur..tseyn der reinen 
Spontaneitat (den Freyheitsbegriff) zum Grunde legen (welches auch angeht aber alsdann worde 
es nicht Wahrnehmung des inneren Sinnes und darauf gegrOndetes empirisches Erkentnis seiner 
selbst (innere Erfahurng) sein konnen sander nur Bewur..seyn der Regel seines Thuns und 
Lassen ohne dadurch ein theoretisches (physiolog isches) Erkentnis seiner Natur erwoben zu 
haben als worauf die Psychologie eigentlich ausgeht." The closing parenthesis is missing in the 
Academy text.-- Compare also Beck's (1960) reference to Heimsoeth on page 226 footnote no. 
45. Beck seems to agree with Heimsoeth when he states on page 227: "But the evidence of 
spontaneity and our knowledge of the law of the self as noumenon certainly give a richer 
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One of Kant's Reflexionen zur Metaphysik not quoted by Heimsoeth seems to 
support his suggestion: 
Freedom is said to be a capacity to first start a state .. . the "I" proves the 
endpoint of reason for actions. "I do this" does not mean another effects 
this; and even if I say: I suffer this, it still means the intuition of a subject 
which is for itself and suffers. 35 
1 believe that it is in line with Heimsoeth's interpretation when we say that the "I" 
of transcendental apperception which is the focal point36 for all thought becomes 
in the field of the practical the focal point for actions of the will . We actually 
experience being the last subject whenever we are conscious of being an 
autonomous subject. Personality can therefore be understood as the ultimate 
subject or the fixed point from which all actions of the autonomous subject 
originate. In the lecture on metaphysics recorded by Dohna, Kant states that we 
can regard the "p e r s o n a I i t y of the soul" from the point of view of morals 
insofar as someone who is free is capable of the imputation of action and from 
the point of view of psychology or theoretical philosophy, and we are then 
concerned with the identity of the person. Kant makes clear that it is the "I" (of 
transcendental apperception) which connects the states of the human being and 
that with regard to empirical consciousness we cannot tell what this "I" or 
conception of personality than that of the transcendental unity of apperception, though the 
propositions in which it functions are all practical, not theoretical. " 
35Reflexionen zur Metaphysik, val. 17, no. 4338, 511: "Die Freyheit soli ein Vermogen seyn, einen 
Zustand zuerst anzufangen .... das lch beweiset den Endpunkt der GrOnde von den Handlungen. 
lch thue dieses [oder zeigt nich~ heir..t nicht: ein andrer wirkt dieses; und selbst, wenn ich sage: ich 
leide dieses, so bedeutet es doch die Anschauung [meiner se~ eines subjects, [was] was vor [sic ; 
read "fOr sich" or "an sich"] sich selbst ist und leidet."--"Suffer" is meant in the sense of being the 
patient not the agent. In the English I left out the alternative readings printed in square brackets in 
the German text. 
36Kant speaks of a "fixed point" in Reflexionen zur Metaphysik, vol. 17, no. 4492, 571: "Was ist 
das eigentliche subiect, nemlich das, was den mancherley [prae] accidentien und modificationen, 
ienen ohne unterschied der Zeit, diesen im Verhaltnis derselben, zu eben demselben fixen Punkt 
dient?" See also ibid ., no. 4702, 680. 
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permanence is so that the identity of the latter cannot be assumed even though it 
cannot be doubted from the point of view of morals: 
Thus morally [or "from the point of morals"] identity is not to be doubted, 
but (physically) theoretically one cannot assume it just as little as that the 
water in the river remains always the same (Locke trial). 37 
It is by virtue of the moral personality that actions of the person as a free person 
can be imputed to her or him, because as an intelligible being he or she is the 
final subject or substantia noumenon.3B This seems also to be the reason why 
Kant, in the Lecture on the Metaphysics of Morals refers to personality as 
"intelligible substance."39 Heimsoeth's interpretation seems to suggest that in the 
371 quote the whole passage from Metaphysik Dohna, vol. 28: 683 not only the translated part: 
"Die Per s 6 n I i c h k e it der Seele konnen wir betrachten 1.) mora I is c h -- insofern dies 
Wesen einer Zurechnung (Imputation der Handlung) fahig , frei ist, -- davon haben wir eben 
gehandelt. 2.) psycho I o g is c h. -- Behalten wir wahl in unserm ganzen Leben ldentitaet der 
Person? das i c h ist intellectuel, dadurch verbindet der Mensch seine Zustande, also findet 
ldentitat statt, aber das was beharrlich ist, das empirische Bewu~tseyn in der Zeit, kann der 
Mensch nicht nennen . Moralisch also ist die ldentitat gar nichty zu bezweifeln , aber (physisch) 
theoretisch kann man sie nicht annehmen, so wenig als im Flu~ das Wasser immer das nemlicht 
bleibt (Locke Versuch) ." The last part could also be translated with "as little as that water in [its] 
flow remains always the same." 
3Bit is of interest that the first category of relation in KpV is not understood in terms of inherence 
and subsistence but seems only to be understood in terms of subsistence, that is , in terms of the 
existence of substance. Furthermore, if as I suggest, the second category refers to the homo 
phaenomenon, then the homo phaenomenon is understood in terms of the states he or she 
chooses. These states can or cannot correspond to the substance of the human being, that is, her 
or his personality. The correlation between the category of personality and homo noumenon and 
states of the person and homo phaenomenon has also been suggested by H. J. Paton who, 
according to Beck (1960) 148 footnote no. 40, offers the following interpretation of the categories 
of relation : "They are (a) relation to homo noumenon (personality) under the imperative of 
autonomy; (b) relation to homo phaenomenon (person) under the imperative of the end in itself; 
(c) relation of actions of different persons in a kingdom of ends."-- Paton, however, does not 
correlate personality (homo noumenon) with substantia noumenon or the state of the person 
homo phaenomenon with substantia phaenomenon. 
39MSV 627 "Die Personlichkeit oder die Menschheit in meiner Person ist gedacht als eine 
intelligible Substanz, der Sitz aller Begriffe, dasjenige, was den Menschen in seiner Freiheit von 
allen Objekten unterscheidet, unter dessen Gesetzgebung der Mensch in seiner sichtbaren Natur 
steht." In Vorarbeiten zur Kritik der praktischen Vernunft, vol. 23, 71 Kant states: "Nun ist aber 
unser moralisch bestimmter Wille selbst ein Beyspiel einer Idee von Freyheit von intelligibeler 
Substanz und zwar dadurch da~ er Folgen die sich in der Erfahrung geben lassen an 
Bestimmungsgrunde uber Erfahrung hinaus kni.ipft." 
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realm of the practical the substantiality of the person is not expressed by 
permanence as defined in the first analogy of experience, but by the fact that a 
person, because of her or his consciousness of personality, is conscious of the 
responsibility for her or his actions or states. But this is not all: I also believe that 
the view of personality as the last subject or substance underlies Kant's view of 
the person as an end in itself. Personality, viewed as the endpoint of actions, is 
the endpoint or creator of all ends and values.4o Being the creator of all ends and 
values, it is itself of absolute value; and being itself not created by someone else, 
it cannot be of merely relative value for someone else. 
What we have said so far can now be applied to part of Kant's argument 
against self-murder in The Metaphysics of Morals: 
Man cannot renounce his personality as long as he is a subject of duty, 
hence as long as he lives; and it is a contradiction that he should be 
authorized to withdraw from all obligation, that is, freely to act as if no 
authorization were needed for this action. To annihilate the subject of 
morality in one's own person is to root out the existence of morality itself 
from the world , as far as one can, even though morality is an end in 
itself.41 
We can only be subjects of duty because of our personality (homo noumenon or 
substantia noumenon). The subject of duty is the last subject in the sense of the 
subject to which all actions can be imputed. The destruction of this subject roots 
40See the last part of Beck's analogy quoted at the beginning of this section. 
41 Gregor 219 (MS 422f: "Der Personlichkeit kann der Mensch sich nicht entau~ern , so lange von 
Pflichten die Rede ist, folgl ich so lange er lebt, und es ist ein Widerspruch die Befugnis zu haben 
sich aller Verbindlichkeit zu entziehen, d. i. frei so zu handeln, als ob es zu dieser Handlung gar 
keiner Befugnis bedOrfte. Das Subject der Sittlichkeit in seiner eigenen Person zernichten , ist 
eben so viel , als die Sittlichkeit selbst ihrer Existenz nach, so viel an ihm ist, aus der Welt 
vertilgen , welche doch Zweck an sich selbst ist; .. . . "). Gregore translates "so viel an ihm ist" with 
"as far as one can" which may be correct, but it may also mean to destroy the existence of 
morality "as far as it constitutes (or makes up a part of) one's person." 
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out the existence of morality itself because the latter is only possible because the 
intelligible self or substantia noumenon is the creator of all ends and values. 
Physical and Moral Life 
We ended the last section with a quote from The Metaphysics of Morals to which 
we now return in a slightly different context. In the latter work Kant assumes that 
if one deprives oneself of life, one "annihilate[s] the subject of morality in one's 
own person" which means that one "root[s] out the existence of morality itself 
from the word .. . . "42 In the lecture on metaphysics Kant discusses the body under 
the category of substance and states: 
The human being cannot dispose over his substance: because he would 
dispose over his personality itself, i n n e r freed om , or humanity in 
his person itself.43 
To take one's life entails, according to Kant, the annihilation of the subject of 
morality. With the first Critique we can therefore stress that personality or the 
intelligible self, to which Kant also refers as soul, does not exist independently 
from the body. Thus, suicide ends life as we know it and that means life as bodily 
life. The fact that suicide results in death can, however, not be the reason why 
suicide is prohibited. And even though it is true that the exercise of the will is no 
longer possible once we kill ourselves, this is also the case when we die a 
42Gregor 219 (MS 423: "Das Subject der Sittlichkeit in seiner eigenen Person zernichten , ist eben 
so viel, als die Sittlichkeit selbst ihrer Existenz nach, so viel an ihm ist, aus der Welt vertilgen ... ".) 
43MSV 601 : "1) der Mensch kann nicht Ober seine Substanz disponieren: denn er wOrde Ober 
seine Persenlichkeit selbst, i n n e r e F r e i h e i t , oder Menschheit in seiner Person selbst 
verfOgen." In MSV 593 Kant discusses the object of the rights of the human being according to the 
category of relation and lists under the first category: "1) in Ansehung seiner Substanz oder in 
ROcksicht des Rechtes zur disposition Ober seinen Kerper als Kerper." See Chapter on the "Right 
of Humanity." 
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"natural" death. The fact that suicide ends or destroys biological life cannot be 
the reason why it is prohibited. 
Since we are not concerned with theological or social arguments against 
suicide, the moral argument against suicide seems to have to concentrate on the 
intention or maxim of the suicide. In other words, in order to support his view that 
self-murder must be prohibited, Kant has to show that our moral life is governed 
by a principle which excludes intentional self-destruction, a topic to which we will 
return in the Chapter on "Homicidium Dolosum." 
In the following section, however, we will concentrate on Kant's view of 
the embodied self and the moral self. The former is based on the view of life as 
the commercium between body and soul and the latter on the view of life as the 
capacity for desire. 
Life as Commercium of Body and Soul : The Embodied Self 
Kant's view that the body is an integral part of the self is found in the Lecture on 
Practical Philosophy where Kant explains the importance of the body for life and 
freedom. Kant's discussion of this topic is headed by the title "Of duties to the 
body with regard to life" and leads to a discussion "Of Self-murder." We already 
saw that Kant criticizes this very view of duties "to" ("gegen") body, soul, or god 
in The Metaphysics of Morals and turns away from Baumgarten's position that 
these substances can put us under obligation.44 Kant's discussion of the duties 
to the body with regard to life seems to be a brief attempt to develop the 
prohibition of self-murder from the physical basis of human life. Yet in the then 
following discussion of self-murder and self-sacrifice it becomes clear that even 
44See Chapter on "Duties," footnotes no. 96 and 97. 
though Kant continues to subscribe to the view of life as bodily existence, his 
argument is based on the respect owed to humanity. 
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In the section "Of duties to the body with regard to life," Kant is concerned 
with the following questions: First, he asks whether or not we have the 
permission ("Befugniss") to dispose over our life and if so, what this permission 
entails. Since life, in this brief section, is understood as physical life, the question 
can also be reformulated to read "Do we have the permission to dispose over 
our body?" Second, Kant asks what the permission to care for our lives involves. 
The answer to the first two questions is followed by a six page discussion of self-
murder, and the answer to the second question involves a discussion of the 
necessity of self-sacrifice which shows that the preservation of life is not the 
highest duty. 
With regard to the first question, Kant uses a thought-experiment to show 
that life is not a state because the condition of life is the physical life. If we 
imagine that our body would not be the condition of our life, that we could leave 
the body and return to it like we enter and leave a country, then we could indeed 
dispose over the body, but it would also mean that we would not dispose over 
our life but only over its state ("Zustand").45 The physical life (the body) is the 
necessary condition for life in all its manifestations, and Kant objects to the view 
that the physical life is only a state of life which could be exchanged for another 
one. Kant stresses that the body is 
the entire condition of life, so that we do not have another concept of our 
life except through our body, and thus, since the use of our freedom is 
45MC 369: " ... wenn wir so aus dem Kerper ausschiOpfen kennten , und in einen andern eingehn, 
so wie in ein Land, denn kennten wir Ober den Kerper disponiren, denn wOrde er unsrer freyen 
WillkOr unterworfen seyn, allein , denn worden wir nicht disponiren Ober unser Leben, sondern nur 
Ober unsern Zustand, Ober die beweglichen Goter, Ober die Mobilien , die zum Leben geherten." 
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only possible through the body, we see that the body makes up a part of 
ourselves.46 
Our body belongs to our self and to the universal laws of freedom 
according to which duties are incumbent upon us.47 
According to these quotes, our concept of life is that of a bodily life and it is only 
because of our bodies that we can exercise our freedom. This , however, does 
not mean that Kant is a materialist. He believes that life is the "connection of the 
soul with the body,"4B and that the principle of life cannot be explained in terms of 
matter;49 yet according to the first Critique, from this distinction we cannot 
conclude that the soul is a Cartesian substance and exists separately from the 
body. so A person is thus for Kant an embodied self. 
46MC 369: "Nun ist aber der Kerper die g~nzliche Bedingung des Lebens, so da~ wir keinen 
andren Beg riff von unserm Leben haben, als vermittelst unsers Kerpers, und da der Gebrauch 
unsrer Freiheit nur durch den Kerper meglich ist, so sehn wir, da~ der Kerper einen Theil unsrer 
selbst ausmacht." 
47MC 378: "Unser Kerper gehert zu unserm selbst, und zu den allgemeinen Gesetzen der 
Freyheit, nach denen uns die Pflichten zukommen ." The corresponding passage in Mrongovius' 
lecture notes on page 1516 states: "Denn da der Kerper zu seinem Selbst geheret, so macht er 
mit ihm eine Person aus ... ".--The last three quotes show that Kant believed in an embodied self. 
In the book The Embodied Self Friedrich Schleiermacher's Solution to Kant's Problem of the 
Empirical Self (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1995), p. 3, Thandeka states that: 
"Schleiermacher believed that Kant (as well as Fichte and Hegel) had overlooked the fact that we 
are embodied beings who think." She seems to agree with this view since she states on page 60: 
"In other words, the unity of the thinking subject had not guaranteed a necessary link of the 
subject's subjective thoughts to the actual objective relations entailed in the content of empirical 
knowledge. This disparity between subjective and objective knowledge sundered the self. The 
thinking self had no guarantee that its knowledge of itself as part of the world of sense actually 
corresponded to the selfs objective reality as part of that empirical , sensate world . The self had 
no guarantee that it had a body." In light of our discussion of self-murder the claim that Kant had 
"overlooked that we are embodied beings who th ink" must at least be qualified . Whether or not 
Kant's notion of apperception as developed in the first Critique can guarantee that the self has a 
body is, however, a different question.--For the relevance of the body ("Leib") for Kant's 
transcendental philosophy as developed in the Opus postumum see Kurt HUbner's "Leib und 
Erfahrung in Kant's Opus postumum," in Kant. Zur Deutung seiner Theorie von Erkennen und 
Handeln, ed . Gerold Prauss (Keln : Kiepenheuer & Witsch, 1973), pp. 192-204. 
4BMC 376: " ... Leben, welches in der Verbindung der Seele mit dem Kerper besteht, .. .. ". In 
Metaphysik Dohna, val. 28, 684 Kant speaks of the "Commercium inter animan et corpus. " 
49See for example Metaphysische AnfangsgrOnde der Naturwissenschaft, vol. 4, 544 and 
Metaphysik Dohna, vol. 28, 687, where Kant stresses that the view that matter is alive, that is, the 
view of Hylozoism, is the death of all physics or philosophy of nature. 
so see Kant's discussion of the Paralogism of rational psychology in KrV B 41 Of. 
Hence, [in] so far as someone destroys his body and thereby takes his 
life, he has thus used his empirical will to destroy the power of his 
empirical will itself, whereupon free empirical will contradicts itself. 51 
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Kant argues in this quote that the body is the means through which the empirical 
will ("Willkur") has power over life. Since the bodily life is not a state of life, the 
destruction of the physical life (body) implies the destruction of the moral life 
(freedom). This argument like the one given nine years later in the Lecture on the 
Metaphysics of Morals, namely that the disposition over one's substance 
understood as body implies the disposition over one's personality, stresses that 
the self is an embodied self. In order to conclude that the destruction of the 
power of the empirical will (the body) by the empirical will constitutes a 
contradiction Kant adds that freedom as the condition for life cannot be used to 
end life. 52 In his argument he assumes that freedom can only be exercised 
because we have a body. Thus, if we decide to destroy the body, the exercise of 
freedom is no longer possible. But this argument could only be used as an 
51 MC 369: "So ferne also jemand seinen Kerper zerstort, und sich hiedurch das Leben nimmt, so 
hater seine WillkOhr gebraucht, die Macht seiner WillkUhr selbst zu zerstoren , alsdenn aber 
wiederstreitet sich die freye WillkUhr selbst." 
52MC 369: "Wenn die Freiheit die Bedingung des Lebens ist, so kann sie nicht dazu dienen, das 
Leben aufzuheben, denn sonst zerstort und hebt sie sich selbst auf; denn braucht der Mensch 
das Leben um das Leben aufzuheben." In this quote Kant speaks of the "condition of life" not the 
"entire condition of life" as he does when he speaks of the body. Kant's argument could be read 
as a variation of Plato's argument in the Phaedo where he employs the principle that essential 
opposites do under no circumstance allow of generation into or out of one another in order to 
prove the immortality of the soul. Plato distinguishes between opposites in the concrete and 
essential opposites whereby the former allow for a generation into or out of their opposite. This 
distinction allows Plato to state that concrete objects (human beings) described with the help of 
opposites (alive, dead) can turn into their opposites, whereas the ideas describing these concrete 
objects do not change. According to Plato's Phaedo, in Plato. Euthyphro, Apology, Crito, Phaedo, 
transl. Benjamin Jowett (Buffalo, New York: Prometheus Books, 1988), pp. 85, 122, 125f, it is the 
soul which is the condition or essence of life and does not allow for its opposite death, even 
though the living are generated from the dead. According to Kant, it is freedom which is the 
condition of life, and we will see that the opposite of freedom or free empirical will is not death but 
the intent to stop willing . Furthermore, unlike the existence of the Platonic idea, the existence of 
the Kantian idea is dependent on the existence of the human being. 
argument against self-murder, if we assume that the exercise of freedom is of 
absolute value so that the destruction of the physical life must be forbidden . 
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Having argued for the embodiment of the self and against the view that 
the bodily life is a state, Kant concludes: " ... the human being cannot dispose 
over himself and his life but doubtless over his state."53 He specifies his 
understanding of a person's disposition over her or his state in his section "Of 
Self-murder": 
Thus in order to preserve the person we can dispose over our body; but 
he who robs himself of life does not thereby preserve his person; he then 
disposes over his person but not his state, he then robs himself of it [the 
person]. This is contrary to the principal duty to oneself, since it revokes 
the condition for all other duties. This goes beyond the limits of the use of 
the free empirical will , since the use of the free empirical will is only 
possible because the subject exists. 54 
To repeat , the exercise of duties is only possible because the person exists as 
an embodied self. According to the lecture notes as well as The Metaphysics of 
Morals , we are allowed to dispose over our body, open an abscess, and 
amputate a limb as long as we intend to preserve our lives; we are, however, not 
allowed to commit suicide since we would then destroy the subject of duty.55 
That is why we read in Vigilantius' notes as well as in The Metaphysics of Morals 
that suicide destroys the subject of duty or personality. 
53MC 369. 
54MC 370: "Also zur Erhaltung der Person haben wir die Disposition Ober unsern Kerper; der sich 
aber das Leben raubt, erhi31t seine Person nicht dadurch; denn disponirt er Ober seine Person, 
aber nicht Ober seinen Zustand , denn raubt er sich die selbst. Dieses ist der obersten Pflicht 
gegen sich selbst zu wider, denn dadurch wird die Bedingung aller Obrigen Pflichten aufgehoben. 
Dies geht Ober aile Schranken des Gebrauchs der freyen WillkOhr, denn der Gebrauch der freyen 
WillkOhr ist nur dadurch meglich , dar.. das subject ist." 
55See MC 370: "Er kann sich z. E. ein GeschwOr effnen lassen, eine Narbe nicht achten , ein Glied 
abnehmen etc., es steht ihm also frey, in Ansehung des Kerpers das vorzunehmen , was ihm 
rathsam und zutraglich ist. .. . So lange wir die Absicht haben, uns selbst zu erhalten , so kennen 
wir unter dieser Bedingung Ober unseren Kerper disponiren." The same point is made in MS 423, 
see Chapter on "Ends" footnote no. 1 05. 
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What we have said so far does not explain why the annihilation of the existence 
of the subject of duty is prohibited . We only know that the destruction of this 
subject makes the exercise of free empirical will impossible. Furthermore, the 
previous discussion seems to suggest, first, that death or the end of life is not a 
state of life. It is not the end of the physical life and the continuation of a spiritual 
life. In other words, death cannot be integrated into life as a state; it cannot be 
part of life. Accordingly, if one kills oneself, one does not dispose over a state but 
ends one's life and thus the possibility to exercise one's freedom . Third, it seems 
to suggest that preserving the person must always mean preserving the physical 
life of the person. 
It could be argued that, according to the last quote from Collins' notes, a 
person is allowed to, for example, prostitute herself or himself in order to 
preserve her or his life and, secondly, that the preservation of life or freedom 
excludes death . This, however, is, despite the content of the last quote, not 
Kant's view. In the section "Of the Care for One's Life" which follows immediately 
after his discussion of suicide, Kant makes clear that the moral integrity of the 
person is more important than the physical existence of the person . This priority 
of one's moral integrity or one's inner worth leads Kant to stress in all of the 
relevant lectures, including the Lecture on the Metaphysics of Morals, that there 
are situations where we must sacrifice our lives because it is the only way to 
avoid the violation of the dignity of humanity. Kant 's view that life has to be 
preserved in order to preserve the person or freedom must therefore be specified 
in light of his position that it is not life per se which must be preserved but the 
moral life. For this purpose Kant must qualify his position that the physical life is 
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not a state of life, and he must distinguish between a physical and a moral life 
whereby death can be the proper means to preserve one's moral integrity. 
Life as the Capacity for Desire: The Value of the State of the Person versus the 
Value of the Person 
In order to prepare the discussion of the view that some circumstances require 
the sacrifice of life, we turn to Kant's distinction between the value of the state of 
a person and the value of the person as given in the Critique of Practical 
Reason. While discussing the concept of an object of practical reason, Kant 
introduces the categorial difference between the good ("das Gute") and the evil 
("das Bose") and the weal ("das Wohl") and the bad (das "Ubel"), i.e., the woe 
("das Weh").56 According to Kant, the weal and the woe refer to the sensory state 
of the person , whereas good and evil refer to actions or maxims of the will and 
not to the sensory state of the person. 57 
Kant illustrates the difference between good and evil and the weal and the 
woe with reference to the Stoic who regards physical pain not as an evil ("Bose") 
which diminishes her or his value as person, but as something bad ("0bei")5B 
which diminishes only the value of the state of the person: 
56See KpV 59. 
57Beck 62 (KpV 60: "Das W o h I oder 0 b e I bedeutet immer nur eine Beziehung auf unseren 
Zustand der A n n e h m I i c h k e i t oder U n a n n e h m I i c k e i t , des VergnOgens und 
Schmerzens, und wenn wir darum ein Object begehren oder verabscheuen, so geschieht es nur, 
so fern es auf unsere Sinnlichkeit und das GefOhl der Lust und Unlust, das es bewirkt, bezogen 
wird . Das G u t e oder B 6 s e bedeutet aber jederzeit eine Beziehung auf den W i II e n, so fern 
dieser durchs V e r n u n f t g e set z bestimmt wird , sich etwas zu seinem Objecte zu machen ; 
wie er denn durch das Object und dessen Vorstellung niemals unmittelbar bestimmt wird , sondern 
ein Vermogen ist, sich eine Regel der Vernunft zur Bewegursache einer Hand lung (dadurch ein 
Object wirklich werden kann) zu machen. Das Gute oder Bose wird also eigentlich auf 
Handlungen , nicht auf den Empfindungszustand der Person bezogen ... ".) 
58Compare the discussion of small-pox inoculation in the Chapter on "Casuistical Questions" 
where Kant refers to the plight of small-pox as "Obel." See also footnote no. 62. 
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Though one may laugh at the Stoic who in the severest paroxysms of gout 
cried out "Pain, however thou tormentest me, I will never admit that thou 
art anything bad [evil; Y. U.] (KaK6v, malum)!" he was nevertheless right. 
He felt it was an evil [a bad (!)thing ("Obel") ; Y. U.] , and he betrayed that 
in his cry ["and this his cries"or "screams"' revealed;" Y. U.] , but that 
anything [morally] evil [Bases] attached to him he had no reason to 
concede, for the pain did not in the least diminish the worth of his person 
but only the worth of his condition [state; Y. U.]. A single lie of which he 
was conscious would have struck down his pride, but pain served only as 
an occasion for raising it when he was conscious that he had not made 
himself liable to it by an unrighteous action and thus culpable. 59 
The example illustrates that it is the violation of the moral principle and not the 
pain caused by bad health which makes a person evil. His distinction between 
the value of a person and the value of the state or condition of a person shows 
that the person is not identical with the states of her or his sensibility. eo This, 
however, does not indicate a separation of mind and body, of the person from 
her or his states, but a distinction between different kinds of determinations of 
the will either through a principle of reason or an object of pleasure or 
59Beck 62 (KpV 60: "Man mochte also immer den Stoiker auslachen, der in den heftigsten 
Gichtschmerzen ausrief: Schmerz, du magst mich noch so sehr foltern, ich werde doch nie 
gestehen, daP-> du etwas Boses (KaKov, malum) seist! er hatte doch recht. Ein Obel wares, das 
fOhlte er, und das verrieth sein Geschrei; aber daP-> ihm dadurch ein Boses anhinge, hatte er gar 
nicht Ursache einzuraumen; denn der Schmerz verringert den Werth seiner Person nich im 
mindesten, sondern nur den Werth seines Zustandes. Eine einzige LOge, deren er sich bewuP->t 
gewesen ware, Mtte seinen Muth niederschlagen mOssen; aber der Schmerz dient nur zur 
Veranlassung, ihn zu erheben , wenn er sich bewuP->t war, daP-> er ihn durch keine unrechte 
Handlung verschuldet und sich dadurch stafwOrdig gemacht habe.")--1 added my corrections of 
Beck's sometimes misleading translation in parenthesis. The Akut over omega is not found in the 
text of the Academy Edition.--The Stoic in Kant's example seems to be Posidonius who as Kant 
explains in VerkOndigung des nahen Abschlusses eines Tractats zum Ewigen Frieden in der 
Philosophie, val. 8, 414f overcame a severe gout attack by vividly criticizing the Epicurean school 
and thus demonstrated "t h at p a i n is not h i n g e vi 1." Posidonius is thus an example of 
how philosophy can have a therapeutic effect on one's health. In Reflexionen zur Metaphysik, val. 
17, no. 4351 , 516, Kant states: "Schmerzen sind nichts Boses, d. i. sie konnen auch ohne 
vorhergehende Sonde mit dem hochsten Gute in der Welt zusammen bestehen. Sie sind 
Obungsmittel der Freyheit und Cultur." 
60if one would argue that the state of the person (homo phaenomenon) is identical with the person 
(homo noumenon) , pain could indeed be viewed as an evil and the battle against evil could turn 
into a battle against the homo phaenomenon. In other words, if the person "is" her or his pain , 
killing the person could be justified since it would kill the pain , that is, the evil. 
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displeasure. In order to determine whether a person is good or evil, that is, 
whether her or his maxims are good or evil, we must look to the principle which 
determines the will. 51 
If we now apply our distinction between personality (homo noumenon) 
and the state of the person (homo phaenomenon), we can say that it is the value 
of the homo phaenomenon which is diminished by physical pain but not the 
value of the homo noumenon. The latter could only be diminished by evil, a lie, 
for example, which would belong to the moral state of the person.62 The 
important point is that the states of the homo phaenomenon are subordinated to 
the homo noumenon. 63 
In one of the Reflexionen zur Moralphilosophie Kant situates the 
distinction between the value of the person and the value of the state of the 
person into the context of duties to oneself. He confirms that body and soul are 
integral parts of the person and that it is the value of the person and not the 
value of the sensible state of the person which should serve as an incentive to 
611t is in this sense that Kant states in MM 1482: "Socrates was in a miserable state which had no 
value at all ; his person, however, in this state was of the highest value." ("Socrates war in einem 
elenden Zustande, der gar keinen Werth hatte, seine Person aber war in diesem Zustande der 
grb~te Werth .") I take it that this statement refers to Plato's description of Socrates' death in the 
Phaedo. Kant's statement seems to echo Socrates' solace in the Apology which he offered to 
those who acquitted him of the charges: "Wherefore, 0 judges, be of good cheer about death, and 
know this of a truth--that no evil can happen to a good man, either in life or after death." (Jowett 
52). 
62Th is view could be in conflict with MS 419f, 424-428 as well as one of the Reflexionen zur 
Moralphilosophie, vol. 19, no. 6789, 161 ("Aile ethische Handlungen gegen sich selbst konnen 
imputirt werden, sie mogen gut oder bose seyn. Man kan sich seine Gesundheit oder Krankheit 
selbst zuschreiben .") Since, according to the former work, an indulgence in food, drink, and 
sexual desires violates the duty of self-preservation which has as one of its ends the conservation 
of one's bodily perfection , and since, according to the latter, health and illness can be imputed to 
the person, it seems that the Stoic could be accused of a violation of duty or being an evil person, 
if his gout would be the result of an intentional abuse of his body. 
63Reflexionen zur Moralphi/osophie, vol. 19, no. 6605, 106: " ... und gleichwie die V o II k o m -
me n h e it eines subiects nicht darauf beruht, da~ es giOckselig sey, sondern da~ sein 
Z u s t a n d de r frey he it s u b o r d i n i r t sey ... ". 
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comply with the duties to oneself. He makes clear, however, that with regard to 
what he calls "the principal obligation" the body is no longer regarded as an 
integral part of the person: 
With regard to the duties to oneself, it is the value of the person and not 
[the value of] the state which includes the incentive. Soul and body and 
their perfection belong to his person. Perfection consists not in what is 
accidentally good, e.g. science, grace, etc. but in that which is essentially 
[good]. The perfections of one's body have to be given preference over all 
pleasures. Yet with regard to the principal obligation , e. g. to preserve 
one's chastity, to satisfy the right of others, the body counts no longer [as 
part of] the person; therefore death itself, even though not a willful one, is 
linked to the value of the person.64 
As an example of an obligation where the body is no longer an integral part of 
the person , Kant refers to the duty of chastity ("Keuschheit") which, according to 
The Metaphysics of Morals, is a virtue contrasted with the vice of defiling oneself 
by lust. 55 Since the content of the quote is reminiscent of Kant's criticism of 
Lucretia66 the wife of L. Tarquinius Collatinus who, after she had been raped by 
64Reflexionen zur Moralphi/osophie, vol. 19, no. 6590, 98: "Bey den Pflichten gegen sich selbst 
mur1 der Werth der Person und nicht des Zustandes den Bewegungsgrund enthalten . Zu seiner 
Persohn gehort Seele und Kerper und deren Vollkommenheit. Die Vollkommenheit besteht nicht 
im accidentellen Guten, z. E. Wissenschaft, Zierl ichkeit etc. , sonderm im wesentlichen . Allen 
Vergnogen mOssen die Vollkommenheiten seines Korpers vorgezogen werden . allein in 
Ansehung der gror1en Verbindlichkeiten , e. g. seine Keuschheit zu erhalten, das recht anderer zu 
erfOIIen, wird der Koper nicht mehr zur Persohn gerechnet; daher ist der tod selbst, obgleich kein 
willkOrlicher, mit dem Werthe seiner Persohn verbunden." 
65See MS 424. 
66Since Lucretia became a type of chastity (see Francis Griffin Stokes', A Dictionary of the 
Characters & Proper Names in the Works of Shakespeare (London, Calcutta , Sydney: George G. 
Harrap & Company Ltd ., 1924) p. 196), Kant's integration of the virtue of chastity into his 
catalogue of perfect duties might have been prompted by his reflections on her suicide. We should 
also not forget that it is the vice of defiling oneself by lust which is opposed to the virtue of chastity 
and is opposed to the duty of self-preservation.--ln MS the connection between marriage as a 
means to fulfill the strict duty of chastity is no longer made, since the former is discussed in the 
"Doctrine of Right" and the latter in the "Doctrine of Virtue." It is no longer clear that "defiling 
oneself by lust" which constitutes a violation of one's personality, i. e., humanity, can only be 
avoided through marriage (Compare MSV 637f, MS 424) . 
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Sextus Tarquinius, committed suicide, we can use Kant's discussion of Lucretia's 
rape and suicide to explain the above quote: 
In order to defend her honor she should rather have fought until she 
would have been murdered. Then she would have done right and then it 
would [have] be [been] no self-murder.67 
Kant suggests that Lucretia, while raped , should have defended herself until she 
would have been killed; she should have sacrificed herself by letting herself be 
murdered in order to preserve her honor. In other words , instead of committing 
suicide later, Lucretia should have defended herself until the point of death . With 
regard to the quote from the Reflexionen, Kant, I believe, would argue that 
Lucretia should have disregarded the threat to her physical existence (her body) 
by sacrificing her life. This kind of death, not her self-murder, would have 
preserved her honor, and thus the value of the person as a moral self. Kant's 
argument suggests that if a rapist becomes a murderer and a woman defends 
herself, her honor can be preserved because she does not participate in a 
violation of duty.6a 
Kant takes a similar position with regard to torture. A person should 
"rather endure all torture, even endure death itself," before he or she "commits a 
67MC 371 : "Sie sollte sich also Iieber zur Vertheidigung ihrer Ehre solange gewehrt haben, bis sie 
ware umgebracht worden , denn hatte sie Recht gethan und denn ware es auch kein Selbstmord." 
68Even though Kant states that "it was not her fault" which seems to indicate that Kant does not 
evoke the misogynous prejudices that Lucretia was responsible for the rape, his suggestion that 
she should have defended her honor until she would have been killed is nevertheless perverse 
since it leaves the woman at the mercy of the rapist, who either decides to murder her or not to 
murder her. Furthermore, Kant assumes in the argument that every rapist would murder his victim 
if confronted with sufficient resistance. But what would be the state of affairs if he rapes but does 
not murder her? Would she lose her honor? Compare Margaret Pabst Battin's discussion in 
Ethical Issues in Suicide (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall , 1995), p. 124, who raises 
similar questions.-- With his view that honor is of the utmost importance for women as the "2nd 
sex" ("2te Geschlecht;" MC 371) Kant must, according to our standards today , be called a sexist. 
Yet it must also be kept in mind that Kant believes that a torture victim who is either male or 
female should rather endure pain and death than commit suicide. The general command to 
sacrifice oneself is therefore not gender specific. See the following footnotes . 
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base act."69 One should even be so brave not to incriminate oneself and should 
rather sacrifice one's life instead of telling a lieJO Not only does Kant forbid the 
incrimination or self-incrimination under torture, but he also forbids suicide as a 
way to put an end to torture. The argument against self-murder under torture can 
also be regarded as a social argument against suicide which Kant, according to 
The Metaphysics of Morals, does not want to consider. 71 Kant observes that a 
person who is willing to commit suicide has power over others, since he is not 
subjected to anyone and cannot be obligated : 
Indeed, there seems to be something moral to it [to self-murder], since 
such a person who has the power to leave the world when he wants, is 
not allowed to be subjected to anyone, does not let himself be bound by 
anything, tells the greatest tyrant the greatest truths because the latter 
cannot force him by any kind of torture since he can expedite himself 
quickly out of this world--like a free person can leave the state when he 
pleases.72 
Because the suicide can refuse to subject herself or himself to institutional 
mechanisms of terror, like torture, the suicide has power and is unpredictable. 
69MC 377: "lch mur., Iieber aile Marter, ja selbst den Tod ausstehn, ehe ich eine niedertrachtige 
Handlung begehe." 
70Reflexionen zur Moralphi/osophie , vol. 19, no. 6979, 219 Kant states: "Nicht das Leben zu 
erhalten , sondern dasjenige selbst mit Aufopferung des Lebens, wodurch man des Lebens wUrdig 
ist. Z. E. in der tortur von sich ein schandlich Verbrechen zu bekennen."--Torture was still in use in 
Prussia during Kant's lifetime. According to Reinhold Koser's "Die Abschaffung der Tortur durch 
Friedrich den Gro!:,en," in Forschungen zur brandenburgischen und preussischen Geschichte: 
Neue Folge der" Markischen Forschungen" des Vereins fOr Geschichte der Mark Brandenburg, 
vol. 6 (Leipzig : Duncker und Humblot, 1893}, pp. 233-239, Frederick the Great abolished torture 
with some exceptions in 17 40 and completely in 1754. Since there were still cases of torture 
taking place after 1754, some have argued that the cabinet order from August 4, 1754 did still 
allow for exceptions (ibid . 238 footnote no.1 ). 
71 For the following quotes see also Battin 89-93. 
72MC 374: "Ja, es scheint auch was moralisches darinne zu seyn , denn ein solcher, der die Macht 
hat, aus der Welt zu gehn, wenn er will , darf keinem unterworfen seyn , sich durch nichts binden 
lassen, dem gro!:,ten Tyrann die gro!:,ten Wahrheiten sagen, indem ihn derselbe durch keine 
Marter zwingen kann, weil er sich geschwinde aus der Welt expediren kann ; so wie ein freyer 
Mensch aus dem Staate gehn kann , wenn er wiii. "--Kant applies here again the metaphor of 
leaving a country to the person who commits suicide which presupposes as we saw that the 
physical life could be a state of life . 
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Kant states that "nothing" can keep a person "who in principle does not respect 
his life ... from performing the most hideous vice ... ; he is not afraid of King or 
torture."73 Kant indicates here that as soon as the human being does not respect 
his life and is willing to kill himself that the measure for moral behavior vanishes; 
this affects not only the individual but the whole community: 
Because [he] who already has come so far that he is at any time the 
master over his life is also master of the life of every other's life, for him 
the door to all vices stands open and before one can get hold of him, he is 
willing to steal himself away from the world .74 
Those who defend and teach that suicide is permissible are therefore 
"necessarily detrimental for a republic."75 Kant's reasoning suggests , that the 
willingness to kill oneself does not only attest to the lack of a moral standard 
which harbors the danger of leading a vicious life, but entails the rejection of 
responsibility. Furthermore, his reasoning suggests that a self-murderer never 
intends to preserve the moral self or humanity; or, to put the matter differently, 
the person who argues that he or she intends the preservation of the dignity of 
humanity is not a self-murderer. 
All these examples show that in Kant's view it is not only possible to live a 
moral life despite pain and misery, but that one has the duty to do soJ6 Pain and 
73MC 375: " ... denn der sein Leben so gar nach Grundsatzen nicht achtet, den kann gar nichts 
von dem erschrecklichsten Laster zurOckhalten ; er scheuet keinen Konig und keine Marter." 
74MC 372: "Denn wer es schon so weit gebracht hat, da~ er jedesmal ein Meister Ober sein Leben 
ist, der ist auch Meister Ober jedes andern sein Leben, dem stehet die Thore zu allen Lastern 
offen, und ehe man ihn habhaft werden kann, ist er bereit, sich aus der Welt wegzustehlen ." 
I translate "jedesmal" (every time) with "any time." 
75MC 374: "Die Vertheidiger und Lehrer der Befugni~ des Selbstmordes sind einer Republik 
nothwendig sehr nachtheil ig." Battin 91 remarks that "there is some evidence that the kind of 
lawlessness Kant fears is encouraged by strict sanctions against suicide, rather than by 
permissive attitudes toward it." 
761n the Reflexionen zur Anthropologie, vol. 15 II , no. 1511 , 831 Kant states: "Der Schmerz ist nur 
ein Obel , das Laster was Boses. Selbstmord." In Reflexionen zur Moralphilosophie , vol. 19, 
no. 6801 , 166 he stresses: "Der Mensch kan gro~e Handlungen selbst im UngiOke ausoben ... 
und da, wo er das Leben aufopfert, nicht weil er dasselbe ha~t . da ist er doch des Lebens werth . 
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misery on ly affect the value of the sensible state of the person and not of the 
value of the person, and it is the value of the person which has to be protected. 
Kant agrees, therefore, with the Stoics that with respect to the nobility of the 
ideal of humanity one has to assume that the human being possesses honor and 
virtue whose preservation has priority over the preservation of the physical life. 
But he disagrees with the Stoics that this priority can serve as a reason to justify 
suicide.?? In the Lecture on the Metaphysics of Morals Kant explains: 
He must therefore give up his life if he can only preserve it under the 
condition that he does something shameful , that he loses true honor and 
virtue ; in this respect he must attach little value to pain and death, 
because if he regards a life which makes him unworthy of humanity of 
higher value than a painful death and thereby manages to escape the 
latter, he is vile. He is already morally dead if he can only live for vices 
and can only preserve his life by practicing the same. But how follows 
from this the conclusion that under such circumstances he would be 
allowed to take his own life?7B 
Kant expresses the same idea in The Metaphysics of Morals when he takes up 
the criticism of the suicide of the Stoic wise man: 
But there should have been in this very courage, this strength of soul not 
to fear death and to know of something that man can value even more 
highly than his life, a still stronger motive for him not to destroy himself, a 
Der so sein Leben selbst kleiner schatzt als die Gemachlichkeit des GIOks, der ist des lebens 
nicht werth ." 
77For a comparison of Kant's view and the Stoics view on suicide see Seidler's article "Kant and 
the Stoics on Suicide." 
7BMSV 629: "Er mul1 daher sein Leben aufgeben, wenn er es nur unter der Bedingung erhalten 
kann , dal1 er etwas Schandliches thue, dal1 er wahre Ehre und Tugend verlieren soli ; er mul1 in 
dieser Richtung Schmerzen und Tod geringer achten : denn schatzt er ein Leben, was ihn 
unwordig der Menschheit macht, hoher als einen schmerzlichen Tod und entgeht dadurch dem 
letzteren , so ist er niedertrachtig. Er ist schon moralisch tot, wenn er nur fOr Laster lebt und sich 
durch AusObung derselben nur sein Leben erhalten kann. Aber wie folgt hieraus der Schlul1 , dal1 
er befugt sei unter solchen Umstanden, sich selbst das Leben zu nehmen?" 
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being with such powerful authority over the strongest sensible incentives, 
and so not to deprive himself of lifeJ9 
In both quotes, Kant stresses that biological life is not of absolute value. The first 
quote explicitly states that since life is not of the highest value, it should be given 
up in order not to violate the dignity of humanity which represents the highest 
value. Even though the second quote does not explicitly talk about self-sacrifice, 
I argue that it is implied because the knowledge of something that we can value 
even higher than our own life can motivate us to give it up.ao In both quotes, 
however, Kant suggests that taking or robbing oneself of one's life is not the 
appropriate way to avoid violating and thus preserving one's dignity. Kant had 
presented this view already in the Lecture on Moral Philosophy: 
Self-murder is not horrible and prohibited because life is such a good, 
since it would then only depend on each person whether or not he would 
regard it as a high good. Following the rule of prudence it would often be 
the best means to remove oneself, but, according to the rule of morality, it 
is under no condition permitted because it is the destruction of humanity 
since humanity is placed below animality. Besides that, there are more 
important things in the world than life. The observance of morality is more 
important. It is better to sacrifice life than to lose morality. It is not 
necessary to live but it is necessary that as long as one lives one lives 
respectable; he who can no longer live respectable is no longer worthy to 
live. But one can always live as long as one can observe the duties to 
79Gregor 219 (MS 422: "Aber eben dieser Muth, diese Seelenstarke, den Tod nicht zu fOrchten 
und etwas zu kennen , was der Mensch noch hbher schatzen kann, als sein Leben, hatte ihm ein 
um noch so viel grbr..erer Bewegungsgrund sein mOssen, sich , ein Wesen von so gror..er, Ober die 
starkste sinnliche Triebfedern gewalthabenden Obermacht, nicht zu zerstbren, mithin sich des 
Lebens nicht zu berauben.") 
BOA statement in the "Doctrine of Right" confirms my view. Gregor 142f: "I say that in this case the 
man of honor would choose death , and the scoundrel convict labor. This comes along with the 
nature of the human mind; for the man of honor is acquainted with something that he values even 
more highly than life, namely honor, while the scoundrel considers it better to live in shame than 
not to live at all (animanm praeferre pudori; Iuvena! [Satires Ill , 8, 83])." (MS 333f: " ... so sage ich : 
der ehrliche Mann wahlt den Tod, der Schelm aber die Karre; so bringt es die Natur des 
mensch lichen GemOths mit sich. Denn der erstere kennt etwas, was er noch hbher schatzt, als 
selbst das Leben: namlich die E h r e ; der andere halt ein mit Schande bedecktes Leben doch 
immer noch fOr besser, als gar nicht zu sein (animam praeferre pudori. luven.)" ). 
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oneself [and] without using force. However, he who is willing to take life is 
not longer worthy to live.s1 
The above quotes can be understood as further explications of the view Kant 
expressed in the Critique of Practical Reason as well as The Metaphysics of 
Morals that in order to preserve the dignity of humanity which is of higher value 
than our life we must avoid lowering the value of our person which means that 
we must value our true honor more than our life.82 
Morality does not say that I should preserve life but that which alone 
makes me worthy of living. But I am also not worthy of life if I throw it 
away myself and place the value of life behind the pleasantness to live.s3 
The following conclusions can be drawn from this section: first, they show that it 
is honor in the sense of being worthy of respect which guarantees our dignity as 
human beings. This sense of honor, which is identical with the negative sense of 
81 MC 373: "Der Selbstmord ist nicht deswegen abscheulich und unerlaubt, wei I das Leben ein 
solches Gut ist, denn alsdenn kommt es nur auf einen jeden an , ob er es fOr ein hohes Gut halt. 
Nach der Regel der Klugheit ware es oft das beste Mittel, sich selbst aus dem Wege zu raumen , 
aber, nach der Regel der Sittlichkeit ist es unter keiner Bedingung erlaubt, weil es die Destruction 
der Menschheit ist, da die Menschheit unter die Th ierheit gesetzt wird . Sonst ist in der Welt vieles 
weit hoher als das Leben. Die Beobachtung der Moralitat ist weit hoher. Es ist besser das Leben 
aufzuopfern als die Moralitat zu verlieren . Es ist nicht nothig zu Ieben, aber das ist nothig, dar.. 
man so lange als man lebet, ehrenwert lebe; wer aber nicht mehr ehrewerth Ieben kann , der ist 
gar nicht mehr werth zu Ieben. Es lar..t sich aber jederzeit so lange Ieben, als man die Pflichten 
gegen sich selbst beobachten kann, ohne Gewalt Ober sich zu brauchen. Derjenige aber, der 
bereit ist sich das Leben zu nehmen, ist nicht mehr werth zu leben."--1 translate "ehrenwert" with 
"respectable" and not with "honorable" because Kant is not concerned with honor in the sense of 
being awarded an honor but in the sense of being worthy of respect or being a decent person. 
82Beck 90f: "In the greatest misfortunes of his life which he could have avoided if he could have 
disregarded duty, does not a righteous man hold up his head thanks to the consciousness that he 
has honored and preserved humanity in his own person and in its dignity, so that he does not 
have to shame himself in his own eyes or have reason to fear the inner scrutiny of self-
examination?" (KpV 88: "Halt nicht einen rechtschaffenen Mann im gror..ten UngiOcke des Lebens, 
das er vermeiden konnte, wenn er sich nur hatte Ober die Pflicht wegsetzen konnen, noch das 
Bewur..tsein aufrecht, dar.. er die Menschheit in seiner Person doch in ihrer WOrde erhalten und 
geehrt habe, dar.. er sich nicht vor sich selbst zu schamen und den inneren Anblick der 
SelbstprOfung zu scheuen Ursache habe?") 
B3Reflexionen zur Moralphilosophie, val. 19, no. 6979, 219: "Die moral sagt nicht, dar.. ich das 
Leben erhalten soli, sondern dasjenige, wobey ich allein werth bin zu Ieben. Aber ich bin auch des 
Lebens nicht werth, wenn ich es selbst wegwerfe und den werth des Lebens der Annehmlichket 
zu Ieben nachsetze." 
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honor already discussed in the Chapter on the "Right of Humanity," must be 
distinguished from the positive sense of honor. We are worthy of honor in the 
negative sense in so far as we have not violated a duty to ourselves.a4 Kant's 
command honeste vive could therefore also be expressed by the command "do 
not dishonor the dignity of humanity."B5 Since it was suggested that one's 
humanity or one's personality can be understood as the intell igible substance, 
the command could also be expressed by saying "Do not perform any actions or 
choose any maxims that would alter your moral state in such a way that it could 
no longer be understood as an expression of the intell igible substance or the 
homo noumenon." Only if this condition is fulfilled can all other duties be 
observed.86 
Second, since self-sacrifice can be necessary in order not to dishonor 
humanity, the sacrifice of the self cannot be the sacrifice of one's honor or one's 
personality, but the sacrifice of one's physical existence for the purpose of 
preserving one's honor. In the case of self- murder, however, Kant believes that 
it is our honor or the absolute value of the person represented by personality 
which is destroyed. To put the matter differently, in the case of self-sacrifice, 
giving up our physical existence guarantees that we do not lose our honor or 
dignity; whereas this is precisely the case when we commit suicide. We will see 
in the next chapter that this distinction between the two different meanings of the 
841n MSV 602 Kant discusses the preservation of honor understood as either self-respect or 
respect in the eyes of others under the category commercium. 
85See Chapter on the "Right of Humanity." 
86 In MM 1482 Kant states: "Wenn auch aile Annehmlichkeiten des Lebens aufgeopfert werden , 
so ersetzet die Erhaltung der WOrde der Menschheit den Verlust aller dieser Annehmlichkeiten , 
und erhalt den Beyfall, und wenn alles verlohren gegangen, so hat man doch einen innern Werth. 
Unter dieser WOrde der Menschheit konnen wir nur die andern Pflichten ausOben, es ist die Basis 
aller Obrigen Pflichten, wer keinen innern Werth hat, der hat seine Person weggeworfen , und kann 
keine andere Pflicht mehr ausOben." Compare the quote from MS 417 in the Chapter on "Duties," 
footnote no. 123. 
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term "self' is a reflection of the intention of the agent which determines whether 
or not an action is moral or immoral and whether death is the result of self-
sacrifice or self-murder. 
Third, the quotes presented in this section give us a first indication that the 
duty of self-preservation as formulated in The Metaphysics of Morals must reflect 
the priority of the value of the moral life over the physical life. The quotes 
suggest that in cases where we are only able to live a "vile" life morality absolves 
us from the care for our life because in that case "a higher duty commands and 
judges."87 
Fourth, Kant's suggestion that the dignity of humanity is of higher value 
than one's life seems to contradict his view that life is not a state. Yet it could be 
argued that from the perspective of theoretical reason life is the commercium of 
body and soul, and since we know of this commercium only as physical 
existence life is not a state; but from the perspective of practical reason both 
physical and moral life represent values which are related in such a way that 
moral life or dignity is an end in itself to which physical life is subservient. 
Immortality and Obligation 
The belief that death as a result of self-sacrifice not as a result of self-murder can 
be the proper means to avoid the violation and thus the preservation or 
protection of the dignity of humanity seems to be a variation of the postulate of 
the immortality of the soul. The following th ree paragraphs, may suffice as a brief 
87MC 378: "Wenn ich also mein Leben nur durch Niedertrachtigkeit erhalten kann , so spricht mich 
die Tugend von der Pflicht mein Leben zu erhalten los, weil hier eine hohere Pflicht gebietet und 
mir das Urtheil fallet." See also ibid. 377. 
introduction to Kant's view of the immortality of the soul and its importance for 
morality. 
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Even though the immortality of the soul cannot be proven by theoretical 
reason, it is a necessary assumption of practical reason.ss It is necessary to 
assume the immortality of the soul to allow for the possibility of the supreme 
condition of the highest good which is the complete congruence ("v o II i g e 
A n g e m e s s e n h e i t") of intention with the moral law. Since this complete 
congruence would be holiness of which the human being is not capable, 
perfection can only be understood in terms of an infinite progress: 
This infinite progress is possible, however, only under the presupposition 
of an infinitely, enduring existence and personality of the same rational 
being ; this is called the immortality of the soul"89 
Kant makes a similar point in the Critique of Judgment with regard to the honest 
man (like Spinoza) who denies the existence of God and of a future life, but is 
nevertheless determined by the moral law. By acting according to the moral law, 
the goal of this person is to create good , yet the question is how this person who 
denies the final end or goal ("Endzweck") of creation can still uphold this goal in 
light of the purposeless chaos which, as a result of his position, surrounds him .9o 
In his Lecture on the Metaphysics of Morals given in 1792/93 Kant refers, 
according to Dohna, to the immortality of the soul as the continuous existence of 
personality and distinguishes between psychological arguments and 
metaphysical a priori arguments for the immortality of the soul. The latter 
argument is based on theoretical reasons or on practical reasons. The 
88KrV B 415. 
89Beck 127 (KpV 122: "Dieser unendliche Progressus ist aber nur unter Voraussetzung einer ins 
U n e n d I i c h e fortdaurnden E x i s t e n z und Personlichkeit desselben vernOnftigen Wesens 
(welche man die Unsterblichkeit der Seele nennt) moglich .") 
90KU 452f. 
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metaphysical-practical reasons refer either to the ends of nature or the ends of 
God. Since human beings cannot know the intentions or ends of God, "the proof 
from the analogy of the human being with organized beings of nature is therefore 
for us the most certain."91 In this proof the predispositions ("Anlagen") of human 
nature are regarded as if they were products of nature.92 
To start our discussion of the connection between the prohibition of 
suicide and the immortality of the soul, we turn to some of the belief systems a 
potential suicide could hold . First, a suicide could believe in the immortality of the 
soul and assume that the afterlife is a better place than her or his present life. If 
the act of suicide would go unpunished, the logical consequence of the belief 
would be that the potential suicide would not hesitate to kill herself or himself. 
We saw that Kant discusses the possibility of leaving the body like one leaves a 
country in a thought-experiment, according to which one could dispose over 
one's body if the physical life were a state which could be exchanged for another 
one, the afterlife.93 However, Kant uses the thought experiment to show that we 
only have a concept or know of life because we have a body; whereas all the 
suicide has is the belief in a better life after death . 
Second , if a suicide believes that the physical life is only a state and that 
the soul is immortal and an afterlife exists, but also believes that the act of 
suicide would be punished with eternal condemnation, he or she would try to 
91 Metaphysik Dohna, vol. 28, 687: " ... der Beweis aus der Analogie des Menschen mit den 
organisierten Wesen in der Natur ist also fOr uns der sicherste." 
92See Chapter on "Ends."--For the discussion of the predispositions of the human being see the 
Chapter "Homicidium Dolosum." 
93This seems to have been the attitude of the early Christians who free ly strove for martyrdom 
which prompted St. Augustine to prohibit suicide. See Rudolf Hirzel , Der Se/bstmord (Darmstadt: 
Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft: 1966), p. 125f. The early Christians did obviously not have to 
struggle with the question raised by Socrates in the Phaedo (Jowett 74) namely "why, when a 
man is better dead, he is not permitted to be his own benefactor, but must wait for the hand of 
another"? 
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develop a plan with the goal to circumvent the punishment. Kant mentions such 
a case in the Vorarbeiten zum Streit der Fakultaten while pointing out that as 
long as religion consists in the purely formal observance of the statutes of the 
Church instead of being merely the vehicle for a truly moral belief the state 
cannot trust its citizens. How else, Kant says, can we explain the "terrible crime" 
of a person tired of life but not willing to give up his future salvation who kills 
another innocent person because that way the priest can still give him hope for 
his salvation ; whereas in the case of self-murder he would have to condemn 
him.94 
Third , if the suicide does not believe in the immortality of the soul , the act 
could neither have positive nor negative consequences--at least for the suicide 
because life simply ends. Kant discusses this case in one of his Reflexionen zur 
Moralphilosophie: 
Self-murder may not be as detrimental assuming that another world does 
not exist, but it is then even more horrible. How would you regard a friend 
of whom you could never be sure whether he might not ponder self-
murder. (Against self-murder. As long as the human being lives, he has 
always the opportunity to exercise good and even heroic virtue. He must 
regard life in its deepest misery as the invitation of fate to his 
steadfastness. )95 
94Vorarbeiten zum Streit der Faku/taten , val. 23, 446: "Wie wollte man sich sonst das so 
schreckliche Verbrechen eines seines Lebens OberdrOP->igen doch aber auf kOnftige Seeligkeit 
nicht Verzicht thuenden Menschen erklaren der einen andern Unschuldigen ermordet um darauf 
durch priesterliche Bearbeitung vorbereitet sterben zu konnen darum weil ihm der Geistliche auf 
diesen Fus immer noch zur Seeligkeit Hofnung macht anstatt daf?> er den Selbstmorder geradezu 
verdammen worde." 
95Reflexionen zur Moralphilosophie, val. 19, no. 6801 , 166: "Der Selbstmord ist vielleicht nicht so 
schadlich bey der [Erwartung einer] Voraussetzung, es gebe keine andre Welt; aber er ist alsdenn 
noch scheuslicher. Wie wOrdet ihr einen freund ansehen, von dem ihr nie sicher waret, ob er nicht 
mit dem Selbstmorde umginge? ( ... Wieder den Selbstmord. So lange der Mensch lebt, hater 
immer gelegenheit, gute und selbst heroische tugend auszuoben. Er muf?> das Leben in dem 
grof?>ten Elende als die Aufforderung des Schiksals an seine Standhaftigkeit ansehen.)" 
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In order to decide how the question of immortality influences the argument 
against suicide, we turn to Georg Lehmann's transcription of Kant's notes on a 
"Lose Blatt" which was inserted in Kant's personal copy of the Critique of 
Practical Reason.96 On this loose sheet Kant uses the duty not to murder oneself 
to illustrate the Quaestio Stolpiana "An dentur officia ad quae obligari hominem 
demonstrari non possit nisi posita animi imortalitate?"97 The discussion of the 
prohibition of self-murder shows that the consciousness of duty does not 
"presuppose" ("voraussetzen") the immortality of the soul but that the 
consciousness of duty implies the hope for immortality. To put it differently, it is 
not necessary to presuppose that the soul is immortal in order to act from duty, 
but by acting from duty we postulate the immortality of our soui.9B 
Kant lists the following points under the quaestio: first, for all duties it is 
the case that one cannot regard them as determining the will without "at the 
same time" ("zugleich") hoping99 for the immortality of the soul; second, it is not 
the case for any duty that it can only obligate insofar as one "presupposes" 
("voraussetzt") the immortality of the soul ; third, of a person who denies the 
immortality of the soul it cannot be proven that he or she is obligated to any 
96Gerhard Lehmann "Kants Bemerkungen im Handexemplar der Kritik der praktischen Vernunft," 
Kant-Studien 72 (1981 ): 132-139. See also Seidler 445 footnote 54. 
97Quoted from Gerhard Lehmann "Kants Bemerkungen im Handexemplar der Kritik der 
praktischen Vernunft," Kant-Studien 72 (1981) 134. Lehmann points out that because this 
formulation of the quaestio differs from the one quoted by Adickes in vol. 17, Reflexion no. 4151 , 
435, it can be assumed that Kant was "several times" occupied with the questions of the 
foundation . 
98Lehmann (1981) 135. 
991 believe that Kant is here not very precise in his choice of words. "Hope" (see next footnote) 
must be distinguished from a necessary assumption of reason or a moral belief (KrV A 828/B 
856). See VerkOndigung des nahen Absch/usses eines Tractats zum ewigen Frieden in der 
Phi/osophie, vol. 8, 419 where he contrasts the hope for a future life with the necessary 
assumption of reason of a future life which is the result of the moral imperative. 
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action.1oo The reason for this is not because of a lack of incentives 
("BewegungsgrOnden") but because the good understood as extending to infinity 
would be a chimera .1 o1 
Kant then uses the duty not to commit self-murder to illustrate the three 
points. He states that an obligation not to commit self-murder seems only to exist 
under the presupposition ("Voraussetzung") of a future life. In other words, it 
seems that we can only be obligated not to kill ourselves if we presuppose the 
immortality of the soul; a view which would contradict option two. Kant continues 
that if there is no future life--which is assumed under point three of the quaestio--
the act of self-murder does not change the state, but ends the existence of the 
self so that this very last act cannot have an effect either on personal worth or 
unworthiness nor can it effect one's advantage or disadvantage. "In general," 
Kant goes on, "instantaneous existence ... cannot have a value" without thinking 
the infinity of duration or a future world.1o2 
1DDLehmann (1981) 138: "1. Aile Pflichten sind von der Art [meaning of the kind characterized in 
the quaestio] ; denn man kann niemals die Pflicht fO r [wichtig] willensbestimmend ansehen, ohne 
zugleich die Hofnung der Unsterblichkeit damit zu verbinden. 2. Keine Pflicht ist von der Art, dar.. 
sie nur verbindlichkeit bey sich fOhrt, so fern man die Seelenunsterblichkeit voraussetzt, es mor..te 
denn eine Pflicht seyn, die sich jemand verbindlich machte, andern nach dessen Tode Dienste zu 
leisten [vergelten] [footnote follows] , ([index follows] dergleichen die Obernehmung fOr jemanden 
Seelenmessen zu lesen , der dafor etwas im Testament ausgemacht hat) , welches aber eine 
ertraumte Pflicht ist. 3. Von dem, der das kOnftige Leben leugnet, kan niemals die obligation zu 
irgend einer Hand lung bewiesen werden, nicht weil es an Bewegungsgronden fehlt, sondern weil 
das Object der Handlung, namlich das in Unendliche sich erweiternde Gute, nach diesen 
Grundsatzen auf die Art blor..e Chimare seyn worde." 
101Compare KU 452f. See also our discussion in the Chapter on "Belief of Reason." 
1021n the following I give the quote for the whole paragraph . Lehmann (1981) 138f: "Ein Fall 
([index follows] der Pflicht) scheint von der Art zu seyn, dar.. die Verbindlichkeit dazu nur unter der 
Bedingung der Voraussetzung des kOnftigen Lebens statt findet, und dieser [footnote follows] ist 
die Pflicht, den Selbstmord zu meiden. Denn weil durch diesen, wenn kein ander Leben ist, mein 
Zustand nicht verandert wird , sondern mein Selbst gar aufhort, so ist diese Hand lung als die letzte 
von allen, die ich thun kann, ohne Folgen, weder auf meinen personlichen Werth [noch] oder 
unwert, noch auf meinen [Nachthe] Vortheil oder Nachtheil ; wie denn Oberhaupt ein von selbst 
hinfelliges und gegen die Unendlichkeit der Dauer, die ich mir den ken kann, kein augenblickliches 
Daseyn ohne eine kOnftige Welt gar keinen Werth haben kann." For the continuation of the quote 
see next footnote. 
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But since, regardless of that, as long as I live throwing this life and myself 
away constitutes criminal intent which cannot be conceived unless one is 
worthless, the assumption of another life which is connected with the 
consciousness of my duty belongs to the value of my existence; here, in 
turn, the reason of the consciousness of duty is not the expectation of 
another world, but the opposite, but in such a way that this duty cannot 
obligate without carrying at the same time the postulate ["position"] of 
immortality with it.103 
In other words , "regardless" of the possibility that an afterlife may or may not 
exist so that our existence may or may not have value, the intent to kill ourselves 
and to violate a duty to ourselves is enough to indicate our moral worthlessness. 
We are worthless because we violate a duty and thus disrespect the moral law. 
Kant seems to distinguish between the ascription of worthlessness ("Nichts-
wurdigkeit") as a moral category and the condition under which such an 
ascription is possible (the immortality of the soul) . It only makes sense to speak 
of a violation of duty or one's worthlessness if we postulate the immortality of the 
soul. Thus, Kant argues, the assumption of another life implied in the 
consciousness of duty contributes to the value of one's existence.104 It "belongs" 
to the value of existence in the sense that it is the rational condition under wh ich 
it alone makes sense to say of a person that he or she has a moral value.1os 
103Lehmann (1981 ) 139: "Da aber dem ungeachtet, so lange ich lebe, dieses Leben und mich 
selbst wegzuwerfen ein Vorsatz ist, der ohne NichtswOrdigkeit nicht gefar..t werden kann , so 
gehort die mit dem Bewur..tsein meiner Pflicht verbundene Vermutung eines andern Lebens zum 
Werte meines Daseins; hier ist also wiederum nicht die Erwartung einer andern Welt der Grund 
des Bewur.,tseins der Pflicht, sander umgekehrt, doch so dar., diese Pflicht nicht verbindend seyn 
kann, ohne die position der Unsterblichkeit zugleich bey sich zu fOhren ." I use Lehmann's 
improved transcription for the first part of the quote (up to "umgekehrt, ") on page 134 and continue 
it, as suggested by Lehmann, with the rest of the quote not in need of corrections given on page 
139. 
1041 am not sure whether this is also Seidler's point when he states on page 445 footnote no. 54: 
"Since, however, the resolve to commit suicide 'in fact' indicates a lack of self-worth , there 'must 
be' (postulated) an eternal continuance of my supremely valuable self." 
105 In the second draft of the Preisschrift Ober die Fortschritte der Metaphysik, val. 20, 298 Kant 
states that bel ief in the moral practical sense has a moral worth because it entai ls free 
acceptance. ("Daher hat der Glaube in moralisch-praktischer ROcksicht auch an sich einen 
moralischen Werth , weil er ein freyes Annehmen enthalt. ") 
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If we apply these findings to the duty not to kill oneself, it becomes clear that this 
duty can be observed without presupposing the immortality of the soul (point 
two); but since it is impossible to prove that a person who denies the immortality 
of the soul can have an obligation not to kill herself or himself (point three), this 
duty--like any other duty--must carry with it the postulate of the immortality of the 
soul if it determines the will (point one). We will return to the question of belief for 
the prohibition of self-murder in the second main part of this dissertation. 
Kant's notes on the loose sheet can now be used to explain why he states 
in the Reflexion that "self-murder may not be as detrimental under the 
assumption that another world does not exist, but it is then even more 
horrible."106 Kant, I believe, would argue that the denial of the immortality of the 
soul can be an indirect proof that the self-murderer does not have a 
consciousness of duty, because, according to Kant, the consciousness of duty 
necessarily implies the postulate of the immortality of the soul. He could argue 
that the consciousness of duty does not determine the will of the self-murderer 
which, according to Kant, is horrible. In the First Critique Kant explains: 
I also know with complete certainty that no one can be acquainted with 
any other conditions [namely that there is a God and a future world, Y. U.] 
[footnote follows] which lead to the same unity of ends under the moral 
law. Since, therefore, the moral precept is at the same time my maxim 
(reason prescribing that it should be so) , I inevitably believe in the 
existence of God and in a future life, and I am certain that nothing can 
shake this belief, since my moral principles would thereby be themselves 
overthrown, and I cannot disclaim them without becoming abhorrent in my 
own eyes.1 D7 
106Given the findings of this section, it is, however, not clear to me why suicide is not as 
"detrimental" under the assumption that another world does not exist. 
1D7Kemp Smith 650 (KrV A 828/B 856: " ... ich weir.. auch ganz gewir.. , dar.. niemand andere 
Bedingungen kenne, die auf dieselbe Einheit der Zwecke unter dem moralischen Gesetze fOhre 
[foonote follows] . Da aber also die sittliche Vorschrift zugleich meine Maxime ist (wie denn die 
Vernunft gebietet, dar.. sie es sein soli), so werde ich unausbleiblich ein Dasein Gottes und ein 
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If we renounce the moral principles which define our nature, we become, in 
Kant's eyes, monsters or horrible creatures ("Scheusal"); we become "abhorrent" 
("verabscheuungswurdig").1os Unlike the doubtful belief ("Zweifelglaube") a 
dogmatic unbelief ("dogmatischer Unglaube") cannot coexist with a moral 
maxim.1o9 
Another component that could make Kant want to characterize self-
murder as horrible is that a suicide who does not assume the immortality of the 
soul could be said to live only for the fulfillment of her or his pleasures. In another 
Reflexion zur Metaphysik Kant points out: 
He who recognizes morality as important and thus a holy law and a just 
judgment together with a benevolent reign, is easily convinced of the 
future . He, to whom this seems only to have a conditioned necessity, 
cannot be convinced. For why should the enjoyment of a life which 
revolves around [or, "whose whole objective is" ("auslaufen")] mere 
pleasure, be continued after death?11o 
kOnftiges Leben glauben, und ich bin sicher, dar.. diesen Glauben nichts wankend machen konnte, 
weil dadurch meine sittlichen Grundst3tze selbst umgestorzt werden wOrden , denen ich nicht 
entsagen kann , ohne in meinen Augen verabscheuungswordig zu sein .") 
108See Chapter on "Homicidium Do/osum" footnote no. 161. 
109See KU 472.--The suicide who assumes that another world or life does not exist seems to 
make the same mistake as the person who believes that no other life exists. In the Reflexionen 
zur Metaphysik val. 17, no. 4557, 593 Kant states: "So much I know: that no one could prove that 
no other life is. One can also not say that one believes no other life exists, but: one could only not 
believe that one is." (The entire Reflexion reads as follows: "lch kan nicht sagen: ich weir.. , dar.. ein 
ander Leben ist; sondern: ich glaubs. So viel weir.. ich, dar.. keiner beweisen konne es sey kein 
ander Leben. Man kan auch nicht sagen, dar.. man Glaube, es sey kein ander Leben; sondern: 
man konne nur nicht glauben, dar.. eines sey. Dieses zeigt mehr einen noch wahrenden Mangel 
von Einsicht als eine Einsicht des Gegentheils an. Die Hofnung einer Andern Welt ist eine 
Nothwendige hypothesis der Vernunft in Ansehung der Zweke und eine nothwendige Hypothesis 
des Herzens in ansehung der moralitaet. Sie ist also praktisch auf sichere GrOnde gesetzt, aber 
theoretisch dunkel und ungewir.. . Man kan ienseit dieser Welt nur das wissen , was uns in dieser 
obliegt.") Compare also KrV A 829f/ B 857. 
11 DReflexionen zur Metaphysik val. 17, no. 4558, 593: "Der, so die Moralitaet vor [read "fOr"] 
wichtig erkennt und daher ein heilig Gesetz und ein gerecht gericht nebst der gOtigen Regierung , 
ist Ieicht von der Zukunft zu Oberzeugen . Der, dem dieses eine nur bedingte Nothwendigkeit zu 
haben scheint, kann gar nicht Oberzeugt werden. Denn warum sollte eben der Genur.. eines 
Lebens, welches auf blor..en Genur.. auslauft, noch nach dem tode fortgesetzt werden?" 
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If the main purpose in our life is the satisfaction of desires, we do not need the 
belief of the immortality of the soul because we do not disregard any of our 
desires in order to fulfill our duties but live in order to gratify them. This last 
statement of Kant could be interpreted as a reason why someone might commit 
suicide. 
Having said all this, what can Kant say to the suicide whose belief is 
characterized by the first kind of belief system, and who argues "I kill myself 
because I believe in the immortality of the soul"? It seems that Kant's postulate 
of the immortality of the soul not only differs from the belief of the suicide, but 
that the suicide's belief is unacceptable for Kant. The suicide who acts from 
belief system one would have in Kant's eyes a crude understanding of the 
immortality of the soul as the continuous existence of a soul-substance. Kant 
would have to argue, as he does in the case of the suicide who denies the 
immortality of the soul , that the belief in the immortality of the soul is an 
expression of the consciousness of duty which excludes suicide. Kant's view that 
the duty not to commit suicide does not presuppose but imply the immortality of 
the soul indicates to us that suicide is prohibited because of the intentions of the 
suicide. 
Generalizing the result and applying it to any violation of duty, we can say 
that whenever it is our intention to act from duty, we postulate the immortality of 
the soul or the "infinitely enduring existence and personality of the same rational 
being " and thus can be said to intend the preservation of the moral life or our 
personality because we allow for its possibility; whereas if it is our intention to act 
contrary to duty, we do not postulate the immortality of the soul and thus intend 
to destroy the moral life or our personality because we do not allow for the 
possibility to be bound by duty. 
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CHAPTERV 
ENDS 
As we saw in the Chapter on "Duties" Kant discusses self-murder in the Lecture 
on the Metaphysics of Morals under the right of humanity, but according to The 
Metaphysics of Morals, self-murder is discussed in the "Doctrine of Virtue," 
suggesting that it affects the end of humanity rather then the right of humanity. 
The question is whether or not this assumption can be justified. 
Kant distinguishes in the latter work between negative and positive duties 
to oneself: 
Negative duties forbid man to act contrary to the end of his nature and so 
have to do merely with his moral self-preservation; positive duties which 
command him to make a certain object of choice his end, concern his 
perfecting of himself. [The literal translation of the first part is: "[Negative 
duties] forbid man with regard to the end of his nature to act contrary to 
it. "]1 
As this quote clearly states, negative duties (perfect duties to oneself) which 
include the prohibition of self-murder and lying, forbid actions which are contrary 
to the end of human nature. In other words, a violation of the end of human 
nature represents a violation of a perfect duty to oneself. It is , however, not 
immediately clear what Kant means by the "end" of human nature and whether 
or not this end is identical with the end of humanity. Furthermore, in his argument 
that self-disembodiment is murder because it destroys the subject of morality as 
1Gregor 216 (MS 419: " .. . jene, welche dem Menschen in Ansehung des Zwecks seiner Natur 
v e r b i e t e n demselben zuwider zu handeln, mithin bios auf die moralische S e I b s t e r-
h a I t u n g , diese, welche g e b i e t e n sich einen gewissen Gegenstand der WillkOr zum 
Zweck zu machen und auf die V e r v o II k om m nun g seiner selbst gehen .. . ". 
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an end in itself, Kant seems not to argue that it is a crime because it is contrary 
to the end of human nature: 
To annihilate the subject of morality in one's own person is to root out the 
existence of morality itself from the world , as far as one can , even though 
morality is an end in itself.2 
This quote, even though it states that self-murder destroys morality as an end in 
itself, does not explain how the end in itself is related to the end of human 
nature; nor does it explain how the destruction of the subject of morality is 
related to the obstruction of the end of human nature. But does this mean that 
the characterization of the end of human nature has no bearing on the argument 
against self-murder so that the immorality of self-murder can be established 
without reference to the end of human nature? Furthermore, Kant affirms that the 
purpose of the negative duties to oneself is "moral self-preservation." Yet it is not 
clear why the omission to act contrary to the end of human nature constitutes not 
only "self-preservation" but "moral" self-preservation. 
Another question closely related to the first concerns the relationship Kant 
establishes between natural ends and duties to oneself. He states that an action 
"contrary to the natural end" is "thus contrary to one's duty to oneself."3 Since we 
already indicated that Kant's argument against self-murder does not mention that 
it violates an end of human nature, leaving aside for the moment what this end 
may be, it seems that a characterization of the end of human nature in terms of 
the end of the human being's animal nature, too, is of no relevance for the 
2Gregor 219 (MS 423: "Das Subject der Sittlichkeit in seiner eigenen Person zernichten , ist eben 
so viel , als die Sittlichkeit selbst ihrer Existenz nach, so viel an ihm ist, aus der Welt vertilgen , 
welche doch Zweck an sich selbst ist .. . ". 
31 have changed Gregor's translation on page 222 (" ... contrary to nature's end, and so also 
contrary to one's duty to oneself .... ")since MS 426 reads: " ... nicht dem Naturzweck und hiemit 
auch der Pflicht gegen sich selbst ... zuwider." 
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argument against self-murder. But if that were true, why then does Kant find it 
necessary to preface the section on the duty to oneself as an "animal ... and 
moral being" in The Metaphysics of Morals by listing the different impulses which 
serve preservation as an end of nature? In other words , if a natural instinct for 
preservation, be it the preservation of the self or the species cannot serve as a 
foundation for the duty of self-preservation why then is it necessary to make the 
reference to this end of nature? Kant cannot and does not argue that because 
we have an impulse for self-preservation we ought to preserve ourselves. He 
stresses that "the need to preserve oneself ... in itself cannot establish a duty."4 
But to say that the nature of the human being as a self-preserving organism 
cannot "establish" ("begrOnden") a duty of self-preservation does not mean that 
an action which is contrary to the end of nature does not violate the duty to 
oneself.s 
So, even if nature's end--which as we will see may or may not be 
identified with the end of human nature--turns out to be of no relevance for the 
argument against self-murder, we must still explain how an action contrary to the 
end of nature is related to the destruction of the subject of morality as an end in 
itself, unless we regard the reference to nature only as a "convenient medium" 
for making the argument more palatable for the reader.s To put the matter 
4Gregor 240 (MS 445: Denn abgesehen von dem BedOrfnis der Selbsterhaltung, welches an sich 
keine Pflicht begronden kann ... ".)I have changed Gregor's translation . 
ssee Gregor (1963) 133. 
6Gregor (1963) 134 uses this description and argues: "Given the popular Stoic ethics of Kant's 
time and the eighteenth century's acceptance of a teleological nature, Kant might well hope to 
'gain an entrance to the common understanding' by connecting his ethics with 'nature' and 
'nature's purposes'. Today, the value of this connection would be considerably diminished. But if 
the role of 'nature' is only that of a convenient medium for expounding a moral argument 
established independently of it, no serious objection can be brought to its presence in the 
argument. It can simply be removed without affecting the 'rational proof itself." Because Kant 
himself was critical of the Stoic dictum "vive convenienter naturae" and re-interprets it when he 
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differently, even if the "rational proof' against self-murder can be established 
independently of the end of nature, we still have to explain why Kant assumes a 
correlation between actions that are contrary to the end of nature and actions 
contrary to the moral subject as an end in itself. It is not enough to simply state 
the "appeal to 'nature' is possible only because its funct ion and supposed 
purposes can be seen to coincide with this rational system of ends."7 The 
coincidence itself must be able to tell us something about the ends of reason . 
Only if we have determined the end of human nature, can we state which 
end the self-murderer violates; and only if we understand the reason why Kant 
correlates an action contrary to an end of nature with a violation of a duty to 
oneself, do we have a basis for arguing that the reference to nature in Kant's 
argument against suicide is more than a "convenient medium" for presenting his 
argument against self-murder. The two main sections of this chapter are 
designed to accomplish this goal. 
In the first main section on "The End of Human Nature" I will , first, clarify 
the meaning of the 'end of human nature' by discussing three possible 
candidates for the "end" of human nature: the status of the human being as an 
end in itself, self-preservation, and self-perfection . In order to clarify which of the 
candidates qualifies as the end of human nature I will , first, discuss the motto of 
the negative duties to oneself in The Metaphysics of Morals and show that the 
perfect duty of self-preservation prohibits the interference with human nature 
understood as a perfect product of nature. Second, I will turn to the Vorarbeiten 
zur Tugendlehre to show that negative duties protect a negative end , namely the 
speaks of the perfect duties to oneself, I find Gregor's suggestions not convincing . See footnote 
no. 26. 
7Gregor (1963) 134. 
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dignity of humanity. Third, I will show that the essential ends which Kant 
discusses in the Lecture on Moral Philosophy are the conditions to which the use 
of freedom must conform. I will conclude this section by arguing that perfect 
duties to oneself forbid one with regard to the end of perfection to act contrary to 
one's status as an end in itself. Our discussion in this first main section will also 
explain why negative duties to oneself are concerned with "moral" self-
preservation . 
In the second main section on "Natural Ends, Ends of Nature, and Ends of 
Reason," I will show that the correlation between actions contrary to natural ends 
and actions violating duties to oneself is a result of Kant's assumption that nature 
must allow for the realization of the moral law in the world. I will, first, show that 
the command to preserve oneself in the perfection of one's nature refers to the 
inner perfection of a natural end discussed in the Critique of Judgment. Second I 
will show that perfect duties to oneself are concerned with one element of the 
ultimate end of nature, namely, the culture of discipline or the duty of apathy 
which safeguards the status of the human being as an end in itself. Third, I will 
explain that Kant characterizes the animality of the human being in terms of 
nature's end of preservation because it is the necessary condition for the 
realization of freedom. 
The End of Human Nature 
There are three possible candidates for the 'the end of human nature.' But 
before we turn to the discussion of the candidates, we observe that Kant uses 
the singular "end" not the plural"ends" in the statement "negative duties forbid 
man to act contrary to the end of his nature." This seems to suggest that the 
207 
prohibition of, for example, self-murder and self-mutilation as well as lying and 
avarice preserves the same end (the end of human nature), even though these 
duties comprise duties to oneself as an animal (and moral) being and duties to 
oneself merely as a moral being . 
The first candidate for the end of human nature is the status of the human 
being as an end in itself. In the Chapter on "Duties," we already referred to the 
second formulation of the categorical imperative in the Groundwork and pointed 
out that the principle of humanity as an end in itself is the "supreme limiting 
condition of every man's freedom of action ."8 The distinction between negative 
and positive duties is the result of the objective division of duties to oneself with 
regard to what is formal and what is material in duties to oneself. The end in itself 
represents the formal aspect of duties to oneself, whereas the end of perfection 
which is at the same time a duty represents the material aspect of duties to 
oneself. It could , however, be argued that since Kant speaks of the 'end of 
human nature' that, rather than referring to the human being as an end in itself, 
he is referring to nature's end with regard to the human being , a possibility we 
will take into account when we talk about the second candidate. For the moment 
we put this objection to rest by reminding ourselves that "nature" does not 
necessarily mean nature as opposed to reason but can also mean "essence": 
Rational beings, on the other hand, are called persons because their 
nature already marks them out as ends in themselves--that is, as 
something which ought not to be used merely as a means--and 
consequently imposes to that extent a limit on all arbitrary treatment of 
them (and is an object of reverence) . 9 
BGMS 431 ; see Chapter on "Duties" footnote no. 21 . 
9Paton 96 (GMS 428: " .. . dagegen vernOnftige Wesen P e r s o n e n genannt werden , wei I ihre 
Natur sie schon als Zweck an sich selbst, d. i. als etwas, das nicht bios als Mittel gebraucht 
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Given these suggestions, Kant's statement quoted at the beginning of this 
chapter that negative duties 'forbid man to act contrary to the end of man's 
nature' could mean that they 'forbid man to act contrary to the human being as 
an end in itself.'10 
The second candidate for the end of human nature is the end of the 
human being as either animal or moral being. Negative duties to oneself, that is, 
those duties which are concerned with moral self-preservation comprise two 
kinds of duties, the duty to oneself as an "animal (natural) and a moral being" 
and the duty to oneself "only as a moral being."11 Since the first duty 
commands one to preserve oneself in one's animal nature which is characterized 
by impulses striving for the preservation of the self, species, and one's health; 
and the second duty commands one not to deprive oneself "of the prerogative of 
a moral being" which consists in "acting in accordance with principles," or the 
duty that the maxim of one's will is consistent with the dignity of humanity, 12 the 
end of human nature could be said to comprise the preservation of one's 
werden darf, auszeichnet, mithin so fern aile Willkur einschrankt (und ein Gegenstand der 
Achtung ist) .") 
10Gregor (1963) 128f seems to suggest a similar approach, even though she does not identify 'the 
end of human nature' with the end in itself but refers to it as one of Kant's "criteria for determining 
what sort of maxims fail , because of their relation to our own humanity, to qualify for giving 
universal law." See also footnote no. 21 . 
11 Rather than speaking of "Man's Duty to Himself as an Animal Being" in MS 421 (Gregor 218) 
Kant should have spoken of "Man's Duty to Himself as an Animal (Natural) and at the Same Time 
Moral Being," since this would correspond to his initial subjective division in MS 420 (Gregor 216) 
of "man's duties to himself ... in terms of whether the subject of duty (man) views himself both as 
an animal (natural) and a moral being or only ["bios"] as a moral being." He adheres to his initial 
distinction when he speaks of "Man's Duty to Himself Merely ["bios"] as a Moral Being" in MS 
428.--Gregor translates "bios" one time with "only" (216) and the other time with "merely" (225). I 
suggest translating both with "merely." 
12Gregor 216 (MS 420: "Was aber die Pflicht des Menschen gegen sich selbst b 1 o s als 
moralisches Wesen (ohne auf seine Thierheit zu sehen) betrifft, so besteht sie im Form a 1 en 
der Obereinstimmung der Maximen seines Willens mit der W 0 r d e der Menschheit in seiner 
Person; also im Verbot, dal1 er sich selbst des V or z u g s eines moralischen Wesens, namlich 
nach Principien zu handeln, d. i. der inneren Freiheit, nicht beraube und dadurch zum Spiel blor1er 
Neigungen, also zur Sache, mache. ") 
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physical and moral life or the capacities that ensure the preservation of the 
physical and moral life. In short, it would mean that negative duties would 'forbid 
man to act contrary to the end as animal and moral being and so have to do 
merely with one's moral self-preservation.' To repeat, according to this 
interpretation, the duty of self-preservation prohibits one from acting contrary to 
the impulses for preservation, and it prohibits one from interfering with the 
capacity to act according to principles and thus constitutes moral self-
preservation. This would mean that the end of human nature comprises two 
different kinds of ends. It should, however, be observed, that, strictly speaking , 
Kant never mentions an 'end' of the moral being but only speaks of the 
"prerogative." 13 
The third candidate for the end of human nature is perfection "belonging 
to man as such (properly speaking, to humanity)" and which it is our duty to 
make our end. 14 Perfection is therefore on the one hand understood as the 
essence of the human being and on the other hand as an activity to realize this 
essence. 
In the Chapter on "Duties" we saw that Kant distinguishes between the 
right and the end of humanity. It was shown that the latter consists in one's 
natural as well as moral perfection. What "characterizes humanity (as 
distinguished from animality)" is "the capacity to set oneself an end--any end 
whatsoever." Kant refers to this capacity as an end which entails the duty to 
make ourselves 
131bid . 
14Gregor 191 (MS 386: "Wenn von der dem Menschen Oberhaupt (eigentlich der Menschheit) 
zugehorigen Vollkommenheit gesagt wird : dar!,, sie sich zum Zweck zu machen, an sich selbst 
Pflicht sei ... ".) 
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worthy of humanity by culture in general, by procuring or promoting the 
capacity to realize all sorts of possible ends, so far as this is to be found in 
man himself.15 
Kant identifies the duty entailed in the capacity to set oneself ends with the 
imperfect duty to cultivate the crude predisposition of our nature and so to raise 
animality to the level of humanity.16 The duty to cultivate one's natural 
predisposition is therefore commanded for a pragmatic purpose, namely to 
develop in us the capacity to set various ends.1 7 
In addition to natural perfection, the end of perfection as a duty entails 
also moral perfection which focuses on the incentives which move us to fulfill our 
duties. It requires us to act from duty, that is, independent of inclination and 
constitutes, to use an expression from the Lecture on Moral Philosophy, the 
"goodness" ("Bonitaet") of the free empirical will.18 Natural perfection is only good 
under the condition that it is used according to the moral law.19 To put the matter 
differently, it is the goodness of the will (moral perfection) and not the capacity to 
set oneself any end whatsoever (natural perfection) which constitutes the 
personality of the human being and hence the absolute value of the person.2o 
15Gregor 195 (MS 392: "Das Vermogen sich Oberhaupt irgend einen Zweck zu setzen ist das 
Charakteristische der Menschheit (zum Unterschiede von der Thierheit) . Mit dem Zwecke der 
Menschheit in unserer eigenen Person ist also auch der Vernunftwille, mithin die Pflicht 
verbunden, sich um die Menschheit durch Cultur Oberhaupt verdient zu machen, sich das 
V e r m b g e n zu AusfOhrung allerlei moglichen Zwecke, so fern dieses in dem Menschen selbst 
anzutreffen ist, zu verschaffen oder es zu fordern , d. i. eine Pflicht zur Cultur der rohen Analgen 
seiner Natur, als wodurch das Thier sich allererst zum Menschen erhebt: mithin Pflicht an sich 
selbst.") 
16Gregor 239 (MS 444). Even though Kant speaks in MS 392 and 444 of "all sorts of possible 
ends," natural perfection is, according toMS 387, a command of morally practical reason . 
17This view of perfection seems to correspond to Kant's description of the imperative of skill in 
GMS 415 where Kant uses the example that parents teach their children different kinds of skills in 
case they might need them. 
18See footnote 45. Compare also MSV 517f. 
19See RGV 2 footnote. 
20MS 434 states: "Selbst, dar.. er [der Mensch] vor diesen [den Thieren] den Verstand voraus hat 
und sich selbst Zwecke setzen kann , das giebt ihm doch nur einen i:i u r.. e r e n Werth seiner 
Brauchbarkeit (pretium usus) ... Aile in der Mensch als P e r s o n betrachte, d. i. als Subject einer 
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If perfection rather than preservation would represent the end of human nature, it 
would mean that, according to the original quote, negative duties would 'forbid 
man to act contrary to his natural and moral perfection and so have to do 
merely with his moral self-preservation.' They would forbid one to act contrary to 
the end which it is our duty to make our own, and moral self-preservation would 
then consist in omitting actions which make natural and moral perfection 
impossible. 21 
In order to further clarify which of these three candidates is most likely to 
qualify as the end of human nature, we turn first to the analysis of the two 
mottoes or dicta in The Metaphysic of Morals which characterize the first and 
second principle of the duty to oneself and secondly to the Vorabeiten zur 
Tugendlehre and the Lecture on Moral Philosophy. 
The Metaphysics of Morals: Negative and Positive Duties 
According to the "Doctrine of Virtue" Kant distinguishes between two mottoes of 
the duty to oneself which also express the functions of negative and positive 
duties to oneself. The first motto represents the perfect duties to oneself and 
moralisch-praktischen Vernunft, ist Ober allen Preis erhaben ... ".--It is in this sense that we have 
to understand one of the Reflexionen zur Moralphilosophie, vol. 19 no. 7305, 307: "Die WOrde der 
Menschheit in seiner eignen Persohn ist die Persbhnlichkeit, d. i. die freyheit; denn er ist nur 
Zweck an sich selbst, so fern er ein wesen ist, dar.. sich selbst Zweke setzen kan . Die 
Vernunftlose, die das nicht kbnen , haben nur den Werth der Mittel." 
21This is the view Mary Gregor takes in the Introduction "Kants System der Pflichten in der 
Metaphysik der Sitten," in Immanuel Kant. Metaphysische AnfangsgrOnde der Tugenlehre , edited 
and introduced by Bernd Ludwig (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1990), p. LXIIf: "Wenn also 
vollkommene Pflichten gegen sich selbst tatsachlich Tugendpflichten sind, so mur.. das 
zugeMrige Gesetz einen Zweck vorschreiben. Der einzige Zweck, der in Frage kommt, scheint 
die eigene Vollkommenheit zu sein." But Gregor (1963) 128 seems to suggest that it is the ends of 
our composite nature, rather than perfection which perfect duty to oneself forbid to violate: 
"Certain maxims will be disqualified because they disrupt the rational order among the end of 
man's composite animal, rational , and moral being , and the prohibitions against such actions will 
comprise perfect duties to oneself as a moral being with an animal nature." 
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commands "live in conformity with nature (naturae convenienter vive)" which 
Kant interprets to mean "preserve yourself in the perfection of your nature."22 
The second motto represents the imperfect duties to oneself and commands 
"make yourself more perfect than mere nature has made you (perfice te ut finem, 
perfice te ut medium)."23 Unlike negative duties to oneself which are concerned 
with the "moral health (ad esse)" of the human being , positive duties to oneself 
are concerned with the "moral prosperity (ad me/ius esse, opulentia moralis) ."24 
The first motto commands one to live according to nature which could be 
interpreted to mean that one ought to live according to the laws of nature or that 
22Gregor 216 (MS 419: ... lebe der Nature gemar! (naturae convenienter vive) , d. i. e r h a It e 
dich in der Vollkommenheit deiner Natur ... ".)Gregor separates the translations of the mottoes 
from the original Latin formulations by putting the former in quotation marks. I have left out the 
quotation marks in Gregor's quotes. 
23Gregor 216 (MS 419: " .. . mach e d i c h v o II k om m n e r , als die blor!e Natur dich schuf 
(perfice te ut finem; perfice te ut medium).") See comment on quotation marks in previous 
footnotes. Gregor translates "dich schuf' (past tense) with "has made you" (present perfect). 
24Gregor 216 (MS 419). John E. Atwell in his Ends and Principles in Kant's Moral Thought 
(Dordrecht/Boston/Lancaster: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1986), p. 129f seems to suggest that 
both the motto "live according to nature, i.e. preserve yourself in the perfection of your nature" as 
well as "make yourself more perfect than mere nature created you" characterize perfect duties to 
oneself. According to Atwell 's diagram lying is contrary to the duty to make oneself more perfect 
than mere nature has made one and not, as I believe, contrary to the motto to preserve oneself in 
the perfection of one's nature. 
If we were to take Atwell's interpretation for granted , perfecting oneself would be the same 
as being honest--a view Kant would disagree with . In Immanuel Kant's Menschenkunde oder 
philosophische Anthropologie, ed. Fr. Ch. Starke (Leipzig , 1831; reprinted ., Hildesheim, New 
York: Georg Olms Verlag , 1976), p. 295 Kant states: "Es ist ein schlechtes Zeitalter, woman 
durch Ehrlichkeit Ehre erwirbt, aber noch ein weit schlechteres ist das, wo die Unredlichkeit keine 
Schande zuzieht. Nichts erwirbt Beifall, als das, was selten ist. Weniger als ein ehrlicher Mann 
kan Niemand seyn. Wenn es aber schon sehr viel ist, dar! jemand ein ehlicher Mann ist, und 
wenn ihm das als ein sehr gror!es Verdienst angerechnet wird , so kann man sich vorstellen , wie 
schlecht das Zeitalter seyn mur!; denn das Verdienst ist das, wodurch man mehr thut als man 
schuldig ist. Nichts ist verdienstlich , was nur genau der Schuldigkeit gemar! ist. Wer sich aber als 
ein ehrlicher Mann verhalt, der thut nur gerade seine Schuldigkeit. "--Even though Kant seems to 
focus on honesty in interaction with other people, his statement can also be applied toward 
honesty to oneself. If we do not lie to ourselves or others, we are certa inly not perfecting 
ourselves, but we only "remove the obstacle within (an evil will actually present in [us])" in order to 
"develop the orig inal pred isposition to a good will within" us "which can never be lost" (Gregor 
236/MS 441 ). The prohibition of lying represents the first step which is governed by the duty to 
preserve oneself in one's moral nature, and it is the second step which is governed by the motto 
to perfect oneself. 
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one ought to make nature or its laws the standard for one's actions. Yet Kant 
interprets this motto to mean that we ought to preserve ourselves in the 
perfection of our nature.25 According to the original formulation, nature is 
something external, a standard for our actions; but according to Kant's 
interpretation, it is an essential and perfect part of who we are and characterizes 
what is and not what ought to be. Thus, to "live in conformity with nature" does 
not mean that we ought to emulate nature and improve our natural endowment, 
but that, because our nature is already perfect, we ought not to interfere with its 
perfection; we ought to preserve it.26 
25This is a dictum of the Stoic philosophy, but the question is whether Kant's interpretation of this 
principle reflects the Stoic meaning. Kant's interpretation of "Live according to nature" is that the 
person should preserve the perfection of his or her nature. Schink 427f points out that this 
interpretation of the first principle does not convey the Stoic understanding of this principle. And 
he stresses that it is Kant's second principle of the duties to oneself which conveys the Stoic 
understanding of "live according to nature," namely "make yourself more perfect than mere nature 
has made you." 
26Kant consciously rejects Baumgarten's formulae ("Fac bonum et ommitte malum," "Quaere 
perfectionem, quantum pates," "Vive convenienter naturae," "Ama optimum, quantum pates;" (MC 
264ff/MM1414) given in§§ 39-46 of his lnitia Philosophia Practicae (see val. 19, 7-91 of the 
Academy Edition) which Baumgarten intended as universal principles of obligation. Like the other 
formulae the Stoic principle "Vive convenienter naturae" is tautological, according to Kant's 
statements in both the Lecture on Moral Philosophy as well as the Lecture on the Metaphysics of 
Morals. 
In MC 266/MM 1415 we read : "Ein andres moralisches Principium des Autors ist: Vive 
convenienter naturae. Dieses ist ein Stoisches Principium. Wo schon in der Moral viele Principia 
seyn , da sind gewi~ keine, denn es kann nur ein wahres Principium seyn. Wenn der Satz auch so 
gesagt wird: Lebe gem~~ den Gesetzen, die dir die Natur durch die Vernunft giebt, so ist er doch 
tautologisch , denn der Natur gem~~ Ieben, wOrde bedeuten, seine Handlung nach der physischen 
Ordnung der natorlichen Dinge einrichten, also w~re es eine Regel der Klugheit, aber nicht ein 
moralisches Principium, ja auch nicht einmal eine gute Regel der Klugheit, denn wenn es hei~t: 
richte deine Handlungen so ein , da~ sie mit der Natur Obereinstimmen, so wei~ ich nicht, ob es 
gut ist, wenn die Handlungen mit der Natur Obereinstimmen. Viel weniger ist es ein Principium der 
Moralitat." 
According to MSV 518, Kant states: "d. vive convenienter natura [sic). Dies kann hei~en : 
Lebe als Thier-- in physischem Verstande vergleicht man das Verhalten der Menschen damit 
bald so, da~ diese verlieren , bald so, da~ sie dabei gewinnen konnen. Soli es hei~en : Lebe den 
Vorschriften der Vernunft gem~~ . so zeigt es nicht mehr an, als: thue die Pflicht weil es Pflicht ist, 
und ist also tautologisch ." 
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The second motto adds to the above information that human beings are the 
products of nature's creation. In the context of the first motto this means that as 
products of nature human beings are perfect. Yet in the second motto nature as 
the creator of perfection becomes "mere nature" whose creation is in need of 
further perfection. 
The characterization of imperfect and perfect duties, that is, those duties 
which either preserve "nature in its perfection (as receptivity)" or which require 
the "cultivation (active perfecting)" in order to acquire the "capacity" adequate for 
all ends, shows that Kant distinguishes between two kinds of perfection . When 
nature is understood as an essential and perfect aspect of who we are, that is, in 
terms of our natural predispositions, it is our obligation to preserve it by not 
violating it; according to this view, we do not take an active part in creating 
perfection. But when nature is understood as the creator of the human being, it is 
our obligation to further perfect it by choosing the appropriate ends; according to 
this view, we are active participants in perfecting our natural endowment and in 
doing so raise it to another level of perfection. 
The finding regarding the first kind of perfection coincides with Kant's own 
view as illustrated by the following quote from the casuistical questions in the 
section "On Defi ling Oneself by Lust:" 
Nature's end ["Zweck der Natur"] in the cohabitation of the sexes is 
procreation, that is, the preservation of the species. Hence one may not, 
at least, act contrary to that end . .. . 
If, for example, the wife is pregnant or sterile (because of age or 
sickness) , or if she feels no desire for intercourse, is it not contrary to 
nature's end ["Naturzweck"] , and so also contrary to one's duty to oneself, 
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for one or the other of them, to make use of their sexual attribute --just as 
in unnatural lust?27 
According to the quote, an action which is contrary to nature's end of the 
preservation of the species is contrary to the perfect duty of self-preservation. By 
analogy, we expect Kant to reason that an action which is contrary to nature's 
end to preserve the animal and moral being is contrary to the duty of self-
preservation. Furthermore, a violation of nature's end or its purposiveness in 
general corresponds to the renunciation of personality. Kant presents this view 
when he discusses the vice of lying which is contrary to the perfect duty to 
oneself as a moral being only: 
But communication of one's thoughts to someone through words that yet 
(intentionally) contain the contrary of what the speaker thinks on the 
subject is an end that is directly opposed to the natural purposiveness of 
the speaker's capacity to communicate his thoughts, and is thus a 
renunciation by the speaker of his personality, and such a speaker is a 
mere deceptive appearance of a man, not man himself.2B 
Again , by analogy Kant would have to hold the view that self-destruction is an 
end that is directly opposed to the natural purposiveness of the agent's capacity 
(the will) to set himself ends and thus destroys personality. When Kant states 
that the self-murderer destroys the subject of morality, that is, personality, he is 
27Gregor 221f (MS 426: "Der Zweck der Naturist in der Beiwohnung der Geschlechter die 
Fortpflanzung, d. i. die Erhaltung der Art; jenem Zwecke darf also wenigstens nicht zuwider 
gehandelt werden . ... 1st es z. B. zur Zeit der Schwangerschaft -- ist es bei der Sterilitat des 
Weibes (Alters oder Krankheit wegen), oder wenn dieses keinen Anreiz dazu bei sich findet, nicht 
dem Naturzwecke und hiemit auch der Pflicht gegen sich selbst an einem oder dem anderen Theil 
eben so wie bei der unnatorlichen Wohllust zuwider, von seinen Geschlechtseigenschaften 
Gebrauch zu machen; ... ". It may be that Gregor translates "Naturzweck" with "nature's end" to 
adjust it to "Zweck der Natur" in the first sentence. In MS 424 Kant calls the preservation of the 
species and love of life a "Naturzweck" ("natural end") and in MS 425 he uses the term "end of 
nature." 
2BGregor 226 (MS 429: " ... aber die Mittheilung seiner Gedanken an jemanden durch Worte, die 
doch das Gegentheil von dem (absichtlich) enthalten, was der Sprechende dabei denkt, ist ein der 
natorlichen Zweckmassigkeit seines Vermogens der Mittheilung seiner Gedanken gerade 
entgegen gesetzter Zweck, mithin Verzichtthuung auf seine Personlichkeit und eine bios 
tauschende Erscheinung vom Menschen, nicht der Mensch selbst. ") See also MS 425. 
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not so much focusing on the destruction of the capacity to set oneself any ends 
whatsoever, but on the destruction of the autonomous use of that capacity. 29 
The following conclusions can be drawn from this section: first, the perfect 
duty of self-preservation commands one to preserve the perfection of human 
nature by prohibiting any interference with perfection as a product of nature. 
Second , the expression "natural end" or "end of nature" refers to the perfection 
of the human being understood as the perfection of a product of nature. Third , 
acting contrary to the end of nature violates the duty to oneself. To put it in 
general terms, any action which is contrary to nature's end is contrary to the duty 
to oneself. Unlike imperfect duties which require our active perfecting of our 
natural endowment, perfect duties to oneself require that we abstain from an 
interference with this endowment. Kant's view that an action contrary to the end 
of nature violates the duty to oneself suggests that the end of nature represents 
the limiting condition for the actions of human beings. What is not yet clear, 
however, is whether the end of human nature we set out to identify at the 
beginning of this chapter is identical with nature's end of preservation , or whether 
the latter only determines a space or region of human nature which must be 
protected from human destruction in order to allow for the possibility of the end of 
human nature and because of that requires the formulation of specific duties of 
omission . If we were to conclude our investigation into the end of human nature 
with this section, we wou ld have to argue that negative duties forbid one to act 
contrary to the end of natural perfection. 
291n connection with the right of humanity as the necessary condition which limits freedom Kant 
states in the Reflexionen zur Moralphilosophie , vol. 19, no. 6801 , 165f: "Der Selbstmorder zeigt 
auch die freyheit in dem Gro~ten wiederstreit wieder sich selbst, mithin in der gro~ten Zerrottung 
des Eignen Wahnes. Die Menschheit ist h e i I i g und unverletzlich. ([index follows] so wohl in 
seiner eignen Persohn als in der anderer. Seine eigne Einwillingung ist hier nichtig, weil man 
keinen Willen hat um aufzuhoren gar etwas zu seyn.)" 
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Vorarbeiten zur Tugendlehre: Negative Ends and Negative Duties 
According to the last section negative duties.command the preservation of 
(human) nature in its perfection. They do not require that we actively perfect 
ourselves but that we do not obstruct or destroy our natural predispositions. But 
perfection is also an end of humanity which entails the duty to actively perfect 
oneself, that is, "natural perfection" which "is the cultivation of any capacities 
whatever for furthering ends set forth by reason" and the "cultivation of morality" 
in the person with the goal to make it one's maxim to act from duty (moral 
perfection) . 3D Kant does not mention self-preservation or moral health when he 
discusses the duty to perfect oneself. Because of this and because the duty of 
self-preservation is a perfect--not an imperfect duty--self-preservation seems not 
to fall under the umbrella of self-perfection . In order to further investigate the end 
of human nature and to decide whether or not it can be identified with the end in 
itself, self-preservation, or self-perfection, we turn to the Vorarbeiten zur 
Tugendlehre. 
There, Kant states that "the end of humanity in your own person is either 
conformity with the nature of the human being or his cultivation according to laws 
of freedom."31 A few lines later Kant identifies the "end of humanity in our own 
person" with perfection which includes natural as well as moral perfection. 
Furthermore, he explains that "one's own perfection as end is either [a] strict or 
3DGregor 195f (MS 391 f) . 
31 Vorarbeiten zur Tugendlehre , vol. 23, 387: "Der Zweck der Menschheit in Deiner eigenen 
Person ist entweder Obereinstimmung mit der Natur des Menschen oder seiner Cultur nach 
Gesetzen der Freiheit." I interpret this to mean that both the end to conform with human nature as 
well as the end to cultivate the human being have to be in accordance with laws of freedom.--See 
also Gregor (1963) 125 for her observations regarding this and the following quote in the body of 
the text. 
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wide duty of virtue to oneself,"32 thus allowing not only for imperfect but perfect 
duties of virtue. 
Our first question is whether or not the function of "either ... or" in the first 
quote is inclusive or exclusive. In other words, does Kant want to say that the 
end of humanity is only one of two things or does it include both, namely, 
conformity with human nature as well as its cultivation according to laws of 
freedom? Since, according to The Metaphysics of Morals, the first principle of the 
duty to oneself is "live in conformity with nature" which Kant interprets as 
"preserve yourself in the perfection of your nature," and the second principle is 
"make yourself more perfect than mere nature has made you ," the Vorarbeiten 
can be read to mean that the end of humanity consists in living in conformity with 
nature and to perfect oneself. Thus, "either ... or" functions as the conjunction 
"and ." Furthermore, since Kant distinguishes in the Vorarbeiten between a strict 
and a wide duty of virtue to oneself, the former can be said to correspond to the 
negative duties to oneself and the latter to the positive duties to oneself in The 
Metaphysics of Morals.33 
There remains, however, an important question, namely, whether or not 
Kant's view in the Vorarbeiten that the end of humanity which comprises 
conformity with as well as the cultivation of human nature can be reconciled with 
his view of perfection in The Metaphysics of Morals as either natural or moral 
perfection. On the one hand, perfection is understood as conformity with as well 
as perfection of human nature and thus includes both perfect duties (the duty to 
conform with, or, according to The Metaphysics of Morals, preserve nature) as 
32Vorarbeiten zur Tugendlehre, vol. 23, 388: "Eigene Vollkommenheit als Zweck ist entweder 
stricte oder late Tugendpflicht gegen sich selbst." 
331 neglect the question discussed in the Chapter on "Duties" how a perfect duty can be a duty of 
virtue. 
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well as imperfect duties (the duty of moral and natural perfection); on the other 
hand, perfection is synonymous with natural and moral perfection only, that is , it 
represents one of the ends which are at the same time duties, does not include 
conformity with or preservation of human nature, and thus entails only imperfect 
not perfect duties to oneself. In short, in the latter case the "either ... or" in the 
Vorarbeiten would have to be interpreted as a disjunction or an exclusive "or." 
But before we continue the discussion of this problem, we turn to another 
statement in the Vorarbeiten: 
0 n e ' s o w n p e r f e c t i o n . Natural or artificiaL--Health and skill [,] 
perfice te ut finem perfice te ut medium (development of the powers of the 
understanding .. . ). To have a he a It h y soul in a healthy body is duty. 
Not only health but also the perfection increased through art is duty. One's 
own duty is negative, that is, not to corrupt oneself with regard to both 
elements; because otherwise one would have to learn the whole of the art 
of pharmaceutics.--Do not act contrary to the end of your nature with 
regard to your life: [in other words do not act contrary to] the natural 
inclination for the reproduction of the species and the use of your 
capacities as human being.34 
This quote confirms a later statement of Kant in the Vorarbeiten that the sum of 
all duties to oneself consists in "mens sana in corpore sano," whereby sanity 
consists in the removal of pain and the effortless use of all of one's capacities.3s 
34Vorarbeiten zur Tugendlehre , vol. 23, 399: "E i g en e V o I k o m me n h e i t . Naturliche oder 
kOnstliche --Gesundheit und Geschicklichkeit perfice te ut finem perfice te ut medium 
(Erweiterung deiner Verstandeskr~fte .. . ). Eine g e sun de Seele in einem gesunden Korper zu 
haben ist Pfl icht. Nicht bios die Gesundheit sender auch die durch Kunst erhohete 
Vollkommenheit ist Pflicht. Die eigene Pflicht ist negativ d. i. sich in beyden StOcken nicht zu 
verderben; denn sonst mor..te man die ganze Arzneykunst lernen. -- handle dem Zwecke deiner 
Natur in Ansehung deines Lebens -- der natorlichen Neigung zur Fortpflanzung der Art und dem 
Gebrauche deiner Vermogen als Mensch nicht entgegen." 
35Vorarbeiten zur Tugendlehre , vol. 23, 400: "Die Summa aller Pflicht gegen sich selbst: mens 
sana in corpore sana. nur ist zu bestimmen nothig was die Sanit~t sey. -- Sie besteht nicht im 
Genier..en des VergnOgens sonder in der Entfernung des Schmerzes u. im leichten Gebrauch aller 
Vermogen."--Juvenal, The Satires of Juvenal, trans. Rolfe Humphries (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press 1958) who coined the Latin mens sana in corpore sana, writes at the end of his 
Tenth Satire, p. 134, lines 350-366: 
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According to the above quote, one's own perfection which we know to represent 
the end of humanity in our own person , includes not only our duty to have a 
healthy body and soul but also to perfect ourselves--whereby perfection seems 
to refer to the perfection of skill (physical perfection) and not to moral perfection. 
In other words, the meaning of "one's own perfection" seems only to include the 
health of body and soul as well as natural perfection but not moral perfection. 
Furthermore, the quote seems to suggest that both duties are negative.3s The 
duties are negative because they command one not to act contrary to or to 
destroy the end of human nature with regard to human life. Kant explains that 
this end includes not only the inclination for propagation but also the use of one's 
capacities as human being. 
If we compare this quote with the previously quoted statements from the 
Vorarbeiten as well as with those in The Metaphysics of Morals , the following 
differences and similarities become obvious: 
Pray for a healthy mind in a healthy body, a spirit 
Unafraid of death, but reconciled to it, and able 
To bear up, to endure whatever troubles afflict it, 
Free from hate and desire, preferring Hercules' labors 
To the cushions and loves and feasts of Sardanapallus. 
I show you what you can give to yourself: only through virtue 
Lies the certain road to a life that is blessed and tranquil. 
That Kant read Juvenal's Satires shows MS 334 (Chapter "Care for the Moral Self' footnote no. 
80). The quote provides an apt description of Kant's own view of the duty of apathy and virtue in 
the "Doctrine of Virtue" and could be used to support Gregor's (1963) statement on page 129 
footnote 5 that if the term 'health' is "taken in a wide enough sense, as the due order among 
components of human nature, the formula would summarize Kant's argument [against self-
destruction]." (Gregor mistakenly spells "sana" as "sane").--For my interpretation of moral health 
see the discussion of the mottoes of duties to oneself and the conclusion of this chapter. See also 
the Chapter on "Belief of Reason." 
361 say "seems" because in light of Kant's reference to the "art of pharmaceutics" 
("Arzneimittelkunst") it is also possible that "elements" ("Stocke") refers only to body and soul , 
which would mean that only the duty to have a healthy body and soul would be negative. 
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The statement "Do not act contrary to the end of your nature with regard to your 
life" is somewhat similar to the statement in The Metaphysics of Morals, 
according to which negative duties "forbid man to act contrary to the end of his 
[the human being's] nature." In both cases they proh ibit actions contrary to the 
end of one's nature whereby the Vorarbeiten specify that these ends concern 
life. It is not completely clear whether the prohibition to act contrary to the sexual 
drive of reproduction as well as one's capacities as a human being corresponds 
only to the duty to preserve oneself in one's animal nature or also to the duty to 
preserve oneself in one's moral nature. The context of both quotes, however, 
makes it clear that the end of one's nature is the limiting condition with regard to 
health and (possibly) perfection. In other words, both The Metaphysics of Morals 
as well as the Vorarbeiten concur in that negative duties forbid one to act 
contrary to the end of one's nature, and that means they forbid one to act 
contrary to one's health and (possibly) to one's perfection in terms of skill. 
But the last quote differs from The Metaphysics of Moral in that it subsumes both 
the duty to be healthy as well as the duty to improve one's skill under the motto 
"perfice te ... "which, in the "Doctrine of Virtue," is the exclusive principle for the 
imperfect duties to oneself concerned with one's perfection or cultivation.37 
To repeat: according to the last quote from the Vorarbeiten , one's own 
perfection includes health and physical perfection (perfection of skill) . Yet when 
Kant in The Metaphysics of Morals speaks of the end of perfection which it is our 
duty to have, he speaks only of one's own perfection (natural and moral) . He 
does not mention preservation or health as an end which it is our duty to make 
371 believe that the imperfect duties in The Metaphysics of Morals with regard to their matter 
(natural perfection) are also only concerned with the improvement of skill ; imperfect duties with 
regard to their form (moral perfection) refer to the disposition ("Gesinnung") to act from duty. 
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our own; and Kant finds it obviously necessary to introduce a separate principle 
for those duties which concern the health of the human being. We are thus again 
faced with the question whether the preservation of (the health) of the human 
being is or is not an element of the end of perfection. If it is not, it has to be 
explained how Kant can define preservation as a duty since, according to the 
"Doctrine of Virtue," duties correspond to ends and not, as in the "Doctrine of 
Right," to rights .3a In other words, according to the "Doctrine of Virtue," every 
duty corresponds to an end which is at the same time a duty. Since only the 
imperfect duties to oneself are concerned with the end of perfection, the question 
is what is the end of the perfect duties to oneself? In order to answer this 
question I suggest taking up Kant's concept of the "negative end"39 in the 
Vorarbeiten: 
The end which we should have with our own person is negative: humanity 
in our person [literally : "in us"] does not want that we shall degrade the 
human being to a means.4o 
Furthermore, he explains: 
The duty to oneself with regard to the end of humanity in his own person 
is also merely negative with respect to perfection (moral [perfection]). 
Not to degrade the dignity of humanity in one's own person is the first 
(negative) duty.41 
38See also Gregor (1990) LXII : "Wenn also vollkommene Pflichten gegen sich selbst 
Tugendpflichten sind , so mu~ das zugehorige Gesetz einen Zweck vorschreiben ." See also 
footnote no. 21 . Compare Kant's distinction between the "Doctrine of Right" and the "Doctrine of 
Virtue" in the section "The difference between the 'Doctrine of Right' and the 'Doctrine of Virtue': 
Incentive and End" in the Chapter on Duties. 
39Compare Gregor's observation regarding negative ends in Gregor (1963) 126f and 125. 
40 Vorarbeiten zur Tugendlehre, vol. 23, 398: "Der Zweck den wir mit unsrer eignen Person haben 
sollen ist negativ: die Menschheit in uns will nicht da~ wir den Menschen zum Mittel erniedrigen 
sollen." 
41 Vorarbeiten zur Tugendlehre , vol. 23, 398: "Die Pflicht gegen sich selbst in Ansehung des 
Zwecks der Menschheit in seiner eigenen Person ist was die Vollkommenheit (die moralische) 
betrift auch bios negativ. 
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The quotes state that with regard to the end of moral perfection the duty to 
oneself is negative, and they make clear that this duty consists in the 
preservation of the dignity of humanity. Since Kant states that this duty is "also" 
negative, it could mean that all those duties which prohibit the obstruction of 
one's health as well as one's natural and moral perfection are negative. This in 
turn would suggest that perfect duties to oneself protect ends which it is our duty 
to make our own and thus allow for the imperfect duties to oneself and others. 
This would explain why Kant states in the Vorarbeiten: 
Duties to oneself refer not to rights of others but to ends which are at the 
same time duties and are the highest among all duties of virtue.42 
The question is, however, whether this interpretation still holds true for The 
Metaphysics of Morals. There the prohibition to act contrary to the end of human 
nature is no longer discussed under the title of "perfice te ... "or "make yourself 
more perfect than mere nature has made you" but under the title "naturae 
convenienter vive," that is, "preserve yourself in the perfection of your nature." 
We find that all the negative duties from the Vorarbeiten become in The 
Metaphysics of Morals duties of self-preservation and seem to correspond to 
what Kant calls in the Vorarbeiten the "strict" duties of virtue. The duty not to act 
contrary to the end of one's nature with regard to one's life becomes in The 
Metaphysics of Morals the duty to preserve oneself in one's animal and moral 
nature,43 and the duty not to degrade the dignity of humanity which Kant calls in 
the Vorarbeiten a "negative end" becomes the duty to preserve oneself merely in 
Die WOrde der Menschheit in seiner eignen Person nicht herabzusetzen ist die erste 
(negative) Pflicht." 
42Vorabeiten zur Tugendlehre, vol. 23, 405: "Pflichten gegen sich selbst beziehen sich nicht auf 
Rechte sondern auf Zwecke die zugleich Pflichten sind und sind die hochsten unter allen 
Tugendpflichten." 
43See footnote no. 11 . 
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one's moral nature. It should , however, be clear that this does not mean that the 
duty to preserve oneself in one's animal and moral nature can be exercised 
without presupposing that the agent is free and capable to act according to 
principles. We have seen in the Chapter on the "Care for the Moral Self' that 
self-murder does not only destroy one's physical existence, but destroys one's 
moral existence and thus the dignity of humanity or one's status as an end in 
itself. 
Our findings in this section suggests that negative duties protect what 
Kant calls in the Vorarbeiten a negative end , namely the dignity of humanity. But 
before I present the conclusion of this chapter and identify the end of human 
nature I would like to discuss the concept of the 'essential end(s) of humanity' in 
the Lecture on Moral Philosophy which will complete our investigation into the 
end of human nature. 
The Lecture on Moral Philosophy: Universally Val id Ends and the Essential 
End(s) of Humanity 
My main goal in this section is to show that the protection of the dignity of 
humanity by the perfect duties to oneself corresponds to the protection of what 
Kant calls in the Lecture on Moral Philosophy the "essential ends of humanity" 
and that these ends are identical with the objective ends discussed in the same 
lecture.44 Self-murder is, according to this Lecture, a violation of the essential 
ends of humanity and thus contrary to the duty to oneself. 
44Josef Schmucker states in Die UrsprOnge der Ethik Kants in seinen vorkritischen Schriften und 
Reflektionen (Meisenheim am Glan: Verlag Anton Hain KG, 1961}, pp. 333, 335 that Kant not only 
already subscribed to the formalism of the categorical imperative in the mid sixties, but that Kant 
always adhered to both the principle of an objective necessary end (which he made the 
foundation of the categorical moral imperatives in the Preisschrift) as well as the principle of 
universal valid conformity and that they stood in a correlation to each other-- a thesis wh ich , 1 
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In the part of the Lecture entitled "Of the Principle of Morality" Kant states: 
The subordination of our will to the rule of universally valid ends is the 
inner goodness and absolute perfection of the free empirical will, in which 
case it conforms with all ends . ... Thus, the moral goodness consists in 
the governance of our empirical will by rules by means of which all actions 
of my empirical will conform with each other in a universally valid manner. 
And such a rule which constitutes the principle of the possibility of the 
conformity of all empirical will, is the moral rule .45 
Kant expresses a similar view of the correlation of universal rule and objective 
ends in his Lecture on Rational Theology where he states that morality consists 
in rules which make it possible that "the ends of all rational beings make up a 
system."46 For our purpose we are only interested in those actions which are 
directed to ourselves, not to others. In other words, we are concerned with duties 
to oneself--more specifically, with perfect duties to oneself--and want to 
understand their relationship to universally valid ends. In the Chapter on "Duties" 
the importance of the duties to oneself was already stressed. Kant states in this 
Lecture that "the duties to oneself are independent of all advantages and 
concern only the dignity of humanity."47 They constitute the "principal condition 
believe, finds support in Kant's argument against self-murder in the Lecture on Moral Philosophy. 
On the question of formalism see also Schmucker's "Der Formalismus und die materialen 
Zweckprinzipien in der Ethik Kants," in Kant und die Scholastik Heute, ed. Johannes B. Lotz 
(Pullach bei MOnchen: Verlag Berchmanskolleg, 1955), pp. 155-205. 
45MC 257: "Die Unterordnung unsers Willens unter die Regel allgemein gOitiger Zwecke ist die 
innere Bonitaet und absolute Vollkommenheit der freien WillkOhr, denn stimmt sie mit allen 
Zwecken Oberein .... Die moralische Bonitaet ist also die Regierung unserer WillkOhr durch 
Regeln, wodurch aile Handlungen meiner WillkOhr allgemein gOitig Obereinstimmen. Und seiche 
Regel die das Principium der Moglichkeit der Uebereinstimmung aller freien WillkOhr ist, ist die 
moralische Regei."--See Schmucker (1961) 317, 322. 
46Danziger Rationaltheologie, val. 28.2,2 page 1304: "Moralist lnbegriff der Regeln , nach welchen 
es moglich ist, dar:!. die Zwecke aller vernonftigen Wesen ein System ausmachen." See also 
footnote no 156. 
47MC 343: "Die Pflichten gegen sich selbst aber sind unabhangig von allen Vortheilen , und gehn 
nur auf die WOrde der Menschheit." It seems that the duties to oneself in the Lecture on Moral 
Philosophy only comprise negative duties and not positive duties as is the case in the later 
Lectures and works. MC 347: "Die Pflichten gegen unse selbst sind negativ, und restringiren 
unsre Freyheit in Ansehung der Neigungen, die auf unser Wohlbefinden gerichtet sind." 
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and the principle of all of morals, since the worth of the person constitutes the 
moral worth ; the value of skill concerns only one's state."4B Kant identifies the 
inner worth of the world or the summum bonum with freedom. This freedom, if it 
is not restricted , is the cause of vices such as crimina carni contra naturam and 
self-murder.49 In order for freedom not to become destructive, it must be 
restricted by objective rules similar to the rules which govern natural events and 
actions. 
According to the Lecture, events or actions in nature as well as moral 
actions follow rules. Animals act according to rules because they are not free ; 
they are determined by stimuli by bruta necessitas. But their inclinations are 
determined by an inner subjectively necessitating reason or principle so that their 
actions conform to a rule. While the behavior of animals conforms to rules 
because they are not free, free beings can only act according to rules because 
they restrict their freedom. 
The condition under which freedom is restricted is the universal law to 
"proceed in such a way, that in all your actions regularity prevails." "And what 
then," Kant asks, "will that be which with regard to myself ought to restrict 
freedom?" He answers: 
This is: not to follow the inclinations. The original rule , according to which I 
should restrict freedom is the conformity of free conduct with the essential 
ends of humanity. I will therefore not follow the inclinations, but subsume 
them under a rule. He who subjects his person to the inclinations, acts 
48MC 344: "Die Pflichten gegen sich selbst sind die oberste Bedingung und das principium aller 
Sittlichkeit, denn der Werth der Person macht den moralischen Werth aus; der Werth der 
Geschicklichkeit beziehet sich nur auf seinen Zustand." 
49MC 346f: "Es ist also die Freyheit der Grund des entsetzlichsten Lasters, indem sich sich vieles 
erkOnsteln kann , um ihre Neigung zu befriedigen, z. E. ein crimen carnis contra naturam, so wie 
sie auch ein Grund der Tugend ist, die die Menschheit ehrt. Ein ige Verbrechen und Laster die aus 
der Freyheit entspringen, bringen Grausen hervor, als der Selbstmord, andere Ekel , ja auch so 
gar schon dann , wenn man sie blor., nennt." 
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contrary to the essential end of humanity, since, as a free agent he must 
not be subjected to inclinations but should determine them through 
freedom; since, if he is free, he must have a rule; this rule is the essential 
end of humanity. 50 
According to this quote, Kant uses the terms "essential ends" (Plural) and 
"essential end" (Singular) and refers to it in the first case as a a standard for free 
action and in the second case as a rule. He argues that the restriction of freedom 
is guaranteed by not following one's inclinations but subjecting them to the rule 
of freedom. In short, according to this quote the essential ends of humanity 
consist in self-determination. Given the similarity of the content of this quote and 
the previous one which formulates the principle of morality, I believe that we are 
justified in assuming that the essential ends of humanity are identical with the 
universally valid ends. 
Kant applies the "original" rule of the restriction of freedom to actions 
directed to human beings themselves. The principal rule of freedom is: 
To proceed with all actions with regard to oneself in such a way that the 
entire use of the powers together with the most extensive [or "greatest"] 
use of the same is possible. For example, if I have drunk too much today, 
I am powerless [ohnmachtig] to make use of my freedom [and] of my 
powers; or [if] I murder myself, I likewise deprive myself of the capacity to 
use the same. Thus, it is contrary to the most extensive use of freedom, 
that it as the supreme principle of life should terminate itself and all its 
use.51 
50MC 345/MM 1483: "Dieses ist: den Neigungen nicht zu folgen . Die ursprOngliche Regel , nach 
der ich die Freyheit restringiren soli ist die Uebereinstimmung des freyen Verhaltens mit den 
wesentlichen Zwecken der Menschheit. lch werde also nicht den Neigungen folgen, sondern sie 
unter eine Regel bringen. Wer seine Person den Neigungen unterwirft, der handelt wider den 
wesenlichen Zweck der Menschheit, denn als ein freyhandelndes Wesen mu~ er nicht den 
Neigungen unterworfen seyn , sondern er soli sie durch Freyheit bestimmen; denn wenn er frey ist, 
so mu~ er eine Regel haben; diese Regel ist aber der wesentliche Zweck der Menschheit." 
51 MC 346: "lhre [der Freiheit] oberste Regel ist: In allen Handlungen in Ansehung seiner selbst so 
zu verfahren, da~ aller Gebrauch der Krafte mit dem gro~ten Gebrauch derselben moglich ist, z. 
E. habe ich heute zu viel getrunken , so bin ich ohnmachtig , mich meiner Freyheit, meiner Krafte 
zu bedienen, oder bringe ich mich selbst um, so nehme ich mir gleichfalls das Vermogen des 
The goal of perfect duties to oneself is to secure the greatest possible use of 
freedom without allowing freedom to be subservient to one's inclinations: 
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The conditions according to which alone the greatest use of freedom is 
possible and according to which it [freedom] is in conformity with itself, are 
the essential ends of humanity; to these freedom must conform. The 
principle of all duties is therefore the conformity of the use of freedom with 
the essential ends of humanity. s2 
Kant identifies the essential ends with the conditions which allow for the greatest 
use of freedom. Hence, when he states that the "principle of all duties"53 consists 
in the conformity of the use of freedom with the essential ends of humanity, he is 
saying that it consists in using one's freedom in accordance with the conditions 
which allow for the greatest use of freedom. 
This quote seems to anticipate the formula of the categorical Imperative in 
the Groundwork as well as Kant's characterization of humanity in The 
Metaphysics of Morals as the capacity to set oneself any end whatsoever which 
includes the duty to procure and promote the "capacity to realize all sorts of 
possible ends." The essential ends of humanity forbid those actions which make 
the ends which are at the same time duties, impossible. They are what Kant calls 
in the Vorarbeiten "negative ends." They represent a formal moral54 principle 
which requires us to make our actions consistent with our status as autonomous 
beings or ends in themselves--a status which requires each person to treat 
Gebrauchs derselben. Es streitet dieses, also mit dem gror..ten Gebrauch der Freyheit, dar.. sie als 
das hochste principium des Lebens sich selbst und allen ihren Gebrauch aufhebe." 
52MC 346: "Die Bedingungen unter denen nur allein der gror..te Gebrauch der Freyheit moglich ist 
und unter welchen sie mit sich selbst Ubereinstimmen kann, sind die wesentlichen Zwecke der 
Menschheit. Mit diesen mur.. die Freiheit Ubereinstimmen. Das principium aller Pflichten is also 
die Uebereinstimmung des Gebrauchs der Freyheit mit den wesentlichen Zwecken der 
Menschheit." 
53Kant does not use the term "categorical imperative." 
54MC 347: "Es mur.. dahero ein principium sein , dar.. die Menschen ihre Freyheit restringiren, 
damit er sich selbst nicht widerstreite, und dieses principium ist moralisch." 
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herself as an end in herself and not as a means. 55 Whenever a person disposes 
over herself as a thing , as is the case if she sells members of her body for 
money, indulges in bodily vices or murders herself, 56 she chooses to let herself 
be determined by inclinations and does not allow for the "greatest use of 
freedom."57 This, however, is contrary to the end of humanity because it 
contradicts his status as autonomous being. All of Kant's examples which he 
uses to illustrate the above principle are negative duties to oneself which restrict 
freedom with regard to those inclinations concerned with our well-being 
("Wohlbefinden").sa The "principle of all duties" seems therefore identical with the 
principle of the duties to oneself: 
The principle of the duties to oneself does not consist in self-love 
["Selbstgunst"] but in self-respect ["Selbstschatzung"], that means that our 
actions have to conform to the dignity of humanity. One could here also 
use [an expression] from Law: neminem /aede therefore noli naturam 
humanam in te ipso /aedere. se 
A violation of human nature represents a violation of the dignity of humanity or 
the essential ends of humanity. 
To conclude: first, Kant characterizes a good will as a will which subjects 
itself to the rule of universally valid ends. We have identified these universally 
55Kant does not use the term "end in itself' but a similar expression: "the end because of which all 
means are." MC 343: "Es ist ganz widersinnig, da~ ein vernOnftiges Wesen, welches ein Zweck 
ist, warum aile Mittel sind, sich als ein Mittel gebrauche." 
56MC 346: "Wir wollen dieses in Beyspielen zeigen, z. B. der Mensch ist nicht befugt, fOr Geld 
seine Gliedma~en zu verkaufen , und wenn er auch fOr einen Finger 10 000 Thaler bekame, denn 
sonst konnte man dem Menschen aile Gliedma~en abkaufen." Compare the case of selling one's 
healthy teeth in MS 423. 
57We will return to the question of the "use" of freedom in the Chapter on "Belief of Reason." 
58MC 347: "Die Pflichten gegen uns selbst sind negativ, und restringiren unsre Freyheit in 
Ansehung der Neigungen, die auf unser Wohlbefinden gerichtet sind." 
59MC 347: "Das principium der Pflichten gegen sich selbst bestehet nicht in der Selbstgunst, 
sondern in der Selbstschatzung, das hei~t unsre Handlungen mo~en mit der WOrde der 
Menschheit Obereinstimmen. Man konnte auch hier sagen , so wie es beim Recht hei~t: neminem 
laede, also noli naturam humanam in te ipso laedere." 
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valid ends with the essential ends of humanity and have shown that they 
represent the conditions which allow for the greatest use of freedom . The 
essential ends do not allow us to treat ourselves as a means to an end, which is 
the case if we disable or destroy our capacity for freedom. Furthermore, we 
suggested that the "principle of all duties" which consists in the conformity of the 
use of freedom with the essential ends of humanity is identical with the principle 
of the duties to oneself. Both principles preserve the autonomy or dignity of the 
human being and require that we do not subject ourselves to the rule of our 
inclinations. Lastly, Kant's reference to the formula neminem laede which he 
interprets to mean that we ought not to harm our human nature anticipates 
Kant's prohibition in The Metaphysics of Morals that negative duties forbid one to 
act contrary to human nature. 
Second, adopting or "having a rule" and subjecting oneself to it seems to 
express Kant's view of humanity in The Metaphysics of Morals where Kant 
explains that the prerogative of human beings as moral beings is to act in 
accordance with principles. This prerogative is protected by the perfect duty to 
preserve oneself as a moral being which requires that the maxims of one's will 
should conform with the dignity of humanity in one's person .6o In the words of the 
Lecture this means that as moral beings we subject ourselves to the rule of the 
essential ends of humanity. 
Third, the principle of the essential ends of humanity combines the first 
two formulae of the categorical imperative discussed in the Groundwork: the 
formula of the universal rule of nature and the formula of the end in itself. 
60See footnote 12. 
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Fourth, in this lecture the universal governance of events in nature provides the 
model for the governance of free actions by universal rules. This view seems to 
anticipate Kant's characterization of the perfection of nature which can only be 
improved by further cultivating nature in adherence to the moral law. Nature is 
perfect with regard to universality or rules as well as the purposiveness it 
exhibits. In other words, universality and purposiveness constitute perfection . 
Both are constitutive elements in the principal rule of freedom, and it seems as if 
Kant wants to suggest that human beings can only improve natural perfection 
and realize the purposiveness of freedom by "mirroring" the aspect of the 
universality and purposiveness of nature. 51 This does not mean, as our 
discussion of the mottoes in The Metaphysics of Morals already indicated, that 
we should act according to laws of nature but according to the universality of its 
laws. 
Fifth , Kant argues that if animals follow their inclinations, inclinations 
cause orderly actions, but when human beings choose to follow their inclinations, 
the result is chaos. In the latter case they contradict the end of humanity in their 
person and their actions go counter to their personhood.62 Kant makes, however, 
61 1n this context the Reflexionen zur Logik, vol. 16, 768 footnote as well as page 769 are of 
interest: "Zum Exempel: was den Naturgesetzen gemc;lss ist, macht mich vollkommener, die 
Tugend ist den Naturgesetzen gemc;lss, also macht mich die Tugend vollkommener; was mich 
vollkommener macht, dazu bin ich verbunden, die Tugend macht mich vollkommener, also bin ich 
zu ihr verbunden", and: "Was mich vollkommmener macht, dazu bin ich verbunden; denn dar.. ist 
[die]( ... Regel der) Natur des freyen Willens. Nun macht mich die Tugend vollkommener, weil sie 
den gesetzen der Natur gemc;~r.. ist. Also bin ich zur Tugend verbunden." In Reflexionen zur 
Anthropologie, val. 15 II, no. 1263, 558 Kant states: "Die Hauptregel ist: die Natur ist Gut. ([index 
follows] denn sie dient zur Regel.) Was nun bestandig angetroffen wird , gehort zur Natur; also ist 
es gut) ."--ln the second main section of this Chapter we will see that it is not so much a question 
of mirroring but projecting and that, according to Kant, the purposiveness in nature is only 
possible because of the morality of the subject, that is, the purposiveness of freedom. 
62MC 345: "Bey den Thieren sind schon die Neigungen durch subjective neceP..iterende GrOnde 
bestimmt. Es kann daher unter ihnen keine Regellosigkeit statt finden . Folgt nun der Mensch frey 
seinen Neigungen , so ist er noch unter den Thieren, denn es entsteht bey ihm alsdenn eine 
unmistakably clear that the satisfaction of natural inclinations is not harmful. 
Whatever harm can be attributed to inclinations must be contributed to the 
"invention and use of freedom."63 Yet if inclinations in themselves are not 
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harmful, and if it is only the artificial satisfaction of these natural inclinations 
which can be harmful, then the rule not to follow one's inclinations appears in a 
different light. It seems then no longer intended to prevent the satisfaction of 
inclinations per se, but to prevent the danger free beings face when they try to 
satisfy these inclinations without subjecting them to a rule . In the latter case, it is 
not only possible that the whole of nature can be transformed,64 but that "without 
restriction human beings would destroy themselves."65 
Conclusion 
We started out to determine what Kant means when he says that negative 
duties "forbid man to act contrary to the end of his nature and so have to do 
merely with his moral self-preservation." We have now to decide which one of 
the candidates--end in itself, self-preservation, or perfection--Kant identifies with 
the end of human nature. Only after we have identified the end of human nature 
will we be able to state which end the self-murderer violates. 
Regellosigkeit, die bey den Thieren nicht ist. Es widerstreitet aber aldenn der Mensch den 
wesentlichen Zwecken der Menschheit in seiner Person, und handelt wider sich selbst." 
63MC 345: "Alles schadliche ist durch seine Erfindung und den Gebrauch seiner Freyheit, z. e. 
aile starke Getranke, und die vielerley Speisen fOr seinen Geschmack." A similar point is made by 
Kant when he discusses the vice of "unnatural" lust in MS 425. 
64MC 345f: "Wenn er nun seiner Neigung die er sich selbst ersonnen hat, ohne Regel folgt, so 
wird er der abscheulichste Gegenstand, indem er durch seine Freyheit um seine Neigungen zu 
befriedigen die ganze Natur umformen kann." 
65MC 347: "Weil wir Freyheit und Vermogen haben, unsre Neigungen durch allerhand 
Erfindungen zu befriedigen, so worden ohne Restriction die Menschen sich selbst zu Grunde 
richten." 
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I would like to start with a general observation regarding the end of human 
nature, the essential ends of humanity, as well as the right of humanity which we 
discussed in an earlier chapter. With the exception of Kant's illustration of the 
Formula of the Law of Nature in the Groundwork, all of Kant's arguments against 
self-murder, that is, his arguments that it violates the right of humanity, the 
essential ends of humanity, or the end of human nature either anticipate or use 
the second formula of the categorical imperative. According to this formula, we 
are not allowed to treat humanity in our own or someone else's person merely as 
a means. Since the duty to preserve oneself prohibits any action which would 
degrade the dignity of humanity which consists in the autonomy of the person , it 
aims at the preservation of the self as the creator of moral values and thus as an 
end in itself. All texts make clear that the self-murderer degrades the dignity of 
the human being as end in itself. Not resisting his inclinations to attain his 
subjective ends, he refuses to subject himself to a universal rule, that is , a rule 
which guarantees the integration of all ends consistent with that of the objective 
end. He therefore treats himself as a mere means and makes morality as the 
setting of moral values impossible. Thus the argument of the end in itself or the 
objective end combines the aspect of universality with that of purposiveness. 
I believe that these general observations already indicate to us that negative 
duties forbid one to act contrary to the status of the human being as an end in 
itself. Identifying the end of human nature with the status of the human being as 
an end in itself allows us to affirm that Kant uses the end of human nature in his 
argument against self-murder. We can now understand why Kant bases his 
argument against self-murder in the "Doctrine of Virtue" on the assumption that 
man is "bound to preserve his life simply by virtue of his quality as a person" 
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which entails the acknowledgment of the strict duty to preserve himself; he does 
so because it is the nature of the human being as a person to be an end in itself. 
We also understand the reason why he states: "disposing of oneself as a mere 
means to some discretionary end is debasing humanity in one's person;" it is 
because it means to make an objective end, that is, the end in itself impossible. 
But our discussion of The Metaphysics of Morals and the Vorarbeiten also 
suggests that negative duties forbid one to violate our status as ends in 
themselves with regard to the end of perfection . 
It strikes me as more than a coincidence that the prohibition against 
destroying one's animal and moral nature secures those conditions which are 
essential for the realization of ends which are at the same time our duty and thus 
for the creation of the highest good. To explain: by prohibiting actions contrary to 
the preservation of the species, the self, and one's health as well as inner 
freedom, the duty of self-preservation allows for the possibility of one's own 
perfection--the most important of which is moral perfection . Perfection of oneself, 
in turn, is necessary in order to fulfill the other end which is a duty, namely, the 
happiness of others. The realization of both ends constitutes the highest good or 
the awarding of happiness in proportion to one's worthiness to be happy. By 
protecting the physical and moral existence and thus the capacity to realize and 
set ends freely , perfect duties to oneself do not only protect the status of the 
human being as an end in itself, but in doing so they allow for imperfect duties to 
oneself (perfecting oneself) and others (contributing to happiness of others). 
Because of that, these duties constitute the necessary conditions for the 
possibility of the highest good--a possibility which the self-murderer makes 
impossible because he intentionally destroys his freedom. 
235 
My interpretation suggests that even though the duty of self-preservation 
prohibits one from violating the status of the human being as an end in itself, it 
does so in view of perfection. This explains why the German text does not only 
state "[negative] duties forbid man to act contrary to the end of his nature" as the 
English translation would have it, but "[negative duties] forbid man with regard to 
the end of his nature to act contrary to it." In other words, with regard to the end 
of perfection, perfect duties to oneself forbid one to act contrary to the dignity of 
humanity. Both of these aspects, the negative and formal one as well as the 
positive and material one are, it seems to me, part of the concept of an end in 
itself. 56 The first requires that we do not degrade the dignity of humanity and is 
concerned with "moral" self-preservation , and the second commands that we do 
not only cultivate our natural predispositions but develop a good will. 
According to my interpretation self-preservation is primarily concerned 
with the formal not with the material aspect of duties to oneself. 57 But it is this 
formal condition which provides the firm basis for the material condition of 
morality by removing all those obstacles which hinder the complete development 
of the human being as an end in itself. Once these obstacles are removed 
because we adhere to the negative duties, the way is free to focus on the 
material or positive ends which are at the same time duties: our own perfection 
and the promotion of the happiness of others. If my interpretation is correct, it 
would mean that the duty of self-preservation cannot be separated from the duty 
to perfect oneself. 58 Self-preservation must therefore be understood in the 
66See also the brief discussion in the first section of the Chapter on "Duties." 
67This interpretation is supported by Gregor (1963) 124. 
68See Chapter on "Duties" footnote no. 81 . 
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context of self-perfection; it must be viewed "with regard to" self-perfection .69 We 
could also say that the first step towards perfection is moral self-preservation or 
that moral self-preservation is the necessary condition for self-perfection. 
Furthermore, Kant would, I believe, argue that we cannot prohibit self-murder or 
self-mutilation if we do not believe that the ('positive') end of our nature is 
morality. Self-murder is prohibited because perfection is an end which is at the 
same time a dutyJD 
All of what we have said so far can be put into practice by applying it to 
the human being as a being characterized by feeling ("GefOhl") which can give 
rise to affects, and desire ("Begierde") which can give rise to passions.71 
Negative duties tell us which actions to omit and concern the "moral health" of 
the person. This is the reason why they fall under the principle "sustine et 
abstine," a motto we saw Kant also using in the VorarbeitenJ2 More specifically, 
these duties are concerned with the moral health because they entail the 
command that we do not let ourselves be governed by our feelings (affects) and 
inclinations, which, according to the Introduction to the "Doctrine of Virtue," is 
69We will see in the Second main Part of this Dissertation that this view is also held by Hans 
Ebeling. 
70The question is whether or not those who defend suicide as a right must hold that perfection is 
not the end of a rational being. In other words, can suicide only be defended as a right if perfection 
is not the end of a rational being? 
71See MS 408. 
72 1n the Vorarbeiten zur Tugendlehre, val. 23, 403 Kant goes so far as to identify the "Doctrine of 
Virtue" with the principle of "sustine et abstine": "Die Tugendlehre ist sustine abstine gerade 
wieder den Genu~ negativist kein Zweck sondern Mittel (GIOckseeligkeit [.)]"Interesting is in this 
regard also Kant's identification of dietetics and (practical) philosophy in the Loose Blatt Kuffner in 
Vorarbeiten zum Streit der Fakultaten, val. 23, 464: "Man sieht Ieicht, da~ die letztere [that is, 
dietetics] eigentlich eine P h i I o s o p h i e , d. i. eine Vernunfterkenntnis aus Begriffen und darauf 
gegrundeten stoischen Principien (sustine et abstine) sey und zwar eine (technische) p r a k t i-
s c he Philosophie sey, mithin ihrem Stoffe, den Empfindungen nach empirisch , der Form nach 
aber des Gebrauchs und der Anordnug derselben zu Erhaltung der Gesundheit ein Erkenntnis a 
priori (nicht die eines Empirikers) sey ... ". See also Immanuel Kant's Menschenkunde, pp. 259f, 
271 .--We will return to the topic of "health" and "healthy reason" in the Chapter on "Belief of 
Reason." 
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precisely what the duty of apathy commandsJ 3 Kant makes clear that we can 
only become the master of our feelings and inclinations if we govern ourselves, 
and that means if we are determined to act according to the moral law. Both 
elements together make up what Kant calls apathy as strength or virtue: 
The true strength of virtue is a tranquil mind with a considered and firm 
resolution to put the law of virtue into practice. That is the state of health 
in the moral life, whereas an affect, even one aroused by the thought of 
what is good, is a momentary, sparkling phenomenon that leaves one 
exhausted. 74 
Compliance with the negative duties to oneself is the necessary first step 
towards building a strong will , that is, a will which is not controlled by affects. 
Kant's view of virtue as moral strength of the will which can only be estimated "by 
the magnitude of the obstacles that man himself furnishes through his 
inclinations," shows that building a strong will or becoming a virtuous person 
means to, first, clear away or free the will from affects and vices7s in order to be 
able to, secondly, pursue those ends which are at the same time duties. 
The prohibition against degrading the dignity of humanity can , therefore , be 
understood as the prohibition to undermine the strength of the will by subjecting 
73MS 408: " ... namlich von seinen GefOhlen und Neigungeng sich nicht beherrschen zu lassen , 
(der Pflicht der A path i e) ... ". 
74Gregor 206 (MS 409; "Die wahre Starke der Tugend ist das G e m o t h i n R u h e mit einer 
Oberlegten und festen Entschlie~ung ihr Gesetz in AusObung zu bringen. Das ist der Zustand der 
G e s u n d h e i t im moralischen Leben; dagegen der Affect, selbst wenn er durch die Vorstel-
lung des G u t e n aufgeregt wird , eine augenblicklich glanzende Erscheinung ist, welche 
Mattigkeit h i nterla~t.") 
751 do not believe that Kant renders himself a service when he compares the task of striving for 
virtue as a fight: "The vices, the brood of dispositions opposing the law, are the monsters he has 
to fight" (Gregor 206/MS 405). Because when he suggests that we are like knights who cut off the 
heads of the dragon wh ich our own feel ings and inclinations produce, he suggests at the same 
time that becoming a virtuous person requires self-mutilation. But most of Kant's other texts 
suggest a more fitting analogy, namely that, rather than fighting our feelings and inclinations, it is a 
question of integrating them into a harmonious whole. 
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oneself to the dictates of one's inclinations, that is, one's desire.76 In short, the 
prohibition against degrading humanity can be understood as the prohibition to 
undermine the development of a good will. We will see in the Chapter on 
"Homicidium Dolosum" that the self-murderer, according to Kant, allows an affect 
or even a passion to govern himself and undermines the possibility of virtue. 
Natural Ends, Ends of Nature, and Ends of Reason 
We concluded the first section by saying that negative duties forbid one to act 
contrary to the status of the human being as an end in itself, but that they do so 
in view of the end of perfection. We turn now to the question why Kant in addition 
to his argument that self-murder destroys the subject of morality and thus the 
human being as an end in itself, finds it necessary to suggest that self-murder is 
contrary to nature's end of self-preservation. We want to understand the reason 
why Kant, in The Metaphysics of Morals, connects the characterization of human 
animality in terms of impulses through which nature strives to preserve the self 
and the species with the purpose or function of the duty to preserve oneself in 
one's animal nature. In other words, we want to understand the relationship 
between the ends of nature and the end of reason. 
We remember that actions contrary to nature's end are contrary to the 
duty to oneself and thus contrary to the status of the human being as an end in 
itself. Kant, however, does not explain why an obstruction of nature's end, in the 
case of self-murder the obstruction of the end of self-preservation, constitutes a 
violation of the duty to oneself and thus the destruction of personality. He does 
76Gregor 206 (MS 405: "Tugend ist also die moralische St~rke des Willens eines M e n s c h e n 
in Befolgung seiner P f I i c h t ... ". Ibid. : " .. . wozu aber, weil er [der Zwang] unwiderstehlich sein 
soli, St~rke erforderlich ist, deren Grad wir nur durch die Gror..e der Hindernisse, die der Mensch 
durch seine Neigungen sich selber schafft, schatzen konnen.") 
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not explain why it is only the destructive interference with the end of perfection or 
preservation and not the constructive interference which is contrary to the 
purposiveness of nature (the end of nature) and constitutes an interference with 
the purposiveness of freedom (the end of reason) . 
Unlike Mary Gregor, I do not assume that Kant uses the reference to 
nature as a device to explain the argument against self-murder to his 
contemporary readers, but because his philosophical system and his view of 
nature requires it. This much can be said already: in order to show that an 
interference with the ends of nature represents an interference with reason 
(freedom) , Kant must assume that the systems of nature and of reason 
(freedom) allow for a harmonious coexistence of their respective ends and are 
not antagonists.77 This does not mean that the ends of nature are identical with 
the ends of reason nor that the purposiveness of nature is identical with practical 
purposiveness/a it means, first, that the ends of practical reason can be realized 
in the world , and thus the moral law can be applied to the sensible world which in 
turn requires that the system of ends of nature does not conflict with the system 
of ends of reason ;79 and, secondly, that these two systems can be organized into 
a harmonious whole. so In other words, it must be possible to show that both the 
ends of nature as well as the ends of reason are both ends of one and the same 
reason, thus proving the unity of reason of which Kant speaks in the 
77See footnote no. 151 . 
78Compare KU 181 ; Ober den Gebrauch teleologischer Principien in der Philosophie, vol. 8, 182. 
79Th is corresponds to Kant's statement in GMS 424 that we must be able to "conceive" ("den ken") 
of the maxim of our actions as a universal law of nature. 
soThis corresponds to Kant's other statement in GMS 424 that we must be able to will ("wollen") 
that our maxims ought to become a universal law of nature. Compare MS 389 where Kant states 
that ethics adds to the formal principle "So act that the maxim of your action could become a 
universal law'' that "this principle is to be thought as the law of your own will and not of will in 
general, which could also be the will of others." I have added the italics of "will" missing in 
Gregor's translation , in order to adjust it to the version of the Academy Edition . 
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Groundwork.B1 1 hope that the following three sections on "Natural Ends," "Ends 
of Nature" as well as "Ends of Reason" will clarify these points. 
Natural End (Naturzweck) and Ends of Nature 
Kant speaks of "purposiveness arising from freedom" and the "purposiveness of 
nature."82 In the introduction to the Critique of Judgment he states: 
Now the concept of an object, so far as it contains the ground of the 
actuality of this object, is the end; and the agreement of a thing with that 
constitution of things which is only possible according to ends is called the 
purposiveness of its form. Thus the principle of judgment, in respect of the 
form of things of nature under empirical laws generally, is the 
purposiveness of nature in its variety. That is, nature is represented by 
means of this concept as if an understanding contained the ground of the 
unity of the variety of its empiricallaws.s3 
For the moment, we are concerned with the purposiveness of nature and turn to 
the "Critique of The Teleological Judgment."84 There Kant distinguishes between 
a subjective and an objective purposiveness. It is the material as opposed to the 
intellectual objective purposiveness to which we turn. Material purposiveness is 
either a relative or outer purposiveness, or an inner purposiveness. The former 
81 GMS 391 : " ... theils erfordere ich zur Kritik einer rein en praktischen Vernunft, dar.., wenn sie 
vollendet sein soli, ihre Einheit mit der speculativen in einem gemeinschaftlichen Princip zugleich 
musse dargestellt werden konnen , weil es doch am Ende nur eine und dieselbe Vernuft sein 
kann, die blor.. in der Anwendung unterschieden sein mur..." 
82Greene/Hudson 5 (RGV 5: "Zweckmar.!.igkeit aus Freiheit", "Zweckmar.!.igkeit in der Natur.") 
83Sernard 17. Throughout the quotes, I have replaced Bernard's translation of "Zweck" 
("purpose") with that of "end ." (KU 180 (XXVII): "Weil nun der Begriff von einem Object, sofern er 
zugleich den Grund der Wirklichkeit dieses Objects enthalt, der Z w e c k und die 
Obereinstimmung eines Dinges mit derjenigen Beschaffenheit der Dinge, die nur nach Zwecken 
moglich ist, die Z we c k m a s s i g k e i t der Form desselben heir.!.t: so ist das Princip der 
Urtheilskraft in Ansehung der Form der Dinge der Natur unter empirischen Gesetzen uberhaupt 
die Z we c k m a s s i g k e i t d e r N a t u r in ihrer Mannigfaltigkeit. D. i. die Natur wird durch 
diesen Beg iff so vorgestellt, als ob ein Verstand den Grund der Einheit des Mannigfaltigen ihrer 
empirischen Gesetze enthalte." 
841n the following , I adopt Giorgio Tonelli's analysis of the term "purposiveness" in his article "Von 
den verschiedenen Bedeutungen des Wortes Zweckmassigkeit in der Kritik der Urteilskraft," Kant-
Studien 49 (1957/1958): 162ft. 
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purposiveness is called "utility (for man) or mere advantage (for other creatures)" 
and Kant also refers to it as an "end of nature." The latter--inner purposiveness--
is the natural perfection of an organized being whose analogue is the living 
being. 
Kant introduces the term "natural end" in order to make teleological 
judgments of organic nature and thus the explanation of otherwise inexplicable 
phenomena possible. His assumption is that the existence and the behavior of 
organisms cannot be explained with the help of mechanical laws because their 
very being resists the description in terms of cause and effect. as Teleology as a 
method to judge nature is a way to guide the investigation of nature and to 
satisfy reason's need for a systematic view of nature. Kant, stresses, however, 
that the concept of a natural end is neither constitutive for the understanding nor 
for reason, but is only a regulative concept for the reflective judgment.86 
In order to qualify as a natural end, a thing must fulfill two requirements: 
For a thing to be a natural end, in the first place it is requisite that its parts 
(as regards their presence and their form) are only possible through their 
reference to the whole. For the thing itself is an end, and so is 
comprehended under a concept or an idea which must determine a priori 
all that is to be contained in it. a? 
85KU 400: "Es ist namlich ganz gewir.., dar.. wir die organisirten Wesen und deren innere 
M6glichkeit nach blor.. mechanischen Principien der Natur nicht einmal zureichend kennen lernen, 
viel weniger uns erklaren k6nnen; und zwar so gewir.., dar.. man dreist sagen kann: es ist fOr 
Menschen ungereimt, auch nur einen solchen Anschlag zu fassen, oder zu hoffen, dar.. noch etwa 
dereinst ein Newton aufstehen k6nne, der auch nur die Erzeugung eines Grashalms nach 
Naturgesetzen, die keine Absicht geordnet hat, begreiflich machen werde; sondern man mur.. 
diese Einsicht den Menschen schlechterdings absprechen." 
86KU 375: "Der Begriff eines Dinges, als an sich Naturzwecks, ist also kein constitutiver Begriff 
des Verstandes oder der Vernunft, kann aber doch ein regulativer Beg riff fOr die reflectirende 
Urtheilskraft sein, nach einer entfernten Analogie mit unserer Causalitat nach Zwecken Oberhaupt 
die Nachforschung Ober Gegenstande dieser Art zu leiten und Ober ihren obersten Grund 
nachzudenken ... ". 
87Bernard 219. Since I translate "Naturzweck" with "natural end" and not as Bernard with "natural 
purpose" I have changed his translation when necessary. (KU 373: "Zu einem Dinge als 
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Since works of art would also satisfy this first condition, it is necessary to add a 
second one, namely: 
... that its [the natural product's] parts should so combine in the unity of a 
whole that they are reciprocally cause and effect of each other's form. 
Only in this way can the idea of the whole conversely (reciprocally) 
determine the form and combination of all the parts, not indeed as cause--
for then it would be an artificial product--but as the ground of cognition, for 
him who is judging it, of the systematic unity and combination of all the 
manifold contained in the given material.ss 
In order for a product of nature to be possible as natural end, it cannot be 
understood as a work of an artist whose idea of the whole determines the 
arrangement of its parts. Rather, the arrangement or form of the whole must be 
the result of the interaction between the parts of the natural product, and thus be 
independent from the causality of human concepts. Because only if the parts 
themselves determine the form of the whole can the idea of the whole determine 
the form and arrangement of the parts. In other words, only if we assume that 
the parts reciprocally determine their form can we judge the natural product as 
something that is only possible as a natural end. 
The above two conditions are satisfied by organisms which can only be 
thought as possible as ends of nature.s9 They possess an "internal natural 
perfection" which is not analogous to "any causality we know" and thus cannot 
Naturzweck wird nun e r s t I i c h erfordert, dar.. die Theile (ihrem Dasein und der Form nach) 
nur durch ihre Beziehung auf das Ganze moglich sind. Denn das Ding selbst ist ein Zweck, 
folglich unter einem Begriffe oder einer Idee befar..t, die alles, was in ihm enthalten sein soli , a 
priori bestimmen mur... ") 
sssernard 219f (KU 373: " ... dar.. die Theile desselben sich dadurch zur Einheit eines Ganzen 
verbinden, dar.. sie von einander wechselseitig Ursache und Wirkung ihrer Form sind. Denn auf 
solche Weise ist es allein moglich, dar.. umgekehrt (wechselseitig) die Idee des Ganzen wiederum 
die Form und Verbindung aller Theile bestimme: nicht als Ursache -- denn da ware es ein 
Kunstproduct --, sondern als Erkenntnisgrund der systematischen Einheit der Form und 
Verbindung alles Mannigfaltigen, was in der gegebenen Materie enthalten ist, fOr den, der es 
beu rtheilt. ") 
89KU 375. Here Kant uses the term "Zwecke der Natur" to refer to organisms. 
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be explained in terms of either mechanics or art. so A product of nature shares 
with a product of art that its parts exist for the sake of the other parts as well a 
the whole. But the essential difference between the two is that the parts of the 
product of nature are "all organs reciprocally producing one another," and it is 
only because such a product is an "o r g a n i z e d and s e I f - o r g a n i -
z i n g be i n g" that it can be called a "natural end." Thus, an organism is a 
natural end because it is not only organized but self-organizing .s1 
Shortly before Kant gives his definition of a natural end , he uses the 
example of a tree to illustrate its meaning: First, a tree does not only generate 
another tree according to a law of reproduction, but by doing so produces itself 
generically and thus also preserves itself generically. Second, a tree produces 
itself as an individual because it grows. Third, a part of the tree generates itself in 
such a way that the preservation of one part depends on that of the others and 
vice versa. The example shows that an organized being not only preserves itself 
as an individual or species, but that its parts by preserving each other, preserve 
the whole. 
The capacity92 of the tree to preserve itself as species, as individual , and 
the capacity of its parts to preserve the whole organism corresponds to Kant's 
90Bernard 221 (KU 375 : "Genau zu reden, hat also die Organisation der Natur nichts 
Analogisches mit irgend einer Causalit~t . die wir kennen* .... Aber I n n e r e N a t u r v o II -
k o m m e n h e i t , wie sie diejenigen Dinge besitzen, welche nur als N a t u r z w e c k e 
moglich sind und darum organisirte Wesen hei~en , ist nach keiner Analogie irgend eines uns 
bekannten physischen, d. i. Naturvermogens, ja, da wir selbst zur Natur im weitesten Verstande 
gehbren, selbst nicht einmal durch eine genau angemessene Analogie mit menschlicher Kunst 
denkbar." 
91 Bernard 220 (KU 37 4 : " ... sondern als ein die andern Theile (folglich jeder den andern 
wechselseitig ) her v orb ring end e s Organ , dergleichen kein Werkzeug der Kunst, sondern 
nur der allen Stoff zu Werkzeugen (selbst denen der Kunst) liefernden Natur sein kann: und nur 
dann und darum [he is referring to the reciprocal production] wird ein solches Product, als 
o r g a n i s i r t e s und s i c h s e I b s t o r g a n i s i r e n d e s Wesen, ein N a t u r z we c k 
genannt werden kbnnen.") "Wesen" is not italicized in the Academy Edition. 
characterization of the animality of the human being in The Metaphysics of 
Morals by impulses through which 
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nature aims at a) his self-preservation, b) the preservation of the species, 
and c) the preservation of his capacity to enjoy life, though still on the 
animal level only.93 
Thus, both the tree and the human being as an animal being are natural ends 
which as organized and self-organizing beings preserve themselves as 
individuals and as species.94 Furthermore, Kant states that the concept of a 
natural end as exemplified in an organism leads us to the idea of the whole of 
nature as a system according to the rule of ends. 95 This view of the 
purposiveness of nature as a whole is also expressed in what Kant calls in the 
Critique of Judgment "fundamental propositions" or maxims of judgment which 
we use when we investigate nature. Examples of these propositions are "nothing 
in the world is in vain,"96 but "everything is good for something"97 as well as: 
921 use the neutral term "capacity ," since I do not want to enter the debate on Kant's vitalism. 
Suffice it to say that Kant corresponded with the biologist Blumenbach who held a vitalistic 
position, and whose book Ueber den Bildungstrieb Kant held in high regard and mentions in the 
Critique of Judgment. See KU 424 and Briefe, val. 11, no. 438 and 449. See also note and 
references in val. 15 II , 924f. 
93Gregor 216 (MS 420: "Da sind nun die Antriebe der Natur, was die Thierheit des Menschen 
betrifft, a) der, durch welchen die Natur die Erhaltung seiner selbst, b) die Erhaltung der Art, c) die 
Erhaltung seines Vermogens zum angenehmen, aber doch nur thierischen Lebensgenul1 
beabsichtigt.") 
94KU 371 . 
95KU 379. This means, according to Wolfgang Bartuschat's Zum systematischen Ort von Kants 
Kritik der Urteilskraft (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1972), p. 187 "dal1 die Moglichkeit 
des Natuzwecks mit Notwendigkeit zur Annahme eines Zwecks der Natur fOhrt." (" ... the 
possibility of a natural end leads necessarily to the postulate of an end of nature.") 
96A similar statement is found in Metaphysik Dohna, val. 28, 687: "Nichts ist umsonst --dies ist 
der Grundsatz -- Die Zwecke der Organisation sollen in diesem Leben oder in einem zukOnftigen 
erfOIIt werden." 
97Bernard 288 (KU 437) . In Metaphysik K 3, val. 29, 1006 Kant states: "Denkt man sich aber die 
Welt als PMnomen, mithin die Dinge im Raum und Zeit als ihren reellen Verhaltnissen, wozu sie 
gegen einander stehen mossen , so lassen sich folgende vier Prinzipien festsetzen , unter welchen 
man sich die Bestimmungen der Welt den ken mul1: In mundo non datur 1. abyssus, 2. saltus, 3. 
casus (blindes Ungefahr), fatum (blinde Nothwendigkeit)." --Number "4" before "fatum" is missing. 
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Nature takes the shortest way (lex parsimoniae); at the same time it 
makes no leaps, either in the course of its changes or in the juxtaposition 
of specifically different forms (lex continui in natura); its great variety in 
empirical laws is yet unity under a few principles (principia praeter 
necessitatem non sunt multiplicanda).9B 
Nature like the individual organism represents a self-creating99 and self-
preserving system.1oo It organizes itself according to the demands of self-
preservation.1o1 Following the Principle of Teleology we "judge nothing in an 
organized being as unpurposive which maintains [erhalt] it in its propagation."102 
Since human beings as organisms are part of nature, the characterization of 
nature as a whole must also apply to the part. 103 In the "Doctrine of Virtue" Kant 
explains the term "natural end" in the article "On defiling Oneself by Lust" as 
follows: 
98Bernard 18 (KU 182: "Die Natur nimmt den kOrzesten Weg (/ex parsimoniae) ; sie thut 
gleichwohl keinen Sprung weder in der Folge ihrer Veranderungen, noch der Zusammenstellung 
specifisch verschiedener Formen (lex continui in natura) ; ihre gror..e Mannigfaltigkeit in 
empirischen Gesetzen ist gleichwohl Einheit unter wenigen Principien (principia praeter 
necessitatem non sunt multiplicanda).") See also Idee zu einer allgemeinen Geschichte in 
weltborgerlicher Absicht vol. 8, 19 and KrV B 425. 
99KU 424. 
100in Reflexionen zur Anthropologie, vol. 15 I, no. 430, 174 Kant states: "3. Arzneykunde. Die 
Natur im Ganzen erhalt sich , und die Gattung wachst biOhend fort." Given this principle of 
preservation and healthy growth in nature, Kant assumes that the human body must be able to 
restore its health on its own. He speaks of "self-help" ("SelbsthOife") . 
101KU 374: "Sie [die Natur] organisirt sich vielmehr selbst und in jeder Species ihrer organisirten 
Producte, zwar nach einerlei Exemplar im Ganzen, aber doch auch mit schicklichen 
Abweichungen, die die Selbsterhaltung nach den Umstanden erfordert." In KU 420 Kant speaks of 
a "purposive predisposition for the self-preservation of the species": "Selbst, was die Veranderung 
betrifft, welcher gewisse lndividuen der organisirten Gattungen zufalligerweise unterworfen 
werden , wenn man findet, dar.. ihr so abgeanderter Charakter erblich und in die Zeugungskraft 
aufgenommen wird , so kann sie nicht fOglich anders denn als gelegentliche Entwickelung einer in 
der Species urspronglich vorhandenen zweckmal1igen Anlage zur Selbsterhaltung der Art 
beurtheilt werden .. . ". 
102Bernard 269 (KU 420: " .. . das Princip der Teleologie: in einem organisirten Wesen nichts von 
dem, was sich in der Fortpflanzung desselben erhalt, als unzweckmar..ig zu beurtheilen ... ".). 
1 031n Danziger Rationaltheologie vol. 28.2,2 page 1301 Kant states: "Es ist ein Grundsatz bei 
allen Philosophen , dar.. sie bei allen organisierten Korpern alles , was einer Spezies immer 
anhangt, fOr zweckmal1ig halten, wenn wir auch den Zweck nicht einsehen .. .. Die Maxi me, die bei 
organisirten Korpern gilt, gilt auch von der ganzen Natur." 
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Just as love of life is destined by nature to preserve the person, sexual 
love is destined by it to preserve the species; in other words, each of 
these is a natural end, by which is understood that connection of a cause 
with an effect in which , although no understanding is ascribed to the 
cause, it is still thought by analogy with an intelligent cause, and so as if it 
produced men on purpose.104 
According to this quote we can either characterize a natural end as a cause-
effect relationship in which the effect is intended by the cause, or as a product 
intended by the cause. The two views complement each other since the 
relationship can be understood as a product, and the product can be understood 
as a relationship. With regard to Kant's example this means that either the 
causal relationship between love of life (or sexual love) and the preservation of 
the person (or the species) is regarded as a "natural end" or the person itself. 
Because "love of life" and "sexual love" are viewed as if they preserve the 
person or the species intentionally, Kant can be said to state an analogy 
between the effects caused by an impulse and the ends willed by an intelligent 
being. 
The above characterization of a natural end covers only part of the 
definition given in the Critique of Judgment. Kant mentions the aspects of 
directed causation (intention or end) and the analogy between the impulse and 
understanding, but neither refers to the idea of the whole as the ground of 
cognition nor mentions explicitly that the parts of the natural end reciprocally 
produce each other. 
104Gregor 220 (MS 424: "So wie die Liebe zum Leben von der Natur zur Erhaltung der Per-
s o n , so ist die Liebe zum Geschlecht von ihr zur Erhaltung der A r t bestimmt; d. i. eine jede 
von beiden ist Nat u r z we c k , unter welchem man diejenige VerknOpfung der Ursache mit 
einer Wirkung versteht, in welcher jene, auch ohne ihr dazu einen Verstand beizulegen, diese 
doch nach der Analogie mit einem solchen , also gleichsam absichtlich Menschen hervorbringend 
gedacht wird .") I have added the first two missing italics to Gregor's translation . Gregor (1963) 133 
also refers to th is passage. 
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To conclude: The human being as a living being is a natural end or a product of 
nature which is an organized and self-organizing being. We are told that natural 
ends possess an inner perfection which cannot be explained in terms of any 
causation we know. It seems to be this inner perfection which Kant addresses in 
the motto "preserve yourself in the perfection of your nature. "As products of 
nature, that is, as beings which can only be thought of as natural ends, human 
beings are perfect. This view of perfection of the natural product and its parts to 
which Kant refers as organs because of their ability to reciprocally produce each 
other finds its expression in his description of partial self-murder: 
To deprive oneself of an integral part or organ (to maim oneself)-- for 
example, to give away or sell a tooth to be transplanted into another's 
mouth, or to have oneself castrated in order to get an easier livelihood as 
a singer, and so forth -- are ways of partially murdering oneself. But to 
have a dead or diseased organ amputated when it endangers one's life, 
or to have something cut off that is a part but not an organ of the body, for 
example, one's hair, cannot be counted as crime against one's own 
person -- although cutting one's hair in order to sell it is not altogether free 
from blame.1o5 
The above quote illustrates how a person who interferes with his body as a 
natural end uses himself as a means. We find in this quote the same correlation 
which was already mentioned in the first main section of this chapter that 
whatever is contrary to the natural end is contrary to the duty to oneself. It is 
important to stress that as soon as the parts of the body can no longer function 
as organs, that is, are no longer productive parts of the living organism, either 
105Gregor 219 (MS 423: "Sich eines integrirenden Theils als Organs berauben (verstommeln) , 
z. B. einen Zahn zu verschenken oder zu verkaufen , um ihn in die Kinnlade eines andern zu 
pflanzen, oder die Castration mir sich vornehmen zu lassen , um als Sanger bequemer Ieben zu 
konnen , u. dgl. gehort zum partialen Selbstmorde; aber nicht ein abgestorbenes oder die 
Absterbung drohendes und hiemit dem Leben nachtheiliges Organ durch Amputation , oder, was 
zwar ein Theil , aber kein Organ des Korpers ist, z. E. die Haare, sich abnehmen zu lassen, kann 
zum Verbrechen an seiner eigenen Person gerechnet werden ; wiewohl der letztere Fall nicht ganz 
schuldfrei ist, wenn er zum aur..eren Erwerb beabsichtigt wird. ") 
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because they stop working or because they endanger the life of the organism, 
they can be removed . In the first case this removal does not interfere with a 
natural end but with a dead part of the body, and in the second case the removal 
serves to preserve life.1os 
Ends of Nature 
We already indicated that the term "natural end" characterizes living beings or 
organisms such as plants, animals, or human beings as self-producing , self-
preserving , and self-regulating systems. It is a term which allows us to 
investigate living beings, to make them the object of sciences like biology and 
medicine, without constituting them as objects. We already encountered some 
instances where Kant uses the term "natural end" interchangeably with the 
expression "end of nature."107 According to the Third Critique, the former term 
was designed to judge organisms; whereas the term "end of nature" does not 
necessarily refer to an entity such as an organism but is most often used by Kant 
to indicate the essence or main purpose, such as preservation, or perfection 
(cultivation) intended by nature.1oa Kant speaks of the end of nature with regard 
to, for example, animality, humanity, the human being, 1o9 philosophy, 110 and 
reason. Unlike a natural end which constitutes an autonomous biological system, 
106The case of preserving life by removing those parts of the body which threaten its continuing 
existence must be distinguished from cases where one endangers life in order to preserve it. See 
the example of smallpox inoculation in the Chapter on "Casuistical Questions." 
107See footnote no. 27; MS 425. In KU 430 he states for example: " ... so worde doch, was der 
Mensch unter GIOckseligkeit versteht, und was in der That sein eigener letzter Naturzweck (nicht 
Zweck der Freiheit) ist ... ". RGV 26f. 
108Compare also Kant's definition of relative purposiveness of nature in KU 367. 
1 09See body of text. 
11 0Verk0ndigung des nahen Abschlusses eines Tractats zum ewigen Frieden in der Philosophie, 
vol. 8, 417. 
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an end of nature is an effect which nature, understood as a conscious power, 
strives to realize in the various parts of its creations. 111 
In Idee zu einer allgemeinen Geschichte in weltbilrgerlicher Absicht Kant 
tries to detect in the chaos of human behavior an intention of nature which can 
serve as the guideline for human history. Three of the nine propositions which 
characterize this intention, are of interest for our discussion. The first proposition 
states that 
... all natural predispositions of a creature are 
d e s i g n e d t o u n f o I d ["auswickeln"] t h e m s e I v e s 
completely and in accordance with their end 
["zweckma~ig"]. 112 
The second points out that those natural predispositions of the human being 
which concern the use of reason are designed to "completely develop 
["entwickeln"] themselves only in the species, but not in the individual."113 Kant 
believes that the immortal species can progress to the point of perfection whose 
1111 do in no way attempt to give an exhaustive analysis of Kant's use of the terms "end of nature" 
and "natural end," but try to present a distinction sufficient for the purposes of this Chapter. 
112Jdee zu eine al/gemeinen Geschichte in weltbOrgerlicher Absicht, vol. 8, 18: "A II e N at u r-
anlagen eines Geschopfes sind bestimmt , sich einmal vall-
s t ~ n dig u n d z we c k m ~ ~ i g au s z u w i ck e In." 
1131bid.: "Am Menschen (als dem einzigen vernOnftigen Geschopf auf Erden) so II ten sic h 
diejenigen Naturanlagen, die auf den Gebrauch seiner Vernunft 
abgezielt sind , nur in der Gattung , nicht aber im Individuum voll 
standi g en t wick e I n."--See also Kant's Padagogik, vol. 9, 445 and ApH 324. In one of the 
Reflexionen zur Anthropo/ogie, val. 15 II , no. 1521 , 887, Kant states that whereas the purpose of 
the animal species can be reached by the individual animal; the purpose of the human species 
(perfection) cannot be reached by the individual. Even though human beings are endowed with 
the predisposition for perfection, its development is artificial , that is, the result of "the work of the 
human being," and can therefore only be accomplished by the species.--The view that the 
individual human being cannot accomplish the end of the species could be the reason why Kant 
states in MS 425 that sexual love is more important than the love of life since the former 
preserves not only the individual but the species: "Denn sie bewirkt alsdann eine Begierde wider 
den Zweck der Natur und zwar einen noch wichtigern, als selbst der der Liebe zum Leben ist, weil 
dieser nur auf Erhaltung des Individuum, jener aber auf die der ganzen Species abzielt." From this 
quote it can, however, not be concluded that therefore the duty to preserve the species is more 
important than the duty to preserve the self. 
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accomplishment is denied to the class of rational beings.1 14 This "p r o g res s 
toward perfection" is, according to Muthma/3/icher Anfang der Menschen-
geschichte, the purpose of the species.115 The third proposition explains that 
nature has "willed" that all those activities which cannot be performed on the 
basis of the "mechanical arrangement of his animal existence," that is, as 
instinctive actions, 116 shall be the result of the human beings own reason. 117 
Furthermore, he makes clear that the human being is only to partake in the 
happiness and perfection which "he procured for himself independent from 
instinct by means of his own reason."11a 
In the same text Kant distinguishes between two predispositions: the 
predisposition of humanity as an animal species with the end to preserve the 
species and the predisposition of humanity as moral species with the end of 
1141dee zu einer allgemeinen Geschichte in weltbOrgerlicher Absicht, vol. 8, 20: "AIIein so 
rathselhaft dieses auch ist [that the fruits labored for by the previous generation profit only the 
next generation] , so nothwendig ist es doch zugleich , wenn man einmal annimmt: eine 
Thiergattung soli Vernunft haben und als Klasse vernonftiger Wesen, die insgesammt sterben , 
deren Gattung aber unsterblich ist, dennoch zu einer Vollstandigkeit der Entwicklung ihrer 
Anlagen gelangen ." 
115Muthmaf31icher An fang der Menschengeschichte vol. 8, 115: " ... wenn man auf die 
Bestimmung seiner [the human being's] Gattung sieht, die in nichts als im F o r t s c h r e i -
ten zur Vollkommenheit besteht .. .. ". 
116Count Dohna-Wundlacken in Die philosophischen Hauptvorlesungen Immanuel Kants. Nach 
den neu aufgefundenen Kollegheften des Grafen Heinrich zu Dohna-Wundlacken, ed. Arnold 
Kowalewski (Hildesheim: Georg Olms Verlagsbuchhandlung , 1965), p. 616 records Kant's 
definition of an instinct: "Das Prinzip, was als analogon ration is die Tiere lenkt, nennt man lnstinkt, 
das Vermogen ohne Bewu~tsein Handlungen auszuOben, wozu die Menschen Bewu~tsein 
bedOrfen. Naturtrieb: sie lernen es nicht und verstehn es doch. Die Spinne arbeitet, sobald sie aus 
dem Ei gekrochen." In Muthmaf31icher Anfang der Menschengeschichte, vol. 8, 111 , Kant 
compares an instinct to the "v o i c e o f G o d" ("Der Instinct, diese S t i m m e G o t t e s , der 
aile Thiere gehorchen , mu~te den Neuling anfanglich allein leiten") . See also ibid. , p. 112. 
117 See next footnote. 
11aldee zu einer allgemeinen Geschichte in weltbOrgerlicher Absicht, vol. 8, 19: " D i e N a t u r 
hat gewoll t : da~ der Mensch alles , was Ober die mechanische 
Anordnung seines thierischen Daseins geht , ganzl i ch aus sich 
selbst herausbringe und keiner anderen GIOckseligke it oder 
Vollkommenheit theilhaftig werde , als die er sich selbst frei von 
lnstinct , durch eigene Vernunft, verschafft hat." 
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culture which in turn serves to create civil society.11 9 Kant does not deny that a 
conflict between the moral and the natural state exists , but suggests that nature 
did not intend the predisposition to animality for the moral state but merely for the 
"preservation of the human species as animal species." The undeniable conflict 
between the two states can only be avoided in the perfect civil constitution which 
is the final goal of culture. According to the Religion, however, Kant distinguishes 
not between two but three different predispositions:120 the predisposition of the 
human being to animality, to humanity, and to personality as well as their 
respective ends: preservation of the self and the species121 as well as community 
with others, cultivation, and good character.1 22 
Returning to the "Critique of the Teleological Judgment," now to the 
section 'Of the Ultimate End of Nature as a Teleological System,' Kant explains 
that unlike other organisms, the human being is not only a natural end , but also 
the ultimate end ("letzte Zweck") of nature. Nature prepares human beings by 
means of this ultimate end for a task which can only be accomplished 
11 9Muthmal31icher Anfang der Menschengeschichte, vol. 8, 117 footnote: "Also war die Anlage 
derselben [of instincts and capacities] auf den gesitteten Zustand gar nicht gestellt, sonder blor.. 
auf die Erhaltung der Menschengattung als Thiergattung; und der civilisirte Zustand kommt also 
mit dem letzteren in unvermeidlichen Widerstreit, den nur eine vollkommene bOrgerliche 
Verfassung (das aur..erste Ziel der Cultur) heben konnte .... 
Ein anderes Beispiel zum Beweise der Wahrheit des Satzes: dar.. die Natur in uns zwei 
Anlagen zu zwei verschiedenen Zwecken, namlich der Menschheit als Thiergattung und eben 
derselben als sittlicher Gattung, gegrOndet habe ... ". 
1201 assume that the ends which characterize the predisposition to animality are identical with the 
ends of the impulse which characterizes animality, even though predisposition and instinct seem 
to be two different things. 
121 RGV 26. For the different instincts compare also Recension von Mosca tis Schrift: Von dem 
korper/ichen wesentlichen Unterschiede zwischen der Structur der Thiere und Menschen , vol. 2, 
425; MS 277, 420, 426; in Muthma/31icher Anfang der Menschengeschichte vol. 8, 112 Kant 
states that the most important instincts are the instinct for food by means of which nature 
preserves each individual and the instinct for sex. 
122Compare Chapter on "Homicidium Dolosum," section "The Religion within the Limits of Reason 
Alone and The Metaphysics of Morals." 
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independent from nature, namely, to be the final end ("Endzweck") .123 The 
ultimate end which we ascribe to nature with regard to the human being is not 
happiness whose possibility rests solely on natural conditions, but 
culture alone can be the ultimate purpose which we have cause for 
ascribing to nature in respect to the human race.124 
Kant defines culture as 
the production of the aptitude of a rational being for arbitrary purposes in 
general (consequently in his freedom) .1 2s 
Since aptitude does not only comprise the skill to promote ends in general but 
most importantly to promote the will as the capacity to determine and choose 
ends, it cannot be restricted to the cultu re of skill ("Cultur .. . der G esc h i c k-
I i c h k e i t") but must also comprise the culture of discipline ("Cultur der Zucht 
(Disciplin)") which is negative and frees the will from the despotism of desires.126 
Understood in this way, culture is no longer concerned with happiness but with 
producing a rational being's aptitude for arbitrary ends in general. 127 In other 
words, if we disregard the content of the various ends which together make up 
our happiness and focus only on the formal and subjective condition of these 
ends, we arrive at Kant's concept of aptitude: 
123KU 431 . 
124 Bernard 281 (KU 431 : "Also kann nur die Cultur der letzte Zweck sein , den man der Natur in 
Ansehung der Menschengattung beizulegen Ursache hat ... ".) 
125Bernard 281 (MS 431 : "Die Hervorbringung der Tauglichkeit eines vernOnftigen Wesens zu 
beliebigen Zwecken Oberhaupt (folglich in seiner Freiheit) ist die CuI t u r.") and in Reflexionen 
zur Anthropologie, vol. 15 II no. 1521 , 888 Kant states: "Der letzte Zweck der Nature ist Cultur." 
126KU 431f: "Die [Cultur] der G esc hick I i c h k e it ist freilich die vornehmste subjective 
Bedinung der Tauglichkeit zur Bef6rderung der Zwecke Oberhaupt; aber doch nicht hinreichend 
den W i II e n in der Bestimmung und Wahl seiner Zwecke zu befordern, welche doch zum 
ganzen Umfange eine [sic] Tauglichkeit zu Zwecken wesentlich gehOrt. Die letzte Bedingung der 
Tauglichkeit welche man die Cultur der Zucht (Disciplin) nennen konnte, ist negativ und besteht in 
der Befreiung des Willen von dem Despotism der Begierden ... ".) 
127Bernard 281 (KU 431 : "Die Hervorbringung der Tauglichkeit eines vernOnftigen Wesens zu 
beliebigen Zwecken Oberhaupt (folglich in seiner Freiheit) ist C u It ur .") 
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There remains therefore of all his purposes in nature only the formal 
subjective condition, viz. the aptitude of setting ends in general before 
himself and (independent of nature in his purposive determination) of 
using nature, conformably to the maxims of his free ends in general , as a 
means. 12B 
Even though culture, understood in this way, is not the final end of the human 
being, it makes us, nevertheless, "receptive of higher ends than nature itself can 
supply,"129 that is, it makes us receptive of the ends of reason . 
To conclude: first, the aptitude of setting ends in general or culture 
corresponds to the characterization of humanity in The Metaphysics of Morals in 
terms of the capacity to set oneself any ends. Kant characterizes culture in terms 
of two formal conditions: the culture of skill and the culture of discipline. These 
two conditions seem to correspond to the ends of natural and moral perfection, 
namely to cultivate one's natural predisposition and to develop a good will or to 
act from duty. Furthermore, that aspect of culture which requires us to free the 
will from the dictates of desires, is in The Metaphysics of Morals represented by 
the duty of apathy. We saw that the duty of apathy and the corresponding perfect 
duties to oneself are negative and command us not to be ruled by our desires 
and inclinations. They represent the necessary condition to ensure the strength 
of the will and to allow for the goodness of the will, that is, moral perfection. 
Hence, the culture of discipline which is the essential element in culture as the 
ultimate end of nature, corresponds to the "negative end" of the perfect duties to 
oneself which is to ensure the status of the human being as an end in itself. Both 
128Bernard 281 (KU 431 : "Es bleibt also von allen seinen Zwecken in der Natur nur die formale, 
subjective Bedingung, namlich der Tauglichkeit: sich selbst Oberhaupt Zwecke zu setzen und 
(unabhangig von der Natur in seiner Zweckbestimmung) die Natur den Maximen seiner freien 
Zwecke Oberhaupt angemessen als Mittel zu gebrauchen ... ".) 
129Bernard 283 (KU 433: " ... welche uns hoherer Zwecke, als die Natur selbst liefern kann , 
empfanglich macht.") 
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are intended to ensure that we do not subject ourselves to desires or vices, since 
we would then use ourselves merely as a means. 
Second, the first conclusion suggests that perfect duties to oneself are 
concerned with one element of the ultimate end of nature: the culture of 
discipline, which, to use the term of the Vorarbeiten again, is a negative end. 
Kant seems to distinguish between the negative command not to be ruled by 
one's inclinations and the command to make it one's maxim to act from duty. 
Furthermore, whereas the latter seems to be an end of reason, the former is an 
end of nature which makes the end of reason possible. If my conclusion is 
correct, moral self-preservation or the duty of apathy is the necessary condition 
for moral perfection. But if this is the case, what then is the function of referring 
to the human being as an animal being who is characterized in terms of impulses 
for self-preservation? 
It seems to me that Kant sees an analogy between self-preservation in 
nature and moral self-preservation. In both cases a self-preserving system is one 
in which different ends can be integrated without disturbing the balance of the 
whole. Interference with these ends represents a disturbance of the given whole. 
If we do not interfere with the impulses to preserve our lives, the species, and 
our health, we preserve ourselves. By analogy, if we do not interfere with the will 
by subjecting ourselves to desires, we preserve the will. In the next sections we 
will see that Kant's view of nature and the animality of the human being in terms 
of specific impulses is the result of his view that the human being is an end in 
itself. 
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End(s) of Reason 
The previous section made clear that culture as the final end of nature makes us 
receptive to higher ends, ends other than nature can provide, that is, ends of 
reason, more specifically, of practical reason. We already encountered one end 
of reason, namely, perfection when we discussed the end which it is our duty to 
make our own. It turned out that the ultimate end of nature, that is, culture 
understood as the formal subjective condition of aptitude is the necessary 
condition for this end of reason. But Kant also introduces a final end of creation 
which, depending on whether we speak of the final end of creation or the final 
end of the human being , is either the human being as homo noumenon or the 
highest good.13o As the final end of creation , the human being is the source of 
the value of the world in relation to which everything has a value. 131 Kant 
explains that we can only speak of the human being as the final end if the value 
ascribed to things is not given with regard to one's own happiness but with 
regard to freedom. As final end , the human being strives for the highest good 
(summum bonum) or happiness in proportion to the worthiness to be happy 
determined by the moral law. It is worthwhile repeating this point again, since it 
shows us that even though the form of the moral law is by itself sufficient to put 
us under obligation, the moral law "nevertheless determines for us, and indeed a 
priori, a final end towards which it obliges us to strive."132 In other words , the 
13DKU 435: "Wenn nun Dinge der Welt, als ihrer Existenz nach abMngige Wesen, einer nach 
Zwecken handelnden obersten Ursache bedOrfen, so ist der Mensch der SchOpfung Endzweck 
... ". KU 450, see footnote no. 132. 
131 Compare the section on "Substance and Personality" in the Chapter on "Care for the Moral 
Self." 
132KU 450: "Das moralische Gesetz als formale Vernunftbedingung des Gebrauchs unserer 
Freiheit verbindet uns fOr sich allein, ohne von irgend einem Zwecke als materialer Bedingung 
abzuhangen; aber es bestimmt uns doch auch und zwar a priori einen Endzweck, welchem 
nachzustreben es uns verbindlich macht: und dieser ist das h o c h s t e durch Freiheit mogliche 
G u t i n d e r W e I t." Compare also Ober den Gebrauch teleologischer Principien in der 
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highest good is the objective end which the moral law obl iges us to strive for. It 
combines in it virtue as well as happiness, whereby virtue constitutes the 
supreme condition of the highest good .133 Kant distinguishes between a 
subjective and objective condition with regard to the highest good as the final 
end proposed to us by the moral law: 
The subjective condition under which man (and , according to all our 
concepts, every rational finite being) can set a final end before himself 
under the above law is happiness. Consequently, the highest physical 
good possible in the world , to be furthered as a final end as far as in us 
lies , is happiness, under the objective condition of the harmony of man 
with the law of morality as worthiness to be happy.134 
The connection of the two conditions of the highest good requires, however, that 
we assume a moral world cause.135 In other words, we need a force that 
guarantees that the commands of the moral law can be rea lized in the world and 
that our moral actions will be rewarded in due proportion . Hence, the assumption 
of a final end leads us necessarily to the assumption of the existence of God. 136 
Phi/osophie vol. 8, 182.--Bernward Grunewald in his "Zur moralphilosophischen Funktion des 
Prinzips vom hOchsten Gut," in Naturzweckm/3/J igkeit und /3sthetische Kultur, ed. Karl-Heinz 
Schwabe and Martina Thom (Sankt Augustin : Academia , 1993), p. 133f uses the quote from the 
Third Critique to defend Kant's ethics against the charge of empty formalism. 
133KpV 11 Of: "So fern nun Tugend und GIOckseligkeit zusammen den Besitz des hochsten Guts in 
einer Person, hiebei aber auch GIOckseligkeit, ganz genau in Proportion der Sittlichkeit (als Werth 
der Person und deren WOrdigkeit giOcklich zu sein) ausgetheilt, das h b c h s t e G u t einer 
moglichen Welt ausmachen : so bedeutet dieses das Ganze, das vollendete Gute, worin doch 
Tugend immer als Bedingung das oberste Gut ist, weil es weiter keine Bedingung Ober sich hat, 
GIOckseligkeit immer etwas, was dem, der sie besitzt, zwar angenehm, aber nicht fOr sich allein 
schlechterdings und in aller ROcksicht gut ist, sondern jederzeit das moralische gesetzmar..ige 
Verhalten als Bedingung vorausssetzt."--Compare Danziger Rationaltheo/ogie, vol. 28.2,2 page 
1302.--ln GMS 396 Kant refers to the good will as the "highest good." 
134Bernard 301 , (KU 450: "Die subjective Bedingung , unter welcher der Mensch (und nach allen 
unsern Begriffen auch jedes vernOnftige endliche Wesen) sich unter dem obigen Gesetze einen 
Endzweck setzen kann, ist die GIOckseligkeit. Folgl ich , das hochste in der Welt mogliche und, so 
viel an uns ist, als Endzweck zu befordernde physische Gut is G I o c k s e I i g k e i t : unter der 
objectiven Bedingung der Einstimmung des Menschen mit dem Gesetze der S i t t I i c h k e i t , 
als WOrdigkeit giOcklich zu sein.") 
135KU 450; RGV 5. 
136See KU 455; KpV 124-132. 
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Important for our discussion is that the concept of a final end which entails the 
idea of God allows for the connection between the purposiveness of freedom 
and nature. In the Religion , Kant states: 
Therefore it cannot be a matter of unconcern to morality as to whether or 
not it forms for itself the concept of a final end of all things (harmony with 
which , while not multiplying men's duties, yet provides them with a special 
point of focus for the unification of all ends) ; for only thereby can objective , 
practical reality be given to the union of the purposiveness arising from 
freedom with the purposiveness of nature, a union with which we cannot 
possibly dispense.137 
In short, the concept of a final end of all things is the necessary condition for the 
union of the purposiveness arising for freedom and the purposiveness of nature. 
This union is indispensable for us because it alone allows for the realization of 
the highest good in the world.13a In the introduction to the Critique of Judgment, 
Kant elaborates on the condition of the possibility of the final end itself: 
The effect in accordance with the concept of freedom is the final end 
which (or its phenomenon in the word of sense) ought to exist, and the 
condition of the possibility of this is presupposed in nature (in the nature of 
the subject as a sensible being, that is, as man). The judgment 
presupposes this a priori and without reference to the practical , and thus 
furnishes the mediating concept between the concept of nature and that 
of freedom [which makes possible the transition from pure theoretical to 
pure practical [reason] ; Y. U.]. It makes possible the transition from the 
conformity to law in accordance with the former ["der ersten," meaning 
"theoretical reason"] to the final end in accordance with the latter ["dem 
letzten," meaning "the concept of freedom"], and this by the concept of a 
137Greene/Hudson 5, Preface to the First Edition (RGV 5 Vorrede zur ersten Auflage: "Es kann 
also der Moral nicht gleichgOitig sein, ob sie sich den Beg riff von einem Enzweck aller Dinge 
(wozu zusammen zu stimmen, zwar die Zahl ihrer Pflichten nicht vermehrt, aber doch ihnen einen 
besondern Beziehungspunkt der Vereinigung aller Zwecke verschafft) mache, oder nicht: wei I 
dadurch allein der Verbindung der Zweckm~Bigkeit aus Freiheit mit der Zweckm~Bigkeit der 
Natur, deren w ir gar nicht entbehren konnen, objectiv praktische Realit~t verschafft werden 
kann. ") 
138RGV 5: " ... weil das moralische Gesetz will , daB das hochste durch uns mogliche Gut bewirkt 
werde ... ". Compare also Uber den Gebrauch teleologischer Principien in der Philosophie, val. 8, 
183. 
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purposiveness of nature. For thus is cognized the possibility of the final 
end which alone can be actualized in nature in harmony with its laws.139 
Kant stresses at the end of this quote that the final end which ought to exist can 
only be realized in nature and in accordance with the laws of nature. The 
condition of the possibility that such a final end exists must be presupposed in 
nature, more specifically in the nature of the human being as sensible being . In 
other words, (human) nature must be such that it allows for the realization of 
freedom in nature. 140 It is judgment which provides th is condition and thus the 
mediation between nature and freedom through the concept of the 
purposiveness of nature. 
To conclude this section , I would like to raise some questions which 
suggest that Kant's reference to the ends of nature and natural ends in The 
Metaphysics of Morals is the result of the mediating function of the concept of 
the purposiveness of nature. 
When Kant characterizes the human being as an animal being in terms of 
impulses through which nature strives for the preservation of the self, species, 
and health, could it not be that he does so because it is the purposiveness of 
nature which allows for the realization of the final end? In other words, could it 
139Bernard 32f. Please note that Bernard's translation is missing part of the text wh ich I added in 
square brackets. KU 195f (LV) : "Die Wirkung nach dem Freiheitsbegriffe ist der Endzweck, der 
(oder dessen Erscheinung in der Sinnenwelt) existiren soli , wozu die Bedingung der Moglichkeit 
desselben in der Natur (des Subjects als Sinnenwesens, n~mlich der Mensch) vorausgesetzt 
wird . Das, was diese a priori und ohne ROcksicht auf das Praktische voraussetzt, die Urtheilskraft, 
giebt den vermittelnden Begriff zwischen den Naturbegriffen und dem Freiheitsbegriffe, der den 
Obergang von der reinen theoretischen zur reinen praktischen, von der Gesetzm~P..igkeit nach der 
ersten zum Endzweck nach dem letzen maglich macht, in dem Begriffe einer Z we c k m a r.. i g -
k e i t der Natur an die Hand; denn dadurch wird die Moglichkeit des Endzwecks, der allein in der 
Natur und mit Einstimmung ihrer Gesetze wirklich werden kann , erkannt." 
140Bartuschat 263 makes this clear when he states: "Soli, so ist hieraus zu entnehmen , der 
Freiheitsbegriff eine Wirkung haben konnen , derzufolge der Endzweck in der Sinnenwelt zu 
existiren vermag, ist als Bedingung dieser Moglichkeit vorauszusetzen , dar.. die Sinnenwelt hierfOr 
tauglich ist und sich nicht einer solchen Wirkung von sich aus mit Notwendigkeit versperrt." See 
also page 264. 
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not be that because the final end can only be realized in nature and in harmony 
with its laws that it is necessary to regard the human being as a part of the 
purposiveness of nature? In addition, could it not be that the specification of the 
condition of the possibility of the final end depends on the moral law so that the 
content of the purposiveness of nature is a result of practical reason projecting 
its purposiveness onto nature? To further explain my point I turn to the 
Groundwork where Kant states: 
Teleology views nature as a kingdom of ends; ethics views a possible 
kingdom of ends as a kingdom of nature. In the first case the kingdom of 
ends is a theoretical Idea used to explain what exists. In the second case 
it is a practical Idea used to bring into existence what does not exist but 
can be made actual by our conduct--and indeed to bring into existence in 
conformity with this ldea.141 
In teleology, the idea of a kingdom of ends serves to explain what exists. We 
saw this exemplified in the concept of a natural end which does not constitute 
the object but explains the phenomenon of life which remains unexplainable in 
mechanistic terms. In morals the idea of a kingdom of ends serves to realize and 
thus to constitute what ought to exist but does not exist. Given the quote from 
the introduction to the Third Critique we can only realize what does not exist 
(kingdom of ends) if what actually exists (nature) can be understood or explained 
in such a way that what exists allows for what ought to exist. In our case, we 
must explain living organisms in a way which allows for the realization of the 
kingdom of ends. 
141Paton 104 footnote (GMS 436 footnote: "Die Teleologie erwc'3gt die Naturals ein Reich der 
Zwecke, die Moral ein mogliches Reich der Zwecke als ein Reich der Natur. Dart ist das Reich der 
Zwecke eine theoretische Idee zu Erklc'3rung dessen, was da ist. Hier ist es eine praktische Idee, 
urn das, was nicht da ist, aber durch unser Thun und Lassen wirklich werden kann , und zwar 
eben dieser Idee gemc'3~ zu Stande zu bringen.") 
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If my interpretation is correct, it means that the reason why Kant characterizes or 
judges the animality of the human being in terms of nature's end of preservation 
is that it is the necessary condition for the realization of freedom or what ought to 
exist. If, therefore, an action is contrary to the natural end of preservation and 
thus contrary to the duty to oneself, it does not mean that the action constitutes a 
violation of a duty because it is contrary to an end of nature, but that the action is 
contrary to the end of nature because it makes the realization of morality 
impossible and thus violates a duty to oneself.142 Hence, Kant's reference to the 
impulses of self-preservation which characterize the human being as an animal 
being is the result of judging nature in such a way that it allows for the realization 
of morality. It is in this sense, I believe, that we must understand Kant's 
statement in the Critique of Judgment: 
There remains then nothing but the value which we ourselves give our life, 
through what we cannot only do but do purposively in such independence 
of nature that the existence of nature itself can only be a purpose under 
this condition .143 
Not only must nature allow for the realization of morality, but the very existence 
of nature itself can only be an end if we act morally.144 
142My reasoning seems to be in line with Kant's belief that we can fulfill the moral commands 
because we ought to. KpV 30: "Er urtheilt also, da~ er etwas kann , darum weil er sich bewu~t ist, 
da~ er es soli ... "; see also RGV 49 footnote as well as Zum ewigen Frieden. Ein 
philosophischer Entwurf, vol. 8, 370 and ApH 148: " ... was er namlich auf den G e he i ~ 
s e i n e r m o r a I i s c h - g e b i e t e n d e n V e r n u n f t will, das s o I I er, folglich k a n n 
er es auch thun (denn das Unmogliche wird ihm die Vernunft nicht gebieten)." 
143Bernard 284 footnote (KU 434 footnote: "Es bleibt also wohl nichts Obrig, als der Werth, den wir 
unserem Leben selbst geben durch das, was wir nicht allein thun, sondern auch so unabhangig 
von der Natur zweckma~ig thun, da~ selbst die Existenz der Natur nur unter dieser Bedingung 
Zweck sein kann.") 
1441n SZ 99 in the section on "VerknOpfung," Sommer makes a similar observation in a different 
context: "Die Erhaltung der Natur durch Vernunft ist zug/eich Selbsterhaltung der Natur und der 
Vernunft." 
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Finally, I would like to comment on the analogy between the natural end and the 
end in itself. Both the natural end as well as the end in itself or the moral subject 
are autonomous: the natural end is a self-creating and self-preserving system, 
and the moral subject creates itself by subjecting itself to the law of its own will 
and creating moral values. Both are perfect: the natural end possesses an inner 
natural perfection, and the status of the human being as an end in itself entails 
the striving for moral perfection. It seems to me that Kant's characterization of life 
in general as a natural end ensures that it evades complete description and thus 
the possibility of complete manipulation. This point made only implicitly with the 
concept of a natural end is made explicit in the concept of the end in itself and 
the second formula of the categorical imperative which commands us to treat 
humanity in our own or in the person of any other never simply as a means but 
always at the same time as an end . Since nature must allow for the realization of 
morality, it seems that the characterization of the human being in terms of a 
natural end represents the appropriate condition . 
Conclusion 
In order to conclude this second section of the Chapter on "Ends" I will turn to 
the Groundwork which provides us with an apt summary of this last part. 
The section on the end of nature made it clear that preservation is an end 
of nature. According to Kant, nature reaches this end with the help of impulses 
which either strive for the preservation of the self, the species, or the capacity to 
enjoy life on the animal level. Kant believes that impulses like the love of life and 
sexual love are sufficient to accomplish this goal of nature. With regard to 
preservation as an end of nature, our animal nature provides us with all the 
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means needed to accomplish that goal. None of the texts we analyzed suggests 
that the preservation of life and the species is an end of reason; a view also held 
by Kant in the Groundwork. There, he first formulates the principle which governs 
the natural constitution of an organic being or a being "contrived for the purpose 
of life," namely "that in it no organ is to be found for any end unless it is also the 
most appropriate to that end and the best fitted."145 He then uses this principle to 
show why the human being is endowed with reason--thus comparing reason to 
an organ which is part of an organized and self-organizing product of nature (a 
natural end). 
Suppose now that for a being possessed of reason and a will the real 
purpose of nature were his preservation, his welfare, or in a word his 
happiness. In that case nature would have hit on a very bad arrangement 
by choosing reason in the creature to carry out this purpose.146 
According to this quote, reason's "real" ("eigentliche") end or function is 
determined by nature. If happiness were the real end nature intended for reason, 
this end would be more efficiently reached through an instinct, and he concludes 
that the "true function" of reason is to "produce a will which is good ."147 To 
repeat, the real purpose of reason is not happiness which comprises self-
preservation but the creation of a good will. But because Kant compares reason 
to an organ this cannot mean that reason is not concerned with the happiness, 
145Paton 62f (GMS 395: "In den Naturanlagen eines organisirten, d. i. zweckmaf:l>ig zum Leben 
eingerichteten, Wesens nehmen wires als Grundsatz an, daf:l> kein Werkzeug zu irgend einem 
Zwecke in demselbn angetroffen werde, als was auch zu demselben das schicklichste und ihm 
am meisten angemessene ist. ") 
146Paton 63 (GMS 395: "Ware nun an einem Wesen, das Vernunft und einen Willen hat, seine 
E r h a I t u n g , sein W o h I e r g e h e n , mit einem Worte seine G I 0 c k s e I i g k e i t , der 
eigentliche Zweck der Natur, so Mtte sie ihre Veranstaltung dazu sehr schlecht getroffen, sich 
die Vernunft des Geschopfs zur Ausrichterin dieser ihrer Absicht zu ersehen.") 
147Paton 64 (GMS 396: " ... so muf:l> die wahre Bestimmung derselben sein, einen nicht etwa in 
anderer Absicht a I s M i t t e I , sondern a n s i c h s e I b s t g u t e n W i I I e n hervor-
zubringen .. . ".In Reflexionen zurAnthropologie, val. 1511, no. 1411 , 615 Kant states: "Denn die 
Natur hat das, was auf die Erhaltung abgezielt ist, in die lnstinkte Gelegt." 
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including the self-preservation, of the human being. Since reason is compared to 
an organ, it must by definition be intimately related to those "organs" like instincts 
or impulses which are directly in charge of it. In other words , even though it is not 
only unnecessary for reason to aid the impulses or instincts in their task to 
preserve the organism, an interference which might even endanger the 
attainment of the goal, 148 reason must, nevertheless, be interested in and 
contribute to the happiness and thus the self-preservation of the human being . 
Despite the fact that our (animal) nature in and for itself might very well be able 
to reach happiness without the support of reason, the latter because its peculiar 
sphere is "the order of ends" must at least indirectly be concerned with the self-
preservation of the organism.149 But that also means, given the results of the last 
section , that we must be able to realize the command of the moral law in nature 
and that the moral law cannot contradict the law which governs the impulses of 
the human being. 
We have seen that nature represents a system governed by rules. In this 
system every part has its purpose and works most efficiently so as to guarantee 
the preservation of the harmonious whole. Kant guarantees this harmony by 
commanding that we do not obstruct the laws of nature and their ends. Nature as 
a system in which nothing exists without purpose and nothing happens in vain is 
perfect. 15o In this system impulses like the love of life or sexual love serve 
nature's end of preservation. But in order to perfect or cultivate ourselves we 
must emancipate ourselves from nature. This does not mean , however, that we 
can turn our back on our sensible nature or even destroy it. While arguing for the 
148Compare footnotes no. 79, 85 in the Chapter on "Homicidium Do/osum." 
149Kemp Smith 379 (KrV B 425) . 
150See footnote no. 98. 
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liberation of the will from the despotism of impulses, Kant states that nature only 
gave us impulses: 
as guiding threads, that we should not neglect or injure the destination of 
our animal nature--we being all the time free enough to strain or relax, to 
extend or diminish them, according as the ends of reason require.151 
That we can modify but not destroy impulses and thus our physical nature is also 
stressed in Mutmaf3/icher Anfang der Menschengeschichte: 
and 
For nature has certainly not endowed living creatures with instincts and 
capacities ["Vermogen"], in order that they fight or suppress them. 
The human being should work himself up from the crude state of his 
natural predispositions and by raising himself above them should be 
carefullest he violates them.152 
Nature becomes the stepping stone on the basis of which the independent 
creation of culture takes place. With regard to the motto of the imperfect duties to 
oneself: "Make yourself more perfect than mere nature has made you," this 
means that the perfection of the human being as a product of nature has to be 
further developed in order to realize the ends of reason. It is no longer nature 
which creates the human being but the human being who creates herself or 
151 Bernard 282 (KU 432: " ... Triebe zu Fesseln dienen lassen, die uns die Natur nur statt 
Leitfaden beigegeben hat, um die Bestimmung der Thierheit in uns nicht zu vernachlassigen, oder 
gar zu verletzen, inde~ wir doch frei genug sind, sie anzuziehen oder nachzulassen, zu 
verlangern oder zu verkOrzen, nachdem es die Zwecke der Vernunft erfordern .") 
152Mutmal3/icher Anfang der Menschengeschichte val. 8, 117 footnote: "Denn die Natur hat gewi~ 
nicht lnstincte und Vermogen in lebende Geschopfe gelegt, damit sie solche bekampfen und 
unterdrOcken sollten." The second quote is from the footnote of page 118: "Der Mensch sollte sich 
aus der Rohigkeit seiner Naturanlagen selbst herausarbeiten und, indem er sich Ober sie erhebt, 
dennoch Acht haben, da~ er nicht wider sie versto~e ." Compare this with Kant's similar wording of 
natural perfection in MS 387 and 392. 
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himself. Hence we can say that artificial perfection or the cultivation of the natural 
predisposition by the human being is based on natural perfection .153 
Our relationship to nature including our sensible nature can therefore be 
characterized as follows: since human beings as animal beings are a part of 
nature and as such "a link in the chain of natural purposes," subjected to natural 
laws, the impulse to preserve themselves is part of their very nature. Thus the 
question is not "why should we adopt the end of preservation?"--as animal 
beings we are already striving for that goal; it is a given154--but "how do we relate 
to the impulse and its end as part of our nature?" Do we destroy it, do we not 
interfere with it, meaning do we not impede it, or do we foster it? With regard to 
the perfect duty to preserve one's animal nature, Kant chooses the second 
alternative not to bring the end of preservation to naught. 155 He does not argue 
1531n Reflexionen zur Anthropologie, vol. 15 II, no. 1515, 859 Kant states: "Die Natur hat die 
lnstincte als Triebedern zu ihren grof1en Zwecken angelegt. Sie hat aber nicht gewolt, daf1 wir 
ihnen blindlings folgen solten. Nicht durch Leidenschaft. Der cultivirte Mensch solte die Zwecke 
der Menschheit durch Vernunft erreichen, wozu die Thierheit durch Instinct die blof1e Anlage 
bekommen hatte." 
1541n the Reflexionen zurAnthropologie, vol. 1511, no. 1521 , 886 under Characterder 
Menschengattung Kant states: "d. hat keinen Instinct zu seiner Erhaltung. Kan nicht schwimmen." 
On page 894 we read : "Der Mensch hat den Instinct verlassen und noch nicht das Gesetz der 
Vernunft angenommen," and on page 895 Kant remarks: "Der Mensch ist ein Thier, das sich 
perfectionirt, und zwar nicht bios das individuum, sondern auch und vornehmlich die species. Er 
kan [sic] sich im Naturzustande nicht erhalten." But Kant also states in the same volume no. 1423, 
621 : "Er [der Mensch] ist als ein Thier zur selbsterhaltung und als Mensch zur Gesellschaft 
gemacht," and no. 1520, 878: "Ohne Instinct ist gar keine Cultur moglich, denn der Mensch ist von 
Natur faul." 
If the first set of Reflexionen were to represent Kant's last words on instincts, particularly 
the instinct for self-preservation , the human being would lack the instinct to preserve himself. This 
view would contradict the one in The Metaphysics of Morals, according to which the animality of 
the human being is characterized in terms of the impulses for preservation, and Kant would have 
to argue that the instinct for self-preservation is replaced by something else, possibly, the respect 
for the moral law. 
1551t should , however, be remembered that the imperfect duty to increase one's natural perfection 
entails not only the cultivation of the powers of the spirit and the mind but also of the body. Gregor 
240 (MS 446): "Finally , cultivating the powers of the body (gymnastics in the strict sense) is 
looking after the basic stuff (the matter) in man, without which he could not realize his ends. 
Hence the continuing and purposive invigoration of the animal in man is an end of man that is a 
duty to himself." 
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that because human beings as animal beings strive for their preservation they 
ought to use it as a guiding principle for the ir lives. The reason why he, 
nevertheless, assumes that we should preserve, or better, that we should not 
destroy our animal nature is twofold: 
First, we have shown that nature as a system of ends is perfect. There is 
therefore no reason why the human being as part of this system should be 
characterized differently. Second , it cannot be in the interest of reason that the 
laws of practical reason contradict the laws of theoretical reason because if that 
were the case the final end could not be realized , and the unity of the 
purposiveness of nature and freedom could not be guaranteed. It is therefore in 
the interest of reason with regard to the unity and realization of its law that the 
moral agent does not contradict them. It is in the interest of reason or the interest 
to preserve its unity that the human being should not commit self-murder. Hence, 
I have argued that Kant's prohibition of self-murder or the command not to 
obstruct the end of nature has to be understood in the broader context of the 
unity of reason or the "system of ends."156 My interpretation implies that 
obstructing the realization of the ends of nature obstructs the realization of the 
ends of reason. To put it differently, it implies that self-destruction not only goes 
against the ends of nature but also constitutes an adverse interference with the 
ends of reason because it makes the realization of the final end or the summum 
bonum impossible. 
156Kant states in Danziger Rationaltheo/ogie vol. 28.2,2 page 1303: 
"Handle ich nach einem Prinzip, wonach ein allgemeines System der Zwecke moglich ist, so 
handle ich moralisch; denn, wenn aile nach moralischen Prinzipien handeln, so haben aile 
Menschen gemeinschaftliche und Obereinstimmende Zwecke, und so ist ein allgemeines System 
der Zwecke da. --
Dieses allgemeine System der Zwecke macht die eigentliche GOte der moralischen 
Hand lung aus. So ist der Selbstmord nicht erlaubt, weil er das allgemeine System der Zwecke 
unterbricht, indem er ein Glied herausnimmt." 
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CHAPTER VI : 
HOMICIDIUM DOLOSUM 
We saw in the last Chapter on "Ends" that self-murder is a violation of the dignity 
of the human being and makes perfection impossible. Yet according to one of 
our findings in the Chapter on "Care for the Moral Self," Kant believes that life is 
not of absolute value. If life is not of absolute value, since it "has to be sacrificed 
in many circumstances," it has to be explained why Kant stresses that "self-
murder is under no circumstance allowed."1 To put the matter differently, in order 
to avoid a contradiction between the view that self-murder is under no 
circumstance allowed because the disposition over one's body is only permitted 
for purposes of preservation, and the view that some situations require the 
sacrifice of life in order to preserve one's moral integrity, Kant must assume an 
essential difference between self-murder and self-sacrifice. We already 
suggested that the self-murderer destroys the moral self; whereas self-sacrifice 
destroys the phenomenal self. In this chapter we will specify why the destruction 
of the moral self is considered to be a crime called "homicidium dolosum." 
In the Introduction, in the section on "Self-disembodiment," we quoted 
Kant's statement from The Metaphysics of Morals that willful disembodiment can 
only be called self-murder or homicidium dolosum if it can be proven that self-
disembodiment is a crime. Kant stresses, on the one hand, that the crime of self-
murder 
1 MC 372: "Da das Leben unter vielen Bedingungen aufzuopfern ist, .. . so ist auf der andern Seite 
der Selbstmord unter keiner Bedingung erlaubt." Compare MSV 627. 
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... can also be regarded as a violation of one's duty to other human 
beings (the duty of spouses to each other, of parents to their children, of a 
subject to his ruler or to his fellow citizens, and finally even as a violation 
of duty to God, as man's abandoning the post assigned him in the world 
without having been called away from it). 
But, on the other hand , he points out that he will focus on the violation of a duty 
to oneself and investigate 
.. . whether, if I set aside all those relations , man is still bound to preserve 
his life simply by virtue of his quality as a person and whether he must 
acknowledge in this a duty (and indeed a strict duty) to himself.2 
Kant does not discuss self-murder as a possible violation of the right of other 
people, but, as was already shown in the Chapters on "Duties" and the "Right of 
Humanity," as a violation of a strict duty to oneself. In other words, self-murder 
does not violate a right of the human being but the right of the homo noumenon 
which is not a real subject but an idea. Because self-murder violates a different 
class of duties than murder,3 it is not discussed in the "Doctrine of Right" but in 
the "Doctrine of Virtue." I have argued in this dissertation that the perfect duties 
to oneself in the "Doctrine of Virtue" represent the right of humanity and are 
indirectly concerned with the end of perfection. Since Kant uses the terminology 
of the "Doctrine of Right" to discuss self-murder, we will first make some general 
2Gregor 218f (MS 422: "Dieses [das Verbrechen; Y. U.] kann nun zwar auch als Obertretung 
seiner Pflicht gegen andere Menschen (Eheleute, Eltern gegen Kinder, des Unterthans gegen 
seine Obrigkeit, oder seine MitbOrger, endlich auch gegen Gott, dessen uns anvertrauten Posten 
in der Welt der Mensch verl~r..t , ohne davon abgerufen zu sein) betrachtet werden ; -- aber hier ist 
nur die Rede von Verletzung einer Pflicht gegen sich selbst, ob n~mlich , wenn ich auch aile jene 
ROcksichten bei Seite setzte, der Mensch doch zur Erhaltung seines Leben bios durch seine 
Qualit~t als Person verbunden sei und hierin eine (und zwar strenge) Pflicht gegen sich selbst 
anerkennen mosse.") 
31 paraphrased the following quote from the Vorarbeiten zur Tugendlehre , val. 23, 405: "Die Pflicht 
gegen sich selbst auch in Erhaltung seines Wohlstandes (ich bin es mir schu ldig) ist nicht in die 
Classe der Pflicht gegen den Menschen Oberhaupt zu stellen und also auch nicht die Obertretung 
derselben z. B. der Selbstmord mit dem Morde Oberhaupt (wenn es auch der eines andern w~re). 
--Es ist eine Pflicht gegen den homo noumenon immer bios negativ sich nicht wegzuwerfen ."--For 
a continuation of th is quote see the Chapter on "Duties" footnote no. 92. 
remarks with regard to the crime of self-murder and murder, before we turn to 
the characteristics of self-murder itself.4 
The Concept of Crime 
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When we speak of a crime we formally distinguish between two different 
persons: the perpetrator and the victim. We can only speak of a crime if the 
victim possesses rights which are violated by the perpetrator. Only if the 
perpetrator causes the action can it be imputed to her or him, and only if he or 
she actually has the intention to violate the victim's rights do we speak of a 
crime. In The Metaphysics of Morals as well as in the corresponding lecture, 
recorded by Vigilantius, Kant gives a general description of imputation : 
Imputation (imputatio) in the moral sense is the judgment by which 
someone is regarded as the author (causa Iibera) of an action , which is 
then called a deed (factum) and stands under laws. 5 
Imputation consists in general in judicium, aliquem esse auctorem alicujus 
vel bani vel mali [in the judgment that someone is the author of something 
either good or bad]. It refers therefore to the law which determines 
whether something is good or evil and entails the judgment that the agent 
be causa Iibera vel auctor actionis (facti) [author or author of the action (of 
the deed)].6 
40n the one hand , I agree with Mary Gregor's remark in her translation of MS on page 292 
footnote no. 93 where she points out that "Kant often uses the terminolo~lY of The Doctrine of 
Right, as e.g., in the preceding paragraph he called killing oneself a Verbrechen , which in The 
Doctrine of Right was a "crime" (crimen) . Given the context in which these terms were introduced , 
however, it does not always seem advisable to translate them precisely as they were used in 
speaking of rights." This view can be supported by our footnote no. 3. But on the other hand, I 
believe that given Kant's view that a violation of a perfect duty to oneself violates the right of 
humanity or the essential ends of humanity, the translation of crimen with "Verbrechen" is justified 
and in fact used by Kant himself. 
5Gregor 53 (MS 227: "Z u r e c h n u n g (imputatio) in moralischer Bedeutung is das U r-
t h e i I , wodurch jemand als Urheber (causa Iibera) einer Handlung , die alsdann T h at (factum) 
hei~t und unter Gesetzen steht, angesehen wird ... ".)See also MS 223. 
6MSV 559: "Die Imputation besteht also generaliter in dem judicium, aliquem esse auctorem 
alicujus vel boni vel mali. Sie nimmt also auf das Gesetz ROcksicht, welches bestimmt, ob etwas 
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We can only impute an action to someone if he or she is an author of the action . 
Being an author of an action means that the agent is a free being who is 
responsible for her or his actions;? in other words, that the agent is a person .8 
Only if the agent is free can an action be imputed to her or him. Kant goes so far 
as to say that "freedom itself is nothing but accountability."9 If an action is the 
result of the free will of the person and thus a deed (factum) which is governed 
by a law, it has to be determined whether or not the deed can be imputed either 
as meritum, debitum or demeritum: 
If someone does more in the way of duty than he can be coerced by law 
to do, what he does is meritorious (meritum); if what he does is just 
exactly what the law requires, he does what is owed (debitum); finally, if 
what he does is less than the law requires, it is morallly culpable 
(demeritum) .1 D 
Only an action that stands under laws can be imputed, and it is the transgression 
of a strict law, but not the transgression of an ethical law, which constitutes 
demeritum.11 Furthermore, if the transgression of a duty constitutes an 
"intentional transgression (i.e., one accompanied by consciousness of its being a 
gut oder bose sey und enthalt das Urtheil, daB der Handelnde causa Iibera vel auctor action is 
(facti) sey." 
7MSV 558: "Auctor ist ein Urheber der Handlung. Urheber heiBt soviel: die Handlung kann in 
Ansehung ihres Bestimmungsgrundes uranfanglich von ihm abgeleitet werden. Daher wird er als 
die wirkende erste Ursache betrachtet, d. i. der Bestimmungsgrund der Handlung kann nicht 
anderweitig in der Natur gesucht werden .. . ". 
Bin MS 223 (Gregor 50) Kant states: "A person is a subject whose actions can be imputed to 
him. Moral personality is therefore nothing other than the freedom of a rational being under moral 
laws .. . ". 
9MSV 564: "Denn nur eine Hand lung die auf Freiheit beruht, ist imputabel, und Freiheit selbst ist 
nichts weiter, als die Zurechnungsfahigkeit (receptivitas imputationis)." 
10Gregor 53 (MS 227: "Was jemand pflichtmaBig m e h r thut, als wozu er nach dem Gesetze 
gezwungen werden kann , ist v e r d i e n s t I i c h (meritum) ; was er nur gerade dem letzteren 
a n g e mess e n thut, ist S c h u I d i g k e it (debitum) : was er endlich we n i g e r thut, als 
die letztere fordert, ist moralische V e r s c h u I dung (demeritum) .") 
11 MSV 561 : "Die Uebertretung eines strengen Gesetzes ist ja demeritum, Die [sic] Uebertretung 
eines ethischen Gesetzes ist nicht demeritum, -- deBen ErfOIIung meritum." 
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transgression)" it "is called a crime (dolus);" whereas an "unintentional 
transgression which can still be imputed to the agent is called a mere fault 
(culpa)."12 Thus, if the action is not intended because the agent is either in a 
state of emotional agitation or is insane, then the accused can either plead in 
mitigation or is not held responsible at all. In the latter case the action does not 
qualify as a a crime. 
Since Kant refers to self-disembodiment as a crime or homicidium 
dolosum, he must believe that the suicide is a free agent who intentionally 
violates a strict law and hence a strict duty. To put the matter differently, we can 
expect Kant to argue that if one is not only the author of one's own death, but 
also intends to die, one commits self-murder. In other words, self-disembodiment 
must be regarded as a crime (dolus) and hence called "self-murder" (homicidium 
dolosum).13 
With regard to the criterion of authorship Kant states, in the Lecture on the 
Metaphysics of Morals, that there are situations where even though life has to be 
preserved, death is welcome "as long as one is not [the] author of death."1 4 With 
regard to the criterion of intention Kant stresses, in the Lecture on Moral 
Philosophy, that self-murder, unlike risking one's life, is indeed an intentional 
transgression: 
12Gregor 50 (MS 224: "Eine u n v or set z I i c he Obertretung, die gleichwohl zugerechnet 
werden kann, hei~t blo~e V e r s c h u I d u n g (culpa) . Eine v o r set z I i c h e (d. i. diejenige, 
welche mit dem Bewu~tsein , da~ sie Obertretung sei, verbunden ist) hei~t V e r b r e c h e n 
(dolus)." For "intent" compare also MSV 564. 
13See also the discussion of the casuistical questions in the next chapter. 
14MSV 629. The complete sentence reads: "Scheinbar scheint in manchen Lagen der Fall , und 
auch ein --- wiewohl nicht vollstandiger -- Grund dafOr zu sein , da~ man der ErfOIIung einer Pflicht, 
die Erhaltung seines Lebens nachsetze, oder es giebt auch GrOnde und Ursachen , wo der Tod, 
wenn man gleich sein Leben erhalten mu~ . denn willkommen ist, wenn man nur nicht Urheber des 
Todes ist. (Das letztere ist wohl der SchiOssel zum stoischen Prinzip)." 
272 
A difference must be made between a self-murderer and someone who 
has lost his life because of fate. While he who shortens his life by means 
of intemperance is nevertheless to blame for it because of his 
carelessness, so that his death can be indirectly imputed to him, [it can] 
not [be] directly [imputed to him], because he did not intend to kill himself. 
It is not a premeditated death, for all our offenses are either culpa or 
dolus. Even though this case does not constitute dolus it constitutes 
culpa. One can say to this person: "you yourself are responsible for your 
death," but not: "you are a self-murderer." The intention to destroy oneself 
constitutes self-murder. I must not turn intemperance, which is the cause 
of the shortening of life into self-murder, because if I elevate intemperance 
to self-murder, self-murder is thereby reduced to intemperance. A 
difference exists, therefore, between carelessness, whereby the wish to 
live remains, and the intention to murder oneself. 15 
To repeat, it is the intention to destroy or kill oneself which characterize~- :a. W.f.-
murderer. If, therefore , the agent intends to live, but exposes herself to situations 
which could lead to her death, the latter can only be indirectly imputed , since it 
was not intended , and we cannot speak of self-murder because the act is not 
culpable. Another case is that of soldiers or civilians who defend their country or 
their family against an enemy and as a result of it die. They can also not be said 
to have murdered themselves , 1s but their life is, as Kant puts it, determined by 
fate (physically determined) and not by their own will (morally determined).17 
Even though soldiers risk their lives, their risk is for public welfare--not because 
15MC 371f: "Es mu~ ein Unterschied gemacht werden zwischen einem Selbstmorder und 
zwischen einem, der sein Leben durch das Schicksal verlohren hat. Wer sein Leben durch 
Unma~igkeit verkOrzt, der ist zwar durch seine Unvorsichtigkeit Schuld daran , sein Tod kann ihm 
also indirecte imputirt werden , aber nicht directe. Er intendirte doch nicht sich zu toten . Es ist kein 
vorsetzlicher Tod. Denn aile unsere Vergehungen sind entweder culpa oder dolus. Obgleich nun 
hier kein dolus ist, so ist doch culpa. Zu dem kann man sagen: du bist selbst Schuld an deinem 
Tode, aber nicht: du bist ein Selbstmorder. Die Intention sich selbst zu destruiren macht den 
Selbstmord aus. lch mu~ also nicht die Unma~igkeit , die die Ursache der VerkOrzung des Lebens 
ist, zum Selbstmord machen, denn wenn ich die Unma~igkeit zum Selbstmord erhohe, so wird 
dadurch wieder der Selbstmord erniedriget und zur Unma~igke it gemacht. Es ist also ein 
Unterschied zwischen der Unvorsichtigkeit, wobey noch ein Wunsch zum Leben Obrig bleibt, und 
der Absicht sich selbst zu ermorden." 
16See for examples MC 371 . 
17See PPP 209f. 
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of private interests which attitude, according to Kant, is not only imprudent but 
vile ("niedertrachtig").18 
When and if life has to be risked is, however, according to Kant, a subtle 
question.191n one of the Reflexionen zur Moralphi/osophie Kant offers the 
following guideline: 
One has only a negative right concerning life: namely, the means of its 
preservation, to let go of what is n o t a I I o w e d , but not a positive 
one: to use the loss of the same [life] as a means. 2o 
According to this quote we are allowed to stop using those means for the 
preservation of life which are contrary to duty; but we are not allowed to use 
death as a means to pursue ends, which Kant, I believe, would argue include 
even moral ends. The duty not to dispose over our life is therefore an 
unconditioned duty because we have no right to dispose over our lives.21 
In sum, our discussion suggests that if we want to decide whether or not 
someone's action falls under Kant's definition of self-murder, we must ask two 
questions: first, does the agent cause her or his own death, and, second, does 
he or she intend to die? We will apply and further discuss these criteria when we 
turn to the discussion of the casuistical questions in the next chapter. Before we 
can do that, however, we need to analyze all those aspects of the crime of self-
murder which distinguish it from the crime of murder and justify its position as a 
crime in the "Doctrine of Virtue." 
18See MC 376f. 
19MC 377: "Die Frage ist sehr subtil , in wiefern [sic] wir unser Leben zu schatzen und in wie fern 
[sic] wires zu wagen haben?" 
20Reflexionen zur Moralphilosophie, vol. 19, no. 6979, 219: "Ober das Leben hat man nur ein 
negatives Recht: nemlich [seine] das Mittel seiner Erhaltung, was u n e rIa u b t ist, fahren zu 
lassen, aber kein positives: den Verlust desselben als Mittel zu brauchen." The square brackets 
are found in the text.--This argument might be of interest for the debate on suicide and assisted 
suicide which I will not enter into in this dissertation. 
21 Disposition in the sense of doing whatever we like with our lives. 
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Vices 
While presenting the subjective division of man's duties to himself as an "animal 
(natural) and moral being" in The Metaphysics of Morals, Kant states 
The vices that are opposed to man's duty to himself are murdering 
himself, the unnatural use of his sexual inclination, and such excessive 
consumption of food and drink as weakens his capacity for making 
purposive use of his powers.22 
According to this quote self-murder is a vice. 
In the case of a crime as well as a vice, the agent chooses freely to violate 
a duty; yet vices do not violate the external freedom of others but interfere with 
the inner freedom of the agent whose own conscience must be the judge of this 
interference. Whereas from the legal point of view the character of a person is of 
no concern, it is precisely the question whether a person has a good or evil 
character which matters from the moral point of view. 
In the introduction to "Doctrine of Virtue," we find two definitions of vice: 
Every action contrary to duty is called a transgression (peccatum) . It is 
when an intentional transgression has become a principle that it is 
properly called a vice (vitium) .23 
Comparing the above definition of a vice with that of a "crime (dolus)" as "an 
intentional transgression (i .e., one accompanied by consciousness of its being a 
transgression)," we see that both transgressions are intentional, that is, actions 
22Gregor 216 (MS 420: "Die Laster, welche hier der Pflicht des Menschen gegen sich selbst 
widerstreiten , sind der S e I b s t m o r d , der unnatorliche Gebrauch , den jemand von der 
G e s c h I e c h t s n e i g u n g macht, und der das Vermogen zum zweckmar3.igen Gebrauch 
seiner Krafte schwachende u n mar.. i g e Genu r.. de r N a h rungs mitt e I .") 
23Gregor 194 (MS 390: "Eine jede pflichtwidrige Handlung heir..t 0 be r t ret u n g (peccatum) . 
Die vorsetzliche aber, die zum Grundsatz geworden ist, macht eigentlich das aus, was man 
Last e r (vitium) nennt.") It is of interest that Kant translates "transgression" in the case of vice 
with peccatum (meaning: fault, error or sin) and in the case of crime with reatus (meaning : charge 
or something one stands accused of) . MS 224: "Eine pflichtwidrige That heir..t 0 b e r t r e t u n g 
(reatus) ." ' 
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where the agent knowingly violates a duty.z4 Even though human beings have a 
predisposition to evil which concept Kant discusses in the Religion as well as in 
the Lecture on the Metaphysic of Morals, vices are not innate, can be avoided 
and, like crimes, can be imputed to the agent who is considered to be free25 Yet 
vices are not only characterized as intentional transgressions but as 
transgressions where the very intention to transgress one's duty becomes the 
ruling principle of one's actions. 
According to the second definition, it is the faculty of desire which 
provides the hotbed for vices: 
A passion is a sensible desire that has become a lasting inclination (e.g ., 
hatred, as opposed to anger). The calm with which one gives oneself up 
to it permits reflection and allows the mind to form principles upon it and 
so, if inclination lights upon something contrary to the law, to brood upon 
it, to get it rooted deeply, and so to take up what is evil (as something 
premeditated) into its maxim. And the evil is then properly evil, [Gregor's 
footnote follows] that is , a true vice.zs 
The calm and tenacious pursuit of the satisfaction of a sensible desire can lead a 
person to a firm disposition and lasting intent to transgress a duty. A vice is thus 
not only a weakness or a lack of virtue but is the "real opposite" of virtue.z7 
24Gregor 50 (MS 224: "Eine v o r set z I i c h e [Obertretung] (d . i. diejenige, welche mit dem 
Bewuf1tsein, daf1 sie Obertretung sei , verbunden ist) heif1t Verb r e chen (dolus).") 
25Compare for example RGV 32, 36f; MSV 571 f. 
26Gregor 208 (MS 408: "L e i d e n s c h a f t dagegen ist die zur bleibenden Neigung gewordene 
sinnliche Beg i e r d e (z. B. der H a f1 im Gegensatz des Zorns). Die Ruhe, mit der ihr 
nachgehangen wird , laf1t Oberlegung zu und verstattet dem GemOth sich darOber Grundsatze zu 
machen und so, wenn die Neigung auf das Gesetzwidrige fallt, Ober sie zu brOten , sie tief zu 
wurzeln und das Bose dadurch (als vorsatzlich) in seine Maxime aufzunehmen; welches alsdann 
ein q u a I if i c i r t e s Bose, d. i. ein wahres Last e r, ist.") 
27 Gregor 189: "Virtue (= +a) is opposed to negative lack of virtue (moral weakness = 0) as its 
logical opposite (contradictorie oppositum); but it is opposed to vice(=- a) as its real opposite 
(contraries. rea/iter oppositum)." (MS 384: "Der Tugend =+a ist die negative U n t u-
g end (moralische Schwache) = 0 als I o g is c he s G e gent he i I (contradictorie 
oppositum) , das Laster aber =-a als Wid e r s pi e I (contraries. rea/iter opositum) entgegen 
gesetzt .. . ".) 
Since the "Doctrine of Virtue" unlike the "Doctrine of Right" is concerned with 
ends which are at the same time duties, we can assume that vices hinder or 
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make it impossible that those ends can be realized. In the following sections I 
will, first, situate the vice of self-murder in the broader context of Kant's doctrine 
of vices, second, I will turn to the discussion of evil and , third, I will discuss the 
implications of affects and passions for the crime of suicide. 
Kant's Doctrine of Vices 
In this section I will present a systematic overview of Kant's Doctrine of Vices, in 
order to get a first understanding of the vice of self-murder. I will, first, compare 
Kant's classifications of vices in the relevant lectures and the Religion with the 
classification of vices given in The Metaphysics of Morals. Second , I will briefly 
discuss the implications of Kant's Doctrine of Vices. 
The Lectures and The Metaphysics of Morals 
In the Lecture on the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant distinguishes between three 
vices: physical vices (dipsomania (ebrietas) and gluttony (voracitas)), devilish 
vices (for example ingratitude, envy, and gloating), and unnatural vices or so-
called crimina carnis contra naturam (c.c.c.n.) which comprise homosexuality, 
masturbation, and sodomy.za Hence, Kant identifies vices with crimes or 
"crimina." 
Whereas physical vices lower the human being to the level of animality; 
unnatural vices degrade the person below that level: 
28MSV 632: " .. . und distinguirt die Laster a) in physische .. . b) teuflische Laster ... c) die 
unnaturlichen Laster (crimina carnis contra naturam)." 
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All these crimina camis contra naturam involve a bestiality, that is they 
place the human being below the beast, among which , to be sure, no 
community exists, but nevertheless the mixture of different sexes which is 
restricted to animals.29 
In other words, c.c.c.n. "violate[s] even the natural laws of the beasts."30 They 
degrade the dignity of humanity in our person, turn the person into the most 
abominable object, and run counter to the end of nature.31 Devilish vices, 
however, transgress the natural propensity ("Hang") of a human being to evil and 
he or she seems to have adopted the principle of evil itself. 32 
Kant makes a similar point in the "Doctrine of Right" under Marriage Right 
where he distinguishes between the natural and unnatural use human beings 
make of their sexual organs: 
This is either a natural use (by which procreation of a being of the same 
kind is possible) or an unnatural use, and unnatural use takes place either 
with a person of the same sex or with an animal of a nonhuman species. 
Since such transgressions of principle, called unnatural (crimina camis 
contra naturam) or also unmentionable vices, do wrong to humanity in our 
29MSV 641 f: "Aile diese crimina carnis contra naturam involviren eine Bestialitc;it, d. i. sie setzen 
den Menschen unter das Vieh herab, unter welchem zwar keine Gemeinschaft, aber doch 
Vermischung verschiedenen Geschlechts, sowie unter Thieren selbst blieb. " I translate the last 
part of the sentence "unter ... blieb" with "restricted to" and changed the past tense to the present 
tense.--lt should be added that Kant's view that homosexual behavior is restricted to homo 
sapiens and is not found in the animal kingdom is incorrect. For homosexual matings in 
subhuman primates and lower mammals see for example Clellan S. Ford's and Frank A Beach's 
Patterns of Sexual Behavior (New York: Harper & Row, 1951), pp. 134-143. See also Linda Marie 
Fedigan's Primate Paradigms. Sex Roles and Social Bonds, 2nd. ed. (Chicago and London: The 
University of Chicago Press, 1992), pp. 101 , 133, 142-143, 149. For the question of animal 
societies compare, for example, Fedigan's chapter 14, pp. 307-321 where she discusses primate 
models for early human society. 
30MSV 632: " ... die unnatorlichen Laster (crimina carnis contra naturam). Diese gehoren zur 
Bestialitat, setzen den Menschen noch unter das Vieh herunter, so dar.. er selbst den Natur-
gesetzen des Viehes zuwieder handelt. " 
31 MSV 641: " .. . so ist eine contravention wider den Zweck der Natur nicht allein HerabwOrdigung 
der Menschheit in unserer Person, sondern man macht sich auch zum Gegenstande der gror..ten 
Verabscheuung, er mag Wollust an sich selbst [that is, masturbation] oder an einem Gegenstande 
seines Geschlechts [that is, in a homosexual relation] executiren." 
32MSV632. 
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own person, there are no limitations or exceptions whatsoever that can 
save them from being repudiated completely.33 
The only way to avoid the degradation of personality, which constitutes, 
according to the Lecture on the Metaphysics of Morals, a violation of the right of 
humanity, is to make sure that the association of the sexes displays a harmony 
between the natural drive and the morallaw.34 Kant stresses, however, that even 
though nature intended the sexual drive for propagation and procreation, and 
even though matrimony is the only form in which the exercise of sexual 
inclinations can be morally justified, it would be a violation of the dignity of 
humanity, if the purpose of marriage would be confined to procreation.35 
Kant starts the section on c.c.c.n. in the Lecture on Moral Philosophy, by 
saying: "The Crimina camis are contrary to the duty to oneself because they run 
counter to the end of humanity." He explains that the end of humanity with 
regard to one's sexual inclinations "is the preservation of the species without 
throwing away his person."36 
33Gregor 96 (MS 277: " ... und entweder ein n a t 0 r I i c h e r (wodurch seines Gleich en erzeugt 
werden kann), oder u n at 0 r I i c h e r Gebrauch und dieser entweder an einer Person 
ebendesselben Geschlechts, oder einem Thiere von einer anderen als der Menschengattung ; 
welche Obertretungen der Gesetze, unnatorliche Laster (crimina carnis contra naturam), die auch 
unnennbar heir..en, als L~sion der Menschheit in unserer eigenen Person durch gar keine 
Einschrankungen und Ausnahmen wider die g~nzliche Verwerfung gerettet weden konnen." 
34MSV 640: "Diese Verbindung mur.. also schlechthin auf der Uebereinstimmung des Naturtriebes 
mit dem moralischen Gesetz beruhen, und nur unter dessen Billigung, oder mit conservation 
unserer Personlichkeit konnen Geschlechter sich zum wechselseitigen Gebrauch ihrer Substanz 
dadurch besitzen, dar.. sie sich zum gemeinschaftlichen Eigenthum erwerben." 
35MSV 639: "Hieraus folgt nun auch, dar.. der mit der Geschlechtsverbindung beabsichtigte Zweck 
nicht darauf --ad propagandam et procreandam subolem -- eingeschr~nkt sey. Denn zwar hat die 
Natur bey Ein legung des Geschlechtstriebes im Menschen diesen Zweck vor Augen gehabt, allein 
es folgt daraus nicht, dar.. der Mensch auch darauf allein sein Augenmerk richten mosse. Denn 
ihm allein folgen , kann nicht anders geschehen, als dar.. er auf die WOrde seiner Menscheit gar 
nicht achtet ... ". SeeMS 277; MSV 638; compare MC 388. 
36MC 391 : "Die Crimina carnis sind der Pflicht gegen sich selbst entgegen , weil sie wider die 
Zwecke der Menschheit Iauten." MC 391 : " ... der Zweck der Menschheit in Ansehung der 
Neigung [the context suggests that Kant speaks of sexual inclinations] ist die Erhaltung der Arten 
ohne Wegwerfung seiner Person .. . ". 
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According to this lecture, c.c.c.n. are one of two kinds of crimina camis, the other 
being crimina camis secundum naturam (c.c.s.n.). The latter are contrary to 
"healthy reason,"37 and the former are "contrary to the natural instinct and 
animality."38 C.c.s.n. include not only vaga libido (roving desire) which comprises 
fornication (scortatio) as well as concubinage (concubinatus), but also adultery.3s 
Some of these particular crimina appear in the "Doctrine of Right," though no 
longer under the title crimina, but as characteristics of the natural sexual union 
which takes place "in accordance with mere animal nature (vaga libido, venus 
volgivaga, fomicatio)"and is distinguished from the natural union which takes 
place according to "principle" ("Gesetz").4D The second kind of the crimina 
corporis, mentioned in the lecture, are the c.c.c.n. which comprise masturbation, 
homosexuality of men or women, and sodomy.41 
Whereas Kant classifies gluttony and dipsomania (the physical vices) as 
well as c.c.c.n. in this lecture as "beastly vices" ("viehische Laster") because 
they, unlike the vice of lying, cannot be reconciled with the nature and character 
37MC 390: "Aile crimina carnis sind entweder secundum naturam oder contra naturam;" ibid. : "Die 
crimina carnis secundum naturam sind der gesunden Vernunft entgegen ." 
38MC 391 : "Zu den criminibus carnis contra naturam gehort der Gebrauch der Geschlechtes 
Neigung, der dem natorlichen lnstinkt und der Thierheit entgegen ist ... ". 
39MC 390. 
4DGregor 97 (MS 277: "Die natorliche Geschlechtsgemeinschaft ist nun entweder die nach der 
blof.!.en thierischen N at u r (vaga libido, venus volgivaga, fornicatio), oder nach dem G e set z .") 
41MC 391: ""Zu den criminibus carnis contra naturam gehort der Gebrauch der Geschlechtes 
Neigung, der dem natorlichen lnstinkt und der Thierheit entgegen ist, hiezu wird gerechnet die 
onania . ... Zweytens gehort zu den Criminibus carnis contra naturam die Gemeinschaft des sexus 
homogenii , wenn der Gegenstand der Geschlechtes-Neigung zwar unter den Menschen bleibt, 
aber verandert wird, wo die Gemeinschaft des sexus nicht heterogen, sander homogen ist, d. i. 
wenn ein Weib gegen ein Weib, und ein Mann gegen einen Mann seine Neigung befriediget. .. . 
Das dritte crimen carnis contra naturam: wenn der Gegenstand der Geschlechtes-Neigung zwar 
auf die Verschiedenheit des Geschlechts bleibt, aber vom Menschen unterschieden ist. Hiezu 
gehoren z. E. die Sodomiterey, die Gemeinschaft mit den Thieren." Compare also MS 425f.--Kant 
refers only to one meaning of sodomy namely the sexual intercourse with animals. If passions are 
only directed to other human beings (see section on "Passions of Natural Inclination and Suicide" 
at the end of this chapter) the question is whether sodomy can be called a true vice, since a true 
vice is based on principle and grows out of passion. 
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of the human being,42 the classification in the Lecture on the Metaphysics of 
Morals suggests that Kant distinguishes between beastly ("viehische") or 
physical vices, devilish vices, and bestial ('bestialische') vices, that is, c.c.c.n. , 
indicating thereby a distinction between vices which lower us to the level of an 
animal and vices which degrade us even below that level. 
Nowhere in the lectures is self-murder explicitly classified under any of the 
different kinds of vices, and nowhere does Kant provide a separate class for it. 
But he mentions self-murder while discussing the c.c.c.n. Both kinds of vices 
dishonor the human being43 because the subject disposes over herself or himself 
as a means to an end. By committing suicide the human being becomes a 
"blackguard" ("Aas"). Yet even though self-murder is 
the most horrible thing a human being can do, it is nevertheless not as 
ignoble as the crimina camis contra naturam; this is the most contemptible 
[act] a human being can commit.44 
Self-murder evokes "disgust with horror;" whereas the c.c.c.n. evoke "disgust 
with repulsion."45 
Given the above summary of the different vices, it seems that Kant 
distinguishes between four, rather than three, kinds of vices: self-murder, crimina 
42See MC 380: "Zu den viehischen rechnen wir diese: Fr~r..igkeit , Versoffenheit und die crimina 
carnis contra naturam." Kant uses the term "viehische Laster" also in MS 461 . 
43MM 1428. 
44MC 391f: "Der Selbstmord ist zwar das schrecklichste, was ein Mensch in Ansehung seiner 
begehn kann; er ist aber doch nicht so unedel und niedrig, als dies crimen carnis contra naturam; 
dieses ist das ver~chtlichste, was ein Mensch begehn kann." Compare MS 463. See also 
MC 372, 343, 375; MM 1481, 1507; MS 425; PPP 209. 
45MM 1504 ("Die hochste Verletzung der Pflichten gegen uns selbst, bringen entweder Abscheu 
mit Grausen hervor, von dieser Artist der Selbstmord, oder Abscheu mit Ekel, von dieser Art sind 
die Crimina Carnis.") Here Kant speaks of crimina carnis which include the c.c.c.n. See also MS 
425: "eke I haft e r Gegenstand." See footnote no. 52. Compare also footnote no. 161 . 
camis (crimina camis contra naturam, crimina camis secundum naturam), 
physical vices , and devilish vices.46 
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The different classes of vices reappear in The Metaphysics of Morals, 
where Kant classifies the vice of self-murder together with the c.c.c.n. and 
physical vices. C.c.c.n. correspond to the "unnatural use" of one's "sexual 
inclination," the physical vices correspond to the vice of "excessive consumption 
of food and drink," and devilish vices correspond to the "Vices of hatred for Men, 
Directly (contrarie) Opposed to Love of Them" which Kant discusses in the 
second part of the "Doctrine of Virtue" devoted to duties of virtue to others.47 
With the exception of c.c.s.n. and devilish vices, all these vices run counter to the 
natural impulse ("Antrieb") for the preservation of the animal nature which the 
duty of self-preservation protects by preserving the status of the human being as 
an end in itself.4B I suggest that this is the reason why the c.c.s.n., listed in the 
Lecture on Moral Philosophy, are not discussed in the "Doctrine of Virtue" under 
perfect duties to oneself, but mentioned in the "Doctrine of Right" under Marriage 
Right, since they are not contrary to the end of preservation and can be 
understood as a description of sexual interaction in the state of nature. 
Self-murder as well as c.c.c.n. are the most obvious cases of an 
interference with a principle of preservation in nature understood as an end of 
nature. When Kant states that "defiling oneself by lust" is prohibited because "by 
it man surrenders his personality (throwing it away), since he uses himself 
merely as a means to satisfy an animal impulse" he wants to argue that the 
461n the Lecture on Moral Philosophy the discussion of self-murder follows directly after the 
discussion of duties to the body with regard to life; physical vices are discussed under the title "Of 
Duties with regard to the body itself," and c.c.c.n. under the heading "Of Duties to the body with 
regard to sexual inclination." See MC 369, 378, 384. 
47Gregor 251 (MS 458). Space does not allow me to classify all the other vices discussed in MS. 
4Bcompare the section on "Self-love" in this chapter. 
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otherwise natural impulse is used in an "unnatural" way by the human being. In 
other words, nature has endowed us with impulses whose purpose we are not to 
abuse by arbitrarily satisfying the impulse. But Kant is sometimes ambiguous 
about whether it is the impediment of the end of nature which constitutes a vice , 
or whether the mere exercise of our animal instincts suffices to constitute a vice. 
Let me briefly explain this point: 
His distinction between c.c.c.n. and gluttony as well as dipsomania 
suggests that whereas the former are "unnatural" or "contrary to nature" the 
latter two are uncontrolled expressions of the animality of human beings.49 Yet, 
Kant does not consistently adhere to this distinction. While discussing the 
"brutish excess in the use of food and drink" and characterizing a drunk person 
as "a mere animal, not to be treated as a human being ," he also states that a 
person who incapacitates herself or himself in that way, debases herself or 
himself "below even the nature of an animal;"50 which , as was shown, is the main 
characteristic of the c.c.c.n. Despite the fact that gluttony when compared to 
drunkenness "is even lower than that animal enjoyment," Kant, nevertheless, 
believes that "it approaches even more closely the enjoyment of beasts."51 
And while comparing the c.c.c.n. with self-murder Kant states: 
But this does not explain the high degree of violation of the humanity in 
one's own person by such a vice in its unnaturalness, which seems in 
terms of its form (the disposition it involves) to exceed even murdering 
oneself. It consists, then , in this [see explanation in footnote]: That a man 
who defiantly casts off life as a burden is at least not making a feeble 
491n the Religion, Kant refers to gluttony, drunkenness, and wild lawlessness as "beastly vices." 
Greene/Hudson 22 (RGV 27:"v i e h i s c h e L a s t e r") . 
50Gregor 222f (MS 427). 
51 Since I have translated "viehische Laster" with "beastly vices," I have changed Gregor's 
translation on page 223: " ... so it approaches even more closely the enjoyment of cattle." 
(MS 427: " ... mithin sich dem Vieh noch mehr nahert.") 
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surrender to animal impulse in throwing himself away; murdering oneself 
requires courage, in this disposition there is still always room for respect 
for the humanity in one's own person. But unnatural lust, which is 
complete abandonment of oneself to animal inclination , makes man not 
only an object of enjoyment but, still further, a thing that is contrary to 
nature, that is, a loathsome object, and so deprives him of all respect for 
himself. 52 
Here again, Kant' describes the c.c.c.n. as the result of the total subjugation by 
animal inclinations even though he points out that animal inclinations as natural 
inclinations do not result in these so-called vices. 53 
The Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone and 
The Metaphysics of Morals 
In the first chapter of "Book One" of the Religion Kant offers a description of 
human nature under the title "Concerning the Original Predisposition toward 
Good in Human Nature." The predisposition ("Anlage") towards good comprises 
three different classes of predispositions which characterize the human being as 
a member of the human species54: the predisposition to animality ("Thierheit"), 
52Gregor 221 (MS 425: "Aber der hohe Grad der Verletzung der Menscheit in seiner eigenen 
Person durch ein seiches Laster in seiner Unnatorlichkeit, da es der Form (der Gesinnung) nach 
selbst das des Selbstmordes noch zu Obergehen scheint, ist dabei nicht erklart. Es sei denn, da~ . 
da die trotzige Wegwerfung seiner selbst im letzteren, als einer Lebenslast, wenigstens nicht eine 
weichliche Hingebung an thierische Reize ist, sondern Muth erfordert, wo immer noch Achtung fOr 
die Menschheit in seiner eigenen Person Platz findet, jene, welche sich ganzlich der thierischen 
Neigung Oberla!1t, den Menschen zur geniel1baren, aber hierin doch zugleich naturwidrigen 
Sache, d. i. zum e k e I h a f t e n Gegenstande, macht und so aller Achtung fOr sich selbst 
beraubt.") Gregor translates "Es sei denn" ("unless" or "provided that") with the more definite and 
stronger "It consists then in this." Gregor's translation suggests, that self-murder in general 
requires courage; but Kant specifies in this quote the particular kind of self-murder ("die trotzige 
Wegwerfung seiner selbst ... ") which can be called courageous. For a further discussion of the 
courage of the suicide see the section "Responses to the affect of fear: Courage versus 
cowardice" in this chapter. 
53The problem may be solved, if Kant distinguishes between an animal inclination and an animal 
instinct. 
54See RGV 26. 
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humanity ("Menschheit") , and personality ("Personlichkeit") . 55 These three 
predispositions concern only the faculty of desire ("Begehrungsvermogen") and 
the use of the empirical will ("Willkur") . Kant states: 
All of these predispositions are not only (in the negative sense) good (they 
are not in conflict with the moral law), but they are also predispositions 
toward good (they promote the observance of the same [the moral law]). 
They are original, for they are bound up with the possibility of human 
nature.56 
From this quote we can conclude, first, that all predispositions and not only the 
predisposition for personality promote the observance of the moral law. And , 
secondly, that since these predispositions are original ("ursprunglich") because 
they are the elements necessary to be a human being , 57 being human means 
promoting the observance of the moral law. Following Kant, it is only possible to 
use the first two predispositions, yet not the predisposition to personality, 
contrary to their ends ("zweckwidrig"), but it is not possible "to extirpate" 
("vertilgen") any of them. 
Classifying the first two predispositions Kant distinguishes between two 
kinds of physical self-love: mechanical and comparative self-love. He proposes 
to list the predisposition to animality under the heading of physical and merely 
mechanical self-love. 
55See RGV 26ff. It should be pointed out that Kant speaks of the "ursprOngliche Anlage zum 
Guten" and an "Anlage fOr dieT hie r he it .... ; ... Mensch he it ... ; .. . Per so I i c h-
k e it .. . . " (My underlining). 
561 changed the Greene/Hudson translation on page 23 of RGV 28: "Aile diese Anlagen im 
Menschen sind nicht allein (negativ) g u t (sie widerstreiten nicht dem moralischen Gesetze) , 
sondern sind auch Anlagen z u m Gut en (sie befordern die Befolgung desselben). Sie sind u r-
s pro n g I i c h; denn sie gehoren zur Moglichkeit der menschlichen Natur." 
571bid.: "Sie sind u r s p r 0 n g I i c h wenn sie zu der Moglichkeit eines solchen Wesens 
nothwendig gehOren." 
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The so-called "beastly vices" ("vie h is c he Laster") which are opposed to 
the three different kinds of mechanical self-love are gluttony ("Vollerei"), 
voluptuousness ("Wollust"), and wild lawlessness ("wilde Gesetzlosigkeit").5B 
Kant points out that the existence of these vices cannot simply be explained by 
pointing to the predisposition to animality as their root. 59 
The predisposition for humanity is understood in terms of physical yet 
comparative self-love. Kant explains that this kind of self-love makes us judge 
ourselves as happy or unhappy only in comparison with others. It is the basis for 
the "inclination to acquire worth in the opinion of others." For the exercise of this 
predisposition practical reason is necessary even though it is subservient to 
other incentives than its own.so Vices like envy ("Neid"), ingratitude 
("Undankbarkeit"), and gloating ("Schadenfreude") can originate from this 
disposition and are called "devilish vices" ('teuflische Laster") .61 
The predisposition to personality cannot be described in terms of self-love 
because it is defined as "the susceptibility for the respect for the moral law as an 
in itself sufficient incentive for the empirical wiJ/."62 According to Kant, nothing evil 
can be grafted on the predisposition to personality.s3 
ssunlike Greene/Hudson 22, I think that the meaning of "Vollerei" is captured by the term 
"gluttony" and we need not add "drunkenness" in order to render a precise translation . I translate 
"Wollust" with voluptuousness and not as Greene/Hudson with "lasciviousness." 
59RGV 26. 
60See RGV 28. 
61 My translation of "Schadenfreude" with "gloating" differs from Greene/Hudson who translate it 
with "spitefulness" ("Boshaftigkeit") on page 22. Compare also MS 458 where Kant refers to envy, 
ingratitude, and gloating as the "vices of hatred for human beings" which are "directly (contrarie) 
opposed" to the imperfect duties of love of human beings. In RGV 27 Kant indicates that a healthy 
rivalry between people does not exclude mutual love and is intended as a spur to culture. 
621 have changed the Greene/Hudson translation on pages 22f of RGV 27: "Die Anlage fUr die 
Personlichkeit ist die Empfanglichkeit der Achtung fUr das moralische Gesezt, a I s e i n e r 
f u r s i c h h i n reich en d e n T r i e b fed e r d e r W i II k U r." 
63RGV 27: " ... worauf schlechterdings nichts Boses gepfropft werden kann." 
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If we compare the classification of vices with the one in the "Doctrine of Virtue, " 
we observe that in The Metaphysics of Morals self-preservation and preservation 
of the species remain characteristics of the animality of human nature. Yet in the 
latter work, Kant replaces the drive for companionship and its corresponding vice 
"wild lawlessness" with the drive for the preservation of the capacity for animal 
enjoyment and the vice of gluttony. Furthermore, it is important to note that Kant 
does not mention the vice of self-murder in the Religion , but adds it in The 
Metaphysics of Morals in replacement for gluttony. In other words, according to 
the "Doctrine of Virtue," it is self-murder and not gluttony which is contrary to the 
end of self-preservation .64 
Implications of Kant's Doctrine of Vices 
If those instincts which we share with animals conform to the end of 
nature and display the orderliness of nature, then it is difficult to understand how 
the exercise of these instincts could constitute a vice. If it could, the 
characterization of the animality of human nature by animal instincts would 
64The differences between RGV and MS regarding the classifications of predispositions, 
impulses, and vices are indicated in the list below. 
RGV 27: 
Predisposition for animality Vices 
1. self-preservation 1. gluttony 
2. propagation of species and preservation of offspring 2. voluptuousness 
3. association with others 3. wild lawlessness 
MS 420: 
Impulses characterizing the "Man's Duty to Himself as Vices 
animality of the human being an Animal Being" 
1. self-preservation 1. duty not to mutilate or kill oneself 1. self-murder 
2. preservation of species 2. duty not to be unchaste 2. voluptuousness or unnatural 
3. preservation of the 
capacity to enjoy life 
3. duty not to excessively consume 
food and drink 
Terms in bold: duty, impulse or vice used in MS but not in RGV. 
Italicized terms: rearranged vice. 
Underlined terms: predisposition and vice no longer considered in MS. 
use of sexual inclination 
3. excessive consumption 
of food and drink/gluttony 
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contradict the orderliness of nature and therefore the teleological structure of 
nature. This is the reason why Kant has to assume that we somehow "abuse" 
the instinct for preservation by constructing new ends not intended by nature.65 
In other words, in order to uphold the teleological view of nature, Kant must 
argue that c.c.c.n., physical vices as well as self-murder, are not vices because 
they consist in exercising an animal instinct, but because the satisfaction of the 
otherwise natural instinct is exercised in an "unnatural" way or a way contrary to 
the end of nature.66 The "unnatural use" is therefore for Kant "misuse."67 
Furthermore, Kant must not only assume that the realization of the end of 
nature is made impossible, but that it is the free and, in the case of c.c.c.n. and 
physical vices, the repeated choice68 of the individual which makes it impossible. 
Despite the fact that the latter vices are grafted on an animal drive,69 they are, 
651n Muthmaf3/icher Anfang der Menschengeschichte, vol. 8, 111 Kant states: "AIIe in es ist eine 
Eigenschaft der Vernunft, dar.. sie Begierden mit BeihOife der Einbildungskraft nicht allein o h n e 
einen darauf gerichteten Naturtrieb, sondern sogar wid e r denselben erkonsteln kann , welche 
im Anfange den Namen der L 0 s t e r n h e i t bekommen, wodurch aber nach und nach ein 
ganzer Schwarm entbehrl icher, ja sogar naturwidriger Neigungen unter der Benennung der 
0 p p i g k e it ausgeheckt wird. " 
66For Kant that means that we sink below the animal level , even though some might want to argue 
that we "evolve above" the animal level. 
67Gregor 221 (MS 425: " ... naturwidrige Gebrauch (also Mir..brauch) ... ".) We already quoted 
Kant's understanding of "natural" and "unnatural" with regard to the commercium sexua/e. Only 
that use of one's sexual organs is natural "by which procreation of a being of the same kind is 
possible," and unnatural is that use where that is not possible. I believe that this is the reason why 
Kant raises the question of the permissibility of intercourse without the goal of procreation as well 
as intercourse with a pregnant or sterile woman (Kant does not consider the case of sterile man) 
in the "Doctrine of Virtue" in the section "On Defiling oneself by Lust" (MS 426). 
681f suicide is a vice then it is worthwhile noting that it differs from other vicious acts in that it 
cannot be repeated . Kant's understanding of the vice of self-murder stresses the intention of a 
specific act and not the frequency with which it is committed . Yet given Kant's own definition of 
vice as "acting from principle" the question is whether an intentional transgression can "become a 
principle" if one on ly acts once? 
69According to the Religion, it is only possible to misuse the predisposition to animality and 
humanity and not the predisposition to personality , and if such abuse presupposes free choice, it 
must be the empirical will which either interferes with the pred isposition for animality or the 
predisposition for humanity. 
288 
nevertheless, human vicesJO Evil, according to Kant, is never a result of our 
instincts or drives but the result of our free choices, and the duties to ourselves 
as animal and moral beings are duties which protect our animal nature or the 
end nature intended with regard to our animality by protecting the status of the 
human being as an end in itself. 
In the Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone Kant presents his account of 
evil. Contrary to the Stoics, Kant does not believe that inclinations by themselves 
cause evil: 
Natural inclinations, considered in themselves, are good, that is, not a 
matter of reproach, and it is not only futile to want to extirpate them but to 
do so would also be harmful and blameworthy. Rather, let them be tamed 
and instead of clashing with one another they can be brought into 
harmony in a wholeness which is called happiness.71 
Yet he also does not believe that the source of evil is "malignant reason" or "a 
thoroughly evil will."72 The view that our sensuous nature is the sole source of 
70Gregor 254: "If vice is taken in the sense of a basic principle (a vice proper) , then any vice, 
which would make human nature itself detestable, is inhuman when regarded objectively. But 
considered subjectively, that is, in terms of what experience teaches us about our species, such 
vices are still human. (MS 461 : "Aile Laster, welche selbst die menschliche Natur hassenswerth 
machen worden, wenn man sie (als qualificirt) in der Bedeutung von Grundsatzen nehmen wollte , 
sind in h u man, objectiv betrachtet, aber doch mensch I i c h, subjectiv erwogen: d. i. wie 
die Erfahrung uns unsere Gattung kennen lehrt.") In Vorarbeiten zur Tugend/ehre, val. 23, 396 
Kant speaks only of human and devilish vices. 
71Greene/Hudson 51 (RGV 58: "Natorliche Neigungen sind, an sic h s e I b s t bet r a c h-
t e t , g u t d. i . unverwerflich, und es ist nicht allein vergeblich, sondern es ware auch schadlich 
und tadelhaft, sie ausrotten zu wollen; man mul1 sie vielmehr nur bezahmen, damit sie sich 
untereinander nicht selbst aufreiben, sondern zur Zusammenstimmung in einem Ganzen, 
GIUckseligkeit genannt, gebracht werden konnen.") 
721n Opus postumum, val. 22, 290 Kant states: "Es ist ein gutes Princip im Menschen die Stimme 
des categ. lmperativs. Es ist kein boses Princip im Menschen (Energumenos) , denn das ist ein 
Wiederspruch : Nur dal1 er die Prinzipien in der Vernunft hat aber doch auch Sinnenreiz das ist 
das Bose in ihm das er selbst hal1t." 
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evil would reduce the human being to an animal and could not account for moral 
evil, and the view of malignant reason would turn the human being into a deviiJ3 
Rather, Kant locates the source of evil in our free empirical will ("WillkOr") : 
... genuine evil consists in this, that a man does not will to withstand those 
inclinations when they tempt him to transgress--so it is really this 
disposition that is the true enemy. 74 
Kant believes that every human being, "even the most wicked ," hears the call of 
conscience, and he rejects the view that there are cases where human beings 
"repudiate the moral law in the manner of a rebel (renouncing obedience to it) ."?s 
Distinguishing between two different incentives "the law or the sensuous impulse 
[Sinnenantrieb]" Kant thus declares that we "naturally" adopt both of them into 
our maximsJ6 For him, it is not a question of their difference but a question of 
determining the hierarchy between them which makes a human being good or 
evil: 
Hence the distinction between a good man and one who is evil cannot lie 
in the difference between the incentives which they adopt into their maxim 
(not in the content of the maxim), but rather must depend upon 
subordination (the form of the maxim), i.e., which of the two incentives he 
makes the condition of the other. Consequently man (even the best) is evil 
only in that he reverses the moral order of the incentives when he adopts 
73Greene/Hudson 30 (RGV 34f). 
741bid. 51 footnote (Ibid . 58 footnote: " ... das eigentliche Bose aber besteht darin: daP., man jenen 
Neigungen , wenn sie zur Obertretung anreizen, nicht widerstehen w i II , und diese Gesinnung ist 
eigentlich der wahre Feind.") . 
75Greene/Hudson 31 (RGV 36: "Der Mensch (selbst der ~rgste) thut, in welchen Maximen es 
auch sei , auf das moralische Gestz nicht gleichsam rebellischerweise (mit AufkOndigung des 
Gehorsams) Verzicht.")--1 will not enter into the debate whether or not Kant's account of evil can 
be defended. See, for example, John Silber's article "Kant at Ausschwitz," Proceedings of the 
Sixth International Kant Congress, val. 1, ed. Gerhard Funke and Thomas Seebohm (Washington, 
D.C.: Center for Advanced Research in Phenomenology & University Press of America, 1991), 
pp. 177-211. For a response to this article see Lee F. Kerckhove "Moral Fanatism and the 
Holocaust: A Defense of Kant Against Silber," Philosophy in the Contemporary World 1 (Spring 
1994): 21 -25. 
76Greene/Hudson 31 (RGV 36: "Da er nun natorlicherweise beide in dieselbe aufnimmt ... ".) 
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them into his maxim. He adopts, indeed, the moral law along with the law 
of self-love; yet when he becomes aware that they cannot remain on a par 
with each other but that one must be subordinated to the other as its 
supreme condition , he makes the incentive of self-love and its inclinations 
the condition of obedience to the moral law; whereas, on the contrary, the 
latter, as the supreme condition of the satisfaction of the former, ought to 
have been adopted into the universal maxim of the will as the sole 
incentiveJ7 
Kant's account of moral evil shows that as soon as we follow the moral law only 
under the condition that our inclinations can be satisfied, it is the principle of self-
love and not the moral law which rules our actions. Because Kant believes that 
there is a "moral order" ("sittliche Ordnung") or standard which entails the priority 
of the incentive of the moral law over that of the law of self-love, he can use the 
reversal of the order of incentives as an explanation for the existence of evil. 
Self-love, Kant stresses later in the text, "when taken as the principle of all our 
maxims, is the very source of evil."78 
The following consequences can be drawn from the aforesaid for Kant's 
view of self-murder. First, since Kant considers self-murder to be a vice, and that 
77Greene/Hudson 31f (RGV 36: "Also muB der Unterschied, ob der Mensch gut oder bose sei , 
nicht in dem Unterschiede der Triebfeder, die er in seine Maxime aufnimmt (nicht in dieser ihrer 
Materie} , sondern in der U n t e r or d n u n g (der Form derselben) liegen: we I c h e v o n 
be ide n e r z u r Bed in gun g de r andere n mach t . Folglich ist der Mensch (auch 
der Beste) nur dadurch bose, daB er die sittliche Ordnung der Triebfedern in der Aufnehmung 
derselben in seine Maximen umkehrt: das moralische Gesetz zwar neben dem der Selbstliebe in 
dieselbe aufnimmt, da er aber inne wird , daB eines neben dem andern nicht bestehen kann , 
sondern eines dem andern als seiner obersten Bedingung untergeordnet werden mosse, er die 
Triebfeder der Selbstliebe und ihre Neigungen zur Bedingung der Befolgung des moralischen 
Gesetzes macht, da das letztere vielmehr als die o b e r s t e B e d i n g u n g der Befriedigung 
der ersteren in die allgemeine Maxime der WillkOr als alleinige Triebfeder aufgenommen werden 
sollte.")--Kant speaks of the incentive of the sensuous impulse as well as the incentive of self-
love, the law of self love, or the subjective principle of self-love. On the one hand he says that we 
adopt the incentives of our sensuous nature "in accordance with the subjective principle of self-
love" into our maxim, and on the other hand he says that we adopt "the moral law along with the 
law of self-love." Yet these two descriptions are different: in the first case, the incentive is a 
"sensuous impulse" which is selected according to the principle of self-love; and in the second 
case, self-love itself is the adopted incentive. 
78Greene/Hudson 41 (RGV 45). 
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is, an evil, he must assume that the suicide reverses "the moral order of the 
incentives when he adopts them into his maxim" and acts out of self-love. In 
other words, he must believe that the suicide kills herself or himself because she 
or he wants to satisfy sensuous impulses. Second, since a vice is based on 
passion we must assume that the self-murderer chooses a maxim which is 
contrary to law and which serves the only purpose to satisfy a sensible desire 
turned into a lasting inclination . Our next concern will be the further clarification 
of the role of self-love and passion in suicide. 
Self-love 
The concept of self-love ("Selbstliebe") plays an important part in Kant's 
justification of suicide as an immoral action . The following analysis of passages 
from the Groundwork, the Religion , and The Metaphysics of Morals will show 
that Kant distinguishes between self-love as a part of human beings' natural 
make-up and self-love as a principle by means of which human beings choose 
those maxims which are most likely to satisfy their natural inclinations and to 
reach individual happiness. As a part of the natural make-up, self-love serves, 
among other things, to preserve the individual life and that of the species, and 
the principle of self-love in its proper use can be understood as the analogue to 
the "natural" impulse. I will suggest, first, that this distinction allows Kant to argue 
explicitly that a suicide interferes with the natural function or end of self-love and , 
second, that his argument implies that the suicide makes an irrational use of the 
principle of self-love. 
The Function of Self-love in Nature 
We already mentioned that Kant distinguishes in the Religion three 
predispositions which characterize the human being: the predisposition to 
animality, to humanity, and to personality. The ends of the different 
predispositions of nature are preservation, culture, and good character. Kant 
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only refers to the first two predispositions under the title of self-love. The 
predisposition to animality is characterized as "physical and purely mechanical 
self-love" ("physische und blor., m e c h a n i s c h e Selbstliebe"). The 
predisposition to humanity is characterized as "self-love which is physical and yet 
compares" and requires reason. 
Kant speaks of "mechanical" self-love because the predisposition to 
animality which is directed towards self-preservation, the propagation of the 
species as well as the preservation of the offspring, and the association with 
other human beings, can be exercised independently from reason--it does not 
"require" reason and is not rooted in reasonJ9 Kant seems to identify each of 
these different kinds of mechanical self-love with a drive ("Trieb"), but mentions 
in the Religion only a sexual drive and a social drive and not as in The 
Metaphysics of Morals a drive for self-preservation .ao 
79RGV 26: "Die Anlage fOr die Thierheit im Menschen kann man unter den allgemeinen Titel der 
physischen und blor.. m e c h a n i s c h e n Selbstliebe, d. i. einer solchen bringen, wozu nicht 
Vernunft erfordert wird ;" ibid. 28: "Wenn wir die genannten drei Anlagen nach den Bedingungen 
ihrer Moglichkeit betrachten, so find en wir, dar.. die e r s t e keine Vernunft, ... zur Wurzel 
habe .. . ". Greene/ Hudson 22f translate: " .. . wherein no reason is demanded" and " ... requires no 
reason .... " 
ao1 say "seems" because it is not completely clear whether or not Kant identifies the respective 
kinds of mechanical self-love with a drive (see my italicization of part of the quote) or whether he 
distinguishes between the predisposition as an end of human nature and the drive as the means 
to realize it (see my underlining of part of the quote) . RGV 26: "Sie ["die Anlage fOr die Thierheit" 
or "mechanische Selbstliebe"] ist dreifach: e r s t I i c h zur Erhaltung seiner selbst; z w e i t e n s 
zur Fortplanzung seiner Art durch den Trieb zum Geschlecht und zur Erhaltung dessen, was 
durch Vermischung mit demselben erzeugt wird ; d r itt e n s zur Gemeinschaft mit andern 
Menschen, d. i. der Trieb zur Gesellschaft." 
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In general, Kant uses terms like "immediate inclination" for life, 81 "love of life," 
"sexual love"B2 as well as a "natural instinct"B3 for the continuation of life, to refer 
to the impulses by means of which nature strives for the preservation of the 
individual or the species. In the section on "Natural End (Naturzweck) and Ends 
of Nature" in the Chapter on "Ends," we quoted Kant's statement that "just as 
love of life is destined by nature to preserve the person, so sexual love is 
destined by it to preserve the species."B4 In the Anthropology, while pointing to 
the theological implications of his teleological view of impulses, Kant states that 
the aforementioned impulses are the "strongest impulses of nature."B5 
What we have said thus far shows that love of life is a kind of mechanical 
self-love. Furthermore, in the section on "Kant's Doctrine of Vices," we 
suggested that crimina carnis contra naturam and the physical vices are vices 
because the individual chooses to abuse the otherwise "natural" instinct. With 
regard to the impulse which strives for the preservation of the species the 
"abuse" consists in "unnatural use (and so misuse) of one's sexual attributes."B6 
With regard to the impulse for the preservation of one's capacity to enjoy life, the 
B1GMS 397. 
B2MS 424: "So wie die Liebe zum Leben von der Natur zur Erhaltung der P e r s o n , so ist die 
Liebe zum Geschlecht von ihr zur Erhaltung der Art bestimmt .... " Compare also PPP 208. 
B3oer Streit der Faku/taten val. 7, 99. 
B4For this quote from MS 424 see the Chapter on "Ends" footnote no. 104. 
B5Gregor 142f (ApH 276f: "Die starksten Antriebe der Natur, welche die Stelle der unsichtbar das 
menschliche Geschlecht durch eine hohere, das physische Weltbeste allgemein besorgende 
Vernunft (des Weltregieres) vertreten, ohne dal?> menschliche Vernunft dazu hinwirken darf, sind 
Liebe z u m Leben und Liebe z u m G esc hIe c h t ; die erstere um das Individuum, 
die zweite um die Species zu erhalten, da dann durch Vermischung der Geschlechter im Ganzen 
das Leben unserer mit Vernunft begabten Gatttung f o r t s c h r e i t e n d erhaltend wird , 
unerachtet diese absichtlich an ihrer eigenen Z erst 6 r u n g (durch Kriege) arbeitet; welche 
doch die immer an Cultur wachsenden vernOnftigen Gesch6pfe selbst mitten in Kriegen nicht 
hindert, dem Menschengeschlecht in kommenden Jahrhunderten einen GIOckseligkeitszustand, 
der nicht mehr rOckgangig sein wird , im Prospect unzweideutig vorzustellen .") 
B6Gregor 221 (MS 425: " ... naturwidrige Gebrauch (also Mil?>brauch) seiner 
Geschlechtseigenschaft .. . ".)Also Gregor 216 (MS 420:" ... unnatorliche Gebrauch, den jemand 
von der G esc hIe c h t s n e i gun g macht ... ".) 
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abuse consists in "excessive consumption of food and drink."B7 In both cases a 
vice is grafted onto but not caused by an existing impulse. By analogy we can 
assume that self-murder represents a willful abuse of the impulse of love of life. If 
love of life is understood as an instinctive avoidance of physical harm or pain 
with the purpose of preserving the individual , self-murder, even though it might 
serve the avoidance of pain , is, nevertheless, a willful action contrary to the 
impulse's end to preserve physical existence. sa 
The Principle of Self-love 
The principle of self-love is the principle of one's own happiness: 
Now a rational being's consciousness of the agreeableness of life which 
without interruption accompanies his whole existence is h a p p i n e s s , 
and to make this the supreme ground for the determination of choice 
[Willkur] constitutes the principle of self-love. Thus all material principles, 
which place the determining ground of choice in the pleasure or 
displeasure to be received from the reality of any object whatsoever, are 
entirely of o n e k i n d. Without exception they belong under the 
principle of self-love or one's own happiness. ag 
If happiness becomes the supreme ground for the determination of the empirical 
will and we act according to the principle of self-love, we strive solely for the 
satisfaction of our desires and are therefore ruled by our inclinations. The 
resulting heteronomy of the will is the opposite of the autonomy of the will, since 
B7Gregor 216 (MS 420: " ... u n m a~ i g e Genu~ de r N a h rungs mitt e I .") 
aacompare Gregor (1963) 138. 
B9Beck 20f (KpV 22: "Nun ist aber das Bewu~tsein eines vernOnftigen Wesens von der 
Annehmlichkeit des Lebens, die ununterbrochen sein ganzes Dasein begleitet, die G I 0 c k -
s e I i g k e i t , und das Princip, diese sich zum hochsten Bestimmungsgrunde der WillkOr zu 
machen, das Princip der Selbstliebe. Also sind aile materiale Principien, die den 
Bestimmungsgrund der WillkOr in der aus irgend eines Gegenstandes Wirklichkeit zu 
empfindenden Lust oder Unlust setzen, so fern ganzlich e i n e r I e i A r t , da~ sie insgesammt 
zum Princip der Selbstliebe oder eigenen GIOckseligkeit gehoren.")--1 have added the spacing 
between letters to Beck's translation . 
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only a maxim which can be universalized and thus has legislative form qualifies 
as the determining ground of an autonomous will. But the maxim to satisfy one's 
individual desires cannot take on legislative form because it cannot be 
universalized. This does, however, not mean that any action done from self-love 
is immoral. In fact, Kant stresses that happiness is not only the first thing we 
unconditionally desire as natural beings,9o that it is natural for rational beings to 
strive for happiness,91 but that we have a duty to secure our happiness.92 
However, it is not happiness but the worthiness to be happy, that is, the 
establishment of a good will which is the first priority of a rational being.93 As long 
as the principle of self-love does not violate the moral law, we cannot speak of 
an immoral action. The violation only occurs if the empirical will is solely 
governed by the principle of self-love and the moral law is ignored. 
In the Religion Kant distinguishes between two kinds of self-love: love of 
good will ("Wohlwollen," benevolentia) and love of or concern for one's well being 
("Wohlgefallen," complacentia).94 
Kant states again that it is natural to adopt love of good will into one's 
maxim because everyone wants to be well. Furthermore, love of good will toward 
oneself is rational for two reasons: first, because "with regard to the end , only 
that is chosen which can coexist with the greatest and enduring welfare ;" and 
secondly, because "the fittest means for each of these components of happiness 
9DGreene/Hudson 41 footnote (RGV 46 footnote) . 
91 Paton 83 (GMS 415) . 
92Paton 67 (GMS 399) . 
93Paton 64 (GMS 396) . 
94Greene/Hudson 41 footnote (RGV 45 footnote: " ... so kann auch S e I b s t I i e b e in die des 
W o hI w o II ens und des W o hI g e fa II ens (benevo/entiae et complacentiae) eingetheilt 
werden ... ". Compare Kant's approach to self-love in KpV 73 where it is solipsism ("Selbstsucht") 
which is divided into self-love (phi/autia) or "Wohlwollen" towards one's self and "Wohlgefallen an 
sich selbst" (arrogantia). Self-love is here solely understood in terms of "Wohlwollen" toward 
oneself. 
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[meaning, I take it, all of the ends whose satisfaction make up happiness] are 
chosen."9s Kant makes clear that in this case reason serves only as an 
instrument to satisfy the natural inclinations. If the amoral maxim of instrumental 
reason becomes the unconditioned principle of the empirical will, it is the "source 
of an incalculably great antagonism to morality."96 
The rational concern for one's well being is either identical with the love of 
good will toward oneself, or it is love of reason ("Vernunftliebe"), 97 that is, moral 
self-love. The latter makes reverence for the law the highest incentive of the 
empirical will and is thus an expression of the unconditional respect for the law. 
Thus love of one's self serves either to satisfy one's inclinations or the demands 
of the law; and only if the first kind of self-love is in conflict with the law is an 
action immoral. 
Self-love and Suicide 
We mentioned in the Chapter on "Duties" that Kant, while illustrating the first 
formula of the categorical imperative in the Groundwork, uses the example of the 
suicide who wants to kill himself because of self-love: 
1. A man feels sick of life as the result of a series of misfortunes that has 
mounted to the point of despair, but he is still so far in possession of his 
reason as to ask himself whether taking his own life may not be contrary 
to his duty to himself. He now applies the test 'Can the maxim of my 
951 have changed Greene/Hudson's translation on page 41 footnote of RGV 45 footnote: " ... it is 
also rational so far as, on the one hand, that end is chosen which can accord with the greatest 
and most abiding welfare, and, on the other, the fittest means are chosen (to secure] each of the 
components of happiness." ("Sie [die Liebe des Wohlwollens] ist aber sofern vernOnftig , als theils 
in Ansehung des Zwecks nur dasjenige, was mit dem groBten und dauerhaftesten Wohlergehen 
zusammen bestehen kann, theils zu jedem dieser Bestandstocke der GIOckseligkeit die 
tauglichsten Mittel gewt3hlt werden.") 
961bid . 
97Greene/Hudson 41 footnote translate it with "rational self-love." 
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action really become a universal law of nature?' His maxim is 'From self-
love I make it my principle to shorten my life if its continuance threatens 
more evil ["Obel;" Y. U.] than it promises pleasure'. The only further 
question to ask is whether this principle of self-love can become a 
universal law of nature. It is then seen at once that a system of nature by 
whose law the very same feeling whose function (Bestimmung) is to 
stimulate the furtherance of life should actually destroy life would 
contradict itself and consequently could not subsist as a system of nature. 
Hence this maxim cannot possibly hold as a universal law of nature and is 
therefore entirely opposed to the supreme principle of all duty.sa 
According to this quote, Kant distinguishes between different meanings of self-
love. The motive of self-love of the potential suicide to avoid pain or displeasure, 
the subjective principle or maxim of the agent "to shorten ... life if its continuance 
threatens more evil [Obel] than it promises pleasure," and, possibly, the feeling 
of self-love. I say "possibly" because I believe that the term "feeling" 
("Empfindung") can also refer to the feeling of being sick of life ("Oberdru~ am 
Leben empfinden") and hence refers to the feeling of pain or displeasure.99 
According to the latter interpretation, the function of the feeling of being sick is 
similar to the one which Kant ascribes to pain which he regards as a stimulus for 
98Paton 89 (GMS 421f: "1) Einer, der durch eine Reihe von Obeln, die bis zur Hoffnungslosigkeit 
angewachsen ist, einen Oberdruf:l> am Leben empfindet, ist noch so weit im Besitze seiner 
Vernunft, daf:l> er sich selbst fragen kann , ob es auch nicht etwa der Pflicht gegen sich selbst 
zuwider sei , sich das Leben zu nehmen. Nun versucht er: ob die Maxime seiner Handlung wahl 
ein allgemeines Naturgesetz werden konne. Seine Maxime aber ist: ich mache es mir aus 
Selbstliebe zum Princip, wenn das Leben bei seiner langern Frist mehr Obel droht, als 
Annehmlichkeit verspricht, es mir abzukOrzen. Es fragt sich nur noch, ob dieses Princip der 
Selbstliebe ein allgemeines Naturgesetz werden konne. Da sieht man aber bald , daf:l> eine Natur, 
deren Gesetz es ware, durch dieselbe Empfindung, deren Bestimmung es ist, zur Beforderung 
des Lebens anzutreiben , das Leben selbst zu zerstoren , ihr selbst widersprechen und also nicht 
als Natur bestehen worde, mithin jene Maxime unmoglich als allgemeines Naturgesetz stattfinden 
konne und folglich dem obersten Princip aller Pflicht ganzlich widerstreite.")--Paton translates "als 
Natur bestehen" correctly with "subsist as a system of nature." Furthermore, he translates 
"Empfindung" with "feeling" but uses the word "sensation" in his commentary. See also the next 
footnote. 
991n The Categorical Imperative. A Study in Kant's Moral Philosophy (New York: Harper & Row, 
1967) H. J. Paton does not consider the possibility that feeling/sensation ("Empfindung") might 
refer to the feeling to being tired of life ("Oberdruf:l> am Leben empfindet") , and he remarks on page 
148 that self-love is "described here oddly as a sensation ." It is, however, no longer odd if we 
assume that Kant refers to the sensation of being tired of life. 
change. Even though pain is the feeling of life being hindered, "pain must 
precede any enjoymenf."1oo Kant expresses the life-affirming function of pain 
when he states: 
298 
Pain is the spur of activity, and it is in activity, above all, that we feel our 
life; without pain, inertia would set in.1o1 
If the function of pain or displeasure in general, is to "stimulate the furtherance of 
life," pain or the feeling of being sick of life can be said to play a constructive role 
in life. If, therefore, the suicide regards the feeling of being sick of life as a 
reason to kill himself because he wants to avoid pain, he undermines the 
function of pain in nature, and his action can be called shortsighted.1o2 If the 
avoidance of pain is valued higher than the purpose nature intended with pain, 
then the end of nature cannot be realized. In other words, if the principle of self-
love (the principle to avoid pain and strive for pleasure) is the sole principle 
which rules our actions, the furtherance of life becomes impossible. The same 
basic assumptions can be made, if the term "feeling" refers to self-love. 
Kant assumes in the quote from the Groundwork that by thinking of the 
maxim of the potential suicide as a universal law of nature, it is possible to 
decide whether killing oneself constitutes a violation of the duty to oneself. He 
believes that the maxim "From self-love I make it my principle to shorten my life if 
its continuance threatens more evil ["Obel"] than it promises pleasure" cannot 
hold as a universal law of nature and is therefore contrary to the moral law. The 
100Gregor100(ApH231 : "Aiso mul1 vor jedemVergnOgen der Schmerz 
v o r h e r g e h e n .") 
101 Gregor 100 (ApH 231 : "Der Schmerz ist der Stachel der Thatigkeit, und in dieser fOhlen wir 
allererst unser Leben ; ohne diesen worde Leblosigkeit eintreten .") 
1021n Reflexionen zur Anthropologie val. 15 I, no. 536, 235 Kant states: "Die Bestimmung des 
Menschen ist nicht, hier iemals GIOcklich zu seyn, sondern unaufhorlich durch Schmerz getrieben 
zu werden, seine Talente zu entwikeln ." 
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question is, however, why does Kant think that it cannot hold as universal law of 
nature? In his argument Kant assumes that the feeling of self-love or pain 
stimulates or causes the furtherance of life. If this function of the feeling is 
regarded as a universal law of nature, it cannot be the case that the same feeling 
causes the destruction of life.103 In other words, it cannot be a universal law of 
nature that the feeling of self-love or of pain results in the destruction of life. It is 
precisely because the maxim of the suicide purports what is impossible, namely, 
that the feeling of self-love or pain can result in the destruction of life that Kant 
states "hence this maxim cannot possibly hold as a universal law of nature." 
To put the matter differently, if it is a universal law of nature that the 
purpose of self-love--or, if we adhere to the first line of interpretation , of pain--is 
the furtherance of life, it cannot be the case that there are instances where the 
same feeling results in the destruction of life. In other words, the case of the 
suicide who destroys his life from self-love would contradict the universality of a 
law of nature, according to which self-love or pain is a feeling or sensation that 
promotes life. Kant is not argu ing that if everyone would commit suicide no on 
would be "left to do so,"104 but that it would make nature, understood as the 
"universality of the law governing the production of effects" impossible.1os Since 
self-murder from self-love does not pass the test of the categorical imperative, 
or, to put it differently, since the self-murderer tries to exempt himself from the 
103To be precise Kant should have spoken of the "only" function of the feel ing . 
1 041n his translation of GMS on page 137 footnote no. 1, Paton rightly criticizes those 
commentators who held this view and states : "There is clearly no trace of such an argument here 
(or indeed anywhere else, so far as I know), and the reader should be on his guard against such 
absurd ities."--A summary of the criticism which has been launched at Kant's discussion of su icide 
in GMS is found in Leo Henri Wilde's Hypothetische und kategorische Imperative (Bonn: Bouvier 
Verlag , 1975), pp. 123-146. 
105Paton 89 (GMS 421 : "Weil die Allgemeinheit des Gesetzes, wornach Wirkungen geschehen 
dasjenige ausmacht, was eigentlich N at u r im allgemeinen Verstande (der Form nach) , d. i. das 
Dasein der Dinge, heiBt ... ". ) 
universal law of nature in order to satisfy his inclinations, he violates a perfect 
duty to himself.106 
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Even though Kant's example of the suicide is intended to illustrate that 
only those maxims which can become a universal law of nature qualify as a 
moral law, it provides us also with some information about Kant's teleological 
view of human nature and nature in general--a topic we already discussed in the 
Chapter on "Ends." 
Had Kant, for example, assumed that the function of the feeling of self-
love or pain is to promote death, that is, had he assumed something like Freud's 
death instinct, the problem of universalizability would no longer arise, since the 
maxim of the suicide would not run counter to the function of the feeling, since its 
function would be self-destruction .1D7 Yet the Groundwork, or, for that matter, any 
other text by Kant of which I am aware, does not postulate a feeling with such a 
function, but Kant believes that: "to preserve one's life is a duty, and besides this 
every one has also an immediate inclination to do so."1 oa 
Unlike the feeling of self-love--or pain--whose function it is to stimulate the 
furtherance of life, the motive and the principle of self-love seem to allow for the 
destruction of life since their goal is to avoid pain . Kant seems to believe that the 
suicide twists or abuses the life-promoting feeling of self-love into a life-negating 
principle. I believe that the relationship between the end or purpose of the 
rational principle and the end of the sensible feeling of self-love can be described 
in two different ways. 
1 oscompare the Chapter on "Duties" footnote no. 8. 
107Even though Kant's concept of nature would have to be a different one and could no longer be 
defined as "existence of things so far as determined by universal law." (Paton 89/GMS 421 : 
" ... das Dasein der Dinge ... so fern es nach allgemeinen Gesetzen bestimmt ist ... ".) 
108Paton 65 (GMS 397: "Dagegen sein Leben zu erhalten , ist Pflicht, und uberdem hat jedermann 
dazu noch eine unmittelbare Neigung.") 
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Either the principle of self-love runs counter to the end of the feeling of self-love 
and shares only the name with the feeling, or the principle serves the same end 
as the natural feeling. According to the first alternative, happiness as the end of 
the principle of self-love would run counter to the function of the feeling of self-
love or pain to stimulate the furtherance of life. According to the second 
alternative, the striving for happiness coincides with the furtherance of life. The 
latter alternative would, however, require that the principle of self-love cannot, to 
speak with the Religion, be the supreme principle of the agent's actions; it cannot 
rule absolutely or universally. In other words, only if the principle to strive for 
one's happiness is restricted by or subjected to the moral law can it serve the 
same end as the feeling of self-love. 
Kant seems to believe that the first alternative characterizes the suicide's 
immoral employment of the principle of self-love which is contrary to the function 
of the feeling of either pain or self-love, and the second alternative refers to the 
moral employment of self-love. The suicide's immoral use of the principle of self-
love must therefore be distinguished from the moral use of the principle of self-
love where the person decides not to commit suicide. Kant seems to believe that 
the suicide acts irrationally when he makes the principle of self-love the 
unconditioned principle of his action, since in doing so he undermines his 
autonomy. Furthermore, he seems to believe that if happiness as the satisfaction 
of an integrated whole of personal ends109 is the goal of every human being as a 
109See also Paton (1967) 85, 92 who distinguishes two views of happiness in Kant. According to 
the "hedonistic view" of happiness Kant regards "happiness as little more than the greatest 
possible amount of continuous or uninterrupted pleasure throughout the whole of life." Happiness 
is understood as the "final end" of all human beings and the function of practical reason is "to will 
the appropriate means to this clearly envisage end." According to the second view, happiness is 
"regarded as the total satisfaction of our needs and inclinations, ... and what was formerly 
considered as a means to happiness is now considered as an element in happiness." In this case 
we do not have a clear understanding what makes us happy and practical reason "must aim at 
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being of nature, and self-love serves to reach that happiness under the condition 
that it is subjected to the moral law, then it is irrational to make self-love the 
unconditional principle of our action since it will make the attainment of 
happiness impossible. In other words , Kant's argument shows that it is irrational 
to satisfy a singular need at the expense of all others since it is only,the 
satisfaction of the integrated whole of ends that can provide happiness; the 
destruction of life caused by the hedonistic principle cannot serve to promote it. It 
is therefore impossible that the maxim of the suicide can become a universal law 
of nature. 
To summarize: first, our findings in the last three sections suggest that we 
must distinguish between mechanical self-love and a feeling of self-love on the 
one hand, and a principle of self-love on the other. The end of the feeling of self-
love, described in the Groundwork, is to stimulate the furtherance of life, and the 
ends of physical and purely mechanical self-love, according to the Religion, are 
self-preservation, propagation of the species, and community with others. In The 
Metaphysics of Morals Kant also lists an impulse for self-preservation, but does 
not refer to it under the title of self-love. The texts indicate that we must 
distinguish between the automatic and natural striving of a feeling, predisposition 
or impulse for either the promotion and/or preservation of life and the adoption of 
the hedonistic or of the moral principle of self-love. 
We already showed in the section on "Ends of Nature" in the Chapter on 
"Ends" that, according to Kant, preservation is an end of nature and that 
impulses, like the love of life and sexual love are sufficient to accomplish this 
satisfying as many as possible of our needs in an organised life or (as Kant puts it) at bringing our 
natural inclinations into harmony with one another in a whole called happiness ... In so doing 
practical reason manifests itself as prudence or rational self-love." 
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goal of nature. In short, with regard to preservation as an end of nature, our 
animal nature provides us with all the means needed to accomplish the end of 
mechanical self-love. Yet we also stressed that the duty to preserve oneself 
cannot be based on an impulse for preservation, that is, on mechanical self-
love.110 
Since self-preservation is one of the ends of mechanical self-love which is 
accomplished independently from reason , and since, as was shown earlier, the 
duty of self-preservation is not based on an instinct for self-preservation, we 
must distinguish between "mechanical" or "instinctive" self-preservation and 
"moral" self-preservation , that is , self-preservation as a result of the compliance 
with the duty of self-preservation. 
The reason why Kant finds it necessary to postulate a duty of self-
preservation even though the impulse is sufficient to realize this end , is that 
human beings are free. This freedom, even though it is on the one hand 
responsible for the development of a good will, is on the other hand also 
destructive as the example of self-murder illustrates. In order to avoid the 
destructive aspect of freedom it must be regulated. Unlike the rest of nature, 
which can safely rely on an instinct for its preservation , the potential for 
destruction inherent in unrestricted freedom makes it necessary to postulate a 
duty of self-preservation . We will return to the destructive aspects of freedom in 
the last part of this dissertation. 
Finally, for Kant, self-murder can never be viewed as an act done from 
duty or from immediate inclination but is an action ruled by the hedonistic 
110MS 445: "Denn abgesehen von dem BedOrfn i ~ der Selbsterhaltung, welches an sich keine 
Pflicht begronden kann ... ". Gregor translates this sentence on page 240 as follows: "For, quite 
apart from the need to maintain himself, which in itself cannot establish a duty .. . ". 
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principle of self-love. The suicide kills himself because he wants to avoid or 
escape an unpleasant or painful situation and succumbs to the dictates of 
pleasure and pain111 which, according to Kant, is irrational. He can therefore be 
said to be ruled by a heteronomous principle which makes nature understood as 
a preserving and progressing system impossible. 
Affects and Passions 
Since Kant refers to self-murder as a vice and states in The Metaphysics of 
Morals that "a propensity to an affect ... does not enter into kinship with vice so 
readily as does a passion," we would expect Kant to argue that self-murder is 
based on a passion. However, since the statement does not exclude the 
111 In MC 375: "Der Selbstmord findet sich gemeiniglich bey denen, die Ober die GIOckseeligkeit 
des Lebens gekonstelt haben. Denn hat jemand die KOnsteley der VergnOgen geschmeckt, und 
kann sie nicht immer besitzen, so versetzt er sich in Gram Kummer und Schwermuth." Compare 
also GMS 395 (Paton 63) . 
It can also be mere boredom which can cause those living solely according to the 
principle of self-love to kill themselves. In ApH 233 (Gregor 101) Kant states that "to feel alive, to 
enjoy ourselves, is the same as to feel ourselves constantly impelled to leave our present state 
(which must therefore be a pain that recurs just as often as the present)." This pressure to leave 
the present point of time "can grow to the point where a man decides to end his life; for the 
voluptuous man has tried every form of enjoyment and there is no longer anything new for him. As 
a Parisian said of Lord Mordaunt: 'The English hang themselves to pass the time.' The void of 
sensations we perceive in ourselves arouses horror (horror vacw) and, as it were, the 
presentiment of a slow death, which we find more painful than having fate cut the thread of life 
quickly" (Gregor 1 02) . (ApH 233: "Dieser Druck oder Antrieb, jeden Zeitpunkt, darin wir sind , zu 
verlassen und in den folgenden Oberzugehen, ist accelerirend und kann bis zur Enschlie~ung 
wachsen, seinem Leben ein Ende zu machen, wei! der Oppige Mensch den Genu~ aller Art 
versucht hat, und keiner fOr ihn mehr neu ist; wie man in Paris vom Lord Mordaunt sagte: 'Die 
Englander erhenken sich, um sich die Zeit zu passiren.-- --Die in sich wahrgenommene Leere an 
Empfindungen erregt ein Grauen (horror vacw) und gleichsam das VorgefOhl eines Langsamen 
Todes, der fOr peinlicher gehalten wird, als wenn das Schicksal den Lebensfaden schnell abrei~t." 
Gregor does not add the two hyphens. Even though boredom causes horror which might 
lead to suicide, it is not, in the case of suicide, fate, but the suicide himself who causes his death. 
Compare also Reflexionen zur Anthropologie, vol. 15 II, 773.--ln this context we can also mention 
Kant's reference to Switzerland as the country with the highest suicide rate in Physische 
Geographie , vol. 9, 245. Kant makes this remark while discussing the homesickness of the Swiss. 
Swiss suicides, according to Kant, are mainly rich people who travel a lot and are exposed to the 
various excitements and pleasures other countries have to offer. These people "rob themselves of 
life because they have to do without those pleasures in their fatherland ." 
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possibility that vices enter into kinship with affects, the vice of self-murder could 
also be an exception to the rule and be based on an affect. If this were to be the 
case, suicide would not be a true vice. I am not aware of any passages in Kant's 
opus where he talks about the connection between passions and self-murder or 
even specifies which passion might be the likely basis for it. Yet he does talk 
about some of the affects which characterize the state of mind of the suicide. In 
order to exhaust all possibilities, I will in the following section present two 
interpretations; first, that the vice of self-murder is the result of an emotional 
agitation or affect, and second, that it is the result of a passion of natural 
inclination. According to the latter interpretation, self-murder is an expression of 
an ardent passion which combines the elements of passion and affect. 
Before we start our discussion of the two possible lines of interpretation , 
let me start with an introduction to Kant's view of passions and affects. At the 
very beginning of the introduction to The Metaphysics of Morals, Kant 
distinguishes the capacity for desire ("Begehrungsvermogen") from the 
susceptibility to pain and pleasure to which he also refers as "feeling" 
("Gef0hl").112 For our present purpose we need only to point out that affects 
belong to the feelings of pleasure and pain and passions like inclinations, 
instincts, and propensities belong to the capacity of desire.113 Affect and passion 
are thus "essentially different form each other."114 
112Compare MS 211 . 
113Compare Greene/Hudson 24 footnote (RGV 28f footnote) . It should, however, be pointed out, 
that in ApH Kant discusses affects not in the chapter "On the Feeling of Pleasure and 
Displeasure" but together with passions in the chapter on "On the Appetitive Power" ("Vom 
Begehrungsvermogen"). According to the additional remarks printed in the appendix to ApH on 
page 409, Kant states that "Anger belongs to the appetitive power [or the capacity of desire]" 
("Zorn geh6rt zum Begehrungsvermogen.") . Space does not permit me to discuss the reasons for 
this seeming change in the classification of affects and inclinations, at this time. 
114Gregor 208 (MS 407: "Affect en und Le i dens c haft en sind wesentlich von 
einander unterschieden ... ".) 
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Examples of affects are anger, joy ("Freude"), sadness ("Traurigkeit"), fear 
("Furcht").115 They may blind a person so that self-composure116 and reflection 
are no longer possible. Furthermore, an affect "makes itself incapable to pursue 
its own end" which is the reason why it is unwise to deliberately allow for its 
existence .117 Even though an affect like anger which precedes reflection makes 
the latter "impossible or more difficult," it also quickly subsides, and a person 
who has a propensity1 18 to one or more of these affects can nevertheless 
possess good will.119 On the other hand, passions like hatred ("Ha~"), mania for 
honor ("Ehrsucht") , mania for power ("Herrschsucht"), mania for possession 
("Geiz"), or desire for vengeance ("Rachbegierde")12D allow for reflection. Unlike 
a person who is at the mercy of her or his affect, a person who is driven by 
passion creates maxims which allow the satisfaction of those ends aimed for by 
the respective inclination121 so that, if one's inclinations aim for an end contrary to 
law, one's mind has the time to "brood upon it ... and so to take up what is evil 
(as something premeditated) into its maxim." We saw that it is the intentional 
choice to take up into one's maxim that which is contrary to law, which Kant 
11 5Compare ApH 254-265; MS 408. 
116Compare MS 407 where Kant refers to self-composure as animus sui compos which is one of 
the conditions for inner freedom. See Chapter on Ownership, footnote 98. 
In ApH 252 (Gregor 120) Kant states: "In an affect we are taken unawares by feeling , so that the 
mind's self-control (animus sui compos) is suspended." ("Der Affect ist Oberraschung durch 
Empfindung, wodurch die Fassung des Gemuths (animus sui compos) aufgehoben wird.") 
117My translation ApH 253: "Denn Obrigens ist Affect, fOr sich allein betrachtet, jederzeit unklug; 
er macht sich selbst unfahig, seinen eigenen Zweck zu verfolgen, und es ist also unweise ihn in 
sich vorsetzlich enstehen zu lassen." 
1181t is not clear to me whether or not Kant distinguishes between a propensity ("Hang") as part of 
the capacity for desire and the propensity ("Hang") for an affect. 
119Gregor 208 (MS 408): "Yet this weakness in the use of one's understanding coupled with the 
strength of one's emotions is only a lack of virtue and, as it were, something childish and weak, 
which can indeed coexist with the best will." 
120See MS 408; ApH 270. 
121ApH 266: "Leidenschaft setzt immer eine Maxime des Subjects voraus, nach einem von der 
Neigung ihm vorgeschriebenen Zwecke zu handeln." 
307 
defines as "true vice" or an evil which is "properly evil."122 In other words, even 
though vices are rooted in our desires as sensible beings they are not caused by 
them. And because a person who indulges in her or his passion uses reason as 
an instrument to secure the attainment of the end prescribed by the inclination , 
passions, unlike affects, are always connected with a person's reason and can 
only be ascribed to human beings and not to animals or pure rational beings. 123 
I would like to pause here and stress two important points with regard to 
affects and passions. Affects as wells as passions make it impossible for the 
person to compare the feeling or the passion with the totality of feelings or 
inclinations. In both cases Kant's view indicates that the sum of our feelings and 
the sum of our inclinations have to be understood as parts of an organic whole. 
Reflection is impossible when we are in a state of emotional agitation so that we 
cannot put our agitation in perspective with all of our other feelings. But we are 
able to reflect124 when we are subject to a passion and focus only on the 
satisfaction of one of our inclinations to the exclusion of all others.125 This 
inability to put either our affects or inclinations in a context interferes with our 
freedom. An affect interferes only momentarily with freedom and the duty to rule 
122See footnote no. 26. 
123See Gregor 133 (ApH 266: "Sie [that is, passion] ist also jederzeit mit der Vernunft desselben 
verbunden, und blo~en Thieren kann man keine Leidenschaften beilegen, so wenig wie reinen 
Vernunftwesen.") 
124For a qualification of this statement see Kant's distinction of ardent and cold passions below. 
125With regard to affects Kant states in ApH 254 (Gregor 122): "Generally speaking, what 
constitutes a state of emotional agitation is not the intensity of a certain feeling but rather the lack 
of reflection that would compare this feeling with the totality of all the feelings (of pleasure or 
displeasure) that go with our state." (Oberhaupt ist es nicht die Stc;lrke eines gewissen GefUhls, 
welche den Zustand des Affects ausmacht, sondern der Mangel der Oberlegung, dieses GefUhl 
mit der Summe aller GefUhle (der Lust oder Unlust) in seinem Zustande zu vergleichen.") And 
with regard to passions he stresses in ApH 265 (Gregor 133): "Passion (passio animt) is an 
inclination that prevents reason from comparing it with the totality of all our inclinations when we 
are making a choice." ("Die Neigung durch welche die Vernunft verhindert wird, sie in Ansehung 
einer gewissen Wahl mit der Summe aller Neigung zu vergleichen ist die L e i d e n s c h a f t 
(passio animt)." 
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ourselves, but a passion damages freedom and "finds its pleasure and 
satisfaction in slavery."126 Kant characterizes a passion as a "cancerous sore" of 
pure practical reason. It makes it impossible that reason goes "from the general 
to the particular." With regard to the pursuit of happiness ("lm Sinnlich-
Praktischen") the consequences to be drawn would be: 
not to overshadow all the other inclinations or sweep them into the corner 
just to please one inclination , but rather to see to it that the inclination in 
question can co-exist with the totality of all our inclinations.127 
Based on our discussion of self-love in the last section where we stated that it is 
irrational to satisfy a singular inclination because it makes the integrated whole of 
ends, called happiness, 12s impossible, we can now say that if we live our passion 
or allow ourselves to succumb to affects, we live according to the hedonistic 
principle of self-love and make happiness understood in the organic sense 
impossible. To be more precise, affects make it impossible to realize these ends, 
and passions only realize those ends dictated by inclinations. Our discussion 
shows that affect and passion are contrary to reason since reason works 
according to the teleological principle, namely, to determine the part through the 
whole; whereas passion and affects determine the whole through the part.129 We 
have now to decide if the suicide succumbs to either affect or passion, or the 
126Gregor 134 (ApH 267: "Der Affect thut einen augenblicklichen Abbruch an der Freiheit und der 
Herrschaft Ober sich selbst. Die Leidenschaft giebt sie auf und findet ihre Lust und Befriedigung 
am Sklavensinn.") It should be noted that according to MS 407 affects interfere with being one's 
own master, and passions interfere with ruling oneself. 
127Gregor 134 (ApH 266: " ... nicht Einer Neigung zu Gefallen, die Obrigen aile in Schatten ["den" 
is missing] oder in den Winkel zu stellen, sondern darauf zu sehen, dar.. jene mit der Summe 
a II e r Neigungen zusammen bestehen kOnne.") 
128With regard to the pragmatic role of reason in guiding human beings to integrate the 
satisfaction of their inclination in a "systematic whole we call happiness" see Gregor's footnote no. 
46 on page 207 of ApH. For her reference to Paton (1967) see our footnote no. 109. 
129 In Reflexionen zur Anthroplogie, vol. 15.1, 182f no. 442 Kant states: "Die Vernunft bestimmt 
den Theil aus dem Gantzen ( .. . das Besondere aus dem Allgemeinen). Daher ist der Affect oder 
Leidenschaft wieder die Vernunft; denn diese bestimmt das gantze durch den Theil." 
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combination of both; and we have to specify the affect and passion involved in 
suicide. 
Affects and Suicide 
While presenting the Stoics' view that we are free to take our lives if we cannot 
live decently ("nicht anstandig"), Kant comments: 
Here seems to be great courage, yet one has found that all murderers 
during the act are delusioned, desperate and deranged. The disturbance 
of the mind can therefore also cause this horrible resoluteness which can 
be courageous, but the courage is completely misplaced. 13o 
In the Lecture on Moral Philosophy Kant states: 
Anger, affect and dementia are for the most part the cause of self-murder, 
which is why persons who have been saved from its midst are terrified by 
themselves and do not dare it another time.131 
The Streit der Facultaten confirms that suicide is the result of an "affect exalted 
to insanity."132 
130ppp 209: "Hier steckt zwar ein gror..er Muth, man hat doch aber gefunden, dar.. aile Marder bey 
der Handlung vall Wahn, Verzweiflung und VerrOkkung des Gemoths sind. Aus der Stohrung des 
Gemoths kann also diese abscheuliche Entschlor.!.enheit auch entstehen. Hiebey kann zwar Muth 
seyn; dieser Muth aber ist sehr Obel angebracht." 
131MC 374: "Zorn, Affect und Wahnsinn ist mehrenteils die Ursache des Selbstmordes, daher 
Personen die von demselben aus der H~lfte errettet worden , fOr sich selbst erschrecken , und es 
nicht zum andern mahle wagen."--My translation indicates that I interpret "fOr sich selbst 
erschrecken" to mean "vor sich selbst erschrecken." 
1320er Streit der Facultaten in drei Abschnitten, val. 7, 99. Under the heading 
"0 f t h e P o w e r o f t h e m i n d to become master of its pathological feelings through mere 
firm resolution ," Kant describes the state of mind of the suicide after describing a patient who 
suffers for years in the hospital and often declares that he wishes death would free him from his 
agony. Kant states that even this person tries to delay death, and his wish should not be believed. 
Despite the rational wish "the natural instinct wants if differently." With regard to the suicide Kant 
then states: "Der in wilder Entrostung gefar..te Entschlur.. des Selbstmorders, seinem Leben ein 
Ende zu machen, macht hievon keine Ausnahme: denn er ist die Wirkung eines bis zum 
Wahnsinn exaltierten Affects." 
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According to the Anthropology, in the section "On Mental Illnesses" ("Von den 
Gemuthskrankheiten") which is part of Book One "On the cognitive Powers" Kant 
explains that 
Self-murder is often merely the result of a r a p t u s ; for the man who 
has cut his throat in the intensity of his emotional agitation patiently 
submits, soon after, to having it sewn up again.133 
Even though this sudden change of mood or raptus by itself does not yet qualify 
as a disturbed mind , Kant believes that these "attacks of capriciousness" can in 
certain cases "become the rule ."134 
With regard to the cognitive power Kant distinguishes between two kinds 
of mental diseases: morbid anxiety ("Grillenkrankheit") or hypochondria and 
mental derangement or mania. 135 Since a raptus "still falls short of derangement" 
but is discussed in the section on mental illness, those suicides whose deaths 
are the result of a raptus, have to be diagnosed as mentally ill, namely 
hypochondriacs, but not as mentally deranged .136 In his description of 
133Gregor 83 (ApH 213: "Der Selbstmord ist oft blo~ die Wirkung von einem Raptus . Denn 
der, welcher sich in der Heftigkeit des Affects die Gurgel abschneidet, la~t sich bald darauf 
geduldig sie wieder zunahen.")--1 have changed Gregor's "suicide" to self-murder" and have not 
translated the Latin "raptus." In the Reflexionen zur Anthropo/ogie, vol. 15 II, no. 1506, 814, we 
find the following brief entry: "Raptus. Selbstmord. Der Laffe [a kind of fool ; see ApH 211] 
bewundert alles." 
134Gregor 83 (ApH 213: "Noch diesseits der Granze des gest6rten Gemoths is der p 16 t z I i-
c h e We c h s e I d e r L a u n e n (raptus) : ein unerwarteter Absprung von einem Thema zu 
einem ganz verschiedenen , den sich niemand gewartigt. Bisweilen geht er vor jener St6rung , die 
er ankOndigt, vorher: oft aber ist der Kopf schon so verkehrt gestellt, daP., diese Oberfalle der 
Regellosigkeit bei ihm zur Regel werden. ") 
135Gregor 73 (ApH 202: "Die eine ist die G r i II en k r a n k h e it (Hypochondrie) und die 
andere das g est 6 r t e Gem 0 t h (Manie).'') Kant explains the origin of the term 
"Grillenkrankheit" in ApH 212 (Gregor 82) : "Hypochondria is called Grillenkrankheit [Gregor's 
footnote follows] from its analogy to listening, in the quiet of the night, to a cricket chirping in the 
house, which disturbs our mental repose and so prevents us from sleeping." 
136Kant's reference to the visionary ("Phantast") as a "Griellenfanger" who "in a sudden seizure of 
fantasy ... is said to be carried away by it (raptus)" and to hypochondria ("morbid anxiety") as 
"Grillenkrankheit" (ApH 202) seems to indicate a connection between the suicide and the 
visionary to which we will return in the Chapter on "Belief of Reason." The following two notes 
from Reflexionen zur Anthropologie vol. 15 I, no. 487, 207 support the view that suicide caused by 
hypochondria Kant stresses two main points. First, reason has not sufficient 
power over itself to control and direct the course of the thought of the 
hypochondriac whose moods alternate "like the weather."137 Second , a 
hypochondriac imagines that he or she is physically iii.13B 
311 
Kant does not say that the self-murderer imagines that he or she is 
physically sick but points only to the criterion of sudden changes of moods. This 
point is also stressed in a biographical note on Kant's own predisposition to 
hypochondria. In Oer Streit der Facultaten Kant recounts the following : 
Because of my flat and narrow chest which leaves little space for the 
movement of the heart and the lung, I have a natural propensity to 
hypochondria which in earlier years bordered on being sick of life. But the 
consideration that the cause of this restriction of the heart might be merely 
mechanical and could not be changed, lead [me] to the point where I 
ignored it completely; and while I felt the restriction of my chest, calm and 
cheerfulness prevailed in my head. In the company of others it [this calm 
and cheerfulness] did not express itself in changing moods (as is the case 
with hypochondriacs) but deliberately and naturally . ... 
The constriction [of the heart] remains , since its cause lies in my physical 
build [or: "since it is caused by"]. But I have become master over its 
influence on my thoughts and actions, by turning my attention away from 
this feeling as if it would not concern me at all.139 
a raptus is in fact suicide performed because of a "Grille": "Selbstmord aus einer Grille; " ibid .: 
"Raptus: wenn man hinter her einsieht, dar.. sein Zustand eine Grille war." In ApH 203 (Gregor 75) 
he compares a "G r iII e" ("someone has a bee in his bennett") to a "marotte." 
137 ApH 202: "Bei der erst ere n [meaning "hypochondria"] ist sich der Kranke wahl bewur..t, 
dar.. es mit dem Laufe seiner Gedanken nicht richtig zugehe: indem den Gang derselben zu 
richten, ihn aufzuhalten oder anzutreiben seine Vernunft nicht hinreichende Gewalt Ober sich 
selbst hat. Unzeitige Freude und unzeitige Bekommernisse, mithin Launen wechseln wie das 
Wetter, das man nehmen mur.., wie es sich findet, in ihm ab." 
13BApH 212: "Auf solche Weise wird die Hypochondrie als Grillenkrankheit die Ursache von 
Einbildungen korperlicher Obel ... ". 
139The following is the complete quote from Der Streit der Facu/tt!Jten in drei Abschnitten, val. 7, 
104: "lch habe wegen meiner flachen und eng en Brust, die fOr die Bewegung des Herzens und 
der Lunge wenig Spielraum lar..t, eine natorliche Anlage zur Hypochondrie, welche in frOheren 
Jahren bis an den Oberdrur.. des Lebens granzte. Aber die Oberlegung, dar.. die Ursache dieser 
Herzbeklemmung vielleicht blor.. mechanisch und nicht zu heben sei , brachte es bald dahin, dar.. 
ich mich an sie gar nicht kehrte, und wahrend dessen, dar.. ich mich in der Brust beklommen 
fOhlte, im Kopf doch Ruhe und Heiterkeit herrschte, die sich auch in der Gesellschaft nicht nach 
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Thus, in the end Kant did not succumb to the changing moods of the 
hypochondriacs. Even though Kant is not imagining a physical deficiency which 
might be the reason why he speaks of his "natural propensity to hypochondria," 
the pericardia! restriction, nevertheless, influenced his outlook on life so strongly 
that in his youth he became sick of life. Whether or not this means that Kant 
actually contemplated suicide cannot be decided, but it shows us that Kant is at 
least familiar with the state of those people who do no longer want to live. 
Furthermore, the very fact that he learned to conquer this feeling by living 
according to those duties prescribed in the "Doctrine of Virtue" tells us that he 
abwechselnden Launen (wie Hypochondrische pflegen), sondern absichtlich und natorlich 
mitzutheilen nicht ermangelte. Und da man des Lebens mehr froh wird durch das, was man im 
freien Gebrauch desselben t h u t , als was man g e n i e f! t , so kbnnen Geistesarbeiten eine 
andere Art von befbrdertem LebensgefOhl den Hemmungen entgegen setzen, welche blof! den 
Kbrper angehen. Die Beklemmung ist mir geblieben; denn ihre Ursache liegt in meinem 
kbrperlichen Bau. Aber Ober ihren Einfluf! auf meine Gedanken und Handlungen bin ich Meister 
geworden durch Abkehrung der Aufmerksamkeit von diesem GefOhl, als ob es mich gar nicht 
anginge." Compare Kant's description of the suicide in GMS 421 footnote no 98.--ln this context 
we can make a rather strange observation: According to Kant's very positive review of Von dem 
korperlichen wesentlichen Unterschiede zwischen der Structur der Thiere und Menschen (vol. 2, 
421-425) by the Italian anatomist Peter Moscati (for the details concerning the author and the 
publication of the translation of his writing see page 516) the erect walk of human being causes an 
unnatural position of the heart which is not only responsible for "EngbrOstigkeit" ("narrow chest") 
but, because the blood in the portal vein is now forced to ascend opposite to the direction of 
gravity, it is also to blame for hypochondria (423f: "So verlt:ingert z. E. das Herz, da es genbthigt 
wird zu ht:ingen, die Blutgefaf!e, an die es genopft ist, nimmt eine schiefe Lage an, indem es sich 
auf das Zwerchfell stotzt und mit seiner Spitze gegen die Iinke Seite glitscht, eine Lage, darin der 
Mensch und zwar der erwachsene sich von allen Thieren unterscheidet, und dadurch er zu 
Aneurismen, Herzklopfen, EngbrOstigkeit, Brustwassersucht ... einen unvermeidlichen Hang 
bekommt. .. . In der Pfortader, die keine Klappen hat, wird sich das Blut dadurch, dar! es in ihr 
wider die Richtung der Schwere steigen muf!, Iangsam und schwerer bewegen, als bei der 
wagrechten Lage des Rumpfs geschehen wOrde, woraus Hypochondrie, Ht:imorrhoiden ... 
entspringen ... ".) Kant ends his review by saying that nature's first provision was that the human 
being and the species should be preserved for which purpose the four-footed position would be 
the most appropriate one. Since he whole-heartedly agrees with Moscati's view, it seems that he 
would ascribe his hypochondria and his narrow chest to his erect position, which , even though it is 
most appropriate for the rational being, is unnatural and harmful for the physical and mental health 
of the human being. Kant's view would then allow for the rather strange possibility that if suicide is 
caused by hypochondria it may also be indirectly caused by the erect position. We will , however, 
not go so far as to imagine the possible and grotesque therapy Kant might have prescribed to 
suicidal persons or hypochondriacs .. . . 
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practiced what he preached and that philosophy can indeed be used as 
medicine for mind and body; a point to which we will return in the Second main 
Part of this dissertation .1 40 
The quotes discussed so far, describe the suicide's state of mind as either 
moody (the raptus-argument), mentally deranged, 141 or angry, and depict the 
possible courage of the suicide as misplaced. However, this description of the 
state of mind of the suicide seems to make Kant's characterization of self-murder 
as a vice problematic for two reasons: First, because it would indicate that if 
vices are based on passions then suicide can either not be a true vice or that not 
all vices are based on passions. Second, vices constitute "intentional" 
transgressions on principle. Yet how can an insane person intentionally 
transgress a duty?142 Unless we want to argue that a mad person is conscious of 
the violation of duty and is therefore accountable for her deed, the mad self-
murderer cannot intend to transgress a duty, and that means, that the act of 
suicide constitutes neither a vice nor homicidium dolosum. Even if the agent is 
not mad but, for example, extremely angry, the state of mind influences the 
140Compare Chapter on the "Care for the Moral Self," footnote no 59. 
141 Kant distinguishes in ApH 214ff among four different kinds of madness or derangement 
("VerrOckung"): Amentia ("Unsinnigkeit"), Dementia ("Wahnsinn"), lnsania ("Wahnwitz") and 
Vesania ("Aberwitz"). 
142Apart from the question of accountability, Kant's characterization of the demented person 
allows for an interesting view of suicide. In his description of dementia or "Wahnsinn" in ApH 215 
(Gregor 85) he points out that the mad person (he uses the example of what we would call 
persecution mania) does not belong in a madhouse "for being anxious only for themselves, they 
direct their ostensible cunning only to their own preservation, without endangering others, and so 
need not be locked up for safety's sake." ("Sie sind aber doch nicht zu den Hospitalnarren zu 
zahlen: weil sie, nur fOr sich selbst besorgt, ihre vermeinte Schlauigkeit nur auf ihre eigene 
Erhaltung richten, ohne andere in Gefahr zu setzen, mithin nicht sicherheitshalber eingeschlossen 
zu werden bedOrfen.") If Kant would be correct, a demented person would either not commit 
suicide, or if the suicide would indeed be demented, the killing of the self would have to be 
interpreted as a way to preserve the self. 
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degree to which the action can be imputed--a position to which Kant himself 
subscribes.143 
Kant could try to defend his view that suicide is an intentional 
transgression and therefore some kind of vice, by arguing that despite the 
disturbed, despairing, or even deranged state of mind, the suicide is not actually 
insane. In other words, Kant would have to adhere to his view that a suicide 
succumbs to a raptus which may be understood as a temporal attack of insanity, 
but still allows a latitude to characterize the patient as, in general, mentally 
healthy. He could then proceed to argue that, given the duty to know ourselves 
and the duty of apathy which forbids us to be governed by either feelings or 
inclinations and the additional duty that reason governs these inclinations and 
feelings, 144 we should know that we are prone to these attacks and must not 
allow them to affect us but subject them to the rule of reason . Thus, if we are not 
mentally ill in the clinical sense, it is our duty to foresee these attacks and 
143Kant states in his introduction to The Metaphysics of Morals 228 (Gregor 54) : "Hence, the state 
of mind of the subject, whether he committed the deed in a state of agitation or with cool 
deliberation, makes a difference in imputation, which has results." ("Daher der GemOthszustand, 
ob das Subject die That im Affect, oder mit ruhiger Oberlegung verObt habe, in der Zurechnung 
einen Unterschied macht, der Folgen hat.") I suggest to translate "Folgen" with "consequences" 
rather than "results."--Kant's position concerning the accountability of the accused is not 
completely clear. In ApH 213f, he states that because forensic medicine has not reached the 
stage where it can predict the actions of a person, only the philosopher or psychologist--not the 
judge--can decide whether or not someone is insane. It seems, therefore, that the judge can only 
decide that someone is the author of a transgression which would allow her to have the insane 
person be imprisoned or executed unless the court would have to take the opinion of the 
philosopher/psychologist into account. But Kant's argument in KrV A 552/B 580 footnote (Kemp 
Smith 475 footnote) suggests that even the philosopher could not determine whether or not 
someone is mad: "The real morality of actions, their merit or guilt, even that of our own conduct, 
thus remains entirely hidden from us. Our imputations can refer only to the empirical character. 
How much of this character is ascribable to the pure effect of freedom, how much to mere nature, 
that is, to faults of temperament for which there is no responsibility , or to its happy constitution 
(merito fortunae) , can never be determined; and upon it therefore no perfectly just judgments can 
be passed." 
144The duty of apathy is distinguished from the duty to govern oneself; see MS 407ff. 
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prevent them in time.14s A violation of these duties with its possible consequence 
of suicide could then be interpreted as a conscious violation of a duty or a 
transgression. Even though this approach might help to explain why a suicide, 
despite Kant's characterization , can still be accountable for her deed, it does not 
solve the problem why Kant regards self-murder as a vice which is supposedly 
based on passion. 
Before we turn to the discussion of passions and suicide, I would like to 
decide whether suicide can ever be called a courageous and thus virtuous act. 
So far it seems that many suicides, if not completely crazy, are at least on the 
verge of it. 
Responses to the Affect of Fear: Courage versus Cowardice 
In the Anthropology Kant states: 
Whether self-murder presupposes courage too, or whether it always 
results from mere faint-heartedness is not a moral question but only a 
psychological one.146 
Since Kant discusses or mentions the question of courage and faint-heartedness 
or cowardice in several places, a brief excursion into the psychology of suicide 
seems appropriate.147 
145See Kant's discussion of how to prevent a rabies attack in the Chapter on "Casuistical 
Questions," footnote no. 22. --If this is a plausible description of how Kant would argue, it seems 
that he forgets that this self-knowledge presupposes experience, or to put it in Kantian terms, it 
presupposes the sharpening of the faculty of judgment which children or adolescents may not 
possess because of their age. Kant's model is therefore restricted to those people who know 
themselves and have learned to control themselves successfully. 
1461 have changed Gregor's translation on page 126: "Does suicide presuppose courage too, or 
does it always result from mere faint-heartedness? This is not a moral question but only a 
psychological one." (ApH 258: "Ob Selbstmord auch Muth, oder immer nur Verzagtheit 
voraussetze, ist nicht eine moralische, sondern bios psychologische Frage.") 
1471n Reflexionen zur Anthropologie val. 15. II , no. 1515, 849, Kant also considers whether self-
murder can be fearless: "Ob selbstmord Herzhaftigkeit sey?" Compare ApH 256 for Kant's 
definition of fearlessness. 
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In the Anthropology Kant distinguishes between degrees of fear, that is, degrees 
of aversion from danger. Courage and faint-heartedness or cowardice, can be 
understood as responses to the feeling of displeasure which the aversion from 
danger provides. Courage is defined as the "mind's self-control by which it takes 
charge of the aversion from danger with reflection."148 The lack of courage is 
cowardice ("Feigheit") also referred to as dishonorable faintheartedness 
("ehrlose Verzagtheit"). 149 Kant distinguishes between cou rage as a result of an 
affect and courage "aroused by reason" which results in "true fortitude (strength 
of virtue) ."15o When Kant states that courage "is based on principles and is a 
virtue,"151 he seems in fact to give a definition of true fortitude . 
With regard to the question whether self-murder presupposes always 
faint-heartedness or whether it can also be an expression of courage, Kant 
1481 have changed Gregor's translation whose interpretation is slightly different from mine. Kant 
states in ApH 256: "Bangigkeit, Angst, Grauen und Entsetzen sind Grade der Furcht, d. i. des 
Abscheues vor Gefahr. Die Fassung des GemUths, die letztere mit Oberlegung zu Ubernehmen, 
ist der M u t h .. . ". Gregor translates on page a 123f : "Dread , anguish, terror and alarm are 
degrees of fear, that is, of aversion from danger. The mind's self-control by which it takes charge 
of the danger with reflection is courage." After "danger" Gregor inserts a footnote which reads: 
"Die letztere could refer to fear, but the following paragraph seems to indicate that it refers rather 
to danger." I would, however, argue that because fear is defined as aversion from danger, that 
"die letztere" cannot only refer to a part of the Genitive-construction and that it therefore not only 
refers to "danger" but "aversion to danger," that is, fear. Furthermore, Kant's discussion of the 
various responses to danger in the next paragraph (for example, "M u t h , hat der, welcher mit 
Oberlegung der Gefahr n i c h t w e i c h t .. .. W a g e h a I s i g ist der Leichtsinnige, der sich in 
Gefahren wagt, weil er sie nicht kennt. ... to II k U h n , der bei sichtbarer Unmoglichkeit seinen 
Zweck zu erreichen sich in die gro(.)te Gefahr setzt .. . ".)shows that we can respond to the 
aversion of danger, that is, fear, either with or without calm reflection . I believe that someone who 
does not feel an aversion from danger cannot be called courageous. It is only because we feel the 
aversion from danger, that is, only because we are afraid and can either overcome or succumb to 
this emotion , that we can be courageous or faint-hearted . 
149ApH 256. Kant adds a footnote after cowardice which explains the term "Poltron" or poltroon, 
that is "a man who cut off his thumb to escape having to go to war" (Gregor 124). Given that Kant 
often describes the suicide as a poltroon, we can assume that he believes that a suicide in the 
majority of the cases is a coward or a person who lacks courage. See Chapter on the "Right of 
Humanity," footnote no. 41 . for Kant's other remarks on "poltron" in connection with suicide. 
150Gregor 125 (ApH 257: "Der Muth als Affect (mithin einerseits zur Sinnlichkeit gehorend) kann 
aber auch durch Vernunft erweckt und so wahre Tapferkeit (Tugendstarke) sein .") 
151Gregor 124 (ApH 256: "Der M u t h dagegen beruht auf Grundsatzen und ist eine Tugend." 
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distinguishes between two main arguments. If a person "commits suicide simply 
in order not to outlive his honor, and so from anger, his act seems to be one of 
courage."152 He points out that it is more likely that self-murder is committed by 
honor-loving men than those who have no sense for true honor. 153 If, however, 
the patience in suffering is exhausted through sadness ("Traurigkeit") then it is 
an act of faint-heartedness.154 Kant indicates here that depending on whether 
anger or sadness causes the suicide it is either courageous or faint-hearted.155 
Furthermore, he contrasts the heroic with the cowardly attitude. Kant explains 
that we seem to regard it as a kind of heroism "to look death straight in the eye 
152Gregor 126 (ApH 258: "Wenner verObt wird wird , bios um seine Ehre nicht zu Oberleben, also 
aus Z o r n , so scheint er Muth ... ".) I added the Italics to Gregor's translation . According toMS 
425 (Gregor 221 ), the suicide who "defiantly casts off life as a burden" ("trotzige Wegwerfung 
seiner selbst ... als einer Lebenslast") requires courage. See footnote no. 52. 
153His example is the Roland of the French Revolution . According to the explanations added in 
the Appendix of ApH page 365, "Roland" refers to "Jean Marie R. de Ia Platiere (1734-93), a 
French statesman, who, in the year 1792, was Minister of the Interior, fell upon his sword after 
the execution of his wife." In this connection it should be added that Kant offers different 
characterizations of Cato's suicide: In PPP 210 he denies that Cato's suicide was heroic. In MC 
371 /MM 1506 he states that Cato's suicide is "the only example which gave the world an 
opportunity to defend self-murder," and three pages later he states first that it was an act of great 
heroism and cannot be called cowardly , but then stresses that even if one would assume all kinds 
of different tortures Caesar could have inflicted on Cato, he would only have acted nobly if he 
would not have killed himself. Apart from the obvious change of mind with regard to the heroic 
aspect of Cato's suicide, Kant's seemingly divergent descriptions of Cato's suicide can be 
reconciled . Since Kant speaks of the judgment of "the world ," it could indicate that he wants to 
distance himself from the general opinion of the public because he has a different view. This 
interpretation is supported by Kant's statement that in "cases where self-murder is a virtue it 
carries with it great pretense." (MC 371 : "Man mu~ bei diesem Beyspiel freylich gestehn, da~ in 
solchem Fall, wo der Selbstmord eine Tugend ist, er einen gro~en Schein vor sich hat.") If my 
interpretation is correct, it would mean that Kant distinguishes between a heroic and a noble deed . 
(PPP 210: "Dem Cato gibt man Schuld, da~ seine gro~e Tugend der Patriotismus und nicht das 
allgemeine Recht der Menschen sey. Er w~hlte sich einen Tod, aber nicht Heldenm~~ig." MC 371 
(see MM 1504): "Dieses ist das einzige Beyspiel, was der Welt Gelegenheit gab, den Selbstmord 
zu vertheidigen."MC 374 (see MM 1506): " .. . allein es giebt auch Selbstmorder, wobey ein gro~er 
heroismus ist, z. E. Cato, Atticus etc. solchen Selbstmord kann ich nicht feighaft nennen.") 
154Gregor ApH 258:" .. . ist es aber die Erschopfung der Geduld im Leiden durch T r au rig-
k e it, welche aile Geduld Iangsam erschopft, so ist es ein V e r zag en ." 
1551n ApH 257 Kant states that patience ("Geduld") is a feminine virtue distinguished from 
courage. And in the Reflexionen zur Anthropo/ogie, vol. 15 II, no. 1515, 848, he distinguishes 
between impatient despair and despair without courage: "Ungeduldige Verzweiflung ist also nicht 
immer muthlose Verzweiflung. Selbstmord." 
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and not fear it" if we can "no longer love life."156 Yet if we fear death and continue 
to love life under any circumstance so that we are only able to kill ourselves 
because Angst produces a disturbance of the mind, then we die "from 
cowardice" because we "can no longer endure the torture of life." In the latter 
case we are not only not able to look death "straight in the eye" because we 
continue to love life, but we also do not have the strength to endure the suffering. 
In order to illustrate the differences of the state of mind of the suicide, 
Kant describes the various methods by which people commit suicide. Shooting 
oneself, taking potent mercuric chloride ,157 or drowning oneself with the help of 
heavy stones are methods which kill "suddenly and without leaving open the 
possibility of rescue," and Kant concludes that "we cannot contest the courage of 
the self-murderer," in cases such as these.158 If, however, one chooses to hang 
oneself, to take ordinary poison or cut one's throat--all acts which allow for the 
possibility to save the subject who is "usually glad [Gregor: "pleased"] if he is 
rescued and never tries it again"--it shows "cowardly despair that comes from 
weakness. "159 
156Gregor 126 (ApH 258: "Es scheint dem Menschen eine Art von Heroism zu sein , dem Tode 
gerade ins Auge zu sehen und ihn nicht zu fOrchten, wenn er das Leben nicht Ianger lieben 
kann .") . 
157The term "Sublimat" refers to mercuric chloride. Concerning the example of the great monarch 
see the discussion of the case of Frederick the Great in the next chapter footnote no. 18. 
158My translation . ApH 258: "Die Art der VollfOhrung des Selbstmordes giebt diesen Unterschied 
der Gemothsstimmung gewisserma~en zu erkennen. Wenn das dazu gewahlte Mittel plotzlich 
und ohne mogliche Rettung ttidtend ist; wie z. B. der Pistolenschu~ oder (wie es ein gro~er 
Monarch auf den Fall , da~ er in Gefangenschaft geriethe, im Kriege bei sich fOhrte) ein 
gescharftes Sublimat, oder tiefes Wasser und mit Steinen angefOIIte Taschen: so kann man dem 
Selbstmorder den Muth nicht streiten." 
159Gregor 126 (ApH 258f: "1st es aber der Strang, der noch von Anderen abgeschnitten, oder 
gemeines Gift, das durch den Arzt noch aus dem Kerper geschafft, oder ein Schnitt in den Hals, 
der wieder zugenaht und geheilt werden kann ; bei welchen Attentaten der Selbstmorder, wenn er 
noch gerettet werden kann , gemeiniglich selbst froh wird und es nie mehr versucht: so ist es feige 
Verzweiflung aus Schwache, nicht rostige, welche noch Starke der GemOthsfassung zu einer 
solchen That erfordert.") Compare the first part of the English quote with the similar statement in 
MC 374.--ln a brief note from the Reflexionen zur Anthropologie vol. 15. I, no. 1083, 480, Kant 
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Since Kant concludes his analysis of the severe methods of killing with the 
statement that "one cannot contest the courage of the self-murderer,"16o we can 
either assume that Kant contradicts himself by calling murder courageous, or we 
can argue--as I shall do--that he combines in this quote two points of view of 
suicide: the psychological and the moral. From the psychological point of view, 
the act may sometimes constitute courage, but from a moral point of view, it is 
murder which is the reason why Kant, despite his sympathy for some suicides, 
says that the act "is always terrible, and man makes himself a monstrosity by 
it."161 If my interpretation is correct, it means that the courage of the suicide 
considers the opposite: "Ob selstmorder [sic] verzagt seyn. Sie sind ungeduldig, aber nicht 
verzagt. Feighheit kan statt finden, ob man gleich den Tod als Selbstmorder nicht scheuet." 
("Whether self-murderers are faint-hearted . They are impatient but not faint-hearted. Cowardice 
can occur, although, as a self-murderer, one is not afraid of death.")--1 am not sure whether all of 
the supposedly slower methods of killing like cutting one's throat are really less deadly than the 
quick methods. Furthermore, if someone chooses to use one of the slower methods in a setting 
where he or she expects not to be disturbed by anyone, one could argue that because death may 
be slower and therefore more agonizing that this method also shows courage.--ln the Reflexionen 
zur Anthropo/ogie, vol. 15. II , no. 1515, 847, Kant writes: "Schwermothige Verzweiflung aus Gram, 
Wilde aus Entrostung. ([index follows] Selbstmord : hangen oder schier..en.)" 
160Gregor's translation of ApH 258 on page 126 ("when the means he chooses for it are such as 
to kill him suddenly and without leaving open the possibility of rescue, we cannot contest his 
courage.") does not capture the connotation of murder given in the German:" See footnote 
no. 158. 
161Gregor 126 (ApH 259: "Es sind nicht immer bios verworfene, nichtswordige Seelen, die auf 
solche Weise der Last des Lebens loszuwerden beschlier..en; vielmehr hat man von solchen, die 
fOr wahre Ehre kein GefOhl haben, dergleichen That nicht Ieicht zu besorgen. -- lndessen da sie 
doch immer grar..lich bleibt, und der Mensch sich selbst dadurch zum Scheusal macht, ist es doch 
merkwOrdig, dar.. in Zeitlaufen der offentlichen und fOr gesetzmar..ig erklarten Ungerechtigkeit 
eines revolutionaren Zustandes (z. B. des Wohlfahrtsausschusses der franzosichen Republik) 
ehrliebende Manner (z. B. Roland) der Hinrichtung nach dem Gesetz durch Selbstmord 
zuvorzukommen gesucht haben, den sie in einer constitutionellen Verfassung selbst worden fOr 
verwerflich erklart haben.") For a further discussion of the case of Roland see the next chapter.--
With regard to Kant's use of the term monstrosity, we have already seen in the previous chapters 
that Kant often refers to self-murder as a monstrous, or horrible act. Gerhard Lehmann (1981) 
states on page 135 that this kind of argument belongs to the "affective" arguments, meaning, that 
Kant not only appeals to the affect but speaks with emotions (Compare also Gerhard Lehmann, 
Kants Tugenden. Neue Beitrage zur Geschichte und Interpretation der Phi/osophie Kants (Berlin , 
New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1980), p. 75f). Even though Kant's texts show that he assumes a 
universal affective response to self-murder, I believe that the important point about this affective 
aspect expressed in terms like "Grausen," "Scheusal ," "Aas" is the underlying teleological 
argument against self-murder (see also the section on "Vices") . Accord ing to ApH 243 Kant 
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cannot be aroused by reason; if it were, it would be a virtue, and suicide could 
not violate the perfect duty of self-preservation discussed in the "Doctrine of 
Virtue." In short, if the courage of the suicide were aroused by reason and thus 
be a virtue, suicide would not constitute murder. 162 
Kant's distinction between a psychological approach and a moral 
approach to courage corresponds to the distinction between moral (true) 
courage163 and psychological (so-called) courage. In the Lecture on Practical 
Philosophy, for example, he states: 
The disturbance of the mind can therefore also cause this horrible 
resoluteness which can be courageous but the courage is completely 
misplaced . They possess a boldness which is short-lived . Courage, 
however, has to be enduring; only if my steadfastness is based on 
principles does it show heroism.164 
states: "Die Gror..heit, die zweckwidrig ist (magnitudo monstrosa) , ist das U n g e he u r e." 
(Gregor 111 : "The monstrous is greatness that is contrary to the end (magnitudo monstrosa).") I 
suggest that Kant regards self-murder as a moral monstrosity. And it is one of the "monsters" we 
"have to fight." (MS 405: "Die Laster, als die Brut gesetzwidriger Gesinnungen sind die Ungeheuer 
die er nun zu bek~mpfen hat.") According to this interpretation, self-murder is monstrous and 
horrible because it is contrary to the end of freedom. Compare MC 342 chapter on "Ownership," 
footnote no. 40. 
162Here again I disagree with Gerhard Lehmann (1981) who states on page 134 that Kant's 
position on "self-murder" ("Selbstmord") is "not unambiguous" ("nicht eindeutig") . Lehmann rightly 
points out that there are statements, as our discussion shows, which allow for the courage of 
some self-murderer. Yet I disagree that Kant's sympathetic and respectful treatment of some self-
murderer with regard to the aspect of honor indicates his ambivalence to self-murder. I rather 
believe that what Lehmann regards as an ambivalence is really the result of the distinction 
between the psychological and the moral view of suicide. In other words, I do not agree that 
ascribing to the suicide courage or a sense of honor means that Kant thinks that these cases can 
be justified; that is, that they do not violate the perfect duty to preserve oneself.--ln addition, we 
should note that Kant very often uses the words "it seems" ("es scheint") to qualify his attribution 
of courage to the suicide. The following quotes provide some examples. MC 371 : " .. . Fall, wo der 
Selbstmord eine Tugend ist, er einen gror..en Schein vor sich hat"; MC 369: "Selbstmord .. . eine 
scheinbare Seite der Zular..igkeit und Erlaubtheit"; MC 374: "AIIein , dieser Schein (namely, that a 
free person is not accountable to anyone and can kill hersel~ wird gehoben ... ". 
163For Gregor's explanation on moral courage see her translation of ApH footnote no. 43 on page 
207. 
164ppp 209: "Aus der Stohrung des GemOths kann also diese abscheuliche Entschlor..enheit auch 
entstehen. Hiebey kann zwar Muth seyn; dieser Muth aber ist sehr Obel angebracht. Sie haben 
eine Verwegenheit dabey, welche bald entschieden wird . Ein Muth mur.. aber dauerhaft seyn, das 
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In this quote Kant contrasts the boldness of the disturbed suicide to which I refer 
as "so-called courage" with courage or "true courage." Unlike true or moral 
courage which not only involves a self-controlled reaction to danger, but also that 
one does not yield to danger, 1ss the so-called courage of the disturbed suicide is 
the result of a disturbed mind and only short-lived. 166 Thus the boldness or 
horrible resoluteness of the suicide is not the result of rational reflection and 
cannot be considered to be "true fortitude" ("wahre Tapferkeit") or "strength of 
virtue" ("Tugendstarke") which would require the "constant" courage in danger.167 
To summarize: First, Kant's discussion of the courage and cowardice of 
the self-murderer suggests a hierarchy of affects which are more or less 
threatening for moral behavior. If sadness leads to suicide, it is an act of 
cowardice; whereas, if anger causes it, it can be considered to be courageous. 
Even though anger as an affect makes us powerless and thus defeats the end of 
anger--namely to avert an insult or an evi116a __ and is, like sadness, contrary to the 
zeigt nur allein einen heroismum, wenn ich eine auf Grundsazzen beruhende Standhaftigkeit 
habe."--lt is not completely clear what Kant means by "entschieden" in the third sentence. My 
translation suggests that the suicide's boldness, because it is short-lived ("bald entschieden"), 
cannot be understood as courage. 
1651n this context it should be mentioned that even though Kant speaks in MS 422 of the courage 
of the Stoic, he is nevertheless critical of the Stoic suicide: "Hence the Stoic thought it a 
prerogative of his (the sage's) personality to depart from life at his discretion (as from a smoke-
filled room) with peace of soul , free from the pressure of present or anticipated ills, because he 
could be of no more use in life. But there should have been in this very courage, this strength of 
soul not to fear death and to know of something that man can value even more highly than his life, 
a still stronger motive for him not to destroy himself, a being, with such powerful authority over the 
strongest sensible incentives, and so not to deprive himself of life." The Stoic seems to be an 
example of what Kant calls heroism, meaning he or she is not afraid of death . But it also seems 
that in order to be moral it is not enough to be a hero. A person who is not afraid of danger can 
obviously act immorally. 
166Gregor 124: "One whose courage in danger is constant has fortitude ." (ApH 256: " ... t a p f e r 
ist der, dessen Muth in Gefahren a n h a It e n d ist.") 
167See ApH 257, 256. 
16Bin ApH 260 (Gregor 127) Kant states that affects of anger and shame are counterproductive: 
"The affects of anger and shame have the peculiarity of making us less capable of realizing their 
end. They are suddenly aroused feelings of a [present] evil, in the form of an insult; but their 
violence makes us powerless to avert the evil." 
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duty of apathy, Kant's examples suggest that he acknowledges the honor-
preserving function of anger. Despite the fact that we are unable to reflect and 
have no control over ourselves when we are angry, Kant seems not to regard the 
angry suicide who wants to protect her or his honor as disturbed. Anger, if it hits 
on an appropriate end , seems to be a first, if only rudimentary, response to a felt 
injustice or evil. This could explain why the condemnation of the angry suicide is 
less severe than the condemnation of the c.c.c.n.169 But since anger excludes 
reflection and as such is weak, immature, and does not allow for the integration 
of all ends to an organic whole, it cannot become the basis of a self-controlled, 
that is, principled, response. So the reason why Kant regards the angry suicide 
as courageous is not because he or she is angry but because the affect of anger 
hits upon the appropriate end, which is the preservation of honor. I do not 
believe, therefore, that Kant would agree that anger could ever play an essential 
role for making moral judgments. Yet, in the absence of a fully developed moral 
character which rules and governs itself, I believe that Kant's distinction between 
the angry and the desperate suicide is an indirect acknowledgment of the limited 
value of anger.17° Furthermore, Kant's view that sadness slowly exhausts all 
169See MS 425 footnote no. 52. 
1701 believe that it would be very fruitful for the discussion of the role of affects for moral 
judgments as well as moral behavior to compare Seneca's account of apathy and anger with 
Kant's view. For Seneca's position toward anger see the chapter on "Anger in Public Life" in 
Martha Nussbaum's insightful book The Therapy of Desire. Theory and Practice in Hellenistic 
Ethics (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1994), pp. 402-438. Nussbaum 
describes in this chapter what seems to be the sometimes "alarming degree of detachment" (431) 
of the Stoic with regard to human suffering. She uses Seneca's story of the King Cambyses who 
kills and mutilates the son of his closest friend Praexaspes right in front of the father who "did not 
curse the king, he let slip no word of anguish, although he saw his own heart pierced together with 
his son's," (Seneca as quoted by Nussbaum, 434) . According to Nussbaum, the story shows that 
one can conceal anger. However, Seneca acknowledges that "a detached and mild response is in 
some extreme circumstances disgustingly slavish," and he suggests in these cases suicide in 
order to preserve humanity (Nussbaum, 435f). 
patience suggests that it should be a duty to be of good cheer even if we are 
suffering. 
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Second, Kant's condemnation of the faint-hearted suicide shows again 
that a stigma attaches to those who allow pain, be it physical or psychological, to 
not only rule but destroy their lives. The aspect of cowardice refers, therefore, 
indirectly to the bodily aspect which we discussed in the Chapter on "Care for the 
Moral Self' when we distinguished between moral evil ("Bose") and physical evil 
("Ubel"). An honorable person will regard the value of her physical life in 
comparison to the value of her moral life as negligible.171 And Kant does not 
believe, as was shown in the previous chapters, that respect for the moral life 
can make suicide necessary. That is the reason why Kant states in the 
Reflexionen zur Anthropologie that if one commits suicide out of despair "one 
does not respect life," meaning, one does not respect the morallife.172 
Third, despite Kant's acknowledgment of the courage of some self-murderers, 
their courage must be distinguished from moral fortitude. In The Metaphysics of 
Morals Kant explains: 
The vices, the brood of dispositions opposing the law, are the monsters 
he has to fight. Accordingly this moral strength, as courage (fortitude 
mora/is) , also constitutes the greatest and the only true honor that man 
can win in war and is, moreover, called wisdom in the strict sense, namely 
practical wisdom, since it makes the final end of man's existence on earth 
its own end. Only in its possession is a man "free," "healthy," "rich, " "a 
171Compare for example MC 376 and the respective footnotes in the Chapter on "Ownership." 
172Reflexionen zur Anthopo/ogie val. 15. II, end of no.1490, 7 42: "Verzweiflung. Muthige oder 
Verzagte ([index follows] Selbstmord) ; bey der ersten Achtet [sic; Y. U.] man des Lebens nicht." 
("Despair. Courageous or desperate (self-murder); in case of the former one does not respect 
life.") I take it that "bey der ersten" ("in case of the former") refers to "Verzweiflung" since it must 
refer to a femininum. 
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king," and so forth, and can suffer no loss by chance or fate, since he is in 
possession of himself and the virtuous man cannot lose his virtue .173 
Only a person whose reason causes her to be courageous can be said to strive 
for the realization of the final end of human existence, that is, to lead a moral life. 
Courage as induced by anger cannot fulfill this goal since one's ability to judge a 
situation is clouded by one's emotional agitation and may therefore lead to ends 
which are contrary to one's true nature. 
Fourth, since Kant speaks of the affects and not the passions of the 
suicide, it seems that the suicide can be blamed for a weakness but not for a 
true vice or a crime. In order to further investigate this point we now turn to the 
discussion of passions and suicide. 
Passions of Natural Inclination and Suicide 
So far, our discussion indicates that suicide is the result of an emotional agitation 
and not of a passion . Since Kant never actually says to which passion the 
suicide is addicted, we have to reconstruct his view of suicide as based on 
passion from his classifications of passions given in the Anthropology in the hope 
that this reconstruction will also allow us to integrate the role of affects in suicide. 
The passions are divided into passions of natural (innate) inclination and 
passions of inclination that proceeds from human culture (acquired 
inclination). 
The passions of the FIRST kind are the inclinations to freedom and 
to sex, both of which are connected with emotional agitation. Those of the 
173Gregor 206 (MS 405: "Die Laster, als die Brut gesetzwidriger Gesinnungen sind die 
Ungeheuer, die er nun zu bekampfen hat: weshalbe diese sittliche Starke auch, als T a p fer -
k e i t (fortitude mora/is) , die gro~te und einzige wahre Kriegsehre des Menschen ausmacht; auch 
wird sie die eigentliche, namlich praktische, We i s h e i t genannt: weil sie den E n d z we c k 
des Daseins der Menschen auf Erden zu dem ihrigen macht.") I am here taking up Gregor's 
reference in her translation of ApH on page 207 in footnote 43 to Kant's view of fortitudo mora/is in 
MS. It should be noted that Gregor mistakenly refers to pages 379 and 404 of MS instead of 380 
and 405. 
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SECOND kind are the manias for honor, for power, and for possession , 
which are not connected with the impetuosity of an affect but with the 
constancy of a maxim established for certain ends. The former can be 
called ardent passions (passiones ardentes); the latter, like avarice, cold 
passions (frigidae).174 
Since Kant discusses the vice of self-murder in The Metaphysics of Morals 
together with the vice of defiling oneself by lust, I suggest that we focus in our 
discussion on the passion of natural inclination in order to find out whether these 
inclinations can be the basis for the vice of self-murder. If self-murder would be 
based on a natural inclination we expect that this inclination is an innate 
inclination , that it is accompanied by affects and not exercised soberly through 
the rational choice of a maxim; in short, that it is an expression of an ardent 
passion. 
The inclination to freedom is strongest as developed in natural man or the 
savage, but even a new born child, according to Kant, displays this inclination 
through its cries , showing thereby its claim to freedom of which it "unlike any 
other animal" has an obscure idea.175 
In the state of nature where no public laws exist to protect human beings, 
it may be the fate of some that their happiness depends on those who are more 
powerful: 
174Gregor 135 (ApH 267f: "Sie werden in die Leidenschaften der nat 0 r I i chen (angebornen) 
und die der aus der C u It u r der Menschen hervorgehenden (erworbenen) Neigung eingetheilt. 
Die Leidenschaften der ersteren Gattung sind die F r e i h e i t s - und G e -
s chI e c h t s n e i gun g , beide mit Affect verbunden . Die der zweiten Gattung sind 
E h r such t , Her r s c h such t und H a b such t, welche nicht mit dem Ungestom eines 
Affects, sondern mit der Beharrlichkeit einer auf gewisse Zwecke angelegten Maxime verbunden 
sind. Jene konnen e r h i t z t e (passiones ardentes), diese, wie der Geiz k a I t e Leidenschaften 
(frigidae) genannt werden.") 
175According to Kant the baby regards "his inability to make use of his limbs as constraint [Zwang] 
and so immediately announces his claim to freedom .. . ". (Gregor 136/ApH 269). See also the 
footnote on the same page. In Reflexionen zur Anthropo/ogie, vol. 15 II , no. 1515, 854, Kant 
states: "Freedom is an inclination of mere animality in us. Wild . But freedom under laws is 
human." ("Freyheit ist eine Neigung der bor..en [sic] Thierheit in uns. Wild . Aber Freyheit unter 
Gesetzen ist menschlich.") 
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A man whose happiness depends on another man's choice (no matter 
how benevolent the other may be) rightly considers himself unfortunate. 
For what guarantee has he that his powerful neighbor's judgment about 
his well-being will agree with his own?-- The savage (who is not yet 
habituated to submission) knows of no greater misfortune than falling into 
it, and he is right, as long as there is no public law to protect him -- [an 
attitude he maintains] until discipline has gradually made him patient in 
submission.176 
The inclination to freedom is an inclination to outer freedom . Kant compares the 
vehement passion for the sensuous idea of outer freedom to the enthusiasm "the 
concept of freedom under moral laws ... arouses."1 77 
While discussing the inclination to freedom, Kant points out that the 
strongest inclinations of animals (his example is the inclination for sexual union) 
are not called passions "for they have no reason, which alone establishes the 
concept of freedom and with which passion comes in collision ."1 78 Furthermore, 
the passionate love or hate humans have for drink or musk, for example, are not 
passions. They are only "so many different instincts" whereas passions are 
"properly speaking .. . directed only to men and can also be satisfied only by 
men."179 Kant makes explicit that passions unlike, for example, the passionate 
love or hate of something presupposes a maxim.1so 
176Gregor 135 (ApH 268: "Wer nur nach eines Andere n Wahl giOcklich sein kann (dieser mag 
nun so wohlwollend sein, als man immer will), fOhlt sich mit Recht ungiOcklich. Denn welche 
Gewahrleistung hater, dar.. sein machtiger Nebenmensch in dem Urtheile Ober das Wahl mit dem 
seinen zusammenstimmen werde? Der Wilde (noch nicht an UnterwOrfigkeit Gewohnte) kennt 
kein gror..eres UngiOck als in diese zu gerathen und das mit Recht, so lange noch kein offentlich 
Gesetz ihn sichert; bis ihn Disciplin allmahlig dazu geduldig gemacht hat.") 
177Gregore 136 (ApH 269: "So erweckt nicht allein der Freiheitsbegriff unter moralischen 
Gesetzen einen Affect, der Enthusiasm genannt wird, sondern die bios sinnliche Vorstellung der 
aur..eren Freiheit erhebt die Neigung darin zu beharren oder sie zu erweitern durch die Analogie 
mit dem Rechtsbegriffe bis zur heftigen Leidenschaft.") 
178Gregor 136 (ApH 269: " .. . weil sie keine Vernunft haben, die allein den Beg riff der Freiheit 
begrondet und womit die Leidenschaft in Collision kommt; ... ".) 
179Gregor 137 (ApH 270: "Leidenschaften gehen eigentlich nur auf Menschen und konnen auch 
nur durch sie befriedigt werden. " See also next footnote. 
180ApH, Erganzungen aus H 410 : "Leidenschaften [werden] sind von Menschen nur auf 
Menschen nicht auf Sachen gerichtete Neigungen und selbst wenn die Neigung auf Menschen 
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Kant's view of passion and passionate love or hate can now be applied to the 
vice of self-murder. In The Metaphysics of Morals Kant groups the vice of self-
murder together with the vice of the unnatural use of one's sexual inclination and 
the vice of the excessive consumption of food and drink. If passions are properly 
speaking only directed to and can only be satisfied by other human beings and 
presuppose a maxim, the passion for drink is not a passion because it is not 
directed to other human beings, 181 and the passion for sexual intercourse is not 
really a passion because it is based on an instinct.182 It seems, therefore, 
possible that a vice can not only grow out of a true passion but also a passionate 
love or hate of something, and the so-called vice of the unnatural use of one's 
sexual inclination as well as the excessive consumption of food and drink could 
then not be traced back to a true passion but to passionate love. 
The aforementioned considerations entail that self-murder is either not 
based on a true passion but on a passionate love or hate of something, or that it 
differs from these vices and is based on a true passion. 
aber nicht sofern sie Personen sondern bios als thierische Wesen von der n<':imlichen species 
betrachtet werden verfc':illt in der Neigung zum Geschlecht kann die Liebe zwar leidenschaftlich 
aber eigentlich nicht eine Leidenschaft genannt werden weil die letztere Maximen (nicht blose 
lnstincte) in dem Verfahren mit anderen Menschen voraussetzt." We can assume that there 
should be either commas or parentheses around "in der Neigung zum Geschlecht." Mary Gregor 
also refers to this remark in her note number 45 on page 207, but mistakenly refers to page 408 
instead of 410. She does not remark on the missing punctuation, but adds it in her translation : 
"Passions are inclinations directed by men only to men, not to things; end even when the 
inclination hits upon men, not insofar as they are regarded as persons but merely as animal 
beings of the human species, in the inclination to sex, love can be called passionate but not really 
a passion. For passion presupposes maxims (not merely instinct) in one's dealings with other 
men ." 
181 The same is true for the vice of sodomy if understood as the sexual intercourse with animals. 
182it is not completely clear to me whether this means that the inclination to freedom is not really a 
passion or a passionate love for freedom. The example of the sage and the baby indicate to me 
that both alternatives are possible. Since the inability of the baby to use its limbs is felt as 
constraint which in turn is voiced by crying and shows the claim to freedom, we could, if we would 
believe in Kant's explanation, say that this inclination to freedom of the baby is neither directed to 
other people nor can it be satisfied by other people. 
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According to the first alternative, suicide would be based on an instinct which 
means that it would be based on an inclination that can be exercised without a 
maxim. The inclination to freedom would then entail the possibility of self-
destruction. 
According to the second alternative, suicide would grow out of a passion 
which is directed to and can only be satisfied by other human beings. If we 
assume that suicide is based on the inclination to freedom understood as a 
passion we would have to argue that a suicide kills herself or himself because of 
the inclination to freedom and that the latter could not be identified with an 
instinct. Since the inclination to freedom is the inclination to outer freedom , the 
suicide would kill himself to protect his outer freedom. The argument would then 
go as follows . The suicide under no circumstance wishes that his "happiness 
depends on another man's choice (no matter how benevolent the other may be) ," 
and in order to satisfy this vehement passion he commits suicide. This in turn 
would mean that inclination "lights upon something contrary to the law,"183 and it 
would suggest that killing oneself in order to protect one's outer freedom is 
contrary to the moral law. 
Depending on the individual perception of the situation , the enthusiasm-
like affect which accompanies the inclination to freedom could turn into anger or 
faint-heartedness and thus explain the affective component of suicide which 
Kant stresses in his lectures and works . According to this line of interpretation, 
the satisfaction of the ardent passion for freedom overrules the satisfaction of all 
other inclinations so that the person's inclinations cannot be arranged into an 
organic whole, and the passion is then satisfied through the violation of a duty. 
183MS 408 see footnote no. 26. 
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This interpretation explains why Kant stresses the emotional agitation of the 
suicide, but it also shows that the vice of self-murder, unnatural use of one's 
sexual inclination, and the excessive consumption of food and drink are not 
really "true" vices as defined in The Metaphysics of Morals. True vices, if 
understood as rational choices of evil, seem to be based on those passions 
which can be pursued soberly1B4 like, for example, the mania for possession 
which can result in avarice. The very fact that Kant describes the state of mind of 
the suicide as either agitated or even disturbed indicates that the suicide can 
neither think clearly while making the decision or performing the act nor use her 
or his reason properly. In other words, our discussion so far indicates that Kant 
does not consider the possibility that suicide can be the result of a rational 
decision. Yet because he discusses the prohibition of self-murder in the 
"Doctrine of Virtue," he must, nevertheless, believe that a self-murderer is 
responsible for her action and that the act constitutes a violation of duty, namely, 
murder. 
In the following Chapter we will turn to the discussion of the casuistical 
questions which Kant lists in The Metaphysics of Morals in order to judge which 
cases of self-sacrifice or of self-disembodiment constitute self-murder. 
184For avarice compare MS 428f. 
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CHAPTER VII 
CASUISTICAL QUESTIONS 
In this chapter we will discuss the casuistical questions Kant raises at the end of 
the article "Of Self-disembodiment" in The Metaphysics of Morals. So far we 
have shown that self-murder violates a perfect duty to oneself, the duty of self-
preservation which serves to protect the status of the human being as an end in 
itself. We saw that it is the autonomy of the person which constitutes human 
dignity and that Kant refers to this freedom either in terms of the right of 
humanity, essential end of humanity, or negative end with regard to the person . 
Kant argues that the destruction of the subject of morality in one's own person 
means to "root out the existence of morality itself from the world , ... even though 
morality is an end in itself," because it destroys the human being as the creator 
of all moral value. 1 The self-murderer destroys morality because he acts from 
self-love, and that means, according to Kant, that his maxim neither qualifies as 
a universal law of nature nor does it satisfy the condition never to treat oneself 
as a thing . Self-disembodiment constitutes the vice of self-murder because the 
subject guided by the hedonistic principle to avoid pain intentionally transgresses 
the perfect duty of self-preservation in order to die. Kant believes that this 
transgression is very often performed in a state of emotional agitation , but can , 
nevertheless, be imputed to the subject. 
We also saw that Kant allows risking one's life in some cases and that he 
defends the morality of self-sacrifice if it serves to preserve one's own moral 
integrity. He is, however, critical of sacrificing one's life for someone else as the 
1Gregor 219 (MS 423). 
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example of the son who accepts the punishment in lieu of this guilty father 
indicates.2 Kant's view that one should give up one's life if one is no longer able 
to live a moral life entails that one does not act from the hedonistic principle of 
self-love. In other words, the motive for giving up life is not to avoid physical or 
psychological pain and misery but to avoid an immoral life. Giving up one's life to 
preserve morality seems then to mean to abstain from immoral actions, that is, 
prolonging life by immoral means or ending life by immoral means, for example, 
by murdering oneself.3 
The very fact that Kant never added a duty for self-sacrifice, even though 
he believes that it is appropriate to sacrifice one's life in order to preserve one's 
moral integrity (not the integrity or the life of others) suggests, first, that the duty 
of self-preservation allows for the possibility to give up one's life to preserve 
one's moral self, and, second , that there can never be a duty which obligates us 
to sacrifice our lives for others.4 
These considerations help explain why Kant classifies the duty of self-
preservation as a strict (unconditioned) as well as a cond itioned dutys and holds 
at the same time that self-murder is always prohibited, even though giving up 
one's life can be required. It is a strict duty to preserve one's moral integrity, yet 
a conditioned duty to preserve one's physical existence. The latter duty is 
conditioned because it is subject to the condition of morality. The former duty is 
2See Chapter on "Right of Humanity" footnote no. 74. 
3Kant's view of giving up one's life seems, however, to harbor some problems when it comes to 
the question of how one can sacrifice one's life without killing oneself. Battin 124 points out that 
"Kant ignores those situations [for example Lucretia's rape] in which degradation threatens but 
death will not automatically result from resistance to that degradation" and states on the next 
page: "The issue is this: If your life will not be "sacrificed" for you , and yet if you remain alive you 
cannot avoid violation of the moral law, must you then sacrifice your life yourself?" 
4See chapter on "Duties" footnote no. 4, see also MS 393. 
ssee the very beginning of the Chapter on "Duties." 
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strict because it is under no circumstances allowed to compromise one's moral 
integrity. 
By answering the casuistical questions we will further illustrate Kant's 
distinction between self-murder, self-sacrifice, and risking one's life. 
The Casuistical Questions in The Metaphysics of Morals 
Even though Kant does not answer the casuistical questions in the 
"Doctrine of Virtue," he answers or suggests an answer to most of these 
questions in his other works, lectures, or NachlafS. I am aware that Kant could at 
any time have changed his mind and that these answers may not represent the 
answers he would have given at the time when he wrote the "Doctrine of Virtue." 
However, a radical change in his answers would also presuppose a change in 
the overall argument against self-murder which I cannot detect in his work. I 
believe, therefore, that we are justified in regarding these answers or 
suggestions as valid responses to the casuistical questions raised in The 
Metaphysics of Morals. Before we turn to the specifics of the casuistical 
questions, I would like to make some remarks regarding the function of casuistry 
in the "Doctrine of Virtue."6 
At the end of the introduction to the "Doctrine of Virtue," Kant explains that 
because of the "latitude it allows in its imperfect duties," ethics, unlike the 
"Doctrine of Right," results in casuistry and inevitably leads 
to questions that call upon judgment to decide how a maxim is to be 
applied in particular cases, and indeed in such a way that judgment 
6Compare also Gregor (1963) 102, 1 03f, 11 Of for her discussion of casuistry. 
provides another (subordinate) maxim (and one can always ask for yet 
another principle for applying this maxim to cases that may arise) .7 
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Casuistry in Kant's view is not so much "a doctrine about how to find something" 
but rather "a practice in how to seek truth."8 Since Kant adds casuistical 
questions at the end of his section on self-disembodiment, we must assume that 
there are cases where we have to decide how to apply the duty of self-
preservation or the duty not to commit self-murder. Furthermore, since it is with 
regard to imperfect duties that a casuistry arises, we must assume that the 
perfect duty to preserve oneself may also be treated as an imperfect duty. We 
suggested in the Chapter on "Duties" that the duty of self-preservation is 
imperfect because it does not prescribe which actions to perform in order to 
reach the end of human nature; it leaves to the subject a latitude for action. Yet 
with regard to the prohibition not to violate the end of human nature, the duty of 
self-preservation is perfect because it prohibits actions that qualify as self-
murder. This, in turn, means that the purpose of the casuistical question is to 
determine which actions fall within the latitude the duty of self-preservation 
provides. To put the matter differently, the casuistical questions determine which 
cases constitute self-murder and must be forbidden and which cases constitute a 
form of sacrificing or risking one's life and are allowed.9 It is important to 
understand that by raising these questions Kant does not suggest that some 
cases of self-murder are allowed, but that it must be determined which cases 
7 Gregor 211 (MS 411 : "Die Ethik hingegen fOhrt wegen des Spielraums, den sie ihren 
unvollkommenen Pflichten verstattet, unvermeidlich dahin, zu Fragen, welche die Urtheilskraft 
auffordern auszumachen, wie eine Maxime in besonderen Fallen anzuwenden sei und zwar so: 
da~ diese wiederum eine (untergeordnente) Maxime an die Hand gebe (wo immer wiederum nach 
einem Princip der Anwendung dieser auf vorkommende Faile gefragt werden kann) ; und so 
~erath sie in eine Casuist i k, von welcher die Rechtslehre nichts wei~ ." 
Gregor 211 (MS 411 : "Die C as u i s t i kist ... nicht sowohl Lehre, wie etwas g e f u n d e n, 
sonder Obung, wie die Wahrheit solle g e such t werden; .. . ". 
9See also Gregor (1963) 110f. 
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constitute self-murder and are prohibited, and which constitute risking or 
sacrificing one's life and may be permitted . I say "may," because not all forms of 
self-sacrifice or risking one's life are morally acceptable. 
We pointed out that, according to Kant's Lecture on Moral Philosophy, it is 
the intention to kill oneself which constitutes self-murder. As long as the wish to 
live remains, we cannot speak of self-murder. 10 The choice of this criterion 
suggests that what matters in determining whether or not someone murders or 
sacrifices herself is not the reason why she intends to die but the attitude she 
displays towards the continuation of life. But Kant does not mention the subject's 
attitude to life when he formulates the casuistical questions nor does he mention 
the motive of hedonistic self-love which he presents in the Groundwork. 
Had he, for example, exclusively relied on these criteria the questions 
could have been answered very easily: all those who intend to kill themselves or 
kill themselves because of self-love are self-murderers. But Kant neither 
mentions the motive nor the intent of the subjects when he formulates the 
questions. One reason may be that he believes that these criteria are too 
general and must be specified . In other words, it must be specified what we 
mean when we say that someone acts or does not act from self-love and what 
we mean when someone intends or does not intend to kill herself. It could mean 
that we have to know the specific reasons why someone commits suicide in 
order to judge the case. Another reason may be that the cases Kant lists in The 
Metaphysics of Morals represent the cases which remain unclear after the 
criteria of motive and intent have been applied. That would mean that we can 
10This does not exclude the possibility to measure the wish to live by the willingness to die. On the 
contrary, the willingness to die indicates a strong wish to live, but, Kant would say, it is the wish to 
live a moral life. 
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assume that the subjects described are people who do not intend to die and do 
not act from self-love, but, nevertheless, commit suicide or sacrifice their lives. 
This in turn would indicate that in addition to the criteria of motive and intent 
another criterion is needed to determine whether or not a particular case 
qualifies as self-murder. 
Both lines of interpretation suggest that we need to know the reason why 
someone kills or sacrifices himself in order to judge whether or not a particular 
case constitutes self-murder. Since all of the casu istical questions provide the 
reasons why someone commits suicide, they might represent the add itional 
information needed to judge the morality or immorality of a particular case. If this 
interpretation is correct, it could be argued that Kant suggests a two-step 
procedure in order to answer the casu istical questions: first, we have to use the 
criteria of motive and intent to decide whether the case in question is an obvious 
case of self-murder. If it is not, we turn , second , to the discussion of the reason 
for self-sacrifice and risking one's life and separate the morally acceptable 
reasons from the unacceptable ones. In order to do that we must use our own 
judgment. 
These preliminary remarks may suffice, and I suggest that we now classify 
the casuistical questions according to the reasons they mention for killing oneself 
or risking one's life. The first class of questions asks whether ending one's life 
can be justified in order to save one's country or the welfare of humanity. The 
second class of questions asks whether the preservation of honor provides an 
acceptable reason for killing oneself; and , lastly, the third class of questions asks 
whether one is allowed to risk one's life in order to preserve it. All of these 
questions have to be interpreted in the context of the duty to oneself, that is, the 
duty of self-preservation. We will see that all of the cases described in the 
casuistical questions are in final analysis violations of the perfect duty of self-
preservation.11 
Welfare of Others 
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The first two casuistical questions refer to intentional self-sacrifice and deliberate 
martyrdom: 
Is it murdering oneself to hurl oneself to certain death (like Curtius) in 
order to save one's country? Or is deliberate martyrdom, sacrificing 
oneself for the good of all mankind, also to be considered an act of 
heroism?12 
Even though Kant suggests that Curtius' death was an act of heroism, he 
nevertheless considers that such an act of heroism might constitute self-
111 disagree with Gregor (1963) 135 that Kant allows for a right to suicide: "Under special 
conditions there could arise questions of a collision between grounds of obligation, in which we 
might allege a duty (and hence a right) to suicide on the ground that our continued existence 
would imply a violation of another duty." Compare Chapter on "Duties" footnote 92 where Kant 
explicitly denies that one has a right to dispose over one's life. 
12Gregor 219 (MS 423: "1st es Selbstmord, sich (wie Curtius) in den gewissen Tod zu storzen, um 
das Vaterland zu retten? -- oder ist das vorsetzliche Marterthum, sich fOr das Heil des 
Menschengeschlechts Oberhaupt zum Opfer hinzugeben, auch wie jenes for Heldenthat 
anzusehen?") . It seems that Kant refers to Marcus Curtius and not Curtius Mettius since Livy's Ab 
Urbe Condita (From the Founding of the City) , with an English translation by B. 0 . Foster 
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press 1919), vol.3, Book VII. v. 8-vi. 5, makes 
clear that it was Marcus Curtius and not Curtius Mettius who committed suicide, and that it was he 
after whom the Curtian Lake was named: " That same year, whether owing to an earthquake or to 
some other violent force, it is said that the ground gave way, at about the middle of the Forum, 
and, sinking to an immeasurable depth, left a prodigious chasm. This gulf could not be filled with 
the earth which everyone brought and cast into it, until admonished by the gods, they began to 
inquire what it was that constituted the chief strength of the Roman People; for this the 
soothsayers declared that they must offer up, as a sacrifice to that spot, if they wished the Roman 
Republic to endure. Thereupon Marcus Curtius, a young soldier of great prowess, rebuked them, 
so the story runs, for questioning whether any blessing were more Roman than arms and valour. 
A hush ensued, as he turned to the temples of the immortal gods which rise above the Forum, 
and to the Capitol , and stretching forth his hands, now to heaven, and now to the yawning chasm 
and to the gods below, devoted himself to death. After which , mounted on a horse caparisoned 
with all possible splendour, he plunged fully armed into the gulf; and crowds of men and women 
threw offerings and fruits in after him. It was he, they say, and not Curtius Mettius, the soldier of 
Titus Tatius in days of old , who gave his name to the Curtian Lake." 
murder.13 Kant's answer to the first question found in the Lecture on the 
Metaphysics of Morals is negative: 
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It is allowed to risk one's life at the risk of losing it. I can, however, never 
be permitted to sacrifice my life intentionally or to kill myself in order to 
become obligated to others, for example, when Curtius throws himself into 
the cave to preserve the Roman People, he acts contrary to duty .... 14 
According to this quote, it is allowed to risk losing one's life, but it is contrary to 
duty to intentionally sacrifice or to kill oneself.15 We saw in the Chapter on "Care 
for the Moral Self' that Kant permits giving up or sacrificing one's biological life in 
order to preserve one's moral life. In order to avoid a contradiction between the 
permissibility to give up or sacrifice life and the quoted prohibition of intended 
self-sacrifice, Kant would argue that we can justify sacrificing our life if we cannot 
live a moral life. In other words, we are justified in sacrificing our life, if the 
continuation of our (physical) life is only possible by living an immoral life. 
However, if we intend to sacrifice our life even though we are able to live a moral 
life, we are not allowed to do so, since it would mean that we sacrifice our moral 
life and not, as in the former case, our physical life. Kant's answer suggests that 
the duty to oneself overrides the duty to others and that it is possible to be a hero 
and save one's people, but this action can, nevertheless, be in violation of a duty 
to oneself. 
13The construction of the last sentence in the following quote in the body of the text is not 
completely clear. "Wie jenes" seems to refer to the case of Curtius' death, but the question is why 
Kant uses the neuter "jenes." (The grammar of the sentence does not allow that it refers to "das ... 
Marterthum. ") 
14MSV 629: "Es ist erlaubt, sein Leben zu wagen auf die Gefahr, es zu verlieren, dagegen kann 
mir nie erlaubt sein , mein Leben vorsatzlich hinzugeben, order mich selbst zu toten, um mich 
anderen zu verpflichten, z. E. wenn Curtius sich in die Hohle storzt, um das romische Volk zu 
erhalten, so handelt er pflichtwidrig ... ". According to Livy's description, Marcus Curti us threw 
himself in a chasm not in a cave. 
151t is not clear to me what it means to sacrifice or kill oneself "in order to be obligated to others." 
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For the question of martyrdom we turn to the Religion where Kant opposes a 
statement by the rationalist Karl Friedrich Bahrdt that Christ "sought death," 
which, according to Kant, "would have been self-murder." Kant argues that he 
had "to give up his life" and did not murder himself. In a condensed form Kant 
lists all the relevant arguments which make killing oneself a crime: Christ did not 
seek death; in other words, he did not want or intend to die. If he had, he 
would have disposed over his life as a means to an end and would then have 
been "the a u t h or of his own death." Furthermore, Kant also denies that 
Christ did "stake his life without moral but merely with political (and unlawful) 
intent." He therefore did not risk his life for an immoral purpose. 16 Kant 
establishes here a connection between seeking death, using one's life as a 
means to an end , and becoming the free cause (author) of one's death . 
16Greene/Hudson 76 footnote: "Not that (as D. Bahrdt [footnote to Bahrdt added in translation] 
fancifully imagined) he sought death to further a worthy design through a brilliant and sensational 
example; that would have been suicide [self-murder] . For one may indeed attempt something at 
the risk of losing one's life, or even suffer death at the hands of another, when one cannot avoid it, 
without becoming faithless to an irremissable duty; but one may not dispose of oneself and of 
one's life as a means, to any end whatever, and so be the author of one's own death. 
Nor yet (as the writer of the WolfenbOttelsche Fragmente suspects) did he stake his life 
without moral but merely with political (and unlawful) intent, to the end, perhaps, of overthrowing 
the priests' rule and establishing himself in worldly supremacy in their stead." (RGV 81 : "Nicht dar.. 
er (wie D. B a h r d t romanhaft dichtete) den Tod s u c h t e, um eine gute Absicht durch ein 
Aufsehen erregendes glanzendes Beispiel zu befordern; das ware Selbstmord gewesen. Denn 
man darf zwar auf die Gefahr des Verlustes seines Lebens etwas wagen, oder auch den Tod von 
den Handen eines andern erdulden, wenn man ihm nicht ausweichen kann , ohne einer 
unnachlaP..Iichen Pflicht untreu zu werden, aber nicht Ober sein Leben als Mittel, zu welchem 
Zweck es auch sei , disponiren und so U r heber seines Todes sein. -- Aber auch nicht dar.. er 
(wie der WolfenbOttelsche Fragmentist argwohnt) sein Leben nicht in moralischer, sondern blor.. in 
politischer, aber unerlaubter Absicht, um etwa die Priesterregierung zu storzen und sich mit 
weltlicher Obergewalt selbst an ihre Stelle zu setzen, g e wag t habe; ... ".)--Greene/Hudson 
replace the dash with a paragraph. According to the footnote to D. Bahrdt in the English 
translation , Kant refers to the rationalist Karl Friedrich Bahrdt (1741-1792) and his work System 
der moralischen Religion zur endlichen Beruhigung fOr Zweifler und Denker, Chapters IX and X. 
I take it, then , that the initial "D." is the abbreviation for "Doctor."--According to Bahrdt's letter from 
December 29, 1786 (Letters , vol. 10, no. 286, 472f) he enclosed a copy of his "System des reinen 
Naturalismus, welches ich zugleich fOr reines Christenthum halte" for Kant. For Kant's response 
see Briefe, no. 288, 476. 
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Whenever we seek death, we use our lives as a means to an end and are 
therefore the author of our own death; as such, we do not only cause our death 
but are also responsible for it. 
According to Kant, Christ's death was "a manifestation of the good 
principle, that is, of humanity in its moral perfection and an example for everyone 
to follow."17 Since Christ, according to Kant, did not seek his death, it cannot be 
a case of deliberate ("vorsetzliche") martyrdom. However, in the casuistical 
question Kant speaks of "deliberate" martyrdom and even though it may qualify 
as heroism like Crusius' death, it also qualifies as self-murder because of 
premeditation. 
The fourth casuistical question concerns Frederick the Great of Prussia: 
Can a great king who died recently be charged with a criminal intention for 
carrying a fast-acting poison with him, presumably so that if he were 
captured when he led his troops into battle he could not be coerced to 
agree to conditions of ransom harmful to his state? For one can ascribe 
this purpose to him without having to presume that mere pride lay behind 
't 18 I. 
17 Greene/Hudson 77 (RGV 82: " ... so war eben dieser Tad (die hochste Stufe der Leiden eines 
Menschen) die Darstellung des guten Princips, namlich der Menschheit, in ihrer moralischen 
Vollkommenheit, als Beispiel der Nachfolge fOr Jedermann.") 
18Gregor 220 (MS 423: Kann manes einem gror..en unlangst verstorbenen Monarchen zum 
verbrecherischen Vorhaben anrechenen, dar.. er ein behend wirkendes Gift bei sich fOhrte, 
vermuthlich damit, wenn er in dem Kriege, den er personlich fOhrte, gefangen worde, er nicht etwa 
genothigt sei, Bedingungen der Auslosung einzugehen, die seinem Staate nachtheilig sein 
konnten ; denn diese Absicht kann man ihm unterlegen, ohne dar.. man nbthig hat, hierunter einen 
blor..en Stolz zu vermuthen?") . According to ApH 258, Frederick the Great carried "potent 
mercuric chloride" with him. See Chapter on "Homicidium Do/osum" footnote no. 157. Lehmann 
(1980) , however, quotes on page 76, footnote no. 60 from the German edition of Catt's 
conversations with Frederick II (Leipzig o. J. (1926) 251 ), according to which Frederick carried 
opium with him. I could not obtain this specific edition, but was able to obtain F. Lienhard's edition 
of Friedrich der Grosse. Auswahl aus seinen Schriften und Briefen nebst einigen Gesprachen mit 
de Catt (Stuttgart: Greiner und Pfeiffer, 19--?) where the editor states on page 4 7 that "the king 
indeed carried poison with him," but does not mention opium. And , lastly, the editorial notes in the 
Anthropology page 365 refer to the following resources regarding the poison: "Compare C. D. 
KOster, Die Lebensrettungen Friedrichs des Zweyten, 1792 p. 167, according to which the King 
carried already in the first Silesian War a quick-killing powder from France silently with him, and A 
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If we assume with Kant that the reason why Frederick the Great carried poison 
with him was not because of "mere pride,"19 and thus for ulterior motives, but 
because he intended to sacrifice himself for his country's security, the question is 
whether his intentions are still criminal. It seems that if Curtius violated a duty to 
himself by sacrificing himself for the preservation of the Roman People, then 
Frederick must also be accused of violating the duty of self-preservation when he 
intends to preserve the well being of the state. Even though it could be argued 
that Frederick could have avoided being used as a means to an end (as pawn) 
by poisoning himself, he would, nevertheless, not only intend his own death but 
also cause his own death. It could therefore be argued that, according to Kant's 
own criteria, Frederick's intentions were "criminal."20 
F. Busching, Character of Frederick the Second, 2nd edition 1789 p. 431 , where the poison is 
mentioned which Frederick carried with him during the Seven Year War." 
19Even though Frederick does not refer to his suicide in the event that he should be captured by 
the enemy, two letters to his sister (September 17 and 28 of 1757, in Lienhard 40-47) show that 
he contemplated suicide in light of the possible subjection to the tyranny of the "House of Austria." 
He intended to kill himself in order to preserve his honor and compared himself to Cato. 
201n KpV 158 (Beck 162) we find two other examples which also address the question of the 
welfare of others: "The action by which someone with the greatest danger to his own life seeks to 
save others in a shipwreck and at last loses his own life will indeed be counted , on the one hand, 
as duty, but, on the other hand, even more as meritorious action; but [in the latter case] our 
esteem for it will be weakened very much by the concept of his duty to himself, which here seems 
to have been infringed. More decisive is the magnanimous sacrifice of his life for the preservation 
of his country, and yet there still remain some scruples as to whether it is so perfect a duty to 
devote one's self spontaneously and unbidden to this purpose, and the action itself does not have 
the full force of a model and impulse to imitation." Beck does not add the letter spacing of "duty to 
oneself' . ("Die Handlung, da jemand mit der gror..ten Gefahr des Lebens Leute aus dem 
Schiffbruche zu retten sucht, wenn er zuletzt dabei selbst sein Leben einbor..t, wird zwar einerseits 
zur Pflicht, andererseits aber und gror..tentheils auch fur verdienstliche Handlung angerechnet, 
aber unsere Hochsch~tzung derselben wird gar sehr durch den Beg riff von P f I i c h t g e g e n 
s i c h s e I b s t , welche hier etwas Abbruch zu leiden scheint, geschw~cht. Entscheidender ist 
die gror..mothige Aufopferung seines Leben zur Erhaltung des Vaterlandes, und doch, ob es auch 
so vollkommen Pflicht sei , sich von selbst und unbefohlen diese Absicht zu weihen , daruber bleibt 
einiger Scrupel Obrig, und die Handlung hat nicht die ganze Kraft eines Musters und Antriebes zur 
Nachahmung in sich ." Even though Kant is much more positive in his evaluation of sacrificing 
one's life for one's country, he nevertheless has some reservations whether it is indeed a perfect 
duty to sacrifice one's life. This is, I believe, the only passage in Kant's work where he speaks of 
self-sacrifice as a perfect duty. It is as if this example is the direct opposite of his example of the 
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Kant continues his list of casuistical questions with the case of a man bitten by a 
rabid dog: 
A man who had been bitten by a mad dog already felt hydrophobia 
coming on. He explained , in a letter he left, that, since as far as he knew 
the disease was incurable, he was taking his life lest he harm others as 
well in his madness (the onset of which he already felt). Did he do 
wrong?21 
Kant asks whether it is morally permissible for the infected man to kill himself in 
order to prevent the infection of others. In the Lecture on the Metaphysics of 
Morals Kant discusses the case of the rabid man in connection with the case of a 
slave who awaits execution. "Can each of them," asks Kant "take his life?" The 
answer is negative because both could have avoided the situation which 
provides them with the reason to kill themselves. Kant suggests that by "letting 
themselves be tied up [meaning: "be physically restrained"] at the appropriate 
time," both the rabid man as well as the slave could be freed from their "unhappy 
situation" and "harm could be prevented." I take it that the expression "unhappy 
situation" is a euphemism for the misery the slave and the infected person had to 
endure, and that the prevention of harm refers to preventing the infection of 
others.22 Thus Kant rejects the option of self-murder in both cases: 
suicide in GMS. There the person who kills himself is a self-murderer because he acts from self-
love; here the sacrifice of life is proof that he acts from duty.") 21 Gregor 220 (MS 423: "Ein Mann empfand schon die Wasserscheu, als Wirkung von dem BiP., 
eines tollen Hundes, und nachdem er sich darOber so erkl~rt hatte: er habe noch nie erfahren , 
daP., jemand daran geheilt worden sei, brachte er sich selbst um, damit, wie er in einer 
hinterlassenen Schrift sagte, er nicht in seiner Hundewuth (zu welcher er schon den Anfall fOhlte) 
andere Menchen auch ungiOcklich machte; es fr~gt sich ob er dam it unrecht that.") 
22 MSV 603: "Man denke sich die F~lle, wie man wolle, z. E. ein Sklave soli wegen versuchtem, 
aber fehlgeschlagenem, Versuche zur Freiheit das Leben verlieren ; ein vom tollen Hund 
Gebissener spOrt ganz evident die Wirkungen der Tollheit; kann jeder von ihnen sich das Leben 
nehmen? Ersterer hM ein Sklavenleben fOr kein Leben, das der Menschheit angemessen ist; 
letzterer sieht seinen Tod und die Moglichkeit, anderen durch seinen Hang zum BiP., ebenso 
nachtheilig zu werden. -- Dem ohnerachtet vereiteln beide aile Versuche, wodurch sie von ihrer 
ungiOcklichen Lage befreit werden und dem Schaden vorgebeugt werden konne, z. E. sich binden 
To destroy oneself, namely through a willful action undertaken by the 
sensible being, can never be permitted , which is the reason why self-
murder (autocheiria) can never and under no condition be regarded as 
permitted.23 
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The infected man should rather prevent himself from infecting others and should 
endure his suffering and eventual death. The answer to the casuistical question 
is therefore affirmative. 
Honor 
The third casuistical questions asks: 
Is it permitted to anticipate by killing oneself the unjust death sentence of 
one's ruler-- even if the ruler permits this (as did Nero with Seneca)?24 
In the Anthropology Kant discusses the ordered suicide of Seneca by Nero as 
well as the case of Roland who anticipated his execution by committing suicide.25 
The latter case can be read as an answer to the first, more general question and 
the former to the last, more specific question . 
Kant states that in times when "public injustice is established and declared 
lawful" that "honor-loving" ("ehrliebende") men like Roland rather than accepting 
their unjust execution prefer to kill themselves . Because Roland could not 
lassen bei gehOriger Zeit; man hat gan neuerlich das Mittel gegen den tollen Hundebi~ darin 
gefunden, da~ man ihm innerlich Oel einzufiO~en und au~erlich ganz zu beOien sucht." Kant 
seems to suggest that if the slave would not have tried to escape, he would not have had reason 
to kill himself. This suggestion does, however, ignore the problem of the inhumane treatment of 
slaves. 
23MSV 603: "Sich selbst also zu destruiren, namlich durch eine vom Sinnenwesen willkOrlich 
unternommene Handlung, kann nie erlaubt seyn, daher ein Selbstmord (autocheiria) niemals und 
unter keiner Bedingung als erlaubt angesehen werden kann ." 
24Gregor 219 (MS 423: "1st es erlaubt dem ungerechten Todesurthei l seines Oberen durch 
SelbsttOtung zuvor zu kommen? -- selbst wenn dieser es (wie Nero am Seneca) erlaubte zu 
thun?") 
25See also Chapter on "Homicidium Dolosum," footnote no. 153. 
343 
acknowledge his execution as deserved he "prefers death as a free man."26 Kant 
points out that in the context of a state with a constitution Roland himself would 
have regarded self-murder as abominable ("verwerflich"), and Kant's 
interpretation suggests that Roland tried to protect his honor by committing 
suicide. 
With regard to Seneca's suicide, Kant briefly mentions that tyrants like 
Nero regarded the option of suicide as an act of kindness on their part, since it 
allowed the condemned to die in a more honorable way. 
Even though Kant seems to sympathize with Roland because he affirms 
that suicides are not always "depraved , worthless souls who try to rid themselves 
of the burden of life" and even adds that those "without a sense for true honor 
will not easily kill themselves," he nevertheless stresses that suicide "is always 
horrible ["grar!,lich"] ," and closes his discussion of Roland's and Seneca's suicide 
in the Anthropology with the remark: "I do not want to defend the morality of 
26 ApH 259: "Es sind nicht immer bios verworfene, nichtswOrdige Seelen, die auf solche Weise der 
Last des Lebens loszuwerden beschliel?>en; vielmehr hat man von solchen, die fOr wahre Ehre 
kein GefOhl haben, dergleichen That nicht Ieicht zu besorgen. -- lndessen da sie doch immer 
gral?>lich bleibt, und der Mensch sich selbst dadurch zum Scheusal macht, ist es doch 
merkwOrdig, dal?> in Zeitlaufen der offentlichen und fOr gesetzmal?>ig erklarten Ungerechtigkeit 
eines revolutionaren Zustandes (z. B. des Wohlfahrtsauschusses der franzosischen Republik) 
ehrliebende Manner (z. B. Roland) der Hinrichtung nach dem Gesetz durch Selbstmord 
zuvorzukommen gesucht haben, den sie in einer constitutionellen Verfassung selbst wOrden fOr 
verwerflich erklart haben. Der Grund davon ist dieser. Es liegt in jeder Hinrichtung nach einem 
G e s e t z etwas Beschimpfendes, weil sie S t r a f e ist, und wenn jene ungerecht ist, so kann 
der, welcher das Opfer des Gesetzes wird , diese nicht fOr eine v e r d i e n t e anerkennen. 
Dieses aber beweiset er dadurch: dal?>, wenn er dem Tode einmal geweiht worden , er ihn nun 
Iieber wie ein freier Mensch wahlt und ihn s i c h s e I b s t anthut. Daher auch Tyrannen (wie 
Nero) es fOr eine Gunstbezeigung ausgaben, zu erlauben, dal?> der Verutheilte sich selbst 
umbrachte: weil es dann mit mehr Ehre geschah. -- -- Die Moralitat aber hievon verlange ich nicht 
zu vertheidigen."--ln the context of just and unjust executions, Kant's reference to the formal 
execution of a monarch (his examples are Charles I and Louis XVI) in MS 322 footnote (Gregor 
132 footnote) as "self-murder'' should be mentioned: "Like a chasm that irretrievably swallows 
everything, the execution of a monarch seems to be a crime from which the people cannot be 
absolved, for it is as if the state commits suicide [it should say "self-murder"] ."(" ... welches, wie 
ein Alles ohne Wiederkehr verschlingender Abgrund , als ein vom Staate an ihm verObter 
Selbstmord, ein keiner Entsondigung fahiges Verbrechen zu sein scheint.") 
344 
this."27 In other words, he does not want to provide a moral justification of 
Roland's and Seneca's suicides. Kant's reasoning suggests that it is one thing to 
sympathize with a person's situation, yet another thing to justify the actions he or 
she takes in this situation. 
Furthermore, since Kant points out in his Lecture on Moral Philosophy that 
"no one under the sun, no master of the land can obligate me to murder 
myself,"28 we must conclude that not only are Roland and Seneca wrong in 
committing suicide, but Nero is wrong in ordering it in the first place. Kant seems 
to believe that an obligation to commit suicide would undermine a system of 
duties as long as this system rests on the dignity of one's personality. 
The answer to the third casuistical question is therefore negative because 
we are not allowed to anticipate an unjust death by committing suicide. Kant's 
argument shows that a violation of one's honor cannot justify "self-murder."29 
Preservation of Life 
The last of the casuistical questions listed after Kant's discussion of self-murder 
in The Metaphysics of Morals concerns the inoculation of smallpox30 : 
Anyone who decides to be vaccinated against smallpox puts his life in 
danger [see footnote], even though he does so in order to preserve his 
life; and, insofar as he himself brings on the disease that endangers his 
life, he is in a far more doubtful situation, as far as the law of duty is 
27See previous footnote ApH 259. 
28MC 371 : "Zum Selbstmord kann mich keiner unter der Sonne, kein Landesherr verpflichten ." 
29See also our discussion of Lucretia's suicide in the Chapter on "Care for the Moral Self." 
3
°Kant foreshadowed in this discussion of smallpox inoculation many of the questions which are 
today discussed in Medical Ethics. But since the dissertation is not concerned with Medical Ethics, 
I have not discussed the doctor-patient relationship, questions of consent, and the active/passive 
distinction. 
345 
concerned , than is the sailor, who at least does not arouse the storm to 
which he entrusts himself. Is smallpox inoculation, then, permitted?31 
As is the case with the other casuistical questions, the topic is not further 
discussed in the "Doctrine of Virtue." However, Kant intended to publish an open 
letter in the Jahrbilcher der preuf3ischen Monarchie in response to a letter to 
Count Dohna regarding the permissibility of smallpox inoculation. Another 
request to answer this question reached Kant from Professor Juncker in Halle 
who was the editor of the Archiv der Aerzte und Seelsorger wider die Pocken-
noth.32 Whether the answer to the letters was ever written is not known. But 
Kant's discussion of this topic in the appendix on "Medicin" in the Reflexionen zur 
Anthropologie can be taken as an outline for the response that should have been 
published in the Jahrbilcher. 33 Before we turn to the discussion of these sources 
I would like to clarify the term "smallpox inoculation." 
That it is the inoculation with human smallpox (variolation) and not the 
vaccination with the less virulent cowpox, to which Kant refers in The 
31 Gregor 220 (MS 424: "Wer sich die Pocken einimpfen zu lassen beschlier..t, wagt sein Leben 
aufs Ungewisse, ob er es zwar thut, um s e i n L e b e n z u e r h a I t e n , und ist so fern in 
einem weit bedenklicheren Fall des Pflichtgesetzes, als der Seefahrer, welcher doch wenigsten 
den Sturm nicht macht, dem er sich anvertraut, statt dessen jener die Krankheit, die ihn in 
Todesgefahr bringt, sich selbst zuzieht. 1st also die Pockeninoculation erlaubt?") I believe that part 
of the first sentence of Gregor's translation should be changed into "exposes his life to an 
uncertain risk" ("wagt sein Leben aufs Ungewisse"). Furthermore, for reasons discussed in the 
body of the text, "vaccinated" should be understood in the sense of variolation not vaccination . 
32Vol. 15 II, no. 1550, 971 : "In die JahrbOcher der preur..ischen Monarchie einen Brief an den Graf 
Dohna, die Pockeneinimpfung und deren Zulal!.igkeit betreffend*, mit ROcksicht auf Prof. Juncker 
in Halle, den Feuerlarm darober zu mar..igen." The addition(*) reads: "Erorterung einer 
casuist is chen Auf gab e , die Zulal!.igkeit oder Unzulal!.igkeit der Pockeneinimpfung 
betreffend (vide Rechtslehre) .)" It is of interest that Kant wants to discuss this question in the 
"Doctrine of Right" and not as he did in MS "in the "Doctrine of Virtue" (compare also footnote 
no. 48). -- See also Gerhard Lehmann's explanations in the Opus postumum, val. 22, 820 and 
compare Adickes footnote to no. 1550-1553 on pages 970f. 
33See val. 15 II, 972-976 and Opus postum, val. 22, 295-297 and 302-304. Since the content (not 
the punctuation) of the former corresponds with only a few exceptions to the text in the Opus 
postumum, I will quote only from val. 15 11.--For the suggestion that these pages represent an 
outline for the JahrbOcher see Lehmann's reference to Reicke in val. 22, 820. 
Metaphysics of Morals, in the Lose Blatter listed under Reflexionen zur 
Anthropologie as well as in the Opus postumum can , I believe, be assumed 
because of the following reasons: 
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First, Edward Jenner performed his first vaccination in which he used 
cowpox to immunize the patient against smallpox in May of 1796, and he 
published his results in An Inquiry into the Causes and Effects of the Variolae 
Vaccinae, a Disease Discovered in some of the Western Counties of England, 
particularly Gloucestershire, and known by the name of the Cowpox in June 
1798.34 Since The Metaphysics of Morals was published in 1797 and the Inquiry 
in 1798 I will assume that the casuistical question raised in the "Doctrine of 
Virtue" refers to the inoculation of human smallpox. 35 Furthermore, it would 
theoretically be possible that Kant refers to the inoculation of cowpox in the Lose 
Blatterfrom 1800 as well as the Opus postumum. But in light of Professor 
Juncker's request to Kant, stated in the letter of June 27, 1800, to send him his 
expert opinion ("Gutachten") with regard to the question "whether and in how far 
you regard the inoculation of human smallpox as moral or immoral,"36 it is very 
34Derrick Saxby, Jenner's Smallpox Vaccine. The Riddle of Vaccinia Virus and its Origin (London: 
Heinemann Educational Books, 1981), p. 55. 
35Kant is therefore referring to the practice of immunizing the patient by taking material from a 
"ripe pustule" of an infected person and inserting it into a "slight incision" of the skin of the healthy 
patient (Saxby 25). This original inoculation is also known as variolation (Saxby; xiii) and must be 
distinguished from the method of vaccination ["vacca;" Latin for "cow"] . The latter was officially 
introduced by Edward Jenner who used cowpox, not smallpox, to immunize the patient against 
smallpox. Vaccination differed from variolation in "three respects: (1) It was safe for the recipient; 
~~)It_ did not transmit infection to contacts; _(3) "!"here w~s ~o g~~eralized eruption." (Saxby 24) 
Bnefe, val. 12, no. 865, 314: " ... ob und m w1efern S1e d1e E1mmpfung der Menschenblattern for 
sittlich oder unsittlich halten?" See also Count Dohna's letter in footnote no. 42. Furthermore, 
Heinrich Bohn's brief discussion of Kant's attitude to smallpox in his talk "Ueber Kant's Beziehung 
zur Medizin" given to the Kant-Society in Konigsberg on April 22, 1872 and printed in the 
Altpreu!J,ische Monatsschrift 9, Heft 8 (1872): 623 also indicates that Kant refers to the inoculation 
of human smallpox. Gerhard Lehmann mentions this article in the Appendix to the Opus 
postumum (val. 22, 280) but mistakenly (if the spelling in the Monatsschrift is correct) misspells 
Heinrich Bohn as "H. 8 e h n." 
347 
likely that Kant's attempts to answer this question in the Nach/af!, also refer to the 
inoculation of human smallpox. 
Second, since Kant uses in all texts the term "Pockeninoculation" and not 
the term "Kuhpockenimpfung" (cowpox inoculation) of which he was aware,37 we 
can conclude that Kant refers to the sometimes deadly smallpox inoculation and 
not to Jenner's safer alternative of vaccination. If my assumption is correct, it 
would also explain the reason why Kant mentions that the patient risks death or 
mutilation through inoculation38 because human smallpox could not only cause 
severe disfigurement but also blindness and death .39 
That Kant was very critical of variolation and vaccination is shown by the 
following reports: 
Rink states that Kant was biased with regard to "Schutzblattern" 
("protective pox") or vaccination as well as "Biatternimpfung" ("smallpox 
inoculation") and thought that the former would impart bestiality to the human 
being: "During the last year he regarded vaccination in general ["lmpfung 
Uberhaupt"] as a probably dangerous presumptuousness since smallpox and 
wars seem to serve providence as two great means for important ends."40 
37 According to three "Lose Blatter" qu'oted in voL 15 II , 970 footnote, Kant was well aware of 
vaccination : "Kuhpockenimpfung. Vaccination . (Castraten);" "Die neuerliche Verspottung der 
Kupockeninoculation in der Zeitung;" "Vaccinatio Die Kuheiterimpfung nicht die Brutalimpfung." 
--Further support for my assumption is given by Saxby xiii who states that the term "inoculation" 
was until 1798 only used to refer to the procedure whereby "protection against naturally-occurring 
smallpox could be obtained by the deliberate inoculation of smallpox virus into the skin ."--Kant's 
remark quoted in voL 15 II, 970 footnote indicates that he might have wanted to discuss the 
guestion of human smallpox inoculation and cowpox inoculation together. 
38see footnotes no. 31, 48. 
39 According to Saxby 24 the estimated mortality rate of variolation in the early years was about 
"1/50-1/70;" whereas approximately "1/5-1/8 of smallpox patients died, and in some epidemics this 
figure could rise to 1/2." All those dying where children (page 12). That Kant was aware of the 
deadly danger of this disease for children shows voL 15 II, no. 1552, 973. 
40Rink as quoted in Malter 480: "Oder er redete von den Schutzblattern, gegen die er, wie gegen 
die Blatternimpfung Oberhaupt eingenommen war. Von jenen behauptete er, welche Furcht auch 
Andre geaur..ert haben, sie konnten , um mich seines eignen Ausdruckes zu bedienen, eine 
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Wasianski's biography supports Rink's report. He states that Kant still refused to 
use the term "Schutzblattern" in his later years and believed that one would 
impart a kind of bestiality on the patient, that it would make one become 
receptive to cattle-pest, and , lastly, he doubted the protection against smallpox 
because of lack of sufficient experience ("hinlangliche[r] Erfahrung").41 
Some of Kant's arguments can be understood as a direct response to 
Count Dohna. The Count, whose bride intends to inoculate herself against 
smallpox in order to fend off infection , is aware of Kant's rather skeptical view of 
smallpox inoculation as reflected in the casuistical question in the "Doctrine of 
Virtue." The Count himself is in favor of the inoculation for the following reasons: 
I regard it as permissible since the uncertainty of risking my life is even 
greater if I leave it to chance to be infected by a more evil poison , at a 
gewisse Bestialitat in die Menschennatur Obertragen. Die lmpfung Oberhaupt aber betrachtete er 
in den letzten Jahren, als eine wahrscheinlich schadliche Anmal1ung , da sich die Vorsehung der 
Slattern und des Krieges, als zweyer grol1en Mittel zu bedeutenden Zwecken zu bedienen 
scheine." Rink makes clear that these statements cannot be ascribed to Kant's old age because 
he had heard them several times, meaning, I suppose, several times before he reached old age. 
("Aeul1erungen, die zu auffallend seyn wOrden , wenn man sie nicht als Beweise der Schwache in 
seinem hohen Alter annehmen mo!1te, die ich aber zu oft aus seinem Munde gehort habe, und 
gegen die so wenig andre Argumente angehtirt wurden , dal1 ich glaubte eben deshalb sie hier 
anfOhren zu mossen.") Compare also vol. 15 II, no. 1550, 971 . 
41 E. A Ch. Wasianski , Kant in seinem /etzten Lebensjahren (Konigsberg : Friedrich Nicolovius, 
1804), p. 134 (also quoted in vol. 15 II , 971 footnote) : "Ganz entgegengesetzter Meinung war er 
aber im ersten Anfange, als D. Jenner seine Erfindung der Kuhpocken bekannt machte, Ober den 
grol1en Vortheil derselben furs Menschengeschlecht. Er verweigerte ihnen den Namen der 
Schutzblattern noch sehr spat; meinte sogar, dal1 die Menschheit sich zu sehr mit der Th ierheit 
familiarisire und der erstern eine Art von Brutalitat (im physischen Sinne) eingeimpft werden 
konne. Er fOrchtete ferner, dal1 durch Vermischung des thierischen Miasma's mit dem Blute, oder 
wenigstens mit der Lymphe, dem Menschen Empfanglichkeit fOr die Viehseuche mitgetheilt 
werden ktinnte. Endlich bezweifelte er auch, aus Mangel hinlanglicher Erfahrungen, die 
Schutzkraft derselben gegen die Menschenblattern." Hasse confirms Kant's attitude to 
"Schutzblattern" when he states that he had a low opinion of the "Schuz [sic]-Pocken-lmpfung" 
which he regarded as "one more brutality of which we have no need." (Hasse as quoted in Malter 
527) .--For a satiric depiction of the belief that vaccination would impart bestiality on the patient, a 
belief that was shared by many people, including Kant, see James Gill ray's print entitled "The Cow 
POCK--or--the Wonderful Effects of the New Inoculation !" (reproduced in Saxby 7 by Courtesy of 
the Trustees of the British Museum). 
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more dangerous time and [while I am] unprepared. I ask you cordially to 
let me know what the law says as soon as possible.42 
The Count seems to take up Kant's term of the "uncertain ("das Ungewisse") in 
the casuistical question, and argues in a somewhat strange fashion that the 
degree of uncertainty is higher when we do not undergo inoculation than if we 
do. What he wants to say, I believe is, that the likelihood of endangering one's 
life is higher for a person who does not undergo variolation than for a person 
who does. In other words, he argues that the permissibility of smallpox 
inoculation can be decided with reference to the risk for one's life. He assumes 
that the matter used for variolation is less dangerous for the patient than the 
42Briefe, vol. 12, no. 842, 283f. The 22 year old Fabian Emil Reichsgraf zu Dohna writes on the 28 
of August 1799: 
"Verehrungswordigster Mann! 
Nur die Wichtigkeit die die Frage fOr mein Herz hat giebt mir den Muth Sie urn eine 
Antwort zu bitten. lch habe eine Braut mit der ich der innigen Vereinigung der Liebe mit der 
Achtung in der Freunschaft, nahe zu kommen hoffe, diese hat die Slattern noch nicht gehabt. Ein 
Vorfall in unsrer Familie wo eine junge Frau von 19 Jahren in dem Kindbette die Slattern bekam 
und ohne Rettung starb, welche Erfahrung man haufig macht, bestimmte meine Braut selbst sich 
die Slattern einimpfen zu lar..en, wodurch sie meinem sehnlichen Wunsche zuvor kam. -- Nun lese 
ich heute in lhrer Tugendlehre, welche mein Handbuch geworden ist seitdem ich im Jahre 97. lhr 
Sistem durch ein Privatissimum beim Professor Beck damals in Halle, habe kennen lernen. Nun 
fallt mir heute besonders die Stelle wegen der Einimpfung der Slattern unter den Casuistischen 
Fragen auf. lch halte sie fOr erlaubt, da ich doch mein Leben noch auf etwas Ungewisseres wage, 
wenn ich es darauf ankommen lar..e, von einem bOseren Gifte, zu einer gefahrlicheren Zeit, und 
unvorbereitet angesteckt zu werden. lch bitte Sie herzlich lassen Sie mich wissen, was das 
Gesetz spricht, sobald als mOglich. Vielleicht ist die Einimpfung schon geschehen wenn lhre 
Anwort komt, aber schonen Sie mich nicht, ich will wissen ob ich geirrt habe, doch werde ich 
suchen es so lange als mOglich auf zuschieben. 
lch zwinge mich zu schlier..en: nur so viel von meinem Individuum. lch bin 22 Jahre alt, 
Besitzer ansehnlicher GOter und trete in meinen Wirkungskreis mir dem ernstlichen Willen als 
solcher und als Mensch in jedem Verhaltnir.. meine Pflichten zu erfOIIen und frei zu handeln . Sie 
weiser Mann werden mein unsichtbarer Gefahrte sein und es wird mir sehr angelegen sein dar.. 
Sie sich der Gesellschaft nicht schamen dOrfen. FOr so vieles gegebene Licht 
lhr 
ewig dankbarer Fabian Emil 
ReichsGraf zu Dohna." 
Even though the first part of the letter sounds as if Count Dohna's bride had already inoculated 
herself so that Kant's recommendation would reach the couple after the fact, the last part of the 
letter stresses that the inoculation had not yet taken place, and that the Count is awaiting Kant's 
recommendation . 
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natural virus. Furthermore, the letter suggests that he thinks variolation offers 
protection to a woman when she is especially vulnerable ("at a more dangerous 
time"), namely, during pregnancy.43 We will , however, see that Kant does not 
agree with the Count that the calculation of the risk for one's life can be used to 
settle the matter of the permissibility of smallpox inoculation. 
In his two attempts to answer the casuistical question Kant formulates two 
variations of questions. 
Is it permissible to bring on another [person] without his permission one or 
the other of these dangers so that something good--either a physical or 
moral welfare results for human beings which should not be brought about 
if this danger (periclitatio mora/is; [moral experiment or test]) would not be 
risked? the [sic] apostle says: "that those who think that way, 
condemnation serves quite right."--A major example for this today's 
intensely discussed casuistical question , is a particular kind of danger, 
namely: 
The plight of smallpox.44 
43See the reference to the death of the pregnant young family member in the footnote above. 
44Vol. 15 II , no. 1552, 973: "1st es erlaubt, einen Anderen in die eine oder die andere dieser 
Gefahren, mit oder ohne seine Einwilligung, zu bringen, damit etwas Gutes -- ein physisches oder 
moralisches Heil fUr Menschen herauskomme, das ohne diese Gefahrlichkeit (periclitatio mora/is) 
nicht bewirkt werden dUrfte? der Apostel sagt: "dar.. deren, die so denken, Verdammnis ganz recht 
sey". -- Ein gror..es Beispiel fUr diese Casuistische jetzt sehr in Anregung gebrachte Frage ist eine 
besondere Art von Gefahren , namlich: 
Die Pockennoth." 
The dangers to which Kant refers are the following: the person who leads himself into the evil 
("Obel") of danger of death, even though he could have prevented it, fails ; whereas the person 
who exposes himself to the danger of committing a vicious deed commits a crime. The intentional 
exposure to either of the above mentioned dangers is maliciousness. Kant believes that the 
danger with regard to smallpox is not so much what people have to suffer but the morality of their 
behavior. The moral question is whether we should leave infection up to chance, and if so, use the 
physicians to treat the illness, or whether we should infect ourselves intentionally in order to treat 
the illness methodically, since one has no reason to expect a second outbreak of the illness after 
successful inoculation. Kant did not continue th is argument, but given the above distinction, the 
following remarks can be made. Since the person who leads himself or someone else into the 
danger of death as well as the person who consciously exposes himself or others to the danger of 
committing a vicious deed are malicious, smallpox inoculation seems to be contrary to duty. 
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Kant asks whether the utilitarian approach to calculate the risk in order to 
determine whether or not an action is moral is appropriate. As an opponent of 
this view he quotes the Apostle Paulus45 who would have all these utilitarians go 
to hell. 
According to Lose Blatt 1553, Kant introduces his approach to the plight 
of smallpox by pointing out that while the greatest danger for human beings 
living with each other is to "wrong others," suffering of an injustice does not only 
count for nothing, but it can in some circumstances even be meritorious to 
patiently submit to it if it does not encourage the offender.46 Furthermore, he 
stresses that it is a characteristic of smallpox that if one simply entrusts oneself 
to nature, one is in greater danger than if one would inoculate oneself.47 And the 
moral question , is 
whether the rational human being is authorized to give himself and 
others which have no judgment (children) smallpox through inoculation, or 
whether this manner to put oneself into danger of death (or of mutilation) 
must not completely be ruled out, [and] with regard to which therefore not 
only the physician but the moral teacher of Right must be consulted .--
Something is always risked in this case, but the moral recklessness is 
obviously greater than the physical, which [sentence ends; Y. U.]48 
45According to Erich Adickes note, Kant quotes from ''ROmer 3, 8." More specifically, Kant's quote 
is taken from Apostle Paulus' letter to the Roman Church. While explaining that human 
wickedness shows the justice of God, Paulus writes: "And why not do evil that good may come?--
as some people slanderously charge us with saying. Their condemnation is just." 
46Vol. 15 II , 974 no. 1553: "Die Gror..te Gefahr fOr Menschen in ihrem Verkehr unter einander ist 
die, Anderen Unrecht zu thun . Unrecht zu leiden ist hingegen fOr nichts zu achten, und es zu 
dulden, ist oft gar verdienstlich , wenn man hoffen dart, dar.. eine seiche Toleranz den Muthwillen 
zu beleidigen nicht noch verstarken dOrfte." 
471bid.: "Unter den mancherley NOthen, die das Schicksal Ober das menschliche Geschlecht 
verhangt hat, ist eine Noth, Krankheiten , wegen deren man in gror..erer Gefahr ist, wenn man sich 
der Natur Oberlar..t, als wenn man ihr zuvorkommt und sie sich selbst zufogt, um sie mit mehrerer 
Sicherheit heilen zu konnen , namlich die P o c k e n n o t h von welcher hier nun die moralische 
Frage ist ... (cont. next footnote] ." 
48Vol. 15 II , no 1553, 974f:" ... die moralische Frage ist: ob der vernonftige mensch sich und 
anderen , die selbst kein Urtheil haben (Kindern), die Slattern durch Einimpfung zu geben 
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Before we start with the various aspects Kant discusses in the Nach/a/3, I would 
like to point out that Kant does not discuss the question of the authorization or 
permissibility of smallpox inoculation itself, even though all of the questions 
stress the importance of this point. Rather, the purpose of his discussion seems 
to be to lead the reader to the point where she can see that the question of 
smallpox inoculation cannot be decided by calculating the risk for one's life but 
by asking whether or not taking this risk is moral. Since Kant says only very little 
about his view of moral and immoral actions, let it be remembered that one is not 
allowed to dispose over one's life in order to destroy it. In other words we have 
no right to destroy our lives or mutilate our bodies. It is possible that Kant, had 
he finished his outline, would have gone into detail and explained what exactly 
he means by authorization, but as things stand we are left with questions of 
intention and risk to which we now turn . 
Kant regrets that the method to fight the plight of small pox seems to be 
"contrary to morality,"49 and in order to prepare the discussion, he then 
distinguishes between (unintentionally) running ("gerathen") and (intentionally) 
venturing ("begeben") into danger of death: 
be f u g t sey , oder ob diese Art, sich in Gefahr des Todes (oder der Verstommelung) zu setzen, 
nicht gantzlich moralisch unzulaf1ig sey, hierober also nicht bios der Arzt, sonder der moralische 
Rechtslehrer in Anspruch genommen werden mosse. -- Etwas wird hiebey immer gewagt, aber 
die moralische Waghalsigkeit (etwas auf die Gefahr, unrecht zu thun) ist doch offenbar grof1er als 
die physische, welche [sentence ends]". It is of interest that Kant expects an answer from the 
physician as well as the "moral teacher of Right." The latter title, I assume, refers to the teacher of 
the right of humanity or the strict duties to oneself and implies that the question whether or not we 
can willingly risk our own death or that of children is a question of the dignity of humanity. This 
could indicate that if children would be killed as a result of the inoculation, the physician would 
only be held morally accountable.-- See also "Ueber die Moralitat der Blatterninokulazion," Neues 
Deutsches Magazin, ed. C. U. D. von Eggers, vol. 2, July to December (Hamburg: H. L. Villaume, 
1801 ), p. 427, where the author (a father of three children) analyzes the morality of smallpox 
inoculation and, influenced by Kant's view, is rather skeptical of the practice. 
49Vol. 15 II , no. 1553, 975: "Die Pockennoth ist darum eine der am meisten bekommernden, weil 
das Mittel wieder dieselbe zugleich der Moralitat entgegen scheint." 
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To r u n into danger of death is an evil ["Obel"] (something physically 
evil), but to willfully ["willkOrlich"] v e n t u r e into it, is a violation of duty 
(something morally evil ["Bases"]), [which] one may incur intentionally or 
by chance, since the maxim of the behavior in such circumstances brings 
upon the hereby indifferent [person] the reproach of self-murder. 5° 
Kant's explanation of (unintentionally) running into danger of death needs no 
further explanation. Kant then makes a second distinction and explains that 
venturing into danger of death is a violation of duty which is either intentional or 
unintentional. His distinction suggests that in both cases one exposes oneself to 
danger of death willfully, and the difference seems to be that in the first case one 
plays an active part in bringing about one's own death or that of others, and in 
the second case one exposes oneself to danger but does not actively contribute 
to or pursue death. In the two cases of venturing into death, the person is willing 
to risk his life, that is, accepts the possibility of his death by either pursuing his 
death or not doing anything to counteract the possibility of death, which is why 
he says that both can be accused of "self-murder."51 Both, in short, use their 
lives merely as a means.52 The person who allows others or himself to run into 
danger of death fails to prevent, and the person who ventures into it commits a 
crime. Both have to subject themselves to punishment by either their own reason 
or a worldly judge. 
50Vol. 15 II, no. 1553, 975: "In Todesgefahr zu g erath en ist ein Obel (etwas physisch Bases), 
sich aber darinn willkOhrlich zu beg e be n, eine Pflichtverletzung (etwas moralisch Bases) , man 
mag sich nun sie vorsetzlich zuziehen, oder sich auch nur hierin dem Zufall Oberlassen, denn die 
Maxime des Verhaltens in solchen Umstanden zieht dem hiebey gleichgOitigen doch den Vorwurf 
des Selbstmordes zu." 
51 According to this argument, Kant could not say that the soldier ventures into danger of death, 
since he would then commit a crime. It seems, therefore, that he would have to introduce another 
category for the soldier, who when he ventures into death but neither intends to die nor leaves his 
death up to fate because he defends himself, does not commit a crime. 
521 do not attempt to answer the question whether or not Kant's distinction between the person 
who runs into danger of death and the person who ventures into danger of death but entrusts his 
life to fate can be defended. 
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Kant then turns to the discussion of risk and points out that the person who risks 
("wagt") something faces two kinds of dangers. 53 We can either forfeit our 
advantage or violate our duty, and the question is whether it is worse to act 
"contrary to prudence with regard to my advantage" or to violate the "moral law 
with regard to my duties."54 
Kant explicitly declines to approach the problem by calculating the 
likelihood by which either course of action would expose us to greater danger. 
He does not want to decide which danger is "grea t er," but which danger is 
"worse." It is important to separate the two different determining grounds 
("BestimmungsgrOnde") of our choice, that is, to separate the question of 
advantage from the question of duty. Since Kant states that 
Whether the danger is quantitatively greater (more likely to happen) or 
qualitatively greater (more important); with regard to this question , 
hopefully, every well-thinking person will state the latter. 55 
The aforementioned quotes suggest that Kant's response to Count Dohna's 
question would have been negative, because it cannot be answered with 
reference to the calculation of the possible danger of immunization or of 
contracting the disease, but by examining whether smallpox inoculation violates 
the moral law. In other words, it is not a question of calculating the risk for one's 
life but considering the implications for morality. Keeping this in mind , the above 
531 take it that Kant makes some general observation about risk-taking, so that risking something 
would cover both forms of venturing into death. 
54Vol. 15 II , no. 1553, 975 : "Es sind zweyerley Gefahren, in die ein Mensch, der etwas wagt, 
gerathen kan , namlich entweder an seinem Vortheil einzubOssen , oder seine Pflicht zu verletzen ; 
bey welcher die Z u fa II i g k e i t (in Gefahr zu kommen, z. B. auf einem schmalen Brett Ober 
einem Abgrunde oder Ober eine BrOcke ohne Lehnen) in Gefahr zu kommen g r b ~ e r sey wird 
hier nicht in Betrachtung gezogen , sondern was a r g e r ist: wieder die Klugheit in Beobachtung 
meines Vortheils, oder wieder das Sittengesetz in Befolgung meiner Pflicht zu versto~en . " 
55Vol. 15 II , no. 1553, 976: "Ob die Gefahr quantitativ gro~er (Ieichter sich eraugnend [read: 
"ereignend"]) oder qualitativ gro~er (wichtiger) sey: in dieser Frage wird hoffentlich jeder 
Wohldenkende das letztere wenigsten aussprechen." 
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distinction between running and venturing into danger can now be applied to the 
formulation of the casuistical question in the "Doctrine of Virtue." 
In the "Doctrine of Virtue" Kant distinguishes between the sailor who 
entrusts himself to the storm and the patient who arouses the storm by letting 
himself be inoculated against smallpox. The sailor who finds himself in the 
middle of a storm can be said to have run into danger of death . Kant, I believe, 
would argue that the sailor does not cause the action which could kill him; 
whereas the person who inoculates herself or himself against smallpox does 
exactly that. If a ship sinks because of a storm and the crew dies, we do not say 
that the crew was responsible for their deaths unless they recklessly ventured 
into danger. However, the person who inoculates himself with a life-threatening 
virus can be said to intentionally expose himself to danger of death. In case that 
we or the ones in our care die or are mutilated as a result of a possibly life-
threatening inoculation, we are held responsible . We are in the latter case 
experimenting with life and are using a person merely as a means to an end and 
therefore commit a crime. 56 
As was the case with heroic suicide, Kant's rejection of immunization as 
immoral does not mean that he cannot understand why people let themselves be 
inoculated in the face of the threat of smallpox; on the contrary, he offers a 
psychological explanation for it: 
56The question is what would be an example for the person who ventures into death 
unintentionally? Is Kant thinking of the person who does not inoculate herself against human 
smallpox, thereby leaving it up to chance whether or not she becomes infected and endangers her 
life? But that would mean that the refusal of the potentially dangerous inoculation could be a 
crime. Or, is Kant thinking of those who expose themselves to the contact with infected patients 
without taking proper precautions to protect themselves from being infected? 
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The state of a human being knowing his situation, understanding himself 
to be in constant danger, is one of the most serious plights which is why 
one rather decides to throw oneself into the threat pointblank. 57 
Given Kant's view that the calculation of the risk of subjecting or nor subjecting 
oneself to inoculation cannot help us in deciding the question whether or not 
smallpox inoculation can be morally justified ,58 and given that the maxim of the 
behavior of a person who either intentionally or accidentally ventures into the 
danger of death "brings upon the indifferent the blame of self-murder," we must 
conclude that Kant regards any kind of immunization as a violation of duty. Kant 
would therefore have to argue that variolation as well as the safer vaccination59 
would be a violation of a strict duty to oneself or others because one uses a 
person as a means to an end , the end being the avoidance of harm to one's 
physical existence. 5° This view entails the consequence that because we must 
57Vol. 15 II , no. 1553, 976:" Der Zustand eines seine Lage kennenden Menschen, sich immer in 
Gefahr zu wissen , ist eine von den empfindl ichsten nothen dafor man es Iieber beschl ie11t, kurz 
und gut sich in das Bedrohende zu storzen." Since "kurz und gut" ("in short") seems to me out of 
context where Kant places it, I assume he wanted to say "kurz und bOndig" which I translate here 
with "pointblank." In val. 15 II , no. 187, 69, Kant states: "Die Menschliche Natur stortzt sich Iieber 
in lrrthomer als Unwissenheit, so wie Iieber in Gefahr als Unschl011igkeit, Iieber in Sorgen und 
BekOmmern isse als Gnugsamkeit und Enthaltung." 
58He argues against the calculation of risk despite his obvious acknowledgment that the 
inoculation protects the patient against a severe contraction of smallpox. Reflexionen zur 
Anthropo/ogie val. 15 II , no. 1552, 974: " ... da sie [the illness of smallpox] von der besonderen Art 
ist, dal1, wenn die Einimpfung einmal giOcklich gelungen ist, man jene nicht noch zum zweyten 
mal beforchten dart." I would have to continue reading the literature on variolation in order to 
decide whether Kant's view of life-long protection through variolation is correct. Vaccination, 
however, "does not offer lifelong immunity ," according to Saxby 19. 
59Baxby 16f points out that vaccination , even though it is safer than variolation can be a danger 
for some people and cause death. Which is the reason why "as the world incidence of smallpox 
decreases it was argued that there was a greater danger in some countries from vaccination than 
from smallpox and in 1971 the United States and Britain ceased to recommend routine smallpox 
vaccination for children ." 
601 am therefore rather skeptical of Heinrich Bohn's optimistic remark (also mentioned by Gerhard 
Lehmann in his appendix to the opus postumum val. 22, 820) on page 625 that Kant would have 
judged vaccination differently had not the "doubtless experience of its useful effects" been given 
after Kant's death. ("Und doch dart keinen Augenblick bezweifelt werden , dal1 Kant, der geborene 
Naturwissenschaftler, anders Ober die Vaccination geurtheilt haben worde, wenn die zweifellose 
Ertahrung ihrer nOtzlichen Wirkungen nicht jenseits seines Lebens gefallen w~ren . ") 
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protect our moral life, we must rather risk mutilation or even death from the 
infection with natural smallpox than undergo vaccination. That Kant's own 
language is sometimes ambiguous with regard to the question of risk, is shown 
by his statement in The Metaphysics of Morals that smallpox inoculation exposes 
the life of the patient to an "uncertain risk" ("wagt sein Leben aufs Ungewisse") 
or "endangers" life. Saying that the likelihood of being killed or not does not 
matter is the same as saying it is of no concern whether one dies or not. In other 
words, the outcome or consequences of the inoculation or the likelihood of the 
outcome occurring has no bearing on the morality of the action. If the 
consequences really do not matter, as the Nachla!J suggests, the casuistical 
question should simply ask whether or not immunization in general (be it 
potentially dangerous or not) is self-murder, or it should only speak of the danger 
for the "moral" life. 
Furthermore, since it is the intention to destroy oneself which, according 
to the Lecture on Moral Philosophy, characterizes self-murder, willfully venturing 
into danger of death without actively causing one's death must either also be 
considered a form of intending one's death or Kant no longer believes that the 
criterion of intention is important in deciding whether or not someone commits 
self-murder. Since Kant himself points out that someone who undergoes 
variolation does so in order to protect her or his life, we must conclude that in 
spite of the fact that the person wants to live and does not want to destroy his 
life, and in spite of the statistical likelihood being in favor of inoculation , it cannot 
be morally justified because the person is willing to risk his life for an uncertain 
good. In other words, the person uses himself as a means to preserve his life. 
But what if immunization would not involve any risk whatsoever? I am afraid that 
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Kant's statement regarding the purposiveness of war and smallpox suggests that 
even though inoculation might not be a violation of the duty not to destroy 
oneself, Kant would regard it as an interference with nature's intentions. 
In sum, Kant's discussion of smallpox inoculation is about the question 
whether inoculation can be a morally justifiable means to preserve life. Kant's 
arguments against smallpox inoculation, and , for that matter, his arguments 
against self-murder, are not based on the calculation of the good or bad 
outcomes. His argument against inoculation combines the prohibition to dispose 
over our lives and our bodies which refers to the right of humanity and implies 
the distinction between homo noumenon and phaenomenon with the teleological 
argument, according to which any active immoral interference with nature is 
objectionable. 51 I believe that Kant would use this argument to defend the view 
61 Kant's view that war and smallpox are means of providence to decimate the population can be 
understood as an illustration--a rather cynical and frightening one, that is--of his teleological view 
of nature. In a separate Reflexion in vol. 15 II , no. 1551 , 971f, Kant states: "Heroic means of 
physicians are those which concern death and life or, which is the same, would be dared at the 
risk of the patient becoming sick for the rest of his life (if only to fear constant infection).--The wise 
use of such means cannot be expected from individual human beings yet from providence, which 
seems to have willed (that is intended) war and children pox, in order to limit hereby the increase 
[of population].--Even though this is not, with regard to war, a permissible means for the human 
being, the second means, namely that of children pox, is nevertheless permissible [to be taken] by 
other human beings: 'namely , that the government orders smallpox inoculation forever yon e 
[durchgangig], since it is then unavoidable, hence permissible'." ("Heroische Mittel der Aerzte sind 
die, welche auf Tod und Leben oder, was eben so viel ist, auf die Gefahr des Patienten 
lebenslang krank zu werden dabey gewagt wOrden (auch nur eine Ansteckung bestandig fOrchten 
zu mOssen). -- Der Weise Gebrauch solcher Mittel kann nicht von einzelnen Menschen , sondern 
mul?> von der Vorsehung erwartet werden , welche Krieg und Kinderpocken (und zwar absichtlich) 
gewollt zu haben scheint, um die grol?>e Vermehrung hiedurch einzuschranken . -- Ob diese nun 
gleich was den Krieg betrift, kein den Menschen erlaubtes Mittel ist, so ist doch das zweyte Mittel , 
namlich das der Kinderpocken , durch andere Menschen erlaubt: 'dal?> namlich die Regierung die 
Pockeninoculirung d u r c h g a n g i g anbefehle, da sie dann fOr jeden Einzelnen unvermeidlich : 
mithin erlaubt ist'.") 
First, when Kant reasons that war which reduces the population cannot be used as a 
means by human beings to reduce the population and then states that children pox is a 
permissible means, it seems that the analogy would be that children pox are a permissible way of 
reducing the population. This would imply that smallpox inoculation is not a means to protect life 
through immunization, but a means ordered by the government to decimate the population. The 
same view is expressed in ibid. no. 1550, 971, and confirms Rink (see footnote no. 40) : "Damit 
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that even safe immunization should be prohibited since it would mean to 
preserve life with immoral, which in this case means, "unnatural" means. The 
combination of the two arguments seems to underlie Kant's distinction between 
the case of the physician caring for a smallpox patient after natural infection and 
the case where the physician inoculates the patient with smallpox. 52 We saw in 
the Chapter on "Ends" that Kant not only believes that nature, with the human 
body as a part of it, is a self-preserving system, but also that the interference 
with the natural process is only allowed if these actions can be morally justified . 
In other words, we are not to be allowed to do anything immoral to preserve 
nature or our lives as part of that nature, and we are under no circumstance 
allowed to destroy it. 
Our discussion of the question of smallpox inoculation shows again that it 
is not the preservation of life but only the preservation of the moral life which 
Kant aims to protect. 
Staaten nicht mit Menschen OberfOIIt werden [macht] und man sie in ihrem Keirn ersticke: zwey 
Obel als Gegenmittel in sie Gelegt --die Pocken und den Krieg." We learn form this quote that 
Kant wanted to discuss the permissibil ity or prohibition of smallpox inoculation in the "Doctrine of 
Right." Kant's point that the inoculation of children pox is allowed as long as everyone has to do it 
by law can only refer to the juridical but not the moral permissibility . Furthermore, Kant mentions a 
"Pockenrecht" supposedly written by Count Maltiz (see vol. 15 II , 970 footnote). 
62Compare vol. 1511, no. 1552, 973f. 
PART TWO 
THE PRINCIPLE OF SELF-PRESERVATION OF REASON 
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CHAPTER VIII 
SELF-PRESERVATION: OVERVIEW AND SUMMARY 
Preliminary Remarks 
The dissertation so far has been devoted to the analysis, interpretation , and 
reconstruction of Kant's view of the duty of self-preservation and the vice of self-
murder. We have explained that Kant's duty of self-preservation , on the one 
hand , strictly forbids self-murder because it destroys the moral self, but, on the 
other hand , allows for self-sacrifice in some circumstances in order to preserve 
the moral self. Our findings suggest therefore that the final goal of the duty of 
self-preservation is the preservation of the homo noumenon whose preservation 
can take on different forms, depending on the circumstances. It can mean not to 
kill oneself and to continue life despite physical pain and other adversities, or it 
can mean to give up or sacrifice life in order to avoid living an immoral life. The 
results of our discussion lead me to propose that the "duty of self-preservation" 
can also be called the "duty to preserve or protect the dignity of humanity" or the 
"duty to preserve or protect the respect for humanity." Without this duty which 
includes among other duties the duties not to murder oneself and not to lie, 
Kantian morality would be impossible since it is the respect for the person , that 
is, respect for the moral law, which is the foundation of his ethics. 
Our findings strongly suggest that freedom understood as the autonomy 
of the person entails the duty to preserve the moral self or, to put it in negative 
terms, they show that an unrestricted use of freedom is destructive and reason 
must counteract its inherent destructive potential in order to preserve itself. In the 
Chapter on "Homicidium Do/osum" we pointed out that self-destruction is the 
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result of choosing the hedonistic principle of self-love as the guiding principle of 
one's actions. Self-destruction turned out to be a heteronomous choice of the 
rational being ; whereas self-preservation was characterized as the result of an 
autonomous choice of the rational being . Kant assumes throughout his writings 
that self-murder cannot qualify as an autonomous choice of the subject. Given 
these findings, we have to distinguish between a potentially destructive aspect in 
reason , namely, its morally unrestricted and purely instrumental use and a 
preserving aspect of reason which refers to its morally restricted and 
autonomous use. Even though Kant does not allow for an instinct of destruction , 
he, nevertheless, allows for freedom as an inner principle of destruction. 
The Second Part of the dissertation has three chapters : in Chapter VIII 
(the present chapter) I provide an overview of the relevant arguments in the 
debate on self-preservation and then summarize our findings regarding the 
concepts of preservation and of self-preservation in Kant. The overview and the 
summary will serve to provide the context for my own analysis of the principle of 
self-preservation in Kant. 
In Chapters IX and X we will concentrate on two main questions: 
In Chapter IX entitled "Belief of Reason," we will investigate what precisely 
threatens the preservation of reason , and what remedy Kant develops in order to 
avoid the destruction of reason and thus to guarantee its preservation . We will 
begin this chapter with a section on the destructive aspects of freedom and then 
show how reason counteracts its inherent possibility for self-destruction with the 
principle of self-preservation of reason . This principle--the principle of 
universalizability--safeguards the status of reason as the cornerstone of truth and 
allows for the satisfaction of its need in terms of the belief and thus the use of 
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reason. I will explain that once the status of reason is accepted , the belief of 
reason which involves the adherence to the principle of self-preservation of 
reason is adopted, and, with regard to the practical use of reason, moral belief. 
In the last Chapter on "Trustee-Relationship," we will show if and how self-
preservation of reason is related to the duty of self-preservation and whether or 
not the duty of self-preservation entails self-perfection . I will use the trustee-
relationship between the homo noumenon and the homo phaenomenon to 
illustrate that "moral self-preservation" represents the aspect of formal perfection. 
The answers to both sets of questions in conjunction with the results of 
the previous chapters will allow us to decide whether self-preservation in Kant 
exhausts the function of reason or whether self-preservation entails self-
perfection. 
Overview of the Main Arguments in the Debate on the Modern Concept of 
Self-preservation 
In the following overview, I will focus on the proponents of the most recent 
debate on self-preservation starting with Wilhelm Dilthey. 1 Since Dilthey's 
publication, a variety of often divergent views has been developed which 
continue to stress the importance of self-preservation in its role for the modern 
view of subjectivity and rationality. Some of these views are collected in Ebeling's 
Subjektivitat und Selbsterhaltung. In the following I will concentrate on the works 
of Robert Spaemann, Dieter Henrich, Hans Blumenberg, Gunther Buck, Hans 
Ebeling , and Manfred Sommer. All of these philosophers believe that it is 
1 For an overview of the history of the concept of self-preservation see M. Mulsow's article 
"Selbsterhaltung," in Historisches Worterbuch der Philosophie , val. 9 (Basel : Schwabe & Co. AG, 
1995), pp. 393-406. 
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possible to characterize modernity in terms of a particular understanding of self-
preservation , but they differ in their interpretations of this understanding. 
It was Dilthey who stressed the importance of the Stoic tradition for the 
modern concept of self-preservation in his essay "Die Autonomie des Den kens, 
der konstruktive Rationalismus und der pantheistische Monismus nach ihrem 
Zusammenhang im 17. Jahrhundert."2 In this essay Dilthey argues that until the 
end of the 17th century the ruling metaphysics represented a compromise 
between dogmatic belief and rational sciences, and the movement away from 
this rational supranaturalism is accomplished through the realization of an 
"a u t o n o m o u s r a t i o n a I s y s t e m : the construction of the universe by 
reason." According to Dilthey this kind of rationalism appeared in two forms : the 
deist doctrine and the pantheist or panentheist doctrine.3 Dilthey argues that the 
psychology and political philosophy of Hobbes and Spinoza as well as the 
pantheism of Spinoza and Shaftesbury rest on the Roman Stoa.4 He refers to 
Spinoza as the representative of this movement whose entire "ethics, the goal of 
its work is based on the Stoa."5 Dilthey stresses that 
On the whole, the strongest agreement between the Stoa and Spinoza 
consists in regarding the cosmos and thus the human being as a system 
of forces; herein primarily consisted the connection between the Stoic 
thinking and this epoch: only that now since Galilee, the teleological 
context of the Stoa changed into a mechanical one.s 
2Wilhelm Dilthey, "Die Autonomie des Denkens, der konstruktive Rationalismus und der 
pantheistische Monismus nach ihrem Zusammenhang im 17. Jahrhundert," in Gesammelte 
Schriften , vol. 2, (Stuttgart: B. G. Teubner Verlagsgesellschaft, 1964 ). 
31bid ., p. 283f. 
4ibid ., p. 285 footnote. 
Slbid., p. 285. 
61bid., p. 287: "Oberhaupt stimmen ja Stoa und Spinoza im tiefsten darin Oberein, das Weltall und 
so auch den Menschen als Kraftsystem aufzufassen; hierin lag in erster Linie, was das stoische 
Denken mit dieser Epoche verband: nur da~ der teleologische Zusammenhang der Stoa nun seit 
Galilei sich in einen mechanischen umwandelte." 
Spinoza's principle, for example, that the essence of every being is its self-
preservation7 is, according to Dilthey, derived from the Stoic tradition. We will 
see in the following that several contemporary philosophers disagree with 
Dilthey's analysis of the origin of the modern concept of self-preservation . 
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Robert Spaemann was, according to Ebeling, the first philosopher after 
Dilthey who revived the discussion concerning self-preservation. Following 
Spaemann, the traditional Aristotelian view provides the background for 
scholastic thinkers like Thomas Aquinas. According to the Aristotelian view 
everything that exists is striving for a telos--a telos that when reached constitutes 
the essences of the subject or being.a While discussing Aquinas, Spaemann 
states that the Aristotelian theory of human nature implies that in addition to the 
preservation of life, the perfection of life, the good life, is important. Being, that is , 
the pure existence of the acting subject, and perfection, that is, the activity to 
reach the end, are, according to the Aristotelian tradition, not identical.9 The end 
for rational beings is for thinkers like Aquinas contemplatio Dei. Humans realize 
their nature by transcending their mere existence to something else as their end . 
This view, however, changes with Spinoza, and Spaemann refers to the sixth 
definition in the second part of the Ethica where it reads: "Per realitatem et 
perfectionem idem intel/igo."10 Spinoza affirms, contrary to the Aristotelian 
tradition, the identity of being or reality and perfection. 
If the real essence of every being is self-preservation, then it can be said 
with Spaemann that the good life no longer determines the activity of life as mere 
7Compare footnote no. 26. 
8Robert Spaemann, "BOrgerliche Ethik und nichtteleologische Ontologie, in Subjectivitat und 
Se/bsterhaltung. Beitrage zur Diagnose der Moderne, ed. Hans Ebeling (Frankfurt am Main: 
Suhrkamp Verlag, 1976), p. 79. I will abbreviate this book throughout as "SuS." 
glbid. 
101bid. 
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existence or self-preservation, but that it is defined by and subordinated to life as 
self-preservation . Spaemann traces his thesis of the "inversion of teleology"1 1 
back to Bernardino Telesio and his pupil Campanella and states that for both of 
them self-preservation becomes the standard of rational moral action. Not only 
that, self-preservation replaces , according to Spaemann, the highest good , and 
he quotes Campanella: "Conservatio igitur summum bonum est rerum 
omnium."12 Furthermore the three kinds of bonum distinguished in the 
Aristotelian philosophy "the iucundum, the honestum and the utile" are now 
subsumed to the principle of self-preservation.13 
Spaemann stresses the importance of this "inversion of teleology" for the 
modern understanding of the concept of self-preservation. This new ontological 
view is found not only in the writings of Telesio, Campanella and Spinoza, but 
also in the writings of Descartes and Hobbes. Spaemann goes so far as to say 
that 
Hobbes' doctrine of the state, for example, can only be understood 
against the background of this new concept of nature defined in terms of 
self-preservation.14 
We will see that both Buck and Blumenberg criticize Spaemann's thesis of the 
inversion of teleology. 
111bid., 79f:"Die teleologische Interpretation der Natur war, nach dem Worte Bacons, geopfert 
worden als gottgeweihte Jungfrau , die nichts gebiert. An die Stelle der dynamisch-teleologischen 
Struktur, kraft deren alles, was ist, auf eine ihm gemc':iP..e T<':itigkeit, diese Tc':itigkeit aber ihrerseits 
auf die Realisierung eines spezifischen bonum ausgerichtet ist, tritt nun eine Inversion der 
Teleologie: das Sein steigert sich nicht zum T<':itigsein , sondern die Tc':itigkeit ihrerseits hat zum 
alleinigen Ziel die Erhaltung dessen, was ohnehin schon ist. Es ist wiederum Spinoza, der dieser 
Ontologie den klassischen Ausdruck verliehen hat, wenn er das Seiende schlechterdings durch 
diese Inversion, d. h. durch Erhaltung seiner selbst definiert: "Conatus, quo unaquaeque res in suo 
esse perseverare conatur, nihil est praeter ipsius rei actualem essentiam"." 
121bid., 81. Spaemann quotes from Campanella's De sensu rerum et Magia (Frankfurt 1620). 
131bid. 
141bid.: "Die Staatslehre des Hobbes etwa ist nur zu verstehen auf dem Hintergrund dieses neuen, 
durch Selbsterhaltung definierten Naturbegriffs." 
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In his essay "Die Grundstruktur der modernen Philosophie," Dieter Henrich 
points out that at the beginning of modernity self-preservation did not only 
present the basic concept of physics but also of metaphysics, and he states with 
reference to Hobbes' political philosophy and Spinoza's Ethics: 
At the beginning of modernity philosophy of government and anthropology 
as well as ontology and ethics were grounded in the one concept of self-
preservation.1s 
He stresses that it is this diagnosis which provides the perspective as well as the 
problem for any attempt to present modern philosophy as a whole. More 
specifically, he believes that modernity in its revision of the Aristotelian and 
Medieval interpretation of self-preservation received its impulse from the Stoic 
oikeiosis-doctrine. According to Henrich's interpretation of this doctrine, the 
possibility of self-preservation arises on the basis of the familiarity with oneself. 
The familiar ("das Vertraute") is defined in terms of the very nature of an 
individual as well as that which is and which is not beneficial for this nature. 
Familiarity with oneself comprises, according to Henrich, that which also makes it 
possible, that is, knowledge of oneself.16 
It is against the background of this Stoic doctrine that Henrich presents his 
view of modern subjectivity as "mutual implication of self-consciousness and self-
preservation."17 
15Dieter Henrich, "Die Grundstruktur der modernen Philosophie," in SuS 102: "Am Anfang der 
Moderne wurden also Staatsphilosophie und Anthropologie ebenso wie Ontologie und Ethik aus 
dem einen Begriff der Selbsterhaltung begrOndet." 
16See Dieter Henrich, "Ober Selbstbewul1tsein und Selbsterhaltung. Probleme und Nachtrage 
zum Vortrag Ober 'Die Grundstruktur der modernen Philosophie,"' in SuS 127; see also Henrich's 
"Selbsterhaltung und Geschichtlichkeit," in SuS 304. 
17Dieter Henrich, "Selbsterhaltung und Geschichtlichkeit," in SuS 308: " ... wechselseitige 
lmplikation von Selbstbewul1tsein und Selbsterhaltung ... ". 
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Only this is already clear: that the possibility to explain modern experience 
in general with reference to only one of both--familiarity with the self or 
self-preservation--does not exist. Self-preservation implies and thus 
presupposes the structure of the self; familiarity with the self is bound up 
with the experience that it is necessary to continue one's own existence.18 
Gunther Buck argues in his essay "Selbsterhaltung und Historizitat" against 
Spaemann's interpretation of the inversion of teleology. Even though he agrees 
with Spaemann that we have to speak of an inversion of teleology, his 
interpretation of this inversion differs from Spaemann's.19 Buck points out that 
whenever the category of self-preservation is used in modern texts it is 
"synonymous with self-enhancement ["Selbststeigerung"]."2° Furthermore, he 
explains that the understanding of self-preservation as self-perfection constitutes 
an aspect of finality which can be described with Hegel as subjectivity.21 Self-
preservation in this sense expresses a new finality of the modern subjectivity. In 
order to clarify his thesis Buck refers mainly to Hobbes and Rousseau . 
1BDieter Henrich,"Die Grundstruktur der modernen Philosophie," in SuS 108: "Einzig dies ist 
schon klar, dar.!. es keine Moglichkeit gibt, moderne Erfahrung insgesamt durch nur eines von 
beidem zu erklaren, -- Selbstvertrautheit oder Selbsterhaltung. Selbsterhaltung impliziert und setzt 
somit voraus die Struktur des Selbst, -- Selbstvertrautheit ist gebunden an die Erfahrung, dar.. es 
notwendig ist, die eigene Existenz zu kontinuieren ." 
19Gonther Buck, "Selbsterhaltung und Historizitat," in SuS 216f: "Diese Bestimmung [namely 
Spaemann's] des neuzeitlichen Prinzips der Selbsterhaltung scheint mir indessen das Wesen 
dieser Inversion, ihre implizite Dialektik, nicht zu treffen . Was ist denn das fOr eine merkwOrdige 
Seinsweise, deren ausdrOckliche Tatigkeit zum alleinigen Ziel die Erhaltung dessen haben soli , 
was sie "ohnehin schon ist", ohne dabei identisch zu sein mit der rein biologisch verstandenen 
Selbsterhaltung, bei der das, was "ohnehin schon ist", durch ein zum Sein differenzloses Tatigsein 
bleibt, was es ist? Die "Inversion der Teleologie" kann , ausdrOckl ich oder unausdrOcklich, kaum 
den Sinn gehabt haben, das Denken und Handeln des Menschen auf die Stufe einer Kategorie zu 
reduzieren , die sich fOr das Verstandnis gerade des aur..ermenschlichen (tierischen) Lebendigen 
immer schon aufgedrangt hatte. Die teleologische -- und d. h.: theologische --Ontologie wird nicht 
biologisch destruiert. Es ware sonst kaum denkbar, wie sich im Gefolge dieser Inversion so etwas 
wie historischer Sinn und Sinn fOr die Historizitat der Menschen entwickeln sollten . Die alte 
Teleologie erfahrt vielmehr tatsachlich eine "Inversion". Die Kategorie des menschlichen Telos 
kommt nicht einfach abhanden. Sie ist nur nicht mehr in der alten Weise denkbar." 
2°1bid., p. 217: "In Wirklichkeit is 'Selbsterhaltung', wo sie als "fundamentale Kategorie alles 
Seienden ' [Buck quotes here from Blumenberg's Die Legitimitat der Neuzeit, p. 181 ], vor al/em 
aber des menschlichen Daseins, im Gefolge der neuzeitlichen Inversion auftritt, sog/eich synonym 
mit 'Se/bststeigerung". Genauer: Selbsterhaltung ist hier nur denkbar a/s Selbststeigerung." 
211bid . 
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Hans Blumenberg argues that the history of the concept of self-preservation can 
neither be sufficiently represented by referring to the stoic reception (which 
characterizes Dilthey's as well as Henrich's attempt) nor can it be explained in 
terms of the reduction of Aristotelian-scholastic teleology and actus-doctrine 
(illustrated by Spaemann's attempt).22 Hans Blumenberg argues in 
"Selbsterhaltung und Beharrung. Zur Konstitution der neuzeitlichen Rationalitat" 
that so-called intransitive and reflexive statements of preservation 
("Erhaltungsaussagen") lie at the foundation of modern rationality.23 More 
specifically, he contrasts the concept of conservatio sui with the so-called 
transitive conservatio which is exemplified in the view of preservation in terms of 
creatio continua as found , for example, in Descartes. His interpretation of 
modern conservatio sui is therefore opposed to the scholastic conception of 
contingency.24 
Blumenberg finds his thesis exemplified in Spinoza's concept of self-
preservation. Spinoza's conception is no longer subject to the condition of a 
preserving God but expresses the very essence of the thing itself. He refers to 
Spinoza's conception of an impersonal conservatio, that is, perseveratio, and 
22Hans Blumenberg, "Selbsterhaltung und Beharrung. Zur Konstitution der neuzeitlichen 
Rationalit~t. " in SuS 145. 
231bid., p. 188: "Die ganze von Dilthey vorgeschlagene stoische Genealogie erbringt nichts, wenn 
man nicht sieht, was sie schon in den Anf~ngen der Rezeption von Telesio bis Campanella 
eigentlich plausibel gemacht hat, n~mlich die Ersetzung des transitiven Erhaltungsgedankens 
durch den reflexiven und intransitiven". Ibid., 200. 
24Hans Blumenberg, "Selbsterhaltung und Beharrung," in SuS 156: "Die These die hier vertreten 
werden soli ... , stellt den Beg riff der conservatio sui gegen die Tradition der transitiven 
conservatio mit dem Extremwert der creatio continua, im Grunde gegen die gesamte Konzeption 
der Kontingenz in der Scholastik. Damit aber wird Diltheys Hauptthese von der stoischen Abkunft 
des Begriffs der Selbsterhaltung infrage gestellt, namlich eingeschr~nkt auf bestimmte ROckgriffe 
in das Arsenal antiker Formulierungen und orientierender Metaphern organischen Typs . ... 
Nirgendwo im anti ken Denken aber hatte es eine Stelle fOr den Beg riff der Selbsterhaltung in der 
Definition gegeben, die erst durch den ProblemOberhang des scholastischen Systems veranlar..t 
werden konnte." 
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states that this physical model of preservation replaced not only the transitive 
theological model of the scholastic conservatio but also the organic model of the 
conservatio sui used in the Stoa.2s In the third part of his Ethica Spinoza writes: 
"Conatus, qou unaquaeque res in suo esse perseverare conatur, nihil est praeter 
ipsius rei actualem essentiam."26 According to Blumenberg , this understanding of 
self-preservation as an abstract perseverance does no longer have the 
teleological implication of the Stoic view, proposed by Dilthey, namely, that of an 
organic drive. Blumenberg stresses that the very fact that Spinoza defines 
conatus or drive as the essence of the thing shows, despite the usage of 
conatus, the rejection of something like an organic drive. The perseverance of a 
thing is no longer a drive but a state, the state of perseverance. Spinoza's 
definition of the essence of a thing as the state of perseverance allows one, 
according to Blumenberg, to draw the connection to Newton's first law of 
mechanics (the principle of inertia).27 
Given this interpretation, Blumenberg rejects Dilthey's analysis of 
Spinoza's proposition and emphasizes that it does not suffice to use the Stoic 
tradition to explain the modern conception of self-preservation . On the contrary, 
the modern concept of self-preservation as found in Spinoza "is not only a new 
rational principle among others, it is the principle of the new rationality itself."2B 
Of particular importance for our discussion of the role of self-preservation 
in Kant are the views of Hans Ebeling and Manfred Sommer both of which focus 
on Kant's philosophy. At the beginning of his introduction to the collection of 
251bid ., p. 200. 
26Spinoza, Ethica , pars Ill, prop. 7. 
27Hans Blumenberg, "Selbsterhaltung und Beharrung," in SuS 186. 
2Bibid., p. 146: "Es ist nicht nur ein neues rationales Prinzip unter anderen, es ist das Prinzip der 
neuen Rationalit~t selbst." 
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essays in Subjektivitat und Se/bsterha/tung, Ebeling points out that the modern 
interpretation of self-preservation is of supreme importance for the construction 
of a theory of subjectivity: 
Without recourse to the basic meaning of self-preservation it cannot be 
decided which concept of the "subject" a modern theory of subjectivity 
wants to determine. For the competing theorems which construct 
"subjectivity" have the one schema of interpretation in common that they 
orient the conception of the human subject according to how it is or ought 
to be preserving itself as a subject; and it is precisely through the unity of 
this schema of interpretation that they can compete.29 
Ebeling wants to show how self-preservation in modernity is formed in terms of a 
consciousness which is consciousness of freedom as well as death.30 He 
believes that 
The basic structure of human self-preservation is the self-conscious 
orientation toward necessary self-enhancement ["Selbststeigerung"] on 
the one hand and possible self-destruction on the other hand. 31 
After presenting his critique of the consciousness of freedom in Kant and of the 
consciousness of death in Heidegger, Ebeling develops his theory of self-
preservation. 
There are, according to Ebeling, two conditions philosophy has to fulfill so 
that moral self-preservation can become its topic: 
29Hans Ebeling, "Einleitung: Das neuere Prinzip der Selbsterhaltung und seine Bedeutung fOr die 
Theorie der Subjektivit~t." in SuS 9f: "Ohne Rekurs auf die zugrunde gelegte Bedeutung von 
"Selbsterhaltung" 1~17>t sich nicht ausmachen, welchen Begriff von "Subjekt" ein neuzeitliches 
Theorem der Subjektivit~t bestimmen will. Denn die konkurrierenden Theoreme einer 
Konstruktion von 'Subjektivit~t· haben das eine Deutungsschema gemeinsam, das menschliche 
Subjekt daran zu ortientieren, wie es sich jeweilig ein sich selbst erhaltendes istlsein soli , und 
genau Ober die Einheit dieses Deutungsschemas beziehen sie die Moglichkeit der Konkurrenz." 
30Hans Ebeling, Selbsterhaltung und Selbstbewu/3tsein. Zur Ana/ytik von Freiheit und Tad 
(Freiburg/Munchen: Verlag Karl Alber, 1979), p. 12.--ln the remainder of the dissertation I will refer 
to this book as "SeS" which should not be confused with the collection of essays abbreviated as 
"SuS." 
31 SeS 141 : "Die Grundstruktur humaner Selbsterhaltung ist die selbstbewur1te Orientierung auf 
notige Selbststeigerung einerseits und mogliche Selbstvernichtung andererseits." 
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Human self-preservation rests on the premises that (1) theo/ogumena are 
dismissed and (2) that the restriction of the description of self-preservation 
according to laws of natural sciences remains insufficient because it 
misses its basis structure.32 
Ebeling believes that Kant's philosophy fulfills these conditions . The 
transcendental conditions for practical self-preservation are the permanence of 
substance expressed in the first analogy of experience and the transcendental 
doctrine of self-determination as found in the third antinomy which claims that 
freedom can be thought without contradiction .33 It is against the background of 
the first analogy of experience--the so-called first theoretical principle of 
preservation--which represents not only the rejection of a singular creation but 
also of a creatio continua and thus the "critical end of theology" that the duty of 
self-preservation--the so-called first practical principle--can be regarded as a 
meaningful and rational thesis.34 It only makes sense to postulate such a duty if 
the preservation of human existence is independent from God's acts of 
preservation, so that preservation by something other than the self, that is, 
"Fremderhaltung," is excluded .35 
Hence, Kant, according to Ebeling, leveled the path for a modern 
consciousness of self-preservation. The basis for the consciousness of Self-
32SeS 42:"Humane Selbsterhaltung steht unter den Pramissen, dar.. (1) Theologumena verab-
schiedet sind und (2) eine Beschrankung ihrer Beschreibung nach Gesetzen der Naturwissen-
schaften deshalb unzureichend bleibt, weil sie ihre Grundstruktur verfehlt. " 
33SeS 29; see also Hans Ebeling "Grundsatze der Selbstbestimmung und Grenzen der 
Selbsterhaltung," in SuS 382. 
34Hans Ebeling "Grundsatze der Selbstbestimmung und Grenzen der Selbsterhaltung," in SuS 
382. 
35SeS 33: "Diese lmplikationen besagen: Mit der These des stabilen Substanzquantums ist im 
Phanomenbereich jedem concursus divinus der Weg verlegt und damit die M6glichkeit einer 
einmaligen Sch6pfung ebenso abgewehrt wie der Oberkommene Gedanke der creatio continua. 
Diese lmplikationen des ersten theoretischen Erhaltungssatzes erheben den ersten praktischen 
allererst in den Rang einer vernOnftig diskutierbaren These, und das deshalb, weil sich Ober 
menschliche Se/bsterhaltung sinnvoll nur unter der Voraussetzung sprechen lar..t, dar.. eine durch 
ein nicht-menschliches ens rationis bewirkte Fremderhaltung ausgeschlossen werden muf1." 
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preservation is an activity or performance ("Leistung ") of the subject. It is an 
activity which has to be distinguished from preservation understood in terms of 
theological, biological, or physical explanations. It is Ebeling's view that Kant's 
conception of the consciousness of freedom is consciousness of self-
preservation and consciousness of self-enhancement ("Selbststeigerungs-
bewu~tsein") . 36 The consciousness of self-preservation has its origin in the 
consciousness of freedom.37 The unity of consciousness of freedom, self-
preservation, and self-enhancement is demonstrated by showing that the 
categorical imperative which Ebeling understands as a unique principle of self-
enhancement ("einzigartiger Steigerungsgrundsatz") implies two so-called 
"derived principles of preservation" ("abgeleitete Erhaltungsgrundsatze"): the 
prohibition of suicide and the prohibition of lying.3s He stresses that whereas the 
former can be derived from the categorical imperative solely by fulfilling the 
requirement of consistency ("Widerspruchsfreiheit'), the latter can only be 
derived from it by assuming an additional requirement, the teleological 
anticipation of self-enhancement ("Selbststeigerung"). 39 
The consciousness of and the demand for self-preservation as expressed 
in the categorical imperative presuppose the consciousness of the possibility of 
361bid., p. 13. 
37SeS 15: "Der Kantische Entwurf einer Selbsterhaltung und Selbststeigerung des Menschen, der 
kritische Versuch einer autonom gesetzten Vernunft, sich ihrer Autonomie zu versichern hat 
erstmals zugelassen, eine strikt selbstandige humane Subjektivitat zu behaupten. Erst Kant hat 
mit vollem Ernst und insoweit ohne Nachsicht gegenOber der Tradition nach Wegen gesucht, 
"Selbsterhaltung" als menschliche Leistung einsichtig und verstandlich zu machen. Das 
Bewu~tsein der Selbsterhaltung findet seinen Grund im Bewu~tsein der Freiheit." 
3Bses 17f. 
39Hans Ebeling, "Grundsatze der Selbstbestimmung und Grenzen der Selbsterhaltung," in SuS 
381 : "Dabei ist das Wahrhaftigkeitspostulat ausschlie~lich durch OberprOfug auf 
Widerspruchsfreiheit aus dem kategorischen lmperativ ableitbar, das Suizidverbot nur unter 
zusatzlicher lnanspruchnahme eines teleologischen Vorgriffs auf Selbststeigerung." See also SeS 
62f, 70. 
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self-destruction. It is because of the risk of self-destruction that moral self-
preservation is commanded .4o Yet it is important to point out that Ebeling agrees 
with Buck that self-preservation is synonymous with self-enhancement and even 
the preservation of the status quo presupposes the "dimension of self-
enhancement."41 
Because Ebeling argues that Kant's conception of the free will is 
contradictory, but, nevertheless, believes that the idea of the freedom of the will 
is necessary for a theory of moral self-preservation , he suggests regarding this 
idea of unlimited power over oneself and unlimited responsibility for the self as 
an illusion , albeit a necessary one. It is necessary because "without the imagined 
freedom of the will self-preservation would turn into a coerced action underlying 
all other actions."42 Hence, the hypothetical construction of freedom of the will 
functions as "instrument of illusion" for a subject which preserves itself.43 
I will end our overview of the main arguments in the debate on the modern 
concept of self-preservation with a brief discussion of Manfred Sommer's 
position. Sommer's book can be read as a critical response to Adorno's and 
Horkheimer's critique of modern rationality.44 In his lecture "Vernunft und 
Selbsterhaltung" given during the period of World War II, Horkheimer states, for 
example, "the very old civic definition of reason in terms of self-preservation 
already represented its limitation."45 Sommer uses the concepts "self-
40See SeS 56. 
411bid., p. 141 . 
42SeS 127: "Denn ohne die imaginierte Freiheit des Willens worde Selbsterhaltung zu einer 
blor..en Zwangshandlung, die allem anderen Handeln zugrunde l~ge ." 
431bid., p. 129: " ... , dar.. das hypothetische Konstrukt einer Freiheit des Willens nur -- und 
allerdings -- als Instrument der lllusionierung sich selbst erhaltender Subjektivit~t fungiert." 
44For a discussion of self-preservation as a critical category see Ute Guzzoni's essay 
"Selbsterhaltung und Anderssein . Ein Beitrag zur Kritischen Theorie," in SuS, 314-344. 
45Max Horkheimer, Vernunft und Se/bsterhaltung (Frankfurt am Main: S. Fischer Verlag , 1970), 
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preservation," "synthesis," "system," "identity" and "continuity" which have been 
criticized by the proponents of the Critical Theory and blamed for the "horrors of 
the present"46 as guidelines for his own analysis. According to Sommer, the last 
four concepts represent equivalents for self-preservation.47 He shows that 
contrary to Adorno's negative characterization of self-preservation as "brutal ," 
"frantic," "stubborn," "blind," naked," "unconscious," "absurd ," and "desperate,"4B 
it constitutes precisely the opposite, namely, "the avoidance of brutality, despair 
and blindness." The principle of self-preservation proves itself as a humane 
principle ("humanes Prinzip") .49 
Sommer criticizes the Aristotelian view represented by Buck and Ebeling 
that the final goal of the human being is not self-preservation but the good life. 
Contrary to this position, Sommer advocates the opposite thesis that self-
preservation 
can be understood as a rational principle by means of which alone the 
possibility of happiness can be maintained, as a principle of minimum 
["Minimalprinzip"] which is able to show how every attempt to go beyond it 
begins irrationally and ends in self-destruction. so 
p. 54: "Die uralte bOrgerliche Definition der Vernunft durch Selbsterhaltung war schon ihre 
Beschrankung." See SuS 72. 
46Manfred Sommer, Die Selbsterhaltung der Vernunft (Stuttgart/ Bad Cannstattt: Frommann -
Holzboog, 1977; Problemata 66) , p. 19. The book is in the following abbreviated as "SV." 
47SV 19. 
4BSV 22. 
49SV 53: "Selbsterhaltung, so la~t sich im ROckblick auf die bisherigen Oberlegungen sagen, ist 
gerade nicht "krampfhaft", sondern gelassen; sie ist nicht "brutal" ,"verzweifelt" und "blind", 
sondern gerade die Vermeidug von Brutalitat, Verzweiflung und Blindheit. ... all das erweist 
Selbsterhaltung als ein humanes Prinzip." 
sol bid ., p. 11 : "Trotz dieser Ausgangslage werde ich in den vorliegenden Oberlegungen die 
Diastase von Existenzminimum und GIOcksmaximum unterlaufen und die Gegentheses vertreten , 
da~ Selbsterhaltung nicht nur als immer notwendige, sich darin aber auch schon erschopfende 
Bedingung des sie Transzendierenden fungiert, sondern da~ sie sich als ein rationales Prinzip 
begreifen la~t . durch das allein die Moglichkeit von GlOck gewahrt werden kann , als ein 
Minimalprinzip, das zu zeigen vermag, wie jeder Versuch , Ober es hinauszugehen, irrational 
anfangt und in Selbstzerstorung endet. " See ibid., p. 23. 
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Morality consists, according to Sommer, in what Kant calls the "self-preservation 
of reason ."51 In order to illustrate his thesis he turns to Kant's philosophy whose 
"center, its innermost agens and its ultimate goal" is self-preservation. 52 In order 
to explain his understanding of self-preservation he refers to a statement in the 
Critique of Judgment: 
But after this liberation [meaning: the liberation from the dependence of 
God] there exists for the human being no telos lying outside of him; it "can 
no longer be asked why (quem in finem) he exists. His existence involves 
the highest purpose in itself [sic]" (V 435). But this precisely is asserted in 
the principle of self-preservation: the mere existence as the highest end --
of course always with the postscript, that the pure existence of a rational 
being implies the preservation of its reason . 53 
According to Sommer, self-preservation replaces the preservation by an 
omnipotent creator in Kant's philosophy. 54 Sommer himself understands freedom 
as a principle of an immanent performance of self-preservation and therefore in 
contrast to creatio continua or divine creation. 55 
In order to illustrate Sommer's main thesis I point to two instances which 
he interprets in terms of the self-preservation of reason: With regard to the 
51SV 12. 
52Manfred Sommer, "1st Selbsterhaltung ein rationales Prinzip?" in SuS 352: "lch meine es la~t 
sich zeigen, da~ die Philosophie Kants im Prinzip der Selbsterhaltung ihr Zentrum, ihr innerstes 
Agens und ihr au~erstes Ziel hat." See also, for example, SV 12f, 35, 206. 
53SV 147f : "Der Mensch aber hat nach dieser Freisetzung kein au~er ihm liegendes Telos mehr; 
von ihm "kann nicht weiter gefragt werden , [sic] wozu (quem in finem) er existiere. Sein Dasein 
hat den hochsten Zweck in sich selbst [sic]" (V 435) . Genau dies aber ist im Prinzip der 
Selbsterhaltung ausgesagt: das blo~e Dasin als der h6chste Zweck -- freilich immer mit dem 
Postskriptum, da~ das pure Existieren eines vernOnftigen Wesens die Erhaltung seiner Vernunft 
impliziert."--The first [sic] indicates that Kant uses a colon not a comma and the second one points 
out that Kant states "Sein Dasein hat den hochsten Zweck selbst in sich .. . ".--See also Manfred 
Sommer, "1st Selbsterhaltung ein rationales Prinzip?" in SuS 368f. 
54SV 14f. 
55SV 15, 217, 256f. 
Critique of Pure Reason Sommer points out that by securing its limits and 
opening up the possibility for transcendence reason secures its existence. 56 
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Another of his many examples is the function of the categorical 
imperative. After showing that the self-contradiction of reason is identical with the 
self-destruction of reason, he argues that the categorical imperative represents a 
principle of self-preservation of reason .s7 The act of self-preservation has two 
aspects which cannot be separated: the rejection of the preservation by God and 
the avoidance of self-destruction, the latter of which is accomplished by the 
moral law. 58 
Given this brief summary, Sommer seems to be closer to Spaemann's 
thesis of the "inversion of teleology" than he is to Ebling's or Buck's position .s9 
He criticizes Ebeling's view that self-enhancement is something in addition to 
self-preservation . According to Sommer, this position "underestimates" the 
rationality of self-preservation and fails to recognize reason in its fundamental 
intention. 5o Freedom is not an instrument of subjectivity but constitutes it. He 
therefore rejects Ebeling's suggestion "that we want to preserve ourselves all 
56See, for example, "1st Selbsterhaltung ein rationales Prinzip," in SuS 357: "Kritik der Vernunft ist 
zugleich Theorie und Therapie." See Sommer's reference to the "mythos of healing" in Kant and 
Freud SV 228. 
57 See SV 33f, 82: "Nur auf diesem Weg, so scheint mir, ~~~t sich darlegen, da~ der kategorische 
lmperativ, wie immer seine Beziehung zu dem sein mag, was sich mit dem Beg riff "burgerliche 
Gesellschaft" umschreiben ~~~t. ein Prinzip der Selbsterhaltung darstellt -- ohne tautologisch oder 
gar zynisch zu werden." See also "1st Selbsterhaltung ein rationales Prinzip?" in SuS 366. 
sssv 82: ""Der Akt der Selbsterhaltung hat zwei untrennbare Aspekte: Abweisung der 
Fremderhaltung und Verhinderung der Selbstzerstorung , UnabMngigkeit und deren Sicherung. 
Diese Sicherung leistet das Moralgesetz." See also SV 95. 
59For Sommer's criticism of Dilthey's Position, his view of Buck's and Blumenberg's criticism of 
Spaemann as well as his own remark regarding Spaemann, see "1st Selbsterhaltung ein 
rationales Prinzip," in SuS 345, 349 350f. 
5osv 216 footnote: "Wo die Moglichkeit einer Selbststeigerung als eines mehr als Selbsterhaltung 
angenommen wird , wird Selbsterhaltung in ihrer Rationalit~t unterbewertet und Vernunft in ihrer 
fundamentalen Intention verkannt." 
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along, but have to imagine ourselves as free in order to also be able to do it."61 It 
is rather, Sommer argues, because we experience ourselves as free that we 
want to preserve ourselves. 
In Chapters IX and X I will present my own interpretation of the function of 
self-preservation of reason in Kant. Whenever I believe that my findings can 
either be supported or differ from the arguments presented in this overview, I will 
indicate it. But before we start with the interpretation , I would like to summarize 
the meanings of the terms "preservation" and "self-preservation" in Kant. 
General Remarks Concerning the Concepts of Preservation and of 
Self-preservation in Kant 
In the first part of this dissertation we have encountered different meanings of 
the terms "preservation" and "self-preservation. " Kant speaks of the preservation 
of children by their parents, and the preservation of property by its owner.62 We 
saw him distinguish between the preservation of the self understood as the result 
of a natural impulse which characterizes all organisms and self-preservation as 
the result of the adherence to the duty to preserve oneself. 53 
Given these different meanings we can distinguish between at least64 
three models of preservation in Kant: ( 1) Preservation of the physical and 
emotional life as a result of human activity guided by a hypothetical imperative; 
(2) Preservation of the physical life as a result of an impulse or drive; (3) Self-
61 SV footnote 217: "Es ist eben nicht so, dar.. wi r uns immer schon erhalten wollen , uns aber als 
frei vortauschen mOssen , um es auch zu konnen , vielmehr konnen wir erst dadurch, dar.. wir uns 
als frei erfahren, uns auch erhalten wollen ."--For Ebel ing's reply to Sommer's criticism see SeS 
129-132. 
62See Chapter on "Ownership." 
63See Chapter on "Ends." 
641 have, for example, not discussed the preservation of the general will of the people (MS 326) or 
the importance of civil independence and the preservation of one's existence (MS 314). 
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preservation, that is, preservation of the physical and moral self as a result of 
autonomous human activity governed by the categorical imperative. This model 
of self-preservation corresponds to preservation understood as the permanence 
of personality, that is, an ontological assumption of practical philosophy.6s __ Both 
model one and two represent heteronomous modes of preservation and self-
preservation, and only model one describes self-preservation as an autonomous 
act. Model one represents what in the literature is called the transitive meaning 
of the verb "to preserve," a meaning which also applies to the preservation of the 
human being by God. Model two uses the verb in the intransitive sense, and only 
in model three is the verb used in its reflexive sense. 
Additional support for the distinction between the different kinds of self-
preservation is found in the "Critique of the Aesthetical Judgment" where Kant 
explains that the reason why we experience nature's forces as sublime is not 
because it threatens our existence, but because it helps us to awaken and value 
our power to regard nature's threat to our possessions, health, and life of no 
consequences for our moral existence (our personality). 56 To put it differently, the 
experience of our physical powerlessness when confronted with nature's forces 
allows us at the same time to experience our moral power and superiority over 
nature. Kant suggests that upon the capacity to judge ourselves independent 
from nature as well as superior to nature "a self-preservation of a completely 
65For reasons given in the Chapter on "Care for the Moral Self," I do not list the permanence of 
substance as a kind of preservation. 
66KU 262: "Auf solche Weise wird die Natur in unserm asthetischen Urtheile nicht, sofern sie 
furchterregend ist, als erhaben beurtheilt, sondern weil sie unsere Kraft (die nicht Naturist) in uns 
aufruft, um das, wofOr wir besorgt sind, {GOter, Gesundheit und Leben) als klein und daher ihre 
Macht (der wir in Ansehung dieser Stocke allerdings unterworfen sind) fOr uns und unsere 
Pers6nlichkeit demungeachtet doch fOr keine solche Gewalt anzusehen, unter die wir uns zu 
beugen hatten, wenn es auf unsre h6chste Grundsatze und deren Behauptung oder Verlassung 
ankame." 
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different kind is based" in contrast to the one which is threatened by the forces of 
nature.67 
Nature's threat to one's goods, health , and life alluded to in the Third 
Critique, can be understood as an interference with the human activity of 
preserving property, health , and life, but it could also be understood as an 
interference with the instinctive preservation of life. When Kant speaks of the 
"completely different kind" of self-preservation, he refers, I believe, to the 
preservation of the moral self and thus to the duty to preserve or respect the 
dignity of humanity, a duty which is twofold : it is the duty to preserve oneself in 
one's animal nature and as a moral being.--The first meaning corresponds to a 
combination of model one and two, and the second meaning corresponds to 
model three. 
Kant's distinction between self-preservation as the preservation of 
possessions, health , and life and the "completely different" kind of self-
preservation corresponds to the distinction we made in the Chapter on "Care for 
the Moral Self' between the preservation of our physical and our moral 
existence. I suggested that the self which is murdered or the moral self and the 
self which is sacrificed or the physical existence must not only be distinguished 
from each other, but the mere preservation of one's physical existence does not 
constitute a moral action . We must not only distinguish between self-preservation 
as the preservation of the moral self or morality and self-preservation understood 
67KU 261f: " ... so giebt auch die Unwiderstehlichkeit ihrer Macht uns, als Naturwesen betrachtet, 
zwar unsere physische Ohnmacht zu erkennen, aber entdeckt zugleich ein Vermogen, uns als 
von ihr unabhangig zu beurtheilen, und eine Oberlegenheit Ober die Natur, worauf sich eine 
Selbsterhaltung von ganz andrer Art grondet, als diejenige ist, die von der Natur aur..er uns ange-
fochten und in Gefahr gebracht werden kann, wobei die Menschheit in unserer Person 
unerniedrigt bleibt, obg leich der Mensch jener Gewalt unterliegen mor..te." 
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as the preservation of life (health and possessions), but we must also be aware 
that only the self-preservation of the moral self is of moral value. 
This view of self-preservation as a duty entails that the self is not only the 
object which is preserved (animal as well as moral self) but at the same time the 
subject who preserves (moral being) or the subject which abstains from the 
interference with the natural impulse and its end . Preservation of the self by the 
self is thus at the same time the protection of the self by the self against the self. 
With regard to the object of preservation, the purpose is only the preservation of, 
that is, non-interference with animality. This aspect of self-preservation 
resembles model one. sa But we saw that the morality of the non-interference with 
our physical nature is determined by the moral law. Hence, with regard to the 
subject who as the agent of preservation executes the moral law, preservation of 
animality is not the primary goal. The primary goal in the process of preserving 
the animal nature is the preservation of the moral self. This model justifies the 
talk of the reflexive sense of preservation. 
To repeat, the duty of self-preservation which includes the prohibition of 
self-murder is not based on an instinct but is an expression of the autonomy of 
the subject. The purpose of the impulse which characterizes the animal being is 
not the preservation of the moral state but of the physical existence, and the 
function of reason is not to simulate the function of the instinct of self-
preservation but to develop a good will . This does not mean, as was discussed in 
the Chapter on "Ends," that reason is not at all concerned with preservation, but 
that it is only indirectly concerned with the preservation of the physical self (in the 
sense of model one and two) and primarily directed towards the preservation of 
6BThis resembles what in the literature is called preservation by someone other than the self 
"Fremderhaltung." 
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the moral self (in the sense of model three.) We even suggested in the Chapter 
on "Ends" that the morality of the subject is the condition for the purposiveness 
of nature and that natural self-preservation presupposes moral self-
preservation.69 
Our analysis of Kant's prohibition of self-murder confirms Ebeling's thesis 
that a "first consistent interpretation of the rationality of self-preservation 
presupposes the complete dismissal of an instinct of preservation .. . . "70 
Furthermore, Blumenberg's thesis that intransitive statements of preservation, 
that is, processes of preservation governed by natural laws lie at the foundation 
of modern rationality cannot be confirmed with regard to Kant. This has already 
been pointed out by Ebeling who rightly states that for the positive construction 
of human self-preservation in Kant's practical philosophy the conditions of 
intransitive preservation are "insignificant."71 
69The same position is taken by Sommer in SV 35: "Diese These, da/3 physische Selbsterhaltung 
nur durch, ja a/s Se/bsterhaltung der Vernunft mog/ich ist, soli in den folgenden Kapiteln 
begrOndet und expliziert werden." 
70Ebeling makes this statement in SuS 43 while pointing out that Hobbes was not yet ready to 
make that step and continued to operate with an instinct of self-preservation: "Der Versuch einer 
ersten konsistenten Deutung der Selbsterhaltungsrationalitat setzt den vollstandigen Abschied 
von einem "Selbsterhaltungstrieb" voraus, ein Schritt, zu dem Hobbes noch nicht bereit war." 
Compare also Sommer SZ 98. 
71 Hans Ebeling, "Einleitung: Das neuere Prinzip der Selbsterhaltung und seine Bedeutung fOr die 
Theorie der Subjektivitat," in SuS 27: "Daraus erhellt, wie unwesentlich in der praktischen 
Philosophie Kants intransitive Erhaltungsvoraussetzungen fOr den positiven Entwurf menschlicher 
Selbsterhaltung geworden sind ... ". 
383 
CHAPTER IX 
BELIEF OF REASON 
In this chapter, I will propose that what Kant calls the "maxim of self-preservation 
of reason" or the "principle of self-preservation of reason" must be understood in 
the context of the belief or faith of reason ("Vernunftglaube") which is a 
necessary condition for both the theoretical as well as the practical use of 
reason. I will suggests that the principle of self-preservation of reason consists in 
what Kant calls the "maxim of healthy reason" and secures the belief of reason 
and its use. Furthermore, I will suggest that Kant's statement that duties to 
oneself concern the "moral health" of the human being can be understood in the 
context of the self-preservation of reason or as an expression of "healthy 
reason." 
In order to support my suggestions I will, first, discuss the inherent 
dangers for the practical use of reason if freedom is not restricted .1 I will then 
turn to Kant's view in Was heif3t: Sich im Denken orientiren to show that Kant 
himself draws a connection between belief of reason, healthy reason and the 
principle of the self-preservation of reason. Thereafter, I will explain that this 
belief of reason is represented by the belief of healthy reason and that healthy 
reason requires the satisfaction of the criterion of universalizability and 
represents the maxim of self-preservation of reason. It will become clear that 
Kant's conception of the principle of self-preservation secures the perfection of 
reason in terms of the satisfaction of its need for systematic unity. 
1Some of my findings can be supported by Sommer's analysis of the therapeutic function of the 
transcendental dialectic for the "madness" and "pathology" of reason . See, for example, SV 232, 
235f, 237, 239. 
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Freedom and the Duty of Self-preservation 
Our discussion in the previous chapters has shown that it is the function of 
perfect duties to oneself to guarantee the dignity of or the respect for humanity, 
and we quoted Kant in the Chapter on "Duties" that the perfect duties to oneself 
are the necessary conditions of all other duties. Since human beings are free, it 
is necessary to restrict freedom in order to guarantee that it can be exercised. In 
other words, because a free person is by definition not subject to external 
coercion, the source of the restriction of freedom can only be the subject herself 
which means that it is only through self-coercion that freedom can be restricted. 
We explained that it is the function of the perfect duty to oneself as an "animal .. . 
and a moral being" to restrict the exercise of freedom with regard to the 
disposition over body and life, and thus to protect the dignity of humanity. 
Because the dignity of humanity or the respect for humanity is the 
necessary basis for morality, it constitutes at the same time the limiting 
conditions of or the restrictions for the exercise of freedom. Even though nature 
can cause "Obel" it is freedom--not nature--which is responsible for evil ("Bose") 
and destruction. Human freedom is not only responsible for virtue but also for 
"horrifying vices."2 Self-destruction originates from unrestricted freedom,3 and 
because freedom by definition cannot be restricted by something other than 
itself, the remedy against destruction can only be found in freedom itself.4 In 
2MC 346. 
3Kant's philosophical system like Spinoza's system does not to allow for an instinct of destruction. 
But Kant's account of self-destruction differs radically from Spinoza's. Kant attributes a destructive 
force to freedom, yet, according to Spinoza, self-destruction is always a result of external causes. 
See Spinoza's remarks on suicide in his Ethica, Pars IV, propositio 20, scholium. 
41 believe that these considerations lead Ebeling to suggest that the consciousness of self-
preservation involves the consciousness of self-destruction. 
short, according to Kant, only freedom as autonomy can save human beings 
from self-destruction. 
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In the Chapter on "Homicidium Do/osum," it was shown that vices 
understood as principled destructive behavior presuppose the freedom of the 
subject. It comes, therefore, as no surprise that Kant stresses the destructive 
aspect of freedom. In fact , Kant's discussion of violations of rights and duties in 
his lecture shows how serious this problem is: 
This freedom is, however, the source of the most enormous and most 
horrible offenses, hence, we must deal with it carefully.5 
Among all the capacities of the powers of nature nothing is more 
destructive than freedom. It is, to be sure, that which raises us above the 
beasts; but is also the source of all evil.6 
Freedom is thus the reason for the most horrible vices by feigning many 
things for itself in order to satisfy its needs, for example, a crimen camis 
contra naturam, but it is also the reason for virtue which honors 
humanity.? 
Animals do not kill themselves arbitrarily because they are not free. a Only human 
beings because of their freedom can destroy themselves. Freedom is on the one 
hand the end of humanity, the "inner worth of the world" or the summum bonum, 
but on the other hand the "most horrible thing" imaginable if it is not restricted by 
rules which limit its use.9 According to Kant, self-murder is an example of the 
Sppp 209: "Diese Freyheit ist doch aber auch die Quelle der enormsten und abscheulichsten 
Vergehungen, mit dieser Freyheit mO~en wir also behutsam umgehen." 
6PPP 210: "Unter allen Vermbgen der Krafte der Naturist nichts schadlicher als die Frey he it. Sie 
ist zwar dasjenige, was uns Ober die Thierheit erhebt; sie ist aber auch die Quelle alles Uebels." 
7MC 346: "Es ist also die Freyheit der Grund des entsetzlichsten Lasters, indem sie sich vieles 
erkOnsteln kann , um ihre Neigung zu befriedigen, z. E. ein crimen carnis contra naturam, so wie 
sie auch ein Grund der Tugend ist, die die Menschheit ehrt. " 
Bppp 209: "Ein Thier bringt sich nicht willkOhrlich um, weil es keine Freyheit hat." 
9MC 344f: "Worauf beruhet denn das principium aller Pflichten gegen sich selbst? Die Freyheit ist 
einestheils das Vermbgen, welches allen Obrigen unendliche Brauchbarkeit giebt. Sie ist der 
Mchste Grad des Lebens. Sie ist die Eigenschaft, die eine nothwendige Bedingung ist, die allen 
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destructive power of freedom. It is the greatest violation of the duties to oneself 
and most horrible vice because it undermines, as will be shown later, the belief, 
and thus the use of reason without which the realization of the end of morality 
becomes impossible. 1o In the chapter on "Ends" we have seen that in order to 
avoid the destructive aspect of freedom we have to restrict it by objective rules to 
which we subject ourselves: 
If freedom is not restricted by objective rules the result is the vast and wild 
disorder, because it is uncertain whether or not the human being will not 
use his powers to destroy himself and others and the whole of nature.11 
Vollkommenheiten zum Grunde liegt. Aile Thiere haben Vermogen, ihre Krafte nach WillkOhr zu 
gebrauchen. Diese Willkuhr aber ist nicht frey, sondern durch Reitze und stimulos necer:!.itirt. In 
ihren Handlungen ist bruta necer:!.itas. Hatten aile Geschopfe seiche an sinnliche Triebe 
gebundene Willkuhr, so hatte die Welt keinen Werth . Der innere Werth aber der Welt, das 
summum bonnum, ist die Freyheit nach WillkOhr, die nicht necer:!.itirt wird zu handeln ... . Aile 
thierische Handlungen sind regelmt:H!ig , denn sie geschehn nach Regeln, die subjective necer:!.itirt 
sind. In der ganzen nicht freyen Natur finden wir ein inneres subjectives necer:!.itirendes 
principium, wornach aile Handlungen in der ganzen nicht freyen Natur regelmar:!.ig geschehn. 
Nehme ich aber nun die Freyheit bey Menschen, so ist da kein subjectiv necer:!.itirendes 
principium der Regelmar:!.igeit der Handlungen; ware dieses, so ware es keine Freyheit, und was 
wOrde nun daraus folgen? ... Diese objectiv necer:!.itirende GrOnde mor..en im Verstande liegen , 
die die Frey he it restringiren ... . Welches ist denn die Bedingung, unter der die Freyheit restringirt 
wird? Dieses ist das allgemeine Gesetz: Verfahre so, dar.. in allen deinen Handlungen 
Regelmar:!.igkeit herrsche. Was wird denn das seyn, was in Ansehung meiner selbst die Freiheit 
restringiren soli? Dieses ist: den Neigungen nicht zu folgen . Die ursprOngliche Regel , nach der 
ich die Freyheit restringiren soli, ist die Uebereinstimmung des freyen Verhaltens mit den 
wesentlichen Zwekken der Menschheit." Compare MM 1482f. 
10MC 342: "Der Selbstmord ist die hochste Verletzung der Pflichten gegen sich selbst. ... der 
Selbstmord ist nicht abscheulich , weil ihn Gott verbothen hat, sondern Gott hat ihn vielmehr 
verbothen , weil er abscheulich ist." MC 343: "Diese Abscheulichkeit besteht nun darin, dar.. der 
Mensch seine Freyheit sich selbst zu destruiren braucht, da er sie nur bios dazu brauchen sollte, 
dar.. er als Mensch lebe; er kann Ober alles was zu seiner Person gehoret disponiren, nicht aber 
Ober seine Person selbst, auch nicht die Freiheit wider sich selbst brauchen." See also MM 1481 . 
11 MC 344/MM 1482: "Wenn die Freyheit nicht durch objective Regeln restringirt wird , so kommt 
die gror:!.e wilde Unordnung herraus. Denn ist es ungewir:!., ob nicht der Mensch seine Krafte 
brauchen wird , sich und andere und die ganze Natur zu destruiren." MC 344: "Die Freyheit ist also 
der innere Werth der Welt. Von der andern Seite aber, in sofern sie nicht unter gewir:!.e Regeln des 
bedingten Gebrauchs restingirt ist, so ist sie das schrecklichste, was nur seyn kann."--ln his own 
development of theory of human self-preservation, Ebeling considers the total annihilation of the 
human race by the human race (SeS 132-138), something Kant might have had in mind when he 
wrote this part of the lecture. 
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According to this quote, it is not only the individual self-destruction we have to 
fear, but destruction on a much larger scale which may not only lead to the 
destruction of the environment but the annihilation of the human race. 
Yet this illusion [that self-murder is moral] disappears, if freedom exists 
but for an unchanging condition which cannot change under any 
circumstance. This condition is that I do not use my freedom against 
myself in order to destroy myself but that I do not let my freedom be 
restricted by anything external.12 
Kant indicates here that it is a necessary condition for the existence of freedom 
that we do not use freedom to destroy ourselves, but rather do not allow external 
factors to interfere with freedom. We saw in the Chapter on "Care for the Moral 
Self' that these external factors are represented by, for example, adversities like 
sickness and pain . If we use the freedom of the empirical will to destroy 
ourselves, we annihilate the essential ends of the person and violate the moral 
law.13 
In the Lectures on the Metaphysics of Morals Kant goes so far as to state 
that freedom implies1 4 the duty of self-preservation: 
12MC 374: "AIIein, dieser Schein wird gehoben, wenn die Freyheit nicht [sic] durch eine 
unwandelbare Bedingung bestehen kann, die sich unter keinen Umst~nden ~ndern kann. Diese 
Bedingung ist, da~ ich meine Freyheit nicht wieder mich selbst zu meiner destruction gebrauche, 
sander da~ ich meine Freyheit durch nichts ~u~eres einschr~nken lasse." The context makes 
clear that "nicht" must be replaced by "nur." 
13ppp 208: "Der Gebrauch der freyen WillkOr wieder die Person und ihr Daseyn, wieder ihre 
wesentlichen Zwekke, das ist der Gebrauch der WillkOhr wieder sich selbst, und der wiederstreitet 
den moralischen Gesezzen. Sobald der Mensch den Antrieben nachgiebt, so entehrt er die 
Menschheit in seiner eigenen Person." 
14Since Kant stresses in the Critique of Practical Reason that freedom is a Faktum of reason 
which cannot be proven but has to be assumed, we can say that the fact of reason implies the 
duty of self-preservation. Freedom understood as autonomy finds its expression in the prohibition 
not to willfully ("willkOrlich") dispose over one's body and life. In other words, freedom as 
autonomy entails the preservation of the moral self, that is, the subjection to the moral law. The 
fact that freedom as autonomy cannot be separated from the duty of self-preservation might be 
the reason why in the Lecture on the Metaphysics of Morals he refers to the phrase "the human 
being belongs to himself, homo est sui juris" as an "identical principle." We showed in the Chapter 
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An unrestricted capacity is therefore embedded in ["eingelegt"] the human 
being [by means of which] he can bring about [changes] in his nature 
solely by himself and determined by nothing else in nature. This is 
freedom and by means of it the duty of self-preservation is cognizable 
which can therefore not be clearly demonstrated.15 
The quote suggests that because freedom represents a potentially destructive 
force, a duty of self-preservation must be assumed. It is , however, unclear why 
Kant believes that freedom is the reason why the duty of self-preservation 
cannot be clearly demonstrated. Does he mean that the question of self-
obligation is difficult to explain? But he already indicated that it is the relationship 
between the homo noumenon and the homo phaenomenon which lies at the 
basis of this relationship . We will , however, see that the relationship as 
developed in the Lecture on the Metaphysics of Morals does not yet present the 
final form as presented in The Metaphysics of Morals. So, if the reason why the 
duty of self-preservation cannot be clearly demonstrated lies in the model of self-
obligation , we have to delay the final answer to this question until we reach the 
last chapter of this dissertation. 
In the Reflexionen zur Moralphilosophie Kant summarizes those practical 
rules which make up the duty of self-preservation and which are represented by 
the right of humanity: 
It is of utmost necessity for reason to assume certain practical rules as 
principles which necessitate (categorical) without reference to the 
conditions of utility, for example, not to have any intention contrary to 
one's life or to sacrifice one's person for the goals of others . ... that which 
constitutes a prior condition for the use of one's freedom must necessarily 
on "Right of Humanity" that this principle is synonymous with the principle "The human being 
belongs to his own humanity as intellig ible being." 
15MSV 627f: "Es ist also dem Menschen ein unumschr~nktes VermOgen eingelegt, das in seiner 
Natur zu wirken nur durch sich selbst und [das) durch nichts anderes in der Natur bestimmt 
werden kann. Dies ist die Freiheit und durch diese ist die Pflicht der Selbsterhaltung erkennbar, 
die sich daher nicht deutlich demonstrieren l~r..t. " 
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restrict freedom, [and] therefore the essential characteristics of his own 
person and life itself. An intention contrary to these cannot take place .... 
Essential characteristics are those without which he would neither be a 
human being nor a free being. 
He shall not intend to speak an untruth, since as one who can 
determine the sense of it ["his speech"] he must not destroy the meaning 
of the same ["the untruth"]. He shall not intend to kill himself, because if 
he does as he likes with himself, he r e g a r d s himself a s a t h i n g 
and loses the dignity of the human being. He insults others if he treats 
that which is not h is property ["Sache"] as if it were [his property] . The 
self-murderer also shows freedom in the greatest contradiction with itself, 
that is, in the greatest derangement [as the result] of his own delusion 
["Wahnes"]. Humanity in his own person as well as in the person of others 
is h o I y and indestructible. His own consent is in this case void, 
because one has no will to stop being something . All duties ... , namely the 
necessary ones, consist not in our contributing to the welfare of human 
beings but that [we] honor the particular characteristics ["Vorzuge"] and 
dignity of humanity. The right of humanity is therefore that which restricts 
all of freedom by means of necessary conditions .... 16 
It is the right of humanity which restricts freedom by means of necessary 
conditions, that is, by protecting those essential characteristics which constitute a 
human being and a free being . Lying and self-murder not only presuppose 
16Reflexionen zur Moralphi/osophie, vol. 19, no. 6801 , 165f: "Es ist von der gro~esten 
Nothwendigkeit vor der Vernunft, gewisse praktische Regeln als Grunds:3tze anzunehmen , die 
absolut necessitiren (categorisch) , ohne auf den Bedingungen von Nutzen zu beruhen, z. E. keine 
Absicht wieder sein eigen Leben zu haben oder seine eigne Persohn nicht andern Absichten 
aufzuopfern .... so mu~ ... das, was eine vorhergehende [Hand lung] Bedingung ist, sich seiner 
freyheit zu bedienen, die freyheit notwendig einschr:3nken, folglich die wesentliche Bestimungen 
seiner eignen Persohn und das Leben selbst. Wieder diese kan keine Absicht statt find en, .... 
Wesentliche Bestimungen sind die, ohne die er entweder kein Mensch oder gar kein freyes wesen 
seyn wOrde. 
Er soli nicht Absicht haben, die Unwahrheit zu reden , weil er als einer, der seinen Sinn 
bezeichnen kann , die Bedeutung derselben nicht vernichtigen mu~ . Er soli nicht sich selbst 
todten , weil er, wenn er mit sich selbst schaltet, sich a I s e i n e S a c h e b e t r a c h t e t und 
die WOrde eines Menschen verliert. Er beleidigt andre, wenn er das, was n i c h t s e i n e 
Sache ist, als die seinige behandelt. Der Selbstmorder zeigt auch die freyheit in dem Gro~ten 
wiederstreit wieder sich selbst, mithin in der gro~ten Zerrotung des Eignen Wahnes. Die 
Menschheit i st (sic] he iIi g und unverletzlich ([index follows] so wohl in seiner eignen Persohn 
als in der anderer. Seine eigne Einwilligung ist hier nichtig, weil man keinen Willen hat um 
aufzuhoren gar etwas zu seyn.) Aile Pflichten ... , nemlich die nothwendigen, bestehen nicht darin, 
da~ wir der Menschen wohlfarth , sondern der Menschheit vorzoge und WOrde ehren. Also ist das 
Recht der Menschheit dasienige, was aile freyhe it durch nothwendige Bedingungen einschrankt. 
" 
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freedom but undermine it at the same time. The use of freedom must therefore 
be restricted, and we saw that the perfect duties which correspond to the right of 
humanity fulfill this function . These duties counteract an otherwise possible self-
destructive delusion ("Wahn"). 
In the Vorarbeiten zur Tugendlehre Kant states: 
... For the integrity of humanity in his own person must serve as the 
general limiting rule of the empirical will because the subject would 
otherwise destroy itself according to ideas of reason. 17 
This quote indicates that there are ideas which originate in reason which can 
lead to the destruction of the subject. In other words, reason itself harbors the 
potential for the destruction of the subject, for example, the "delusion" of the self-
murderer. 
In the following sections I will discuss the prevention of self-destruction in 
the context of belief of reason. I will show that it is the adherence to the maxim of 
self-preservation of reason which prevents not only the destruction of reason by 
reason, but the destruction of the human being by the human being. 
17Vorarbeiten zur Tugendlehre, vol. 23, 383; the whole paragraph reads: "Die Vernunft kann als 
causa instrumentalis mancher Zwecke oder auch als caursa originaria der Bestimmung des 
Willens betrachtet werden. lm letzteren Faile hei~t sie die reine praktische Vernunft und ihre 
causalitat ist moralisch d. i. nach Freiheitsgesetzen. Diese caufSalitas originaria der Vernunft 
besteht darinn da~ die Allgemeinheit der Regel der WillkOhr der oberste Bestimmungsgrund 
derselben ist und zwar ein fOr sich allein hinreichender durch keine Triebfedern der Neigung zu 
Oberwiegender WillkOhr. So ist die blo~e Nichtswordigkeit die in der LOge der Darbiethung seiner 
selbst als Sache zum wohiiOstigen Genu~ Anderer oder der Verstommelung seiner selbst ein 
genugsamer Grund fOr die Vernunft dem Antriebe dazu zu wiederstehen. Denn die lntegritat der 
Menscheit in seiner eigenen Person mu~ zur allgemein einschrankenden Regel der WillkOhr 
dienen weil sonst das Subject sich selbst nach Vernunftideen vernichten wOrde." 
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Belief of Reason as a Remedy for Potential Self-destruction 
In order to shed some light on the connection between self-preservation and the 
belief of reason we turn to Was heif3t: Sich im Denken orientiren, Kant's Logik as 
well as the Reflexionen zur Logik, and the Reflexionen zur Metaphysik. 
The importance of the belief of reason is lucidly presented in Kant's Was 
heif3t: Sich im Denken orientiren. 1B In this article Kant responds to the dispute 
between Mendelssohn and Jacobi and argues how reason if it is deprived of its 
privilege to be "the last cornerstone of truth" leads to its own destruction. He 
shows that the lawless use of reason is characterized by the following stages: 
rapture ("Schwarmerei") (adopts the maxim that reason is not the ultimate 
lawgiver), superstition (assumes "the total submission of reason to facta") and 
unbelief (follows the maxim that reason is independent "from its o w n n e e d ") 
which results in freethinking "that is, the principle to acknowledge no duties at 
all."19 Kant argues that in order to avoid civic disarray the authorities will 
counteract this situation by abolishing the freedom to think: "And thus freedom in 
thinking destroys itself, if it wants to proceed independent from the laws of 
reason." His answer to the question "What does it mean: to find one's way about 
in thinking?" shows that the adherence to the principle of self-preservation of 
reason preserves reason as the last corner stone of truth and avoids the 
otherwise inevitable destruction of reason . 
Kant uses the concept of "finding one's way about" ("sich orientieren") to 
present the maxim of (healthy) reason in its attempt to know supersensible 
objects. It is the geographical method of determining the cardinal point with 
18The article was occasioned by the argument between Mendelssohn and Jacobi. See the 
editorial notes in vol. 8, 483. 
19See Was hei/3t: Sich im Denken orientiren? Vol. 8, 145f. 
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reference to the position of the sun and the time of the day which Kant uses as 
the starting point in his interpretation of "finding one's way about."2D Broadening 
the concept of the geographical method renders the mathematical method which 
Kant likens to finding one's way about in a familiar but dark room by touching 
one of the objects in the room and using it as a spatial reference point. Kant 
believes that the concept of the mathematical method can be further extended to 
what he calls the "logical method" of finding one's way about, that is, to find one's 
way about in thinking: 
To f i n d one's way a bout in thinking in general means therefore: 
given the inadequacy of objective principles of reason, [that one] 
determines oneself according to a subjective principle [of reason] with 
regard to holding something to be true.21 
With regard to speculative thinking , it means that in the vast and black night of 
the supersensible, reason finds its way about "solely by means of its own need ." 
The recognition of the rightful need ("BedOrfniP.,") of reason to assume that of 
which knowledge is denied because of the lack of objective reasons22 translates 
into a belief of reason ("Vernunftglaube"). We find our way about in thinking by 
means of reason's need for its satisfactory use which according to Kant is 
twofold: theoretical as well as practical. 
2DWas heif3t: Sich im Denken orientiren? Vol. 8, 134: "Sich o r i e n t i r e n heil1t in der 
eigentlichen Bedeutung des Worts: aus einer gegebenen Weltgegend (in deren vier wir den 
Horizont eintheilen) die Obrigen, namentlich den Au f g a n g zu finden."--This sentence sounds 
like Heidegger, or, better Heidegger sounds like Kant! 
21 1bid. , p. 136 footnote: "Sich im Denken Oberhaupt orient ire n , heil1t also: sich bei der 
Unzulanglichkeit der objectiven Principien der Vernunft im FOrwahrhalten nach einem subjectiven 
Princip derselben bestimmen." 
221bid., p. 137: "Nun aber tritt d as Recht des Bed or f n iss e s der Vernunft ein , als 
eines sujectiven Grundes etwas vorauszusetzen und anzunehmen, was sie durch objective 
Gronde zu wissen sich nicht anmal1en darf; und folglich sich im Denken, im unermel11ichen und 
fOr uns mir dicker Nacht erfOIIten Raume des Obersinnlichen, lediglich durch ihr eignes BedOrfnil1 
zu o r i e n t i r e n ." 
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With regard to the former, reason needs to assume something which is 
intelligible for it and can serve as the basis to explain phenomena. Kant states 
that "we must assume the existence of God, if we want to judge about the 
first causes of everything" especially if we want to judge the world as a 
teleological order. But, he continues 
far more important is the need of reason in its practical use, because it is 
unconditioned, and we are not merely obliged to assume the existence of 
God when we w a n t to judge but because we m u s t j u d g e. 
Because the pure practical use of reason consists in the prescription of 
the moral laws. But they all lead to the idea of the h i g h e s t g o o d 
which is possible in the world in so far as it is only possible through 
freed om: [to] morality; on the other hand [these laws] lead to that 
which not merely depends on human freedom but also on n a t u r e, 
namely, to the greatest h a p p i ness , in so far as it is distributed in 
proportion to the former.23 
According to Kant reason "needs" to assume happiness as a "d e p e n d e n t 
highest good" and God as "highest i n d e p e n d e n t good" in order to give 
the highest good objective reality.24 Thus, with regard to the theoretical use of 
reason this need translates into a pure hypothesis of reason; but with regard to 
23Was heif3t: Sich im Denken orientiren? Vol. 8, 139: "Man kann aber das BedOrfn is der Vernunft 
als zwiefach ansehen: e r s t I i c h in ihrem t h e o r e t i s c h e n , z w e i t e n s in ihrem 
p r a k t i s c h e n Gebrauch. Das erste BedOrfni~ habe ich eben angefOhrt; aber man sieht woh l, 
da~ es nur bedingt sei , d. i. wir mossen die Existenz Gottes annehmen, wenn wir Ober die ersten 
Ursachen alles Zuft:illigen vornehmlich in der Ordnung der wirklich in der Welt gelegten Zwecke 
u r t h e i I e n w o II e n . Weit wichtiger ist das BedOrfni~ der in Vernunft ihrem praktischen 
Gebrauche, weil es unbedingt ist, und wir die Existenz Gottes voraus zu setzen nicht blo~ 
alsdann genOthigt werden , wenn wir urtheilen wo II e n , sondern weil wir u r t h e i I e n 
m 0 s s e n. Denn der reine praktische Gebrauch der Vernunft besteht in der Vorschrift der 
moralischen Gesetze. Sie fOhren aber aile auf die Idee des h 6 c h s t e n G u t e s , was in der 
Welt moglich ist, so fern es allein durch F r e i h e i t mOglich ist: die S i t t I i c h k e i t ; von der 
anderen Seite auch auf das, was nicht blo~ auf menschliche Freiheit, sondern auch auf die 
N at u r ankommt, namlich, auf die grO~te G I o c k s e I i g k e i t , sofern sie in Proportion der 
ersten ausgetheilt ist." 
241bid. Here Kant refers to happiness as well as the existence of God as expression of its need , 
even though on page 141 it is only the postulates wh ich express the need of reason . See next 
footnote. 
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its practical use it becomes the postulate of reason.25 It is the belief of reason or 
the recognition of the rightful need of reason , which guides speculative thinking: 
Pure belief of reason is therefore the signpost or compass by means of 
which the speculative thinker on his wanderings of reason in the field of 
supersensible objects can finds its way about, [and] the human being 
[endowed with] common , yet, (morally) healthy reason can map out his 
path with regard to theoretical and practical questions according to his 
whole purpose in a completely adequate fashion; and it is this belief of 
reason which must be presupposed as the ground of any other belief 
even any revelation .26 
According to this quote, a person endowed with "healthy reason" is a person 
endowed with belief of reason. We could also say that healthy reason is reason 
which follows and thus satisfies its need for systematic unity. This belief of 
reason enables the person to make the proper judgments with regard to 
theoretical as well as practical questions, and it guarantees that the judgments 
conform to the purpose of the human being. With regard to the practical 
employment of reason, the belief of reason translates into the postulate of the 
existence of God and the immortality of the soul. 27 
It is important to stress that belief of reason does not provide theoretical 
knowledge. Even though belief--unlike knowledge--is only a holding to be true for 
objectively insufficient but subjectively sufficient reasons and because of that 
25Was heif3t: Sich im Den ken orientiren? Vol. 8, 141 : "Dieses BedOrfnir.. der Vernunft zu ihrem sie 
befriedigenden t h e o r e t i s c h e n Gebrauche wOrde nichts anders als reine V e r n u n f t -
h y p o t h e s e sein .... Dagegen der V e r n u n f t g I a u b e, der auf dem BedOrfnir.. ihres 
Gebrauchs in p r a k t i s c he r Absicht beruht, ein Post u I at der Vernunft heir..en konnte." 
26 Was heif3t: Sich im Denken orientiren? Vol. 8, 142: Ein reiner Vernunftglaube ist also der 
Wegweiser oder Compar.., wodurch der speculative Denker sich auf seinen Vernunftstreifereien 
im Felde Obersinnlicher Gegenstande orientiren, der Mensch von gemeiner, doch (moralisch) 
gesunder Vernunft aber seinen Weg sowohl in theoretischer als praktischer Absicht dem ganzen 
Zweck seiner Bestimmung vOIIIig angemessen vorzeichnen kann ; und dieser Vernunftglaube ist 
es auch, der jedem anderen Glauben, ja jeder Offenbarung zum Grunde gelegt werden mur..." 
27Kant does not speak of the postulate of freedom in this context. 
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cannot constitute knowledge, the degree or firmness of the belief equals that of 
knowledge. 28 
At the end of the article Kant formulates the maxim of reason which we 
follow when we use the belief of reason as a compass to find our way about in 
thinking, that is, when we think for ourselves : 
To t h i n k for o n e s e If means to look for the highest touchstone of 
truth in oneself (that is, in one's own reason) ; and the maxim, to always 
think for oneself is enlightenment. The latter does not require quite as 
much as those imagine who regard enlightenment in terms of 
k n o w I e d g e : since it [enlightenment] is rather a negative principle of 
the use of one's faculty of knowledge, and more often he who possesses 
a lot of knowledge is the least enlightened in its use. To make use of 
one's own reason means only that with regard to all of what one should 
assume one asks oneself: whether one perhaps finds it advisable to make 
the reason why one assumes something--or also the rule which follows 
from one's assumption--the universal principle of the use of one's reason. 
Everyone can make this test with himself; and by scrutinizing [himself] he 
will see superstition and rapture ["Schwarmerei"] vanish forthwith, 
although he has by no means the knowledge to disprove both of them for 
objective reasons. For he only uses the maxim of the s e I f-
p res e r vat ion of reason . To establish enlightenment through 
education in the i n d i v i d u a I s u b j e c t is therefore very easy; one 
must only start early in getting the young heads used to this reflection. To 
enlighten an e p o c h , however, is a lengthy process because one finds 
many external obstacles which in part prohibit that kind of education or 
make it more difficult.29 
28For Kant's distinction between belief and knowledge see Logik, vol. 9, 67-72. See also footnote 
no. 32. 
29Was heil3t: Sich im Denken orientiren? Vol. 8, 146f footnote: "S e I b s t den ken heir..t den 
obersten Probirstein der Wahrheit in sich selbst (d . i. in seiner eigenen Vernunft) suchen ; und die 
Maxime, jederzeit selbst zu denken, ist die Aufklarung. Dazu gehort nun eben so viel nicht, als 
sich diejenigen einbilden, welche die Aufklarung in K e n n t n i s s e setzen: da sie vielmehr ein 
negativer Grundsatz im Gebrauche seines Erkenntnisvermogens ist, und otter der, so an 
Kenntnissen Oberaus reich ist, im Gebrauch derselben am wenigsten aufgeklart ist. Sich seiner 
eigenen Vernunft bedienen, will nichts weiter sagen, als bei allem dem, was man annehmen soli , 
sich selbst fragen : ob man es wohl thunlich finde, den Grund, warum man etwas annimmt, oder 
auch die Regel, die aus dem was man annimt, folgt, zum allgemeinen Grundsatze seines 
Vernunftgebrauchs zu machen. Diese Probe kann ein jeder mit sich selbst anstellen ; under wird 
Aberglauben und Schwarmerei bei dieser Prufung alsbald verschwinden sehen, wenn er gleich 
396 
In this quote, Kant confirms Mendelssohn's view of the status of reason as the 
last touchstone of truth. In order to avoid the pitfalls of rapture and superstition 
we must think for ourselves and look for the highest and that means the last 
touchstone of truth in reason. It means that we follow the maxim of the self-
preservation of reason and test the ideas and principles which we assume as the 
foundation of our thinking . We must therefore ask ourselves whether the reasons 
(ideas) why we assume something allow for the use of reason. The ideas we 
assume and the principle we follow must fit the purpose or function of reason 
and that means they must be able to become universal principles for the 
employment or use of reason.3o 
The requirement that the ideas and rules we adopt must be 
universalizable is reason's way to secure or to preserve its continuing use. 
bei weitem die Kenntnisse nicht hat, beide aus objectiven Grunden zu widerlegen. Denn er 
bedient sich bios der Maxime der S e I b s t e r h a I t u n g der Vernunft. Aufklt:irung in e i n -
z e I n e n en S u b j e c t e n durch Erziehung zu grOnden , ist also gar Ieicht; man mur.. nur frOh 
anfangen, die jungen Kopfe zu dieser Reflexion zu gewohnen. Ein Zeit a Iter aber 
aufzuklt:iren, ist sehr langwierig; denn es finden sich viel t:iul!.ere Hindernisse, welche jene 
Erziehungsart theils verbieten, theils erschweren." 
301 abstain here from a detailed analysis of the function of reason in Kant's philosophy. For our 
purposes it is enough to point to reason's foundational function by postulating those ideas which 
prevent an infinite regress of reasons. See for example KrV B 825/A 797, B 832/A 804. For 
"Einheit des Vernunftgebrauchs" see val. 23, 471 ; ibid. 472f for "Vernunfteinheit": "Die Vernunft 
ist frey von den Bedingungen der Sinlichkeit und mur.. im praktischen es seyn Die Fortsetzung der 
Funktionen der Vernunft bis zur Vollstt:indigen Einheit Ober die Einschrt:inkende Bedingungen der 
Sinlichkeit." 
In the Reflexionen zur Metaphysik, val. 18, no. 6217, 507 Kant stresses the importance of 
the belief of reason for the complete experiential use of reason : "Vernunftglaube ist ... der 
Grundsatz ([index follows] Maxime) der Vernunft, dasjenige anzunehmen, was ... zur Vollendung 
der Reihe der GrOnde einer zum Erfahrungsgebrauche vollig zusammenstimmenden Vernunft 
unvermeidlich nothwendig ist. Nun kan das erste dieser Reihe weder durch Vernunft noch auf 
dem Wege der ErfahrungschiOsse ... als bestimter gegenstand bewiesen werden. Also ist der 
Vernunftglaube zum Vollstandigen Erfahrungsgebrauch (worunter ich die Ableitung der an 
Gegenstanden der Erfahrung ausgeObten Maximen der Vernunft verstehe) unumganglich 
nothwendig ." To postulate the unconditioned for the conditioned is one of the prerequisites for the 
complete unity of reason (freedom of reason). Compare footnote no. 37. 
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This is what Kant means by the maxim of the self-preservation of reason. The 
adherence to the maxim of self-preservation of reason secures the satisfaction of 
the need of reason for systematic unity; it is an expression of the subjective 
belief of reason which provides our thinking with guidance, the lack of which 
would literally leave us "in the dark"--which explains why the negative principle of 
thinking for oneself, the principle of self-preservation of reason , is the principle of 
"enlightenment. "31 
In one of the Ref/exionen zur Logik Kant repeats the importance of the 
principle of self-preservation of reason for belief of reason : 
Moral certainty it is called; it is, however, not knowledge but only belief--
as in the case of the jury. If one has to pass a judgment because of moral 
reasons and ought not remain in suspenso the judgment is necessary. 
The principle of the self-preservation of reason is the foundation of 
the belief of reason, where the degree of holding something to be true is 
the same as in knowing but of different kind, since it is not taken from the 
knowledge of reasons in the object, but from the true need of the subject 
with regard to the theoretical as well as the practical usage of reason . It 
remains always belief, never does it become knowledge and is as the 
former also for creatures the most purposive.--Knowledge makes one 
puffed up (if it is delusion), but knowledge within its limits (Socrates) 
makes one humble. 32 
31Since enlightenment is defined in terms of always thinking for oneself, a procedure which 
presupposes the belief in reason, enlightenment presupposes the belief in reason and the maxim 
of reason's self-preservation. See also Kant's characterization of enlightenment in KU 294, 
footnote no. 76. 
32Reflexionen zur Logik, vol. 16, no. 2446, 371f: "Moral ische Gewisheit heir..t es zwar; sie ist aber 
kein Wissen, sondern nur ein Glauben, wie bey der Jury. Wenn man durchaus, und zwar aus 
moralischen Grunden, ein Urtheil fallen mur.. und nicht in suspenso bleiben darf: so ist dieses 
Urtheil nothwendig. 
Das Princip der selbsterhaltung der Vernunft ist das Fundament des Vernunftglaubens, in 
welchem das FOrwahrhalten eben den Grad hat als beym Wissen , aber von anderer Artist, indem 
es nicht von der Erkentnis der Grunde im obiect, sonder von der [sic] wahren BedOrfnis des 
Subiects in ansehung des theoretischen so wohl als practischen Gebrauchs der Vernunft 
hergenommen ist. Es bleibt immer glauben, niemals wirds wissen und ist auch als das erstere fur 
Geschopfe am Zweckmar:!. igsten. -- Das Wissen blehet auf (wenn es Wahn ist) , aber das Wissen 
bis zu den Grenzen desselben (Socrates) macht DemOthig." See also no. 2447, 2448, and no. 
2770.--Another Reflexion indicates that belief of reason unlike historical belief is based on 
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This quote stresses that belief of reason is based on the principle of self-
preservation of reason. The principle which Kant identified in the previous quote 
with the principle of universalizability is therefore the foundation of the theoretical 
as well as the practical use of reason. 
Before we turn to Kant's view of the proper and improper employment of 
reason and show that the former conforms to what Kant calls healthy reason, 
some brief remarks concerning the use of reason are in order. Kant contrasts the 
"experiential use of reason" with the "chimerical use" of (pure) reason and points 
out that the maxim of the latter is "delusion."33 When Kant speaks of the applied 
or experiential use of reason he refers to the use of reason which allows one to 
produce the ideas or objects one thinks in thought according to laws of 
experience.34 The experiential use of reason is therefore determined by those 
laws or conditions of experience which are outlined in the First Critique. 
subjective reasons of morality which Kant identifies with moral disposition ("Gesinnung") and the 
incentive of morality. This indicates that even the theoretical use of reason because it 
presupposes the belief of reason has its foundation in the moral nature of the subject. Reflexionen 
zur Logik, vol. 16, no. 2771 , 503: "Es giebt einen Vern u n f t g I au ben und einen his tori-
s c h e n . Der erste beruht auf subiectiven Grunden der Moralitat ([index follows] der obiective 
Grund ist die Moglichkeit der Sache; absolute und unbedingte), d. i. der moralischen Gesinung, 
und darauf, da~ moralitaet vor ihn Triebfeder sey. Der Unglaubige verlaugnet diese Triebfeder, 
und sein Mangel der Oberzeugung beruht auf seiner Schuld und kan ihm zugerechtnet werden. 
Der historische Unglaube als Denkungsart auch, aber als Mangel der ... erfoderlichen GrOnde in 
besonderen Fallen nicht." See also Logik, vol. 9, 68 footnote; KrV A 822/B 850, 856f. 
33Reflexionen zur Metaphysik, vol. 18, no. 6220, 511 : "Aller Gebrauch der [reinen] Vernunft ist 
entweder ein Erf a h r u n g s g e b r a u c h , dessen anwendung auf Erfahrung moglich ist, oder 
ein ... chi mar is c her Gebrauch derselben. Die maxime des letzteren is Wahn." 
34See Reflexionen zur Metaphysik, vol. 18, no. 6219, 510: "Wir konnen keinen andern 
angewandten Gebrauch der Vernunft, d. i. einen solchen, dabey der Gegenstand gegeben wird 
([index follows] immanenter Gebrauch.), machen als indem wir das, was wir denken , nach 
Erfahrungsgesetzen in Gedanken hervorbringen konnen." See also ibid. no. 6220, 510. 
Reflexionen zur Metaphysik, vol 18, no. 6219, 509: "Aberglaubisch zu werden: dazu haben die 
Menschen einen* natorlichen Hang; sie personificiren Naturursachen, kennen noch nicht die 
Gesetzma~igkeit der Natur, noch die wichtigkeit des Gebrauchs der Vernunft lediglich unter ... 
Voraussetzung jener Gesetzma~igkeit." Reflexionen zur Metaphysik, vol. 18, no. 6221 , 511: "Also 
ist es Einbildung ohne den Leitfaden der Vernunft, mithin unterstotzt durch scheinbare Erfahrung, 
ohne ihre ... Gesetzma~igkeit zu kennen ... (als worinn der Erfahrungsgebrauch der Vernunft 
besteht). d. i. Aberglaube, der zuerst unsichtbare Krafte oder auch Machte auf die Bahn brachte." 
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What is the experiential use of our reason? 
We can give all our concept only meaning and our judgment only reality in 
so far as they are in conformity with the principles which make experience 
possible (otherwise they are supersensible).35 
That means that "any use of reason which does not conform to the principle of 
the experiential use is delusion."36 There are those ideas which when we 
assume them allow for the experiential use of reason and those which do not: 
The kind of thinking according to ideas of which one cannot make 
experiential use ([index follows] is r a p t u r e . God, freedom and 
immortality are ideas of which one can make an experiential use. But 
secret powers, to turn nature on its head, spiritual views are ideas of 
which one cannot make experiential use precisely because they make 
experience impossible. 
The kind of thinking [according to principle] based on facts of which one 
cannot make any experiential use is s u p e r s tit ion; for example 
foreboding, significant dreams, apparitions of the deceased. 
U n b e I i e f is the principle to deny everything which cannot be 
an object of experience because there are always subjective reasons for 
35Reflexionen zur Metaphysik, vol. 18, no. 6215, 506 : 
"Was ist Erfahrungsgebrauch unserer Vernunft? 
Wir konnen allen unseren Begriffen nur Bedeutung und unseren Urtheilen nur so fern 
realitaet geben, als ... so ferne ([index follows] sie) mit den Principien einer darnach moglichen 
Erfahrung zusammen stimmen (sonst sind sie paraphysisch) ... ". See also ibid. , no. 6219, 510. 
36Reflexionen zur Metaphysik, vol. 18, no. 6220, 51 Of: "Der Erfahrungsgebrauch der Vernunft ist 
der Gebrauch der Vernunft, der .. . seine Warheit durch Darstellung ihrer (Begriffe und) 
Grundsatze in der Erfahrung beweisen kan, wenn man gleich etwas annimmt, was nicht ein 
Gegenstand der Erfahrung ist. e. g. Seele als unkorperliches Wesen oder reine Sittlichkeit. Wenn 
man dergleichen etwas auch nur annimmt, ohne es beweisen zu konnen, so ist doch selbst die 
Annehmung desselben dem Erfahrungsgebrauche der Vernunft in Ansehung der Form .. . ihrer 
Anwendung und der Grundsatze gemar.., eben so als wir Oberhaupt in Ansehung der hypothesen 
verfahren . 
Ein jeder Gebrauch der Vernunft, der nicht mit den Principien des Erfahrungsgebrauchs 
zusammenstimmt, ist Wahn; z. B. himmlische Einflor..e zu Empfinden , auf das Geisterreich Einflus 
zu haben. 
Aller Gebrauch der ... Vernunft ist entweder ein E r fa h r u n g s g e b r a u c h , dessen 
anwendung auf Erfahrung moglich ist, oder ein .. . c h i m a r i s c h e r Gebrauch derselben. Die 
maxime des letzteren ist Wahn . 
.. . Dem erstern ... entweder blor.. ein Gegenstand der Erfahrung zum Grunde gelegt oder 
auch ein Gegenstand der blor.!.en Vernunft, aber die Anwendung auf Gegenstande der Erfahrung 
nach regeln derselben. Das erste ist der physische, das Zweyte ... der ... Erfahrungsgebrauch der 
reinen Vernunft. 
Der die moglichkeit des letzten laugnet, ist unglaubig." 
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holding something as true in case the objective and sufficient [reasons] 
are lacking. The subjective reason ["Grund"] with respect to the 
supersensible is reason ["Vernunft"] which can never sufficiently satisfy 
itself by means of the sensible when it comes to theoretical and moral 
[questions].37 
God, Freedom, and Immortality are ideas which allow for the experiential use of 
reason and the same is true for the idea of the highest good which is also a 
"matter of belief' ("Giaubenssache").3B But the ideas and principles presupposed 
in rapture (the assumed ideas cannot coexist with the laws of experience) and 
superstition (laws of experience are assumed which cannot coexist with the use 
of reason) run counter to the principle of the experiential use of reason, but 
unbelief (allows only for those objects whose existence can be sufficiently proven 
by either reason or experience) denies the possibility of the experiential use of 
reason altogether.39 The first two kinds of thinking are forms of "delusion" or 
37 Reflexionen zur Metaphysik, vol 18, no. 6218, 507: "Die Denkungsart nach ldeen, von denen 
man keinen Erfahrungsgebrauch machen kann, ([index follows] ist Schwarm ere y ). Gott, 
Freyheit, Unsterblichkeit sind ldeen , von denen man einen Erfahrungsgebrauch machen kan . 
Aber Geheime Krafte, die Natur zu verkehren, Geistige Anschauungen sind ldeen, von denen 
man eben darum, weil sie Erfahrung unmoglich machen, keinen Erfahrungsgebrauch machen 
kan. 
Die Denkungsart der Grundsatze aus factis, von denen Man keinen Erfahrungsgebrauch 
machen kan , ist A b e r g I a u b e ; z. B. Ahndungen, bedeutende Traume, Erscheinungen von 
Verstorbenen . 
U n g I a u be ist der Grundsatz alles zu laugen [sic], was nicht Erfahrungsgegenstand 
seyn kan . Denn es giebt immer noch subiective GrOnde des FOrwahrhaltens, wenn es an obiectiv 
hinreichenden fehlt. Der subiective Grund aber in Ansehung des Obersinnlichen ist die sich 
durchs sinnliche niemals hinreichend gnugthuende Vernunft im theoretischen und Moralischen." 
3BLogik, vol. 9, 68 footnote. 
39Reflexionen zur Metaphysik, vol. 18, no. 6217, 506f: Der also eine Idee ([index follows] der 
Vernunft) annimmt, mit der keine Erfahrungsgesetze zusammen stimmen konnen , ist 
schwarmerisch; der ... Erfahrungsgesetze annimmt, mit denen kein Gebrauch der Vernunft 
zusammenbestehen kan , ist aberglaubisch. Der, welcher zwar die Wechselseitige 
Zusammenstimmung der Vernunft und Erfahrung in .. . der Beurtheilung ... eines obiects als 
nothwendig erkennt, aber zugleich kein anderes obiect, als dessen Existenz durch Vernunft oder 
Erfahrung hinreichend erweislich ist, einraumen will, ist unglaubig .... ". See also no. 6216, 506. 
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"mere fantasy" ("Phantasterey") 40 and all three kinds of thinking result in the 
destruction of reason: 
The belief without which it would be impossible to make experiential use 
of reason, be it the theoretical or practical [use], self-sufficient, is pure 
belief of reason. 
Without a pure belief of reason (the use of reason turns) either into 
omniscience (Pansophie) or misology, ... self-murder of reason.41 
As a result of the lack of belief of reason a person can either imagine she knows 
everything, neglecting thereby, we may add, the inherent epistemological 
limitations of reason, or can hate reason and science.42 Kant stresses in this 
quote that without the belief of reason, and that means, according to our 
analysis, if we act contrary to the maxim of the self-preservation of reason, 
reason becomes self-destructive.43 
Let me pause here and point to the connection between the undermining 
of belief of reason by the kind of thinking just discussed and the thinking of the 
self-murderer. 
4DReflexionen zur Metaphysik, vol. 18, no. 6219, 508: "Die Denkungsart einer den Grundsatzen 
des Erfahrungsgebrauch wiederstreitenden Vernunft ist der Wahn. 
*Die Phantasterey ist: 1. Schwarmerei .. . 2. Aberglaube ... ". 
41 Reflexionen zur Metaphysik, vol. 18, no. 6219, 509: 
Der Glaube, ohne welchen es unmoglich ist, selbst den Erfahrungsgebrauch der Vernunft, 
es sey im theoretischen oder practischen, ... sich selbst gnugthuend zu machen, ist ein 
reiner Vernunftglaube. 
Ohne einen reinen Vernunftglauben ([index follows] wird der Vernunftgebrauch) entweder 
Allwisserey (Pansophie) oder Misologie, [Selbstver] Selbstmord der Vernunft. 
According to the Logik, vol. 9, 26 (Hartman/Schwarz 30) a misologist is someone who "hates 
sciences and so much the more loves wisdom." Kant points out that sometimes even the person 
"who at first pursued the sciences with much diligence and fortunate results but in the end found 
not satisfaction in all their knowledge" succumbs to "the mistake of misology." 
42See also Immanuel Kants Menschenkunde, p. 227f. 
43See Sommer's similar view in SZ 97 where he states: "Selbstzerstorung der Vernunft besteht 
hier in der Konstitution von Handlungen aus kontradiktorischen Maximen." 
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In the Chapter on "Homicidium Dolosum" we not only observed that many self-
murderers, according to Kant, kill themselves because they succumb to a raptus 
which characterize the visionary ("Phantasten"), but that they might also be 
described as hypochondriacs. We saw that rapture and superstition are forms of 
"delusion," also referred to as "mere fantasy." It is, I believe, more than only a 
coincidence that Kant uses the same words for the classification of a mental 
illness and kinds of thinking which are contrary to the use of reason. The fact 
that self-murder can be the result of a raptus which characterizes the visionary 
suggests that Kant sees a connection between mental illnesses and those kinds 
of thinking which are contrary to the belief and thus the use of reason .44 With 
regard to the question of responsibility, it is of interest that, according to Versuch 
Ober die Kankheiten des Kopfes, despite the derangement or delusion of the 
visionary, understanding as well as judgment are still working properly. This 
might explain why Kant, despite his characterization of the self-murderer as in 
many cases emotionally disturbed, can still argue that self-disembodiment 
constitutes a crime, that is, an intentional violation of the morallaw.4s 
Furthermore, in the last section of the Chapter "Care for the Moral Self' 
we quoted Kant as saying that "self-murder may not be as detrimental under the 
assumption that another world does not exist, but it is then even more horrible."46 
44Reflexionen zur Metaphysik, vol. 18, no. 6219, 508: "Die Denkungsart ... einer sich von dem 
Erfahrungsgebrauche ganzlich abtrennenden Vernunft ist Phantasterey. (Grillenfangerey.) ... 
Chimare. Traumerey.)" 
45Versuch Ober die Krankheiten des Kopfes, vol. 2, 269f: "Der Abt T e r r ass o n unterscheidet 
irgendwo die von gestortem GemOthe in solche, welche aus falschen Vorstellungen richig 
schlier..en, und in diejenige, die aus richtigen Vorstellungen auf eine verkehrte Art schlief.!.en . 
Diese Eintheilung stimmt mit den vorgetragenen Satzen wohl Oberein. Bei denen von der ersteren 
Art, den Phantasten, oder VerrOckten , leidet der Verstand eigentlich nicht sondern nur das 
Vermogen, welches in der Seele die Begriffe erweckt, deren die Urtheilskraft nachher sich 
bedient, um sie zu vergleichen. Diesen Kranken kann man sehr wohl Vernunfturtheile 
entgegensetzen, wenn gleich nicht ihr Obel zu heben, dennoch wenigstens es zu mildern." 
46Reflexionen zur Moralphilosophie 166, no. 6801 . 
403 
We suggested that the denial of the immortality of the soul can be regarded as 
an indirect proof that the suicide does not have a consciousness of duty, since 
the consciousness of duty necessarily implies the postulate of the immortality of 
the soul. The analysis in this section confirms this suggestion, and the quote 
from the Logik listed below shows that moral belief is an expression of the moral 
disposition ("Gesinnung") of the person. The postulates are indeed an 
expression of the moral belief of reason which guarantees its use, that is, the 
satisfaction of its need. 
We can sum up Kant's position with regard to any kind of thinking which 
makes the use of reason impossible with his statement from the Reflexionen zur 
Anthropologie: 
There are maxims of reason, although we still lack or may even forever 
[lack] objective insights. The universal maxim is: to think that principle, 
according to which ... my reason would be deprived of its use is 
reprehensible; the objective reasons may be whatever they are. ([Deprive] 
of its theoretical or practical use.)47 
With regard to the practical use, we would assume that moral unbelief consists in 
denying the idea of the highest good and the conditions necessary to give it 
objective reality because Kant states: 
He is morally unbelieving who does not accept what indeed is impossible 
to know but is morally necessary to presuppose. A want of moral interest 
always underlies th is kind of unbelief. The stronger a man's moral 
disposition, the more firm and vivid will be his belief in everything he feels 
47Reflexionen zur Anthropo/ogie, vol. 15 I, no. 454, 186f: "Es sind Maximen der Vernunft, wenn 
gleich obiective Einsichten uns noch oder auch auf immer fehlen sollten. Die allgemeine Maxime 
ist: dasjenige Princip zu den ken , nach welchem ... meine Vernunft um ihren Gebrauch gebracht 
werden wUrde, ist verwerflich , die Obiective BeweisgrUnde mogen seyn, welche sie wollen . (Um 
ihren theoretischen oder practischen Gebrauch.)" 
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himself compelled to accept and to presuppose out of moral interest as 
practically necessary.4s 
In other words, the person who is morally unbelieving does not postulate 
freedom, and the existence of God, and the immortality of the soul. 
Healthy Reason and the Principle of Self-preservation of Reason 
The following section serves to show that the maxim of self-preservation of 
reason is the maxim of healthy reason. Furthermore, we will point out that the 
principle of self-preservation serves as a therapeutic instrument and is 
represented by the perfect duties to oneself in the "Doctrine of Virtue." The 
delusion of the self-murderer can be understood as a result of the various kinds 
of thinking which make the belief and thus the use of reason impossible, Kant's 
view of philosophical therapeutics seems to suggest that this "sickness" of 
thinking can possibly be cured if the belief and thus the use of reason can be 
restored. 
In the Reflexionen zur Anthropologie Kant makes two statements which 
are of importance for our discussion: 
48Hartman/Schwarz 77f (Logik, vol. 9, 70: "Moralisch u n g I a u b i g ist der, welcher nicht 
dasjenige annimmt, was zu wissen zwar u n m 0 g I i c h , aber vorauszusetzen, m o r a I i s c h 
not h wend i g ist. Dieser Art des Unglaubens liegt immer Mangel an moralischem Interesse 
zum Grunde. Je grO~er die moralische Gesinnung eines Menschen ist: desto fester und 
lebendiger wird auch sein Glaube sein an alles dasjenige, was er aus dem moralischen Interesse 
in praktisch nothwendiger Absicht anzunehmen und vorauszusetzen sich genOthigt fOhlt.") The 
same statement is found in Reflexionen zur Logik, vol. 16 no. 2770, 502f. The whole Reflexion 
reads: "Moralisch unglaubig ist der, der nicht dasjenige annimmt, was zu wissen zwar unmOglich, 
aber vorauszusetzen moralisch nothwendig ist. 
Der Vernunftglaube ist die Erkentnis der Nothwendigkeit einer Hypothesis .. . der Vernunft, 
ohne welche die ([index follows] schlechterdings) nothwendige practische Gesetze ganzlich 
nichtig seyn wOrden. Er ist also eine nothwendige Hypothesis der practischen Vernunft."--That 
moral disposition and belief in God are interwoven is stressed in KrV A 829/B 857. 
Maxim of he a It h y reason ([index follows] which makes laws of 
experience possible). Only that can be valid, which conforms with the 
universal rules of the use of reason .... 
Principle of reason: its self-preservation.49 
In another Reflexion he states 
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(Healthy reason). General Maxim ... of reason is, to allow only for those 
premises which make the greatest use of reason possible (natura sui 
conservatrix). so 
A similar view is presented in the Menschenkunde where Kant suggests that 
healthy understanding ("gesunde[r] Verstand") be protected against superstition 
by the "maxim of healthy reason": 
Hence, many a one says that he would not be superstitious; and yet, his 
head is filled with superstition because he lacks the maxim of healthy 
reason. This principle is the self-preservation of healthy reason--not of the 
human being but of reason--that is, I must not assume anything which 
would make the free use of reason useless. 51 
Kant distinguishes here explicitly between the self-preservation of healthy reason 
and the self-preservation of the human being. It will, however, become clear 
during our discussion that the latter is governed by the principle of the former. 
The maxim of healthy reason concedes nothing which would deprive us of the 
free use or employment of reason. The use of reason, in turn , is guaranteed if 
49Reflexionen zur Anthropologie, val. 15 II, no. 1509, 823 : "Maxime der G e sun den V e r-
n u n f t ([index follows] welche Erfahrungsgesetze moglich macht) . Nur das kan gelten, was mit 
Allgemeinen Regeln des Gebrauchs der Vernunft Obereinstimmt. ... Grundsatz der Vernunft: ihre 
Selbsterhaltung." 
50Reflexionen zur Anhropologie, val. 15 I, no. 445, 184: "(Gesunde Vernunft.) Allgemeine Maxime 
... der Vernunft ist, nur solche praemissen gelten zu lassen, welche den gr6~ten Gebrauch der 
Vernunft m6glich machen (natura sui conservatrix) . " 
51Jmmanue/ Kants Menschenkunde, p. 226: "So sagt Mancher, er sey gar nicht aberglaubisch, 
und doch ist sein Kopf vall vom Aberglauben , weil ihm die Maxime der gesunden Vernunft fehlt. 
Dieser Grundsatz ist die Selbsterhaltung der gesunden Vernunft, nicht des Menschen sondern der 
Vernunft, d. i. ich mu~ nichts annehmen, was den freien Gebrauch der Vernunft unnotz machen 
worde." 
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the use of reason according to a rule ("regelma~ig") is ensured . 52 The principle 
which ensures the self-preservation of healthy reason is, I believe, synonymous 
with the maxim of self-preservation discussed in Was hei!St: Sich im Denken 
orientiren? If this is correct, the use of reason according to a rule can be 
understood in terms of following the principle of universalizability. 
I would now like to show that the first part of the "Doctrine of Virtue," the 
part concerned with perfect duties to oneself, preserves the health of reason and 
is based on the principle of self-preservation of reason. 
We saw that according to the "Doctrine of Virtue," negative duties to 
oneself, that is, those duties which are concerned with self-preservation, ensure 
the "moral health" of the person. We discussed Kant's usage of sustine et 
abstine as the motto for the duties of omission in The Metaphysics of Morals and 
as the characterization of the "Doctrine of Virtue" in the Vorarbeiten .53 In one of 
the Reflexionen zur Medicin Kant uses the motto sustine et abstine to 
characterize what he calls a "negative doctrine of health"54 so that negative 
duties to oneself can be said to belong to the "negative doctrine of health ."55 
In the Streit der Facu/taten, Kant refers to the Stoic sustine et abstine as 
the principle of dietetics: 
52tmmanuel Kants Menschenkunde, p. 227: "Die Maxime der Vernunft erfordert also, dar.. ich 
nichts einraume, was mich meiner Vernunft berauben worde, so bald ich es annahme .. .. Zu dieser 
Maxime gehort keine speculative Vernunft, ich darf nur immee [sic] nachdenken und mich fragen : 
kannst du dich hier deiner Vernunft regelmar..ig bedienen oder nicht?" 
53See Chapter on "Ends" footnote no. 72. 
54Reflexion zur Medicin , in Reflexionen zur Anthropologie, vol. 15 II , no. 1540, 965: "Die 
T h e r a p e u t i k eingetheilt in Chirurgie und Pharmaceutic, die H y g i e i n e in diaethetic, 
N e g at i v e Gesundheitslehre (sustine et abstine) und ([index follows] Gymnasiastic) die 
p o s it i v e: (vim vita/em excerce) viribus vitalibus utere." See also Immanuel Kant's 
Menschenkunde 259f, 271 ; Reflexionen zur Anthropologie, vol. 15 I, no. 193, 71 . 
551t would , however, not be plausible to refer to the 'Doctrine of Virtue' as a whole as a negative 
doctrine of health, since it also comprises what Kant calls the positive doctrine of health, that is, 
for example, the duty to cultivate "the powers of the body," that is, "gymnastics." 
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Thus Stoicism as the principle of dietetics (sustine et abstine) does 
not only belong to p h i I o s o p h y as D o c t r i n e o f V i r t u e , but 
also [belongs to philosophy] as the r a p e ut i c s .--The latter is then 
p h i I o s o p h i c a I , if it is only the power of reason in the human being 
to be the master of his sensuous feelings by means of giving himself a 
principle, [which] determines the conduct of life. 56 
Kant makes clear that the Stoic principle of sustine et abstine is not only part of 
the "Doctrine of Virtue" but also of what he calls "philosophical therapeutics." 
Kant's characterization of philosophical therapeutics57 corresponds to his 
characterization of virtue in terms of negative duties which prohibit letting oneself 
be ruled by one's affects and passions and the positive command to bring all of 
one's capacities and inclinations under the control ("Gewalt") of reason .58 
According to our interpretation, the part of the "Doctrine of Virtue" which is 
concerned with the "moral health" of the person--the perfect duties to oneself--
can also be called "dietetics" or "philosophical therapeutics," securing the health 
of reason; and that means, in this case, securing the health of practical reason.sg 
As the author of such philosophical therapeutics Kant could very well carry the 
title of a Diaeteticus, that is , a kind of "Hippokratiker" who unlike the physician or 
the surgeon "merely directs the conduct of life."60 If Kant regards himself as a 
56Qer Streit der Facultaten in drei Abschnitten, val. 7, 1 OOf: "Der S to i cis m als Princip der 
Diatetik (sustine et abstine) gehort also nicht blor.. zur praktischen P h i I o so ph i e als 
T u g e n d I e h r e , sondern auch zu ihr als H e i I k u n d e. -- Diese ist alsdann p h i I o s o -
p h i s c h , wenn blor.. die Macht der Vernunft im Menschen, Ober seine sinnliche GefOhle durch 
einen sich selbst gegebenen Grundsatz Meister zu sein, die Lebensweise bestimmt." In Versuch 
Ober die Krankheiten des Kopfes, val. 2, 271 , Kant states: "Doch mochte ich ehrenhalber den 
Philosophen nicht gerne ausschlier..en , welcher die Diat des GemOths verordnen konnte; nur unter 
dem Beding, dar.. er hiefOr, wie fOr seine mehrste andere Beschaftigung keine Bezahlung fordere ." 
57See also Ebeling and Sommer on this point. 
sssee MS 408. 
591n light of the fact that Kant stresses the importance of "Diatetik" over "Terapeutik" (vol. 23 , 464) 
it is important that philosophical therapeutics be understood as dietetics. 
60Reflexionen zur Medicin , in Reflexionen zur Anthropologie, val. 15 II , no. 1544, 966: "Dreyerley 
Hippokratiker, den Kranken zu besorgen: 1) Ein Medicus, 2) Chirurgus, 3. [sic] Diaeteticus, der 
bios die Lebensordnung dirigirt." 
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Diaeteticus who, according to the Reflexion, represents Hippocratic medicine, he 
cannot administer any poison, that is, give any advice that wou ld lead to the 
destruction of life. 
That Kant actually compared himself to a moral"physician" shows his 
response to a letter to Maria von Herbert in 1792.61 Von Herbert's 
correspondence with Kant shows a young woman versed in Kant's philosophy 
who in her despair to end her life turns in one of her letters to Kant for advice. 52 It 
seems that Kant's letter had at least a temporary calming impact on her, 63 but 
her suicide eleven years later64 is proof that Kant was not able to convince her 
that it is not the pleasures life provides which make up its value but the good we 
61 Briefe , vol. 11 , no. 510, 332f: "Sie sehen wohl dar1 wenn Sie einen Arzt zu Rathe gezogen 
haben , Sie auf einen solchen trafen der wie man sieht kein schmeichler ist der nicht durch 
Schmeicheleyen hinhalt ... ".--1 have not used "[sic]" to indicate the uncommon spelling in this as 
well as in the following quotes from the correspondence. 
62Briefe, vol. 11 , no. 478, 273: 
Gro~er Kant. 
Zur dir rufe ich wie ein glaubiger zu seinem Gott um Hilfe, um Trost, oder um Bescheid 
zum Tode, hinlanglich waren mir deine Gronde in deinen Werken vor das kOnftige seyn, daher 
meine Zuflucht zu dir, nur vor dieses Ieben fand ich nichts, gar nichts, was mir mein verlohrnes 
Gut ersezen konnt, den ich liebte einen gegenstand der in meiner Anscheuung alles in sich faste 
... ". According to Johann Benjamin Erhard's Letter to Kant on January 17, 1793 (Briefe , vol. 11 , 
no. 557, 408) this "gegenstand" was a man she was in love with , who, it seems, showed no 
understanding after she told him that a previous lover had abused her trust: "Eine idealische Liebe 
zu realisiren hat sie sich zuerst einen Menschen Obergeben, der ihr Vertrauen mir1brauchte, und 
wiederum einer solchen Liebe zu Gefallen hat sie die~ einem 2ten Liebhaber gestanden." 
63Von Herbert's letter of January 1793 (Briefe, vol.11, no. 554, 400) seems to suggest that she at 
least enjoyed hearing from Kant: "Da~ ich so lange saumte, ihnen von jenen VergnOgen was zu 
sagen, welches mir ihr schreiben verursachte, ist, weil ich ihre Zeit fOr zu kostbar schaze, dar1 ich 
mir nur dan getrau, ihnen eine zu entwenden, wenn sie nicht einzig vor meine Lust, sondern auch 
zugleich zur Erleichterung meines Herzens dienen kann , welche Sie mir schon einst verschaften , 
als ich im gro~ten affect meines Gemoths, bey ihnen Hillfe suchte, Sie ertheilten mir selbe meinen 
Gemoth so angemessen, dar1 ich sowohl durch ihr Gote, als durch ihre Genaue Kentnos des 
Menschlichen Herzens aufgemuntert, mich nicht scheue ihnen den fernern Ganng meiner Seele 
zu schildern." 
64Anmerkungen und Register, vol. 13, 303: "Am 23. Mai 1803 suchte sie nach volliger Ordnung 
ihrer Verhaltnisse und nach einer von ihr in ihrem Hause veranstalteten Festlichkeit in den Fluten 
der Drau den Tod." 
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can do; and that it is because of the moral potential of our life that we have to 
respect it and preserve it.65 
In 1793 Kant mails Maria von Herbert's letters to Elisabeth Motherby, the 
oldest daughter of his close friend Robert Motherby.ss The reason why the 
correspondence between Maria von Herbert and Kant as well as Kant's letter to 
Ms. Motherby is of interest for us is because it suggests that von Herbert's 
contemplation of suicide is contrary to the belief of reason understood as healthy 
reason. In his letter to Elizabeth Motherby, Kant refers to von Herbert as "the 
little visionary" ("kleine Schwarmerin") .67 We saw that rapture ("Schwarmerey") is 
a sub-category of "mere fantasy" and qualifies as derangement or delusion 
("Wahn"). This kind of thinking makes use of ideas which do not allow for the 
experiential use of reason. In von Herbert's case it is the idea of a continuous 
self-reproach which Kant detects in her letter. He points out to her that 
continuously reproaching oneself for something one has done despite the fact 
that one has changed one's attitude "is a fantastical opinion of deserved self-
torment which cannot be counted as part of moral responsibility ."68 Continuous 
self-reproach makes us unfit for life, and that means for Kant unfit for leading a 
65Briefe, vol. 11 , no. 510, 334: " ... ein UngiOck dergleichen uns im Leben mancherley aufstor..t 
und wobey man sich mit Gelassenheit finden mur!. da Oberhaupt der Werth des letzteren so fern 
es in Dem besteht was wir Gutes genier!.en konnen von Menschen Oberhaupt viel zu hoch 
angeschlagen wird sofern es aber nach dem gesch~tzt wird was wir Gutes thun konnen der 
hochsten Achtung und Sorgfalt es zu erhalten und frohlich zu guten Zwecken zu gebrauchen 
wOrdig ist." 
66See Anmerkungen und Register, vol. 13, 659f. 
67 Briefe , vol. 11 , Letter 559, 411f. 
68Vol. 11, Letter 510, 333f: "Aber Ober jener Reue zu brOten und nachdem man schon eine 
andere Denkungsart eingeschlagen ist sich durch die fordaurende Vorworfe wegen vormaliger 
nicht mehr herzustellender fOr das Leben unnotze zu machen worde (vorausgesetzt dar!. man 
seiner Besserung versichert ist) eine phantastische Meynung von verdienstlicher Selbstpeinigung 
seyn die so wie manche vorgebliche Religionsmittel die in der Gunstbewerbung bey hOheren 
M~chten bestehen soli , ohne dal1 man eben nothig habe ein besserer Mensch zu seyn , zur 
moralischen Zurechnung gar nicht gez~hlt werden mossen." 
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moral life and doing good.69 In short, it makes the experiential use of practical 
reason impossible. 
Given that Kant explicitly states in Was heil3t: Sich im Denken orientiren? 
that the adherence to the principle of universalizability which represents the 
maxim of the self-preservation of reason makes "superstition and rapture vanish 
forthwith," we can draw two conclusions from the correspondence between von 
Herbert and Kant: first, Kant would argue that Maria von Herbert does not 
adhere to the maxim of self-preservation of reason. In other words, the 
correspondence indicates that there is a connection between the kind of thinking 
which is contrary to the principle of self-preservation because it makes belief of 
reason impossible and destructive behavior. This in turn seems to suggest that 
the adherence to the principle of self-preservation of reason serves not only the 
preservation of reason but at the same time the preservation of the moral 
existence of the human beingJo 
69Kant does, however, not mean to suggest that one should forget about a wrong action , but that, 
instead of brooding upon it, one should store the memory in one's conscience in order to prevent 
making the same mistake in the future. 
70For a different approach to the correspondence between von Herbert and Kant see Rae 
Langton's "Duty and Desolation," Philosophy 67 (1992): 481-505; thanks go to Dr. Michael 
Seidler who pointed this article out to me.--Langton uses this correspondence to critically discuss 
Kant's view on lying and friendship, but also touches on the subject of self-murder. At this time, I 
would like to respond only to Langton's interpretation of Kant's characterization of von Herbert as 
"kleine Schwarmerin," since I plan to reserve my other points of criticism regarding her 
interpretation of the role of inclinations in Kant's Moral Philosophy and her interpretation of 
passions for a later article. 
Referring to Kant's letter to Elizabeth Motherby, Langton writes on page 500: "But now? 
Herbert is die kleine Schwarmerin, the ecstatical girl, suffering a 'curious mental derangement', 
lost in the 'wanderings of a sublimated fantasy', who doesn't think, especially about important 
things like dating letters . ... Herbert, now deranged, is no longer guilty . She is merely unfortunate. 
She is not responsible for what she does. She is the pitiful product of a poor upbringing. She is an 
item in the natural order, a ship wrecked on a reef. She is a thing ."--Our discussion of Kant's 
concept of rapture ("Schwarmerei") shows that a person who succumbs to it is, contrary to 
Langton's interpretation, responsible for her action. Because of this, Kant cannot and does not 
deny von Herbert the status as a person and Langton is mistaken in assuming that Kant regards 
her as a thing . Furthermore, our analysis shows that far from being a chauvinistic description of 
von Herbert [p. 499: "She is at the mercy (aren't all women?) of irrational passions."], the 
Conclusion 
The findings of this chapter suggest that the acceptance of reason as the 
ultimate cornerstone of truth manifests itself as belief of reason 
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("Vernunftglaube"). Without belief of reason neither the theoretical nor the 
practical use of reason is possible. The principle which secures the theoretical as 
well as the practical use of reason is the principle of self-preservation of reason . 
This principle is described as the principle of universalizability to whose test we 
must subject all ideas we intend to adopt as guides or reasons for our thoughts 
and actions. The principle is reason's own way to allow for the disciplined 
satisfaction of its need to strive for the unconditioned and realize systematic 
unity. The principle protects reason from adopting ideas which do not allow for 
the use of reason and thus lead to its destruction.71 One of reason's essential 
functions is therefore to set limits or to restrict freedom, and it does so by 
following the principle of self-preservation. The function of this principle is 
therefore an inherent negative one. 
If it is true that the belief in reason as the last corner-stone of truth 
manifests itself in the belief of reason governed by the principle of self-
preservation of (healthy) reason which in turn allows for the theoretical and 
practical use of reason, it can be argued that what unites theoretical and 
practical reason is the principle of self-preservation of reason . Both theoretical 
and practical reason can then be said to rest on the principle of self-preservation 
classification "kleine Schwarmerin" indicates that she adheres to ideas which do not allow for the 
experiential use of reason , and hence, lead to self-destruction [For male visionaries see for 
example vol. 2, 267]. Sadly, Kant's analysis was confirmed by von Herbert's suicide. 
71 In this context it should be mentioned that the theme of the maintenance of "use" ("Gebrauch") 
be it that of reason, freedom, or the empirical will runs like a Leitmotiv through Kant's discussion of 
the prohibition of self-murder. See, for example, the Chapter on "Care for the Moral Self' footnotes 
no. 46, 54. 
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of reason, that is, the principle of universalizability. In the case of nature as well 
as freedom the adherence to the principle of universalizability or adherence to 
the law secures the very possibility of nature and freedom. Both nature as well 
as freedom are governed by the principle of universalizability. The principle of 
self-preservation does not only secure the possibility of nature and freedom thus 
counteracting lawlessness in thinking as well as acting which threatens the 
existence of the system, but it is also the guarantor of the formal unity of 
theoretical and practical reason. 
With regard to the particular implications of this principle for the practical 
use of reason, the following observations can be made: 
We saw that the satisfaction of reason's need is of utmost importance for 
the practical use of reason. Without moral belief or faith, morality itself becomes 
impossible. This does not mean that the principle of self-preservation of reason 
is identical with moral belief, but it means that without it moral belief and hence 
morality is impossible. 
There seems to be a connection between the principle of self-preservation 
of reason and the categorical imperative; a connection which has also been 
observed by Blumenberg and Sommer.72 Kant refers to the test of 
universalizability as the maxim of self-preservation of reason. Because both the 
principle of self-preservation of reason as well as the general formulation of the 
721n his Die Legitimitat der Neuzeit (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1966), p. 430, in the 
part "Der Prozer.. der theoretischen Neugierde" Hans Blumenberg states: "Kant hat in der letzten 
Anmerkung des Aufsatzes von 1786 Was heif3t: sich im Denken orientieren? die 'Maxime der 
Selbsterhaltung der Vernunft' formuliert, und zwar unter Anwendung der logischen Strukture des 
kategorischen lmperativs." For Sommer's view see footnote 57 in the Chapter on "Self-
Preservation: Overview and Summary." I am not aware that Ebeling draws an explicit connection 
between the principle of self-preservation of reason and the categorical imperative, but he points 
out that the categorical imperative is a unique principle of self-perfection and implies two so-called 
"derived principles of preservation ;" see SeS 17. 
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categorical imperative use universalizability as the criterion to test either ideas 
and maxims, it seems that the categorical imperative expresses or has a similar 
function as the maxim of the self-preservation of reason. I say "express" because 
we showed that the principle of self-preservation of reason is a general principle 
which governs both the theoretical as well as the practical use of reason so that 
the categorical imperative can be understood as the manifestation of this 
principle which governs the practical use of reason.73 
According to the Groundwork every maxim is characterized by three 
aspects which correspond to the three formula of the categorical imperative: its 
form, its matter, and its determining ground.74 With regard to the maxim of self-
preservation of reason we can say that it, too , has a form which consists in its 
universality. It has a matter which consists in the ideas we choose, and since 
Kant characterizes the determining ground in the Groundwork with the following 
words: "All maxims as proceeding from our own making of law ought to 
harmonize with a possible kingdom of ends as a kingdom of nature," the 
principle of self-preservation of reason ought to be in harmony with a possible 
kingdom of end understood as a kingdom of nature. These three aspects allow 
for the use of reason. To explain, the ideas which allow for a system of ends are 
either theoretical or practical . We saw that in the first case, we speak of 
teleology and use the idea of nature as a kingdom of ends "to explain what 
exists." In the second case, however, we speak of ethics and use the idea of a 
kingdom of ends "to bring into existence what does not exist but can be made 
actual by our conduct." In both cases the ideas of freedom, immortality, and God 
73What has, however, to be clarified is how the status of the principle of self-preservation of 
reason as a subjective principle can be reconciled with the status of the categorical imperative as 
an objective principle. 
74Paton 1 03f (GMS 436). 
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satisfy the need of reason with regard to its theoretical or practical use, and in 
both cases the use of reason is secured by the adherence to the principle of self-
preservation of reason. Even though it is only with regard to the practical use of 
reason that this belief becomes moral belief, the principle of self-preservation of 
reason remains, nevertheless, the foundation for the moral belief of reason 
according to which we postulate the ideas of God, freedom and immortality. The 
postulates represent those ideas which have passed the test of the maxim of 
self-preservation successfully because they allow for the practical use of reason. 
I would now like to return to the importance of the negative methodJ5 In 
the "Doctrine of Virtue" Kant states that negative duties to oneself, that is those 
duties which are concerned with self-preservation, concern the "moral health ." 
Our discussion suggests a correlation between preservation and health because 
the belief of reason which is based on the principle of self-preservation of reason 
is an expression of healthy reason. Preservation as well as health are essentially 
understood in terms of self-limitation. Because Kant characterizes the duties of 
omission in The Metaphysics of Morals by sustine et abstine and identifies the 
"Doctrine of Virtue" in the Vorarbeiten with this motto, the first part of the 
"Doctrine of Virtue" concerned with the negative duties to oneself can be said to 
represent the negative doctrine of health ruled by the command "abstine"; 
75The importance of the negative approach is also described in one of the Reflexionen zur 
Anthropologie, vol. 151, no. 191, 70f: 
Negative Erkentnisse, um lrrthOmer abzuhalten, und positive, um die Erkentnis zu 
erweitern zugleich . 
([index follows] disciplin: negative Unterweisung .) 
([index follows] negative Lehren der Gesundheit.) 
Ein jedes Verfahren ist negativ, wodurch ein gewisser Grund abgehalten wird. 
Durch negative Mittel giOcklich zu seyn. Entbehren. sustine, abstine. 
negativ tugendhaft zu seyn. negativ stolz. negativ erziehen. negativ ist die 
Weisheit des Menschen 
([index follows] Negatives Vermogen. Sparsamkeit.) 
See also the next two Reflexionen no. 192 and 193. 
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whereas the second part represents the positive doctrine of health concerned 
with the perfection of the human being ruled be the command "sustine." I 
suggested that the method or principle which we follow in order to secure our 
moral health can be called "negative doctrine of health" or "philosophical 
therapeutics." Both enlightenment, more specifically "the merely negative 
enlightenment," as well as the negative doctrine of health seem to be governed 
by the principle of self-preservation of reasonJ6 
We stressed that the negative duties require the restriction of freedom and 
are imposed either in terms of the right of humanity, the end of humanity, or 
objective ends. In this context the connection between the essential ends of 
humanity and the negative doctrine of health should be pointed out. The Chapter 
on "Ends" showed that the essential ends of humanity are negative ends, 
secured by the principle to subject one's inclinations to the universal law. This 
principle secures the most extensive use of human freedom and hence human 
dignity. By analogy, the question whether or not an idea or rule can serve as a 
76KU 294 footnote: "Man sieht bald , dar.. Aufklarung zwar in Thesi Ieicht, in Hypothesi aber eine 
schwere und Iangsam auszufOhrende Sache sei: weil mit seiner Vernunft nicht passiv , sondern 
jederzeit sich selbst gesetzgebend zu sein zwar etwas ganz Leichtes fOr den Menschen ist, der 
nur seinem wesentlichen Zwecke angemessen sein will und das, was Ober seinen Verstand ist, 
nicht zu wissen verlangt; aber da die Bestrebung zum letzteren kaum zu verhOten ist, und es an 
andern , welche diese Wir..begierde befriedigen zu k6nnen mit vieler Zuversicht versprechen , nie 
fehlen wird: so mur.. das blor.. Negative (welches die eigentliche Aufklarung ausmacht) in der 
Denkungsart (zumal der 6ffentlichen) zu erhalten oder herzustellen sehr schwer sein ."--lf it could 
be shown that the essential ends of the human being with regard to the limitation of knowledge 
correspond to the essential ends of humanity discussed in the Chapter on "Ends" the following 
connection could be drawn: Since the principle of the self-preservation of reason is the principle of 
enlightenment, and since enlightenment protects the essential ends of the human being, the 
perfect duties to oneself which we showed to protect the essential ends of humanity are not only 
governed by the same principle but seem to express the concept of enlightenment in the realm of 
practical philosophy.--My interpretation can be supported by Sommer's analysis of the function of 
the Critique for the self-preservation of reason in SV 240: "Kritik ist Theorie und Therapie, 
emphatisch: Reflexion und Emanzipation . -- Freil ich ist sie kein einmaliger Akt, sondern etwas, 
das dauernd oder doch immer wieder zu vollziehen ist, weil die natorliche Dialektik stets dazu 
tendiert, in die Abhangigkeit von verselbstandigten Produkten hineinzutreiben." 
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universal principle is determined by whether or not it allows for reason's end or 
function , that is, for its need for systematic unity or totality. Both the universal law 
as well as the principle of self-preservation of reason secure the use of either 
one's capacities, freedom, or reason itself and in doing so protect the dignity of 
the human being. It is, therefore, the restriction of the use--not the development 
of capacities to realize various ends--which is the function of the principle of self-
preservation of reason. Since it is the perfect duties to oneself discussed either 
under the heading of the right of humanity or perfect duties of virtue which 
command the restriction of freedom, they can be said to represent the principle 
of self-preservation of reason in the realm of practical philosophy. 
Lastly, I would like to take up the distinction between "use" ("Gebrauch") 
and capacity ("Vermogen") in order to shed some light on the question of how 
self-preservation of reason is related to self-perfection and whether it even 
makes sense to speak of the self-perfection of reason. In the Chapter on "Ends" 
we pointed out that Kant distinguishes between the term "perfection" as it is used 
in transcendental philosophy where it refers to the "totality of the manifold which 
taken together, constitutes a thing" and in the teleological sense as "the harmony 
of a thing 's properties with an end." Our analysis of Was heifSt: Sich im Denken 
orientiren? has shown that the only way to satisfy the need of reason for ideas 
which secure its use is to subject those ideas to the test of universalizability. In a 
sense the principle of self-preservation represents the principle which secures 
perfection in the teleological sense, namely, that the ideas (the end of reason) 
are in harmony with its properties (reason's need to strive for totality). In other 
words, this principle allows for the use of reason. 
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If this is true, what are the implications for human self-preservation? Can the 
categorical imperative which expresses the principle of self-preservation of 
reason at the same time be understood as the principle which secures 
perfection? And what is the function of the perfect duties to oneself as opposed 
to the imperfect duties to oneself? Does it mean that if we satisfy the need of 
reason and follow the principle of self-preservation of reason we not only 
preserve our moral selves, that is, the dignity of humanity, but at the same time 
perfect ourselves? 
In the next chapter, we will use the trustee-relationship between the homo 
noumenon and the homo phaenomenon to illustrate that moral self-preservation 
is directed towards self-perfection. 
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CHAPTER X 
TRUSTEE-RELATIONSHIP 
We saw that thinking for oneself means accepting reason as the last cornerstone 
of truth and adopting the maxim of self-preservation of reason. This maxim 
governs not only the theoretical but also the practical use of reason. Belief in 
reason as the cornerstone of truth , I argued , entails that we adopt the belief of 
reason which is expressed in the principle of self-preservation of reason. With 
regard to the practical use of reason it means that we not only adopt the principle 
of self-preservation of reason but also moral belief which is based on the latter. 
I will show that the trustee-relationship between the homo noumenon and 
the homo phaenomenon found in The Metaphysics of Morals is an expression of 
the belief in reason as the cornerstone of truth and entails that we believe in 
reason and do not violate the principle of self-preservation. With regard to the 
practical use of reason that means that we must posses moral belief or faith . To 
put it differently, I will show that entrusting the homo phaenomenon to the homo 
noumenon means to entrust life to practical reason and to subject oneself to the 
moral law and postulate the existence of God, the immortality of the soul , and 
freedom. It is an expression of the belief in practical reason and its laws--a belief 
which enables us to bridge the gap between nature and morality or freedom and 
which serves to preserve reason. The belief in reason finds its expression in the 
principle that freedom cannot be used to destroy the moral subject. According to 
this interpretation, the prohibition of self-murder and of lying are the result of the 
belief in and of reason and secure the preservation of reason . 
419 
Before we turn to the discussion of the particular trustee-relationship between 
the homo noumenon and the homo phaenomenon, I would like to make some 
very general observations with regard to trusteeship and belief which take my 
own as well as Kant's view into account. 
Trust and Belief 
We only speak of "entrusting" someone or something to someone else, if who or 
what we entrust is of great value to us. The reason why we entrust the entrusted 
to the trustee is because we believe, for whatever reasons, that this is the best 
way to protect what we care about. We expect the person to whom we entrust 
ourselves, someone else, or something else to act responsibly and treat the 
entrusted with care. In short, we must be able to trust the person who will look 
after whatever we entrust to her or him, and we only trust another person if we 
believe that he or she will not only not abuse the entrusted but will do what is 
best for it. To put it differently, our belief that the other person is willing and 
capable to fulfill our expectations with regard to the trustee-relationship is the 
basis for trust and the trustee-relationship . Furthermore, trust or the trustee-
relationship allows us to break down barriers. For example, it is the almightiness 
and goodness of God, the integrity of a particular priest, friend , or physician 
which allows us to feel safe even though we confess our sins to God or the 
priest, confide intimate thoughts and feelings to our friends, or expose our bodies 
during a medical examination. It seems that the ability and the desire to trust is 
an essential characteristic of human nature. Trust based on belief allows us to 
transcend not only the confinements caused by human individuality, differences 
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in knowledge, social roles and status, but also the gulf between the human and 
the divine, and, I will argue, the gulf between nature and freedom. 
This somewhat incomplete and superficial attempt to characterize the 
trustee-relationship suggests that if we cannot trust others (or ourselves) either 
because we lost the ability to trust or because others turn out not to be 
trustworthy, the condition for transcendence is missing, and we as individuals 
and as a society are deprived of or hampered in the pursuit of all those 
relationships which are based on trust.1 In this sense, human trust is analogous 
to the belief in reason as the last cornerstone of truth wh ich finds its expression 
in the belief and thus the use of reason. 
Kant's own general characterization of the trustee-relationship can be 
reconstructed with reference to the Logik and the Critique of Judgment. After a 
lengthy footnote regarding the epistemological status of belief in general and of 
moral belief for the determination of the empirical will in particular, Kant offers a 
description of the relationship between practical reason and the human being in 
terms of trust and belief : 
Fides is actually fidelity in pacto, or subjective trust in one another, that 
one will keep his promise to the other--good faith [Instead of "good faith" 
the German text states : "fidelity and faith"]. This means faithfulness when 
the pactum has been made, and faith when it is to be concluded. 
By analogy, practical reason is, as it were, the promisor, man, the 
promisee; the expected good from the deed, the promissum.2 
11t seems very difficult if not impossible to point to a human relationship in which trust does not 
play a role. 
2Hartman/Schwarz 77 footnote (Logik, vol. 9, 69 footnote: "Fides ist eigentlich Treue im pacta 
oder subjectives Zutrauen zu einander, dar.. einer dem Andern sein Versprechen halten werde, 
Treue und Glauben . Das erste, wenn das pactum gemacht ist, das zweite, wenn manes 
schlier..en soil. 
Nach der Analogie ist die praktische Vernunft gleichsam der P r o m i t t e n t , der 
Mensch der P r o m i s sa r i u s , das erwartete Gute aus der That das P r o m i s s u m ."--For 
"Promittent" see also MS 284. 
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Practical reason, Kant states in this quote, promises to the human being who is 
the promisee a "good from the deed." The promissum is characterized in terms 
of two aspects: "the good" and "the deed." Kant also points out that in order to 
enter a "contract," it is necessary for both parties to believe that each will honor 
its promise. That it is a mutual promising and not only the promise made by 
reason is lost in the English translation's use of "promisor" and "promisee" for 
Kant's "Promittent" and "Promissarius." I found the latter medieval form only in 
Du Gange, according to which John of Salisbury uses it in his Policraticus3 with 
the meaning "Qui facile promittit" ("He who promises easily "). 4 Accordingly, man 
is not only the one to whom something is promised ("the promisee") but is 
himself as "promisor." Both practical reason as well as the human being promise 
to honor the contract. The question is what do they promise each other? 
Since this quote ends a lengthy footnote on belief as the practically 
necessary assumption of the possibility of the highest good, we can safely 
conclude that what practical reason promises to the human being is the highest 
good and that the human being as moral subject necessarily believes in the 
possibility of the highest good in the world. Furthermore, since it is up to the 
human being to realize the highest good, the Promissarius promises to the 
Prommittent to realize the Promissum or the condition on which the promissum 
3Chapter eleven of Book Three of John of Salisbury's Policraticus is entitled Giver of Gifts and 
Those Who Promise; Promising Not Conducive to Virtue (see Frivolities of Courties and 
Footprints of Philosphers. Being a Translation of the First, Second, and Third Books and 
Selections from the Seventh and Eights Books of the Policracticus of John of Salisbury, trans. 
Joseph B. Pike (Minneapolis: The University of Minnesota Press, 1938), p. 186). The Latin , 
according to Clemens C. I. Webb's edition, /oannis Saresberiensis Episcopi Carnotensis 
Policratici Sive De Nugis Curia/ium Et Vestigiis Philosophorum, Libri VIII (Oxonii: E Typographeo 
Clarendoniano: MCMIX [1909]), p. 497 reads: De munuscu/ariis et promissariis, et quod 
promittere non expediat ad virtutem. 
4Du Gange, Glossarium mediae et intimae Latinitatis, "s.v. "Promissarius." 
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will be granted. In short, reason promises the highest good and the human being 
promises to act in such a way that the highest good can be realized. 
Another, yet, similar approach to belief in terms of trust is given in the 
Third Critique: 
It [that is, "belief'] is a trust in the promise of the moral law; [not however 
such as is contained in it, but such as I put into it and that on morally 
adequate grounds (second edition) .] For a final purpose cannot be 
commanded by any law of reason without this latter at the same time 
promising , however uncertainly, its attainableness, and thus justifying our 
belief in the special conditions under which alone our reason can think it 
as attainable. The word fides expresses this , .. .. s 
The human being's trust that practical reason will keep its promise becomes in 
this quote the human being's trust in the promise of the moral law. But Kant 
points out that the attainability of the promise is not contained in the moral law 
itself but projected onto it by the human being . In other words , the promise of the 
moral law to the human being that the fulfillment of duty will translate in direct 
proportion into happiness, only makes sense for the human being if it is assumed 
that the highest good can be realized . The promise that the highest good can be 
attained or realized is thus a promise which the human being projects onto the 
moral law. The belief in the attainability of the highest good is the assumption of 
those conditions necessary for its possibility (the postulates). Kant goes so far as 
to call the subjective necessity to assume the possible reality of the highest good 
in order to allow for the determination of the will ("Willensbestimmung") the 
ssernard 324 footnote. The second pair of square brackets are Bernard's. (KU 4 71 : "Er ist ein 
Vertrauen auf die Verheir..ung des moralischen Gesetzes; aber nicht als eine seiche, die in 
demselben enthalten ist, sondern die ich hineinlege und zwar aus moralisch hinreichendem 
Grunde. Denn ein Endzweck kann durch kein Gesetz der Vernunft geboten sein , ohne dar.. diese 
zugleich die Erreichbarkeit desselben, wenn gleich ungewir.., verspreche und hiemit auch das 
Forwahrhalten der einzigen Bedingungen berechtigte, unter denen unsere Vernunft sich diese 
allein denken kann . Das Wort Fides drOckt dieses auch schon aus; ... ". Kant continues by 
pointing to the Christian origin of the word fides . 
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"casus extraordinarius, without which practical reason cannot preserve itself in 
respect of its necessary end. "6 But Kant also makes clear that this belief is 
necessary with regard to the determination of the empirical will, but not with 
regard to the action itself. 
This belief is the necessity of adopting the objective reality of a concept 
(of the highest good), i.e. the possibility of its object as an a priori 
necessary object of [the faculty of] choice. If we merely look to action, we 
do not need this belief. If, however, we want to expand ourselves through 
action to the possession of the end thereby possible, we must adopt this 
end as being possible throughout. I therefore can only say: I find myself 
compelled, through my end according to laws of freedom, to adopt a 
highest good in the world as possible, but I cannot compel anyone else by 
reasons [to share this belief] (belief is free)J 
Kant makes a similar point in the Third Critique where he stresses: 
The final purpose which the moral law enjoins upon us to further is not the 
ground of duty, since this lies in the moral law, which, as formal practical 
principle, leads categorically, independently of the objects of the faculty of 
desire (the material of the will) and consequently of any purpose 
whatever. This formal characteristic of my actions (their subordination 
under the principle of universal validity), wherein alone consists their inner 
moral worth, is quite in our power; and I can quite well abstract from the 
possibility or the unattainableness of purposes which I am obliged to 
promote in conformity with that law (because in them consists only the 
external worth of my actions), as something which is never completely in 
my power, in order only to look to that which is of my doing. But then the 
design of promoting the final purpose of all rational beings (happiness so 
6Hartman/Schwarz 76 footnote (Logik, vol. 9, 68 footnote: "Dies ist der casus extraordinarius, 
ohne welchen die praktische Vernunft sich nicht in Ansehung ihres nothwendigen Zwecks 
erhalten kann, .. . ".) For purposes of clarity, I have changed the English translation and have 
translated "sich .. . erhalten" with "preserve itself' instead of "maintain" itself. 
7Hartman/Schwarz 76 footnote (Logik, vol. 9, 69 footnote: "Dieser Glaube ist die Nothwendigkeit, 
die objective Realitt3t eines Begriffs (vom hochsten Gut) d. i. die Moglichkeit seines 
Gegenstandes, als a priori nothwendigen Objects der WillkOr anzunehmen. Wenn wir blor.. auf 
Handlungen sehen, so haben wir diesen Glauben nicht nothig. Wollen wir aber durch Handlungen 
uns zum Besitz des dadurch moglichen Zwecks erweitern : so mossen wir annehmen, dar.. dieser 
durchaus moglich sei. lch kann also nur sagen: I c h sehe mich durch meinen Zweck nach 
Gesetzen der Freiheit genothigt, ein hOchstes Gut in der Welt als moglich anzunehmen, aber ich 
k a n n k e i n e n An de r n d u r c h G r 0 n d e nothigen (der Glaube ist frei) ." 
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far as it is possible for it to be accordant with duty) is even yet prescribed 
by the law of duty. a 
According to this quote, it is in our power to act in such a way that our actions 
satisfy the principle of universal validity ("das Princip der AllgemeingOitigkeit"), 
and it is the satisfaction of this principle which gives our actions a moral worth. 
But the moral law also commands us to strive for the final end or highest good. 
However, Kant makes clear in the body of the text that neither our physical 
capacity nor nature warrants the assumption that the highest good can be 
attained. It seems, therefore, an "ungrounded and vain, though well-meant, 
expectation" to assume that nature could guarantee that good conduct will be 
reciprocated by happiness. If speculative reason could have complete certainty 
that the highest good could not be attained "it would regard the moral law itself 
as the mere deception of our reason in a practical aspect."9 In other words, if we 
were to know that the highest good could not be realized, the moral law itself 
would become a farce.--Luckily, this knowledge is impossible. 
Because it is our duty to promote the highest good of all rational beings it 
must be possible to realize the highest good. The choice is therefore either not to 
believe in reason and assume that reason commands us to pursue a 
Bsernard 323 footnote (KU 471 footnote: "Der Endzweck, den das moralische Gesetz zu 
befordern auferlegt, ist nicht der Grund der Pflicht; denn dieser liegt im moralischen Gesetze, 
welches als formales praktisches Princip kategorisch leitet, unangesehen der Objecte des 
Begehrungsvermogens (der Materie des Wollens), mithin irgend eines Zwecks. Diese formale 
Beschaffenheit meiner Handlungen (Unterordnung derselben unter das Princip der 
Allgmeingoltigkeit) , worin allein ihr innerer moralischer Werth besteht, ist g~nzlich in unserer 
Gewalt; und ich kann von der Moglichkeit, oder UnausfOhrbarkeit der Zwecke, dir mir jenem 
Gesetzt gem~~ zu befordern obliegen, gar wahl abstrahiren (weil in ihnen nur der ~u~ere Werth 
meiner Handlungen besteht) , als von etwas, welches nie vollig in meiner Gewalt ist, urn nur auf 
das zu sehen, was meines Thuns ist. Allein die Absicht, den Endzweck aller vernOnftigen Wesen 
(GIOckseligkeit, so weit sie einstimmig mit der Pflicht moglich ist) zu befordern, ist doch eben 
durch das Gesetz der Pflicht auferlegt.") 
9Bernard 323 footnote (KU 471 footnote: " ... und, wenn sie von diesem Urtheile vollige Gewi~heit 
haben konnte, das moralische Gesetz selbst als blo~e T~uschung unserer Vernunft in praktischer 
ROcksicht ansehen.") 
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"chimera"10--which as was shown leads to the "self-murder of reason"--or to 
assume those conditions (the postulates) which allow for the possibility and thus 
the attainability of the final purpose; one is then justified in trusting in the promise 
of the moral law or--as I will argue--to entrust oneself to it. Moral belief arises 
then out of the discrepancy between the actual (natural) ability of the human 
being and the claim made upon the human being by the moral law.11 
In closing this section let me make the following observations: first, 
according to the previous quote, the principle of universal validity determines the 
morality of action. In light of the findings in the previous chapter this means that it 
is the principle of the self-preservation of reason, a formal and subjective 
principle, which determines the moral worth of actions. 
Second, the fact that practical reason has to postulate the existence of 
God, immortality of the soul, and freedom in order to avoid self-contradiction can 
be interpreted as a result of the application of the principle of self-preservation of 
reason. The latter principle does, therefore, also establish the possibility of the 
highest good. This does not mean as Sommer seems to suggest that reason is 
only concerned with the preservation of mere existence, a position rightly 
criticized by Ebeling, but it means that the principle which makes human self-
10See KU 472: "Ein dogmatischer U n g I a u be kann aber mit einer in der Denkungsart 
herrschenden sittlichen Maxime nicht zusammen bestehen (denn einem Zwecke, der fOr nichts 
als Hirngespinst erkannt wird , nachzugehen, kann die Vernunft nicht gebieten); .. . ". 
11 Bernard 323f footnote: "But since the speculative reason fully convinces itself that the latter can 
never take place, but that on the other hand those ideas whose object lies outside nature can be 
thought without contradiction , it must for its own practical law and the problem prescribed thereby, 
and therefore in a moral aspect, recognize those ideas as real in order not to come into 
contradiction with itself." (KU 471 footnote: "Da aber die speculative Vernunft sich vollig 
Oberzeugt, dar.. das letztere nie geschehen kann , dagegen aber jene ldeen, deren Gegenstand 
Ober die Natur hinaus liegt, ohne Widerspruch gedacht werden konnen: so wird sie fOr ihr eigenes 
praktisches Gesetz und die dadurch auferlegte Aufgabe, also in moralischer ROcksicht, jene ldeen 
als real anerkennen mossen, um nicht mit sich selbst in Widerspuch zu kommen.") 
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preservation possible, the principle of self-preservation of reason , is at the same 
time the principle which makes human self-perfection possible. 
Third , it seems that moral belief or faith can be regarded as the differentia 
specifica between the "Doctrine of Right" and the "Doctrine of Virtue." Both 
doctrines satisfy the principle of self-preservation of reason or the principle of 
universalizability; but it is only in the "Doctrine of Virtue" that moral belief is 
necessary. Yet even then moral belief is based on the principle of self-
preservation of reason. 
The Trustee-relationship between the Homo Noumenon and the 
Homo Phaenomenon 
According to our analysis in the previous sections, trust in the promise of reason 
or the moral law is an expression of moral belief. We saw that belief of reason in 
general and moral belief in particular is based on the principle of self-
preservation of reason. In order to show that the trustee-relationship between the 
homo noumenon and the homo phaenomenon is itself an expression of the 
belief in and of reason and hence based on the principle of self-preservation of 
reason , we now turn to those cases where Kant uses the trustee-relationship in 
the context of the discussion of a) self-murder [1 , 2, 4, 6] , b) duties regard ing the 
body [3] and c) inner duties of right [5].12 We find that these quotes carry legal , 
religious, and moral connotations with them: 
[1] A human being has the usum and fructum over himself, but the right 
with regard to himself is restricted by the condition that his actions 
12For a brief reference to "anvertraut sein" in the context of Kant's phi losophy, see Friede Rieken's 
"Homo noumenon und homo phaenomenon. Ableitung , BegrOndung und Anwendbarkeit der 
Formel von der Menschheit als Zweck an sich selbst," in Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten. 
Ein kooperativer Kommentar, ed. Otfried HOffe (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1989), p. 
242, who interprets it as a "BedingungsverMitnis. " 
conform to the essential end. He is therefore only the custodian 
["Verwalter"] of humanity in his person and not its owner. 13 
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[2] The human being as person is indestructible; it is something holy 
which is entrusted to us. Everything is subjected to the human being, 
except that he must not tear away himself from himself. A being which 
exists by virtue of its own necessity could not possibly destroy itself; a 
being which does not exist by necessity regards his life as the condition of 
everything . He sees that life is entrusted to him, he feels it, [if] he turns it 
[that is, "life"] against himself it appears as if he trembles back in so far as 
he touches the sanctum entrusted to him. 14 
[3] Our body belongs to our self and to the universal laws of freedom 
which supply us with duties. The body is entrusted to us, and our duty 
regarding it is that the human mind must first discipline the body and then 
care for it. 15 
[4] Because in morality the accountability for our actions is determined by 
the principle of reason, one can at any time contrast it with and relate it to 
the sensible being or the human being as phaenomenon and 
consequently assume that the sensible being belongs to the rational 
being. The sensible being is dependent on the power of the noumenon as 
intellectual being to such a degree that it is subordinated [to its 
power], and the substance of the sensible being is only entrusted to him 
by the former [the intellectual being].16 
13ppp 192: "Ein Mensch hat den usum und fructum Ober sich selbst, aber sein Recht in 
Ansehung seiner ist restringiert, unter der Bedingung, da~ seine Handlungen dem wesentlichen 
Zwekke gema~ seyn. Er ist also nur der Verwalter der Menschheit in seiner Person, und nicht 
sein EigenthOmer." Please note that I translate "Verwalter" throughout with "custodian" and not 
with "administrator." I will, however, translate "Verwaltung" with "administration." 
14MC 372: "Der Mensch hat eine Unverlezlichkeit in seiner Person; es ist was heiliges, was uns 
anvertraut ist. Dem Menschen ist alles unterworfen, nur sich selbst mu~ er sich nicht selbst 
entreissen. Ein Wesen , was durch seine Nothwendigkeit da ware, kennte sich unmeglich selbst 
destruiren; ein Wesen , was nicht nothwendig da ist, siehet sein Leben als die Bedingung von 
alleman . Er siehet, da~ das Leben ihm anvertraut ist, er fOhlet es, kehret ers nun wider sich 
selbst, so scheint es, als wenn er zurOck bebte, so ferne er dieses Heiligtum, was ihm anvertrauet 
ist, antastet. " 
15MC 378: "Unser Kerper gehert zu unserm selbst, und zu den allgemeinen Gesetzen der 
Freyheit, nach denen uns die Pflichten zukommen. Der Kerper ist uns anvertraut, und unsre 
Pflicht in Ansehung desselben ist, da~ das menschliche GemOth den Kerper erstlich disciplinire, 
und denn Sorge fOr ihn tragen soii."--See also Eine Vorlesung Kant's Ober Ethik, ed . Paul Menzer 
(Berlin: Pan Verlag Rolf Heise, 1924), p. 197. 
16MSV 602: "Man kann namlich , da in der Moral die Zurechnung unserer Handlung durch das 
Vernunft-Princip bestimmt wird , dieses jederzeit gegen das Sinnenwesen oder den Menschen als 
Phanomenon in Verhaltni~ setzen und dem zu Folge annehmen, das Sinnenwesen gehere dem 
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[5] Any transgression [of inner duties of right] is therefore [a] violation of 
the right of humanity in his own person, he makes himself therefore 
unworthy of the possession of his person entrusted to him and becomes 
worthless since the preservation of his own worth consists solely in the 
respect of the rights of his humanity: he loses all inner worth, and can at 
best be regarded as an instrument for others, after turning into their 
object. 17 
[6] To annihilate the subject of morality in one's own person is to root out 
the existence of morality itself from the world, as far as one can, which is 
an end in itself. Consequently, disposing of oneself as a mere means to 
some discretionary end means to debase humanity in one's person (homo 
noumenon), to which man (homo phaenomenon) was [nevertheless] 
entrusted for preservation.1s 
In these quotes Kant provides different accounts of what is entrusted to whom in 
the trustee-relationship. According to the first five quotes, humanity, life, the body 
or the status of personhood is entrusted to the human being or homo 
phaenomenon. But according to the sixth quote the homo phaenomenon is 
entrusted to the homo noumenon. With the exception of the fourth and sixth 
quote Kant neither specifies who entrusts the human being with the respective 
responsibilities nor says whether or not he speaks of the human being as homo 
phaenomenon or homo noumenon. 
Vernunftwesen an. Das Sinnenwesen ist von dem noumeno als intellectuellem Wesen seiner 
Gewalt nach so abhangig, dar.!> es derselben subordinirt, und die Substanz des Sinnenwesens ihm 
von ersterem nur anvertraut ist." I believe that "'ersterem" was intended to mean "letzterem" 
because it is the intellectual not the sensible being which entrusts the substance (the body) of the 
sensible being to the sensible being. 
171bid. 604: "Eine jede Obertretung ist also Verletzung des Rechts der Menschheit in seiner 
eigenen Person , er macht sich also des ihm anvertrauten Besitzes seiner Person unwOrdig, und 
wird nichtswOrdig, da die Erhaltung seines eigenen Werthes nur in der Beobachtung der Rechte 
seiner Menschheit besteht: er verliert allen inneren Werth , und kann h o c h s t e n s als ein 
Instrument fOr andere, deren Sache er geworden, angesehen werden." 
1BGregor 219 (MS 423): "Das Subject der Sittlichkeit in seiner eigenen Person zernichten , ist eben 
so viel, als die Sittlichkeit selbst ihrer Existenz nach, so viel an ihm ist, aus der Welt vertilgen, 
welche doch Zweck an sich selbst ist; mithin Ober sich als blof.!>es Mittel zu ihm beliebigen Zweck 
zu disponiren, heif.!>t die Menschheit in seiner Person (homo noumenon) abwOrdigen, der doch der 
Mensch (homo phaenomeon) zur Erhaltung anvertrauet war." My underlining. I put "nevertheless" 
in square brackets since I do not find it necessary first, to translate "doch" in this context, and, 
secondly, since it is used in the sense of "ja" meaning "to be sure" and not "nevertheless." 
429 
According to the first quote the human being is the curator of humanity in his 
person. Because he is the curator and not the owner19 he, like the proprietarius, 
has the "usus fructus" over himself. Kant states that his freedom (his right) is 
restricted by the essential end which we already encountered in the Lecture on 
Moral philosophy where it referred to the universally valid end or the autonomy of 
the person which is represented by adopting the rule not to subject oneself to 
one's inclinations. 
The second quote carries with it religious connotations. We already 
mentioned that Kant speaks of the post, that is, life which God entrusts to us.2o 
According to this view, life is a sanctum, something of immeasurable value which 
ought not to be destroyed. The self-murderer, accordingly, is a sacrilegist, 
someone who desecrates life by "touching" it. Such a person, Kant would argue, 
does not believe in the sanctity of life or chooses to act contrary to his belief. In 
this context we should remind ourselves that Kant rejects the theological 
argument against suicide which refers to the creation of life by someone else as 
the reason for the prohibition not to take one's life. This quote from the Lecture 
on Moral Philosophy adds another aspect to the question of self-creation and 
self-destruction. Kant argues that for a being which exists because of its own 
necessity, and I take it that means because it brought itself into existence, self-
19See Chapter on "Ownersh ip." In the 'Doctrine of Right' he lists as the fi rst example of the 
"gratuitous contract" the "depositum" or "keeping goods on trust." Gregor 102 (MS 285). For 
misappropriation ("Veruntreuung") see MS 331 and Ober den Gemeinspruch: Das mag in der 
Theorie richtig sein, taugt aber nicht fOr die Praxis, val. 8, 286f. 
2Din MS 422 Kant speaks of the post or life entrusted to us by God: " Dieses [the crime of self-
murder] kann nun zwar auch als Obertretung seiner Pflicht gegen andere Menschen (Eheleute, 
Eltern gegen Kinder, des Unterthans gegen seine Obrigkeit, oder seine MitbOrger, endlich auch 
gegen Gott, dessen uns anvertrauten Posten in der Welt der Mensch verla~t. ohne davon 
abgerufen zu sein) betrachtet werden ; ... ". Please note that Gregor translates "anvertrauten 
Posten" with "post assigned." See also Chapter on Ownership footnote no. 11 . 
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destruction is impossible.21 Unlike God, human beings can destroy their own 
existence because they do not exist necessarily; they have been created by 
someone else. That life is entrusted to the human being or that he or she is the 
trustee of life is the expression of the conditioned existence of the human being. 
The trustee-relationship allows for the possibility of abuse; more specifically, it 
allows for the possibility of self-destruction . Self-destruction is, according to this 
interpretation, only possible because we are created by someone else which, in 
turn, gives an interesting twist to Kant's critique of the theological argument 
against suicide: it is not only, according to Kant, false that we are not allowed to 
kill ourselves because God created us, but it is because we have been created 
by God that the possibility of self-murder, though a prohibited one, exists.22 
According to the third quote, the body "belongs" to the human self and the 
universal law of freedom. Kant makes clear that "belonging" should be 
understood in terms of "being entrusted to." The human being is the trustee of 
the body and cares for it according to the universal law of freedom. As was the 
case in the first quote, it is the universal moral law which prescribes what we 
ought and what we ought not do with our bodies. With regard to this particular 
trustee-relationship governed by the universal law of freedom, Kant distinguishes 
between the discipline of the body and the care for the body. 
The fourth quote suggests that questions of moral accountability can be 
formulated in terms of the relation between the homo noumenon representing 
the principle of reason and the homo phaenomenon representing the agent 
subjected to this principle. The sensible being "belongs to" the intelligible being 
21 Spinoza's God who is defined in terms of causa sui could be used as an illustration of such a 
being. 
22This is an argument that can be used against Ebeling who argues that suicide is only possible if 
we are no longer created by someone else. 
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which means it is subjected to and governed by the principle of reason . Because 
of that, the body is only entrusted to the sensible being by the intelligible being.23 
We could also say that the disposition over the body, is restricted by the principle 
of reason. Kant suggests here again that we should think of the relationship to 
our bodies in terms of the trustee-relationship between reason (noumenon) and 
the human being (phaenomenon) . 
In the same Lecture Kant makes a similar point when he characterizes 
personality or humanity in one's person as a subject to whose legislation "the 
human being in his visible nature is subjected ["unter ... steht"] ." Personality is the 
"possessor" ("lnhaber") of the body and the administration ("Verwaltung") of all 
the powers of the human being is regulated by its legislation. Unlike in the first 
quote, the human being is not the curator of humanity in his person (that is, 
personality) but of the body, and the trustee-relationship is regulated by the 
legislation of personality. Kant concludes from these observations that the 
human being is endowed with an unrestricted capacity which allows him to 
determine and direct the development of his capacities independently from any 
other outside influences: 
This is freedom and through it the duty of self-preservation is cognizable 
which therefore cannot be clearly demonstrated .24 
23Piease note my remark in footnote no. 16 on the meaning of "ersterem." 
24MSV 627, the whole passage reads as follows: "Die Personlichkeit oder die Menschheit in 
meiner Person ist gedacht als eine intelligible Substanz, der Sitz aller Begriffe, dasjenige, was den 
Menschen in seiner Freiheit von allen Objekten unterscheidet, unter dessen Gesetzgebung der 
Mensch in seiner sichtbaren Natur steht. Man denkt sie sich also als ein Subjekt, das bestimmt ist, 
dem Menschen moralische Gesetze zu geben, und ihn zu determinieren: als lnhaber des Korpers, 
unter dessen Gesetzgebung die Verwaltung aller Krafte des Menschen geordnet ist. Es ist also 
dem Menschen ein unumschranktes Vermogen eingelegt, das in seiner Natur zu wirken nur durch 
sich selbst und [add: "das"] durch nichts anderes in der Natur bestimmt werden kann . Dies ist die 
Freiheit und durch diese ist die Pflicht der Selbsterhaltung erkennbar, die sich daher nicht deutlich 
demonstrieren lal?>t." 
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Kant argues that because the human being is free he ought to preserve himself 
which, as we saw in the Chapter on "Care for the Moral Self," means to preserve 
the moral, that is, the autonomous self. There seems to be an analogy between 
Kant's reference to the ontological impossibility of suicide for a being which 
brings itself into existence and the human being who cannot destroy himself 
because he is the creator of himself. If we agree that it is the essence of the 
human being to be the creator of himself as a moral being , it is intuitively clear 
that he ought not destroy the essence which makes the creation of value 
possible. In other words, if we agree that the essence of freedom is autonomy as 
opposed to heteronomy, then all those acts which undermine this autonomy 
must be prohibited; the duty of self-preservation is therefore an expression of 
freedom understood as autonomy. 
According to the fifth quote, it is the status of personhood which is 
entrusted as a possession to the human being. The preservation of the value of 
the human being as person consists in observing the right of humanity. In other 
words, being the trustee of the person means to subject oneself to the rights of 
humanity. A violation of the trustee-relationship which in this case consists in 
becoming a thing for others, represents a violation of the right of humanity. The 
quote shows that the trustee-relationship describes the function of the right of 
humanity which is to protect the status of the human being as an end in itself.25 
This characterization of the trustee-relationship is changed in the last 
quote taken from the "Doctrine of Virtue." Here it is not the status of the person 
who is entrusted to the human being but the human being as homo 
251n MS 439 footnote, Kant also speaks of the "dual personality" or "doubled self' of a person who 
does not only stand trial in front of the "bar of a court that is yet entrusted to him," but is at the 
same time his own judge. 
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phaenomenon who is entrusted to humanity in his own person (homo 
noumenon) . It is now the homo noumenon who is the trustee.26 More specifically, 
it is the preservation of the human being as "rational b e i n g o f n a t u r e" 
("vernOnftiges N at u r we s e n") ,27 that is, a being which by definition is not 
free, which is entrusted to the human being as personality or homo noumenon, 
"that is, a being endowed with inner freedom."28 The purpose of the trustee-
relationship is the preservation of the homo phaenomenon. It is therefore the 
preservation of the homo phaenomenon or the rational being of nature which is 
entrusted to the homo noumenon or the free being. We can also say that it is 
personality, practical reason , or the autonomous person to whom the care of the 
human being as sensible being is entrusted.29 In short, nature is entrusted to 
26James W . Ellington in his translation of the "Doctrine of Virtue" in Immanuel Kant. Ethical 
Philosophy (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 1986) and Mary Gregor (1963) as 
well as those who rely one their translations, seem not to realize that Kant changed the trustee 
relationship and, hence, provide or use wrong translations. 
That both Ellington's and Gregor's earlier translation (Gregor provides a correct 
translation in her official translation of MS used in this dissertation) seem plausible in light of 
quotes 1-5 does not change the fact that they do not render the meaning of what Kant actually 
says in MS. Ell ington translates on page 84: " ... to degrade the humanity in one's person (homo 
noumenon) . which, after all. was entrusted to man (homo phaenomenon) to preserve. "(My 
underlining) . Gregor (1963) translates on page 136: " .. is to abase humanity in one's own person 
(homo noumenon) , which was yet entrusted to man (homo phaenomenon) for its preservation". 
(My underlining). Ellington's as well as Gregor's earlier translation assume that MS 423 reads' ... 
die Menschheit in seiner Person (homo noumenon) abwOrdigen, die [referring to "Menschheit," 
femininum] doch dem Menschen (homo phaenomenon) zur Erhaltung anvertrauet war'. But the 
text states: " ... die Menschheit in seiner Person (homo noumenon) abwOrdigen, der doch der 
Mensch (homo phaenomeon) zur Erhaltung anvertrauet war." (My underlining and bold/italics). It 
is not the homo noumenon which for the purpose of its preservation is entrusted to the homo 
phaenomenon, but it is the the homo phaenomenon which for the purpose of its preservation is 
entrusted to the homo noumenon. -- I do not believe that the version in MS is the result of an 
editorial or printing mistake, since the likelihood that three words ("die [nominative singular 
femininum referring to "Menschheit"] .. . dem Menschen [both dative singular]") have been 
accidentally changed into a grammatically correct and meaningful sentence ("der [dative singular 
femininum referring to "Menschheit"] ... der Mensch [nominative singular of Mensch]") seems very 
small. 
27Gregor 215 (MS 418) translates "natural being that has reason." 
281bid . 
29A similar characterization of the trustee-relationship is given in Der Streit der Facultaten in drei 
Abschnitten, val. 7, 30 where Kant points out that in order to live a righteous life, avoid injustice to 
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freedom. In order to preserve the moral self, that is the status of an end in itself 
represented by the trustee-relationship, the human being must accept that the 
preservation of physical existence is governed by practical reason and that 
freedom must be subjected to the law of practical reason. 
The question now is whether or not the view of the trustee-relationship in 
the sixth quote can be reconciled with the view expressed in the other five 
quotes. 
In order to answer this question, let us first summarize the findings so far. 
With regard to the relationship between the trustee and the entrusted we saw 
that, according to the first five quotes, it is the homo phaenomenon or the human 
being which is the trustee of either humanity or his person [1, 5] or of life [2] or 
the body [3, 4]. Yet, according to The Metaphysics of Morals, it is the homo 
noumenon which is the trustee of the homo phaenomenon. 
All quotes indicate either explicitly or implicitly that it is the function or duty 
of the trustee to preserve and care for what is entrusted to her or him. They all 
state that our freedom in using humanity, our bodies or lives is restricted by 
either the essential end , the sacredness of life, that is, divine law, the universal 
law of freedom, the principle of reason, or the right of humanity.3° Furthermore, 
the third quote from the Lecture on Moral Philosophy suggests that we must 
others, moderate one's enjoyment of pleasures and practice patience when faced with illnesses, 
all one has to do is to "tame one's inclinations and entrust the reign to reason ." (" ... r e c h t-
s c h a f f e n zu Ieben, keinem U n r e c h t zu thun, sich m a r.. i g im Genusse und duldend in 
Krankheiten und dabei vornehmlich auf die SelbsthOife der Natur rechnend zu verhalten; zu 
welchem Allem es freilich nicht eben gror..er Gelehrsamkeit bedarf, wobei man dieser aber auch 
gror..tentheils entbehren kann, wenn man nur seine Neigungen bandigen und seiner Verunft das 
Regiment anvertrauen wollte, was aber als Selbstbemohung dem Volk gar nicht gelegen ist."). For 
the reign of reason compare also MS 408. 
30The view that reason or its law limits or prohibits any form of arbitrary use is also found in Kant's 
"On Rights to Persons Akin to Rights to Things" where the rationality of a person excludes the 
arbitrary treatment of a person, for example, a child , as suum. See Chapter "The Right of 
Humanity." 
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distinguish between different degrees of care--the discipline of the body and the 
care for the body--which correspond to Kant's distinction in The Metaphysics of 
Morals where the perfect duty to oneself as an animal being requires that we do 
not act contrary to the "natural" impulses which serve the preservation of the self, 
the species, and the capacity to enjoy life on the animallevel,31 and the 
imperfect duty to oneself which, among other things, commands the cultivation of 
"the powers of the body (gymnastics in the strict sense). "32 
What we have not yet determined is, who entrusts either the homo 
phaenomenon or the homo noumenon with the respective care. In the fourth 
quote Kant indicates that it is the homo noumenon which entrusts the homo 
phaenomenon with the care of the body. This might solve the problem with 
regard to quotes two and three, since it could be argued that it is the homo 
noumenon which entrusts life or the body to the homo phaenomenon or the 
human being . Yet it does not solve the problem with regard to quote one, five 
and six. In other words, the question remains who entrusts the human being with 
the care of either humanity, that is, the homo noumenon [1], or the person 
understood as personality (homo noumenon) [5], and who entrusts the homo 
noumenon with the care of the homo phaenomenon [6]. Kant states in the first 
two quotes that the human being's actions must conform to the essential end or 
the right of humanity. We saw that both principles are universal principles of 
practical reason, and we can argue that it is reason which entrusts the human 
being with the care of humanity or the person. This care must be administered 
according to the principles of practical reason. 
31See section on "Vices" in the Chapter on "Homicidium Dolosum." 
32Gregor 240 (MS 445" ... die Cultur der Le i be s kraft e (die eigentliche Gymnastik) .") See 
also my discussion of mens sana in corpore sana in the Chapter on "Ends." 
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Since, according to The Metaphysics of Morals, the homo noumenon is the 
trustee of the homo phaenomenon it seems that in this case, too, reason 
entrusts the homo noumenon with the care for the homo phaenomenon, and the 
care is administered according to the principles of practical reason. But does this 
view entail that the trustee (the homo noumenon) violates the relationship as it 
seems to be the case in the other five quotes? Since Kant states that "disposing 
of oneself as a mere means to some discretionary end is debasing humanity in 
one's person (homo noumenon)," the violation of the trustee-relationship is not a 
violation committed by the trustee (the homo noumenon) but by the human being 
who does not accept his status as trustee. 
In sum, Kant offers three possible answers to the question of who entrusts 
the trustee with the respective care: According to the first possibility, the homo 
noumenon entrusts the physical existence to the homo phaenomenon or to the 
human being. According to the second possibility, practical reason entrusts the 
human being with the care of the homo noumenon. Finally, according to the third 
possibility, practical reason entrusts the homo noumenon with the care of the 
homo phaenomenon, meaning the actions of the human being are subjected to 
the principle of practical reason . 
Since all six quotes entail that the trustee-relationship characterizes the 
human being as subjected to practical reason and its law or objective principles, I 
believe that despite the differences in the formulations the general idea 
expressed in them is the same. In all cases subjecting oneself to the law means 
entrusting oneself to it, and this in turn means to act according to it. 
Finally, I would like to make some concluding remarks regarding trustee-
ship as a model for the moral self and indicate why Kant might have chosen it. 
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From what we have said so far it can be safely assumed that Kant uses the 
trustee-relationship, particularly the one in The Metaphysics of Morals between 
the homo noumenon and the homo phaenomenon, to characterize the moral 
self. Even though reason ought to hold "the reins of government in its own 
hands," it can only do so if the human being in turn subjects herself to this rule.33 
It is important to point out that rather than representing a model of one-sided 
authority, the trustee-relationship which Kant uses to illustrate self-obligation is a 
model of self-governance where the entrusted as well as the trustee respect and 
act responsibly towards each other. Thus Kant's statement that "the human 
being needs a master,"34 must not be understood in the sense of master and 
slave but in terms of the freely elected who governs the electorate. We do not 
choose only our own "master" or "governor," but the "governor" or practical 
reason also represents the ideal which we are striving to emulate as morally 
responsible persons. Entrusting oneself to reason, that is, regarding it as the last 
cornerstone of truth, is not only an expression of the freedom or autonomy of the 
person; it is an expression of free belief or moral belief. By freely subjecting 
ourselves to the moral principle, that is, by entrusting ourselves to practical 
reason, we preserve our physical existence in accordance with the moral 
conditions set up by the law. Being entrusted to reason and its law means 
subjecting oneself to its law, believing with the Third Critique, in its promise of 
the highest good. The very act of subjecting or entrusting oneself to the law does 
not only preserve one's physical existence but preserves at the same time 
morality. In a way then, morality itself is entrusted to the human being, since it is 
only under the condition of entrusting oneself to reason and its laws that morality 
33Gregor 208 (MS 408). See also footnote no. 29. 
34Reflexionen zur Anthropologie, val. 15 II , see, for example, no. 1423, 621; no. 1464, 644. 
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can be preserved. Instead of characterizing the trustee-relationship between the 
human being and practical reason as a "mutual" relationship, we could also say 
that the trustee-relationship between the human being and practical reason 
represents the autonomy of the will. Because it is one and the same subject 
which is characterized by this relationship , it represents the autonomous subject. 
Lastly, it seems to me that this model describes not only the reflexive relationship 
to oneself but represents the model for the moral relationship with others. 
If this interpretation is correct, Kant's insistence that if there were no 
duties to oneself, "then there would be no duties whatsoever and so no external 
duties either" can be interpreted to mean that it is the care for the moral self 
represented by the trustee-relationship which is the foundation for a trusting and 
caring relationship with others and the basis for civic society.35 Because the 
trustee-relationship represents the autonomous subject, it is the view of the 
autonomous person which is the basis and heart of all other duties. 
With regard to the reasons why Kant adopted the trustee-relationship in 
his argument against self-murder, I have the following suggestions to make: 
First, the trustee-relationship allows him to adhere to his statement in The 
Metaphysics of Morals and to set aside the question of whether or not self-
murder is a violation of duties to other human beings or to God. To put it 
differently, the trustee-relationship allows him to avoid entering juridical and 
theological arguments and concentrate on the discussion 
whether, if I set aside all those relations, man is still bound to preserve his 
life simply by virtue of his quality as a person and whether he must 
acknowledge in this a duty (and indeed a strict duty) to himself.36 
35See chapter on "Duties to Oneself," footnote no. 123. 
36Gregor 218f (MS 422) . 
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By explicitly excluding, for example, the question of creation and focusing on the 
moral relationship to oneself, Kant can avoid questions like are we allowed to kill 
ourselves if God has created us, if we are children of parents or mothers of 
babies? Since our findings suggest that the trustee-relationship represents the 
moral self or the autonomous person, Kant is able to argue that "by virtue of his 
quality as a person" the human being is obligated to preserve his life, namely to 
preserve life in accordance with the conditions imposed by the moral law. The 
view of the autonomous person in terms of the trustee-relationship shows that 
freedom as autonomy is freedom subjected to the restrictions of the law, one of 
which is the duty of self-preservation. 
Furthermore, it is important to point out that even though the trustee-
relationship is also used in the religious context, we should distinguish between 
God entrusting the human being with her life (her "post') and determining the 
choices and possibly the very existence of life and the human being who 
determines herself and freely entrusts, that is, subjects herself to the moral law. 
In the first case, we have what is in the literature on self-preservation called 
preservation by someone other than the self ("Fremderhaltung") which is a 
transitive relation commonly illustrated by the concept of creatio continua; 
whereas, in the second case, the case of self-preservation, it is a reflexive 
relation. 37 Because of the different nature of the relationship, I do not believe that 
it can be argued that self-preservation simply represents the internalization of 
"Fremderhaltung." Self-preservation is qualitatively different from the latter kind 
of preservation. Even though I agree with those who argue that it only makes 
sense to speak of human self-preservation if preservation by God is excluded, I 
37See the Chapter on "Self-preservation: Overview and Summary" for the positions of authors like 
Blumenberg, Ebeling and Sommer. 
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do not believe that this entails the end of theology as Ebeling indicated. Rather, I 
would argue that it means that we must change our concept of God and agree 
with those who suggest adopting the dialogical approach.38 Martin Buber, for 
example, speaks of the "reciprocity," "the encounter' between the human I and 
the Divine Thou.39 If we adopt Suber's dialogical thinking, Kant's statement that 
self-murder is not prohibited and horrible because God has prohibited it, but 
"God has prohibited it because it is horrible"40 does not imply the dismissal of 
theology but could indicate that God and human beings can communicate with 
each other because they both refer to the same rational standard, the moral law. 
I am aware that this would mean reinterpreting Kant's concept of God, but, I 
believe that in light of our discussion of trust and belief this reinterpretation might 
be a fruitful one. 
Second, by using the trustee-relationship, Kant is able to avoid references 
to the mind-body dualism and treat human life as a unity. We saw in the previous 
chapters that, according to Kant, the disposition over one's substance or body 
implies the disposition over one's personality, inner freedom, or humanity in 
one's person. Body and personality, it was stressed in the Chapter on "Care for 
the Moral Self," cannot be separated like two different substances but are two 
38That the dialogical thinking may be an alternative to the opposition of self-preservation versus 
"Fremderhaltung" has been pointed out by Hans-Ludwig Ollig "Selbsterhaltung und Tad. Zu zwei 
neueren Veroffentlichungen von Hans Ebeling," Kant-Studien 72 (1981): 503f. See also Ollig's 
attempt to reconcile the two supposed opposites with regard to Hermann Cohen's view of self-
preservation in "Hermann Cohen und das Problem der Selbsterhaltung . Zur Diskussion eines 
Paradigmas neuzeitlicher Philosophie," Theologie und Philosophie 56 (1981): 532ft. 
39See Martin Suber's epilogue "Zur Geschichte des Dialogischen Prinzips ," in Oas dia/ogische 
Prinzip, 3rd ed. (Heidelberg : Verlag Lambert Schneider, 1973), p. 308: " ... in dem im September 
1919 verfal!.ten 'Geleitwort' zu dem Such 'Der gror..e Maggid und seine Nachfolge' (1921) wird die 
judische Lehre als 'ganz auf die doppelgerichtete Seziehung von Menschen-lch und Gott-Du, auf 
die Gegenseitigkeit, auf die Begegnung gestellt' gekennzeichnet." For Martin Suber's dialogical 
thinking see his I and Thou, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Scribner, 1970). 
40MC 375: "Der Selbstmord ist aber unerlaubt und abscheulich , nicht deswegen , weil ihn Gott 
verboten hat, sondern Gott hat ihn verboten, weil er abscheulich ist." 
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aspects of one and the same being. We already mentioned Kant's criticism of 
Baumgarten's view of duties toward the body and the soul : there are no duties 
toward ("gegen") the body and the soul. The basis for self-obligation cannot be a 
dualism between body and soul so that it cannot be the basis for the prohibition 
of self-disembodiment. By replacing the ontological dualism between body and 
soul with the conceptual dualism of the two selves (homo noumenon and homo 
phaenomenon), Kant is able to argue that self-murder is prohibited even though 
he regards life as a unity. He is able to argue that self-obligation entails the 
subjection to the commands of the moral law. In other words, instead of referring 
to the mind-body dualism, Kant uses the trustee-relationship between the homo 
noumenon and homo phaenomenon to characterize the human being or human 
self and is able to argue that the suicide by destroying her or his bodily life and 
thus freedom (personality) violates the moral law, that is, the trustee-relationship 
between the homo noumenon and the homo phaenomenon.41 
Using oneself merely as a means shows that one does not entrust oneself 
to reason because one does not subject oneself to its rule, that is, to the 
categorical imperative which prohibits using oneself as a mere means. In the 
Lecture on the Metaphysics of Morals the violation of the trustee-relationship 
represents a violation of the Right of humanity; and in both the Lecture as well as 
The Metaphysics of Morals it violates a strict duty to oneself. The human being 
as homo noumenon is the trustee ('Treuhander') in whose hands life is entrusted. 
41 Based on his view of the unity of life he can also oppose those who want to kill themselves in 
order to reach a better state called the afterlife. See footnotes no. 45, 94 in the Chapter on "Care 
for the Moral Self." 
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Autochiria or killing oneself with one's own hand ("manu propria") constitutes a 
"misappropriation" ("Veruntreuung").42 
Conclusion 
Let me start with one of my initial remarks regarding trust and belief. I suggested 
in my general description of "Trust and Belief' that trust based on belief allows us 
to transcend the gap between the human and the divine. It is the trust in reason 
which manifests itself in the adherence to the principle of self-preservation of 
reason which allows us to bridge--not to close--the gap between nature and 
freedom. This trust entails with regard to the practical use of reason that we trust 
in the promise of the highest good which manifests itself in the assumption of 
those conditions necessary for the possibility of the highest good (the existence 
of God, the immortality of the soul, and freedom). By entrusting ourselves to 
reason or subjecting ourselves to the moral law, we not only believe in reason 
and its maxim of self-preservation represented by the requirement of 
universalizability but we also believe in reason and its promise of the highest 
good and the conditions necessary to guarantee its objective reality. 
Kant's general remarks concerning belief and trust in the Logik and the 
Critique of Judgment suggest that the relationship between practical reason or 
the moral law and the human being can be interpreted in terms of making a 
promise and honoring the promise made. It seems to me that the particular case 
of the trustee-relationship between the homo noumenon and the homo 
421t seems that because a self-murderer does not entrust himself to the rule of reason that Kant 
suggests that one cannot trust a self-murderer (Compare Reflexionen zur Moralphilosophie, val. 
19, no. 6801 , 166) and that the defender and teacher of self-murder are "very detrimental to a 
republic." (MC 374: "Die Vertheidiger und Lehrer der Befugni~ des Selbstmordes sind einer 
Republik nothwendig sehr nachteilig .") 
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phaenomenon can be interpreted in similar terms. We remember that Kant states 
that the purpose of entrusting the homo phaenomenon to the homo noumenon is 
the preservation of the homo phaenomenon. In short, the promissum is the 
preservation of the homo phaenomenon. This promise can only be kept if the 
human being subjects herself to the rule of reason. This in turn suggests that the 
necessary condition for the preservation of the physical existence is a principle of 
reason, more specifically, the morallaw.43 If that is true, all those methods of 
preserving the phenomenal self which are contrary to the moral law must be 
prohibited . The promise to preserve the homo phaenomenon is therefore not to 
be confused with the promise to preserve life under any circumstances. Rather, 
as was stated repeatedly in this dissertation, the preservation of life is limited to 
the conditions of morality itself. To put it differently, the promissum represents 
the preservation of life according to the moral law. The homo noumenon 
promises that if one entrusts one's life to the rule of reason or the moral law, one 
preserves not only one's status as an end in itself and thus morality but at the 
same time one preserves, whenever it is morally possible, one's physicallife .44 
The trustee-relationship between the homo noumenon and the homo 
phaenomenon seems to be a model of the moral self as an end in itself. It is an 
expression of the belief in reason as the last cornerstone of truth . Entrusting the 
sensible being to the homo noumenon reflects the belief that self-preservation is 
a principle of reason which not only ensures the preservation of nature but does 
43My findings concur here with Sommer's and Ebeling's both of whom stress that self-preservation 
in Kant is a rational principle. See the Chapter on "Self-Preservation: Overview and Summary." 
441 therefore disagree with Wofgang Kersting (1984) 104, who seems to believe that the 
preservation of the moral integrity is not an object of the duty to oneself as "animal (natural) and 
moral being ," but of the duty to oneself "only as a moral being": "Die Pflichten der ersten Art 
zielen auf physische Selbsterhaltung und Bewahrung der korperlichen Unversehrtheit .. .. Die 
Pflichten der zweiten Art hingegen haben die Sicherung und Kontinuierung der moralischen 
lntegritat zum Gegenstand." 
so in accordance with the principle of morality. Kant's view of the trustee-
relationship suggests that nature is entrusted to practical reason and that by 
preserving the human being as an end in itself the natural being is preserved. 
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In cases like self-murder where the authority of the moral law and thus of 
reason is ignored, and one tries to replace the rule of the moral law with arbitrary 
ones, one disposes "of oneself as a mere means for some discretionary end," 
and debases "humanity in one's person (homo noumenon) ."45 To put the matter 
differently, by preserving the trustee-relationship , that is, by subjecting oneself to 
the moral law, one preserves oneself in one's animal nature. Self-preservation is 
moral because it is a free subjection of oneself to the law; and because the 
preservation of nature is subjected to the conditions of moral preservation , the 
duty to preserve oneself in one's animal nature can be regarded as a duty to 
preserve one's animal nature by preserving one's moral nature. This duty 
excludes any "willful" ("willkOrliche") interference with one's life that cannot be 
morally justified. We have shown that, according to Kant, this means two things: 
on the one hand it means that the intentional destruction or incapacitation of 
one's physical life cannot be morally justified because it undermines those 
capacities necessary to be a moral person. For example, the argument that one 
intends to destroy one's life for moral reasons is unacceptable, since morality 
presupposes the existence of the person who can use her freedom morally. But 
it also means, on the other hand, that the unconditioned preservation of one's 
physical existence cannot be morally justified.46 It can , for example, not be 
morally justified to collaborate with an evil regime in order to save one's life. 
Another reason why the preservation of one's animal nature does not entail the 
45Gregor 219 (MS 423) . 
46See the discussion of small-pox inoculation in the Chapter on "Casuistical Questions." 
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preservation of life under any circumstance is that the duty to preserve oneself in 
one's animal nature can be interpreted as the duty to restrict the love of life to the 
conditions of morality so that physical existence is not the highest good . The only 
morally acceptable reason for the interference with one's life is the preservation 
of morality. This can include the interference with one's animal nature in order to 
cultivate and perfect one's human nature, or it can mean sacrificing one's 
physical life. 
What we have said so far is supported by the findings in the Chapter on 
"Ends" where we showed that reason's function is to establish a good will and 
not to secure the happiness (which includes the preservation) of the human 
being. But we also remarked that because of reason's striving for unity it tries to 
integrate all ends into an harmonious whole which--ideally--should allow for 
happiness. Hence, in the same chapter we showed that nature's system of ends 
should neither be inhibited nor destroyed which suggests that the duty of self-
preservation must also fulfill these conditions. 
If my interpretation that the trustee-relationship characterizes the moral 
self as an end in itself is correct, the following final connections and questions 
present themselves: 
First, in the Chapter on "Ownership" we pointed out that it is proprietas 
and not dominium which characterizes self-possession. According to our 
analysis in this chapter, self-possession can now be understood in terms of the 
trustee-relationship. 
Second, it can be argued that the second formula of the categorical 
imperative which characterizes the human being as an end in itself can also be 
understood as an expression of the trustee-relationship so that the examples 
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Kant uses to illustrate it (suicide, lying, neglecting one's talents, and ignoring the 
misery of others) represent violations of the trustee-relationship. Because the 
examples are used to illustrate negative or perfect duties to oneself as well as 
positive or imperfect duties to oneself and others, it seems to me that we must 
distinguish between different degrees of trusteeship: the trustee who does not 
harm and the trustee who does not only not harm but strives to improve the 
conditions of the entrusted . Perfect duties to oneself represent the first level of 
trustee-ship: not to harm the entrusted. 
Third, because the negative duties to oneself are either discussed in what 
we called the "negative doctrine of health" (that part of the "Doctrine of Virtue" 
concerned with perfect duties to oneself) or under the "Right of humanity" in the 
Lecture on the Metaphysics of Morals, it seems that the latter as well as the 
perfect duties of the former are concerned with the first level of trusteeship, that 
is , the trustee who does not harm. If that is true, the next question is "What is the 
connection between the second formula of the categorical imperative and the 
general formula of the categorical imperative?" In the conclusion of the Chapter 
on "Belief of Reason," we pointed out that the categorical imperative expresses 
the principle of self-preservation of reason. Does that mean that the second 
formula can also be understood as an expression of this principle? If we take 
Kant's statement in the Groundwork seriously that the two are "at bottom the 
same,"47 we can indeed regard the second formula as an expression of the 
principle of self-preservation of reason. The first principle of the duties to oneself, 
expressed in the Stoic dictum "live in conformity with nature," can now be 
47Paton 105 (GMS 437f: "Das Princip: handle in Beziehung auf ein jedes vernonftige Wesen (auf 
dich selbst und andere) so, daP., es in deiner Maxime zugleich als Zweck an sich selbst gelte, ist 
demnach mit dem Grundsatze: handle nach einer Maxime, die ihre eigene allgemeine GOitigkeit 
fOr jedes vernOnftige Wesen zugleich in sich enthalt, im Grunde einerlei." 
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interpreted as the request to act according to the categorical imperative and thus 
to preserve the moral health. 
Finally, we have argued in the Chapters on "Duties" and on the "Right of 
Humanity" that the perfect duty to preserve oneself, like all other duties of virtue , 
must be done from duty. Hence, the trustee who does not kill herself, that is , 
does not follow her desire to avoid pain, must act from duty. Because she acts 
from duty she possesses moral belief. She must believe that it is possible to 
realize the highest good, whereas this is precisely what the self-murderer or 
those who allow for it deny. Even though the perfect duty of self-preservation is 
not directly concerned with the worthiness of being happy, and does not 
prescribe how we should preserve ourselves, but indicates which actions ought 
to be avoided, the subject who fulfills her duty of self-preservation does so 
because she believes that the highest good is possible. I, therefore, do not agree 
with Sommer when he restricts Kant's philosophy and hence his Moral 
Philosophy to self-preservation and thinks of self-perfection as a dangerous goal. 
Our analysis of the function of the principle of self-preservation as well as 
that of moral belief has shown that human self-preservation is directed towards 
self-perfection. 
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APPENDIX 
This Append ix compiles all the texts from the Academy Edition which I have 
used to reconstruct Kant's argument against self-murder. It refers to Kant's 
Werke (Works) , the Handschriftliche Nachlaf3 (Posthumous Works) , as well as 
the Vorlesungen (Lectures) . Additional references to "self-murder" are found in 
"Loses Blatt: Quaestio Stolpiana" (see Gerhard Lehmann's "Kants Bemerkungen 
im Handexemplar der Kritik der praktischen Vernunft" in Kant-Studien 72 (1981 )) 
and in Immanuel Kants Menschenkunde 325f; both sources are listed in the 
Bibliography. 
Werke 
Vol. 4: Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten: 398, 421f, 429. 
Vol. 5: Kritik der praktischen Vemunft: 44, 69. 
Vol. 6: Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blof3en Vemunft: 81 footnote ; 
-------- . Die Metaphysik der Sitten: 322 footnote , 420, 421-424, 425. 
Vol. 7: Der Streit der Fakultaten : 99; 
--------. Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht: 213, 258f. 
Vol. 9: Logik: 136; 
--------. Physische Geographie: 245. 
Handschriftlicher Nachlar1 
For a determination of the phases used in the Nachlaf3 see the introduction to 
volume 14 of the Academy Edition. In the following list the page number follows 
the number of the Reflex ion . 
Vol. 15.1: Reflexionen zur Anthropologie: no. 487, 207; no. 1083, 480. 
r::-
I: 
I ~ . 
:I: 
: 
.. 
Vol.15.2: ReflexionenzurAnthropologie: no. 1490, 741f; no.1497, 773; 
no. 1506, 814; no. 1511 , 831 ; no. 1515, 847, 849; no. 1553, 975. 
Vol. 16: Reflexionen zur Logik: no. 3315, 775. 
Vol. 18: Reflexionen z ur Metaph ysik: no. 6219, 509. 
Vol. 19: Reflexionen zur Moralphilosophie: no. 6801 , 165f; no. 6979, 219. 
Vol. 20: Bemerkungen zu den Beobachtungen Ober das Gefahl des Schonen 
und Erhabenen: 52. 
Vol. 22: Opus postumum: 303. 
Vol. 23: Vorarbeiten zum Streit der Fakultaten: 446. 
--------. Vorarbeiten zur Tugendlehre: 400, 405. 
Vorlesungen 
Vol. 27.1: Praktische Philosophie Herder. 30. 
--------. Praktische Philosophie Powalski: 108, 192, 208ff, 216. 
--------. Moralphi/osophie Collins*: 342f; 347; 369-375: Vom Selbstmord 
(Of Self-murder) ; 391 ; 392. 
Vol. 27.2, 1: Metaphysik der Sitten Vigilantius: 565; 587; 593f; 601; 603; 625; 
627 -629; 642. 
Vol. 27.2,2: Moral Mrongovius*: 1427f; 1481 ; 1484; 1502; 1503-1507: Vom 
Selbst-Morde (Of Self-murder) ; 1520. 
Vol. 28.2,2: Danziger Rationaltheologie nach Baumbach 1303. 
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*Because the following passages of the lecture notes by Collins (C) correspond to the notes by 
Mrongovius (M), I have in the majority of the cases quoted from the Collins notes (the standard 
lecture): 
342f (C) = 1481 (M) 
347 (C) = 1484 (M) 
369-375 (C) = 1502-1507 (M) 
391 f (C) = 1520 (M). 
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